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Abstract. 
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The purpose of this research project is to examine the role of conflict resolution 
in training programmes for military peacekeepers. It offers a significant 
contribution to the conflict resolution literature by providing contemporary 
analysis of where further manifestations exist of the links between military 
peacekeeping and the academic study of conflict resolution. 
 
The thesis firstly provides a thorough analysis of where conflict resolution 
scholars have sought to critique and influence peacekeeping. This is mirrored 
by a survey of policy stemming from the United Nations (UN) in the period 
1999-2010. The thesis then undertakes a survey of the role of civil-military 
cooperation: an area where there is obvious crossover between military 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution terminology. This is achieved firstly 
through an analysis of practitioner reports and academic research into the 
subject area, and secondly through a fieldwork analysis of training programmes 
at the UN Training School Ireland, and Royal Military Training Academy 
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Sandhurst (RMAS). The thesis goes on to provide a comprehensive 
examination of the role of negotiation for military peacekeepers. This 
examination incorporates a historical overview of negotiation in the British 
Army, a sampling of peacekeeping literature, and finally fieldwork observations 
of negotiation at RMAS. The thesis discusses how this has impacted 
significantly on conceptions of military peacekeepers from both the military and 
conflict resolution fields. 
 
The thesis adds considerably to contemporary debates over cosmopolitan 
forms of conflict resolution. Firstly it outlines where cosmopolitan ethics are 
entering into military training programmes, and how the emergence of 
institutionalised approaches in the UN to ‘human security’ and peacebuilding 
facilitate this. Secondly, the thesis uses Woodhouse and Ramsbotham’s 
framework to link the emergence of cosmopolitan values in training 
programmes to wider structural changes at a global level. 
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“Soldiers came in their thousands wearing the distinctive blue beret of 
the United Nations (UN), and they brought with them people from Asia, 
Latin America, the Antipodes, as well as from the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. They were not there as imperialists to fight a war, nor to 
defend a people or their territory. They came as peacekeepers whose 
purpose was to alleviate the suffering of all the peoples of the Balkans 
and to try, through peaceful means, to bring about an end to the war. 
This demanded of them the same fighting qualities that soldiers need in 
battle: guile, courage, determination and endurance; but without the 
clarity of purpose of a war, perhaps peacekeeping demanded more of 
them than fighting ever did. Peacekeeping was their mandate, and it is 
on this that they must be judged.” 
 
 
General Sir Michael Rose 
Force Commander United Nations Protection Force 1994-1995 
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Introduction:  
 
Under the working title ‘An examination of the role of conflict resolution in 
training programmes for military peacekeepers’, this thesis examines military 
training for peacekeeping operations to investigate the links between military 
forms of peacekeeping and the academic discipline of conflict resolution. It 
shows where such links exist, whether they have strengthened, and what this 
means for militaries and future conceptions of military peacekeeping. The thesis 
accomplishes this through examining a number of case studies, backed up by a 
considerable review of the academic and practitioner literature emanating from 
a number of disciplines. With peacekeeping operations - particularly those 
sanctioned by the United Nations (UN) - continuing to be a highly used means 
to attempt to manage and resolve conflict, the requirements for soldiers to 
understand how to carry out their work in a more proficient manner, and also 
contribute to the wider transformation of conflict zones into ones where positive 
peace can flourish, is paramount. This thesis adds to the understanding of how 
the discipline of conflict resolution has contributed to training programmes 
aimed to assist military peacekeepers in appreciating and improving their 
capacities. It further contributes by outlining areas where this need is most 
pertinent, and what this means for international conflict resolution efforts.  
 
This thesis offers a multi-layered synthesis of where conflict resolution and 
military training for peacekeeping interlink, and contributes to the conflict 
resolution literature by outlining the important links that exist between the fields. 
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It further adds to the emerging cosmopolitan literature, through examining the 
emergence of cosmopolitan principles in military preparedness for 
peacekeeping operations, as well as cosmopolitan motivations for intervention 
and cosmopolitan actions once deployed. Finally, it contributes to the 
peacekeeping literature by offering a contemporary assessment of current 
training programmes and UN policies. To start, this introductory section outlines 
a brief overview of the ‘backdrop’ to this work, by giving a considered analysis 
of the emergence of the concept of ‘human security’ in UN policy circles.  
The development of the Human Security Agenda 
 
It is the belief of this research project that the emergence of a ‘human security’ 
framework has informed much of the present debate about peacekeeping 
operations. The evolution of human security may also offer a first step to more 
radical future conceptions of the role of peacekeeping in global politics; namely, 
that peacekeeping operations will soon come to represent a cosmopolitan 
international agenda, led by a strong and accountable UN.  
 
Initially, it appears that the proponents of the human security paradigm have 
difficulty in defining exactly what the concept of ‘human security’ means. A good 
example of a short definition can be found in the United Nations’ Commission 
on Human Security meaning - ‘to protect the vital core of all human lives in 
ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’ (sic) (UN, 2003a; 4). 
Broadening this, the Human Security Centre outlines ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ 
concepts of human security. It finds that: 
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Proponents of the ‘narrow’ concept of human security focus on violent 
threats to individuals, or, as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan puts it, 
‘the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence’. 
Proponents of the broad concept of human security argue that the threat 
agenda should include hunger, disease and natural disasters because 
these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.  
(HSC, 2005; viii) 
 
The broader conception of human security has invited a degree of critique, as it 
covers such a vast area. It is thus understandable that it leads to the critique 
that ‘if human security is all these things, then what is it not?’ (Paris, 2001; 92). 
Such a wide definition also leaves itself open to accusations that there are 
greater interests at play with regards to keeping the broader definitions of 
human security vague, with critics suggesting that a coalition of ‘middle power’ 
states, development agencies and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) 
wish to ‘shift attention and resources away from conventional security issues 
and towards goals that have traditionally fallen under the rubric of international 
development’ (Paris, 2001). It also frustrates those in the policy field, who argue 
that if human security was defined more narrowly, it would ’accrue greater 
analytical and policy value’ (Thomas and Tow, 2002; 178).  
 
While the broader definition has drawn a degree of critique, narrower definitions 
have gained more policy traction in the UN, where notions of security dominant 
throughout the Cold War - that a state has absolute authority on what goes on 
within its borders, and the international community is bound by rules of non-
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interference - have been challenged. Throughout the 1990’s UN Secretary 
General Boutros Ghali – who ‘tirelessly promoted the concept that peace, 
development and democracy are interlinked’ (Newman, 2001; 51) – oversaw 
the evolution of human security in the UN. Arguing that the ‘concept of security 
has been for too long interpreted narrowly’ (UNDP, 1994), the 1994 Human 
Development Report offered the first interpretation of this new security agenda, 
and outlined the first real definitions of human security and how it linked to 
human development.  
 
Ghali’s successor, Secretary General, Kofi Annan, took this a stage further and 
oversaw a development of the more narrow concepts of human security: 
namely the protection of civilians in armed combat. In September 1999, Annan 
reported to the UN Security Council (hereafter referred to as ‘Security Council’) 
on that very issue (UN, 1999c), stating that the international community was 
unable to stop belligerent groups repeatedly braking International Humanitarian 
Law by attempting to target civilian populations in conflict zones. His report 
offered a number of recommendations to the Security Council to improve the 
UN’s capacities to protect. The recommendations included a call for a ‘climate 
of compliance’ with international laws protecting civilians in armed conflict 
(through individual states ratifying international conventions), more 
accountability for War Crimes; increased use of conflict prevention tools, further 
protection for civilian populations’ access to Humanitarian aid, special 
protection requirements for women and children to be adhered to in 
peacekeeping operations, and adherence to international law by peacekeeping 
forces.  Annan took the debate further through the publication of The Secretary 
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General’s Millennium Report, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations 
in the 21st Century. This once again argued that the requirements of security 
were to ‘embrace the protection of communities and individuals’ from internal 
violence. It also challenged critics of this new approach, in particular those who 
argued that state sovereignty and non-interference protects the smaller states 
in the international system: 
  
But to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention 
is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity? 
(Annan, 2000; 48) 
 
Ghali and Annan, through their respective periods in office, facilitated the 
development of the human security agenda so that by the end of the decade it 
was at the forefront of the developments in the UN. The human security agenda 
most notably linked with new approaches to peacekeeping in the Report of the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, or as it is more widely known, the 
‘Brahimi Report’. This is outlined in greater depth in Chapter 2, but at this point 
it is worth noting that a main theme throughout the report was developing UN 
structures, policy, and practice to meet the ‘new demands’ in a conflict 
environment, including countering attacks on civilian elements by armed 
groups. Alongside the Brahimi Report, two Security Council Resolutions were 
passed which dealt specifically with threats to civilian populations during 
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internal conflict. In passing Resolutions 1265 and 1296, the Security Council 
brought peacekeeping operations firmly into the sphere of human security1. 
Resolution 1265, passed in September 1999, was the first clear indication of 
this. The resolution expressed the Security Council’s willingness to: 
 
respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted 
or humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, 
including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the 
Council’s disposal in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
(UN, 1999f) 
 
Furthermore, Resolution 1265 tasked the Security Council to ‘consider how 
peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative impact of armed 
conflict on civilians’ (UN, 1999f). In April 2000, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1296. This resolution is a further indication of the UN’s drive to 
underpin its peacekeeping operations on a human security agenda with the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict at the core. The Resolution noted that: 
 
the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons 
and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed 
conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security.  
(UN, 2000d) 
 
                                                
1 These resolutions are discussed in Chapter three, which deals with developments in the UN. 
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As the ‘threat to international peace and security’ is a requirement for the 
Security Council to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN, 1945)2, this 
resolution made clear the possible consequences of systematic targeting of 
civilian populations in conflict zones. As well as adding a number of tasks to 
peacekeeping operations3, Resolution 1296 further gave UN peacekeeping 
forces increased flexibility in using force in the protection of civilians by 
expressing the need to ‘adopt appropriate steps’ to deal with such threats to 
international peace and security. Significantly, this was the first time in the 60-
year history of the organisation when the Security Council passed resolutions 
specifically designed for the protection of civilians. In 2005, Secretary-General 
Annan highlighted the impact of these Resolutions by stating that they ‘marked 
a significant milestone, reflecting the international community’s growing 
commitment to better address the tragic plight of civilians trapped in situations 
of armed conflict’ (UN, 2005c; 1). 
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
report, The Responsibility to Protect, strengthens the narrow definition of human 
security. Published in December 2001, the report is a culmination of research 
into issues over humanitarian intervention, state sovereignty and the right to 
intervene. Recognising the new shift in notions of international peace and 
security, the report argues: 
                                                
2 Article 42 of the UN Charter refers directly to threats to international peace and security - 
‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members 
of the United Nations’. 
3 Important developments included rapid deployment, a focus on Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (DDR), and an increased role for punishment of war criminals.  
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The emerging principle in question is that intervention for human 
protection purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases, is 
supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently 
apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the 
harm, or is itself the perpetrator. 
(ICISS, 2001; 16) 
 
The Responsibility to Protect argues that the concept of sovereignty, which had 
traditionally referred to a state protecting its borders, had now evolved to the 
state protecting the people who live in the territory itself. If that state failed to 
protect the people from suffering then the responsibility turns to the international 
community and its ‘responsibility to protect’. There are three ‘essential 
components’ to ensuring a responsibility to protect is given to populations who 
are at risk: the responsibility to prevent human catastrophe; the responsibility to 
intervene; and the responsibility to rebuild. This incorporates the full spectrum 
of conflict management tools, conflict prevention, intervention, and 
peacebuilding. The report goes on to outline this spectrum: 
 
it is important to emphasize from the start that action in support of the 
responsibility to protect necessarily involves and calls for a broad range 
and wide variety of assistance actions and responses. These actions 
may include both long and short-term measures to help prevent human 
security-threatening situations from occurring, intensifying, spreading, or 
persisting; and rebuilding support to help prevent them from recurring; as 
 27 
well as, at least in extreme cases, military intervention to protect at-risk 
civilians from harm 
(ICISS, 2001) 
 
The conceptual backdrop that the more narrow definition of the human security 
agenda provides gives the report a framework for recommending military 
intervention. Although seeing military intervention as a last resort, the 
Responsibility to Protect finds that there is general agreement that it would be 
warranted in certain ‘exceptional cases of human risk’ and defines six 
thresholds to intervention: Right authority; Just cause; Right intention; Last 
resort; Proportional means and; Reasonable prospects. (ICISS, 2001). 
Furthermore, the report urges the Security Council to consider the ‘Principles for 
military intervention’ to govern responses to requests for intervention. Security 
Council ‘Permanent Five’4 members were also asked not to use their veto (in 
matters where vital state interests are not involved) to ‘obstruct the passage of 
resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for 
which there is otherwise majority support’ (ICISS, 2001). 
 
The report’s focus on the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ also provids impetus to the 
institutionalisation of peacebuilding mechanisms in peacekeeping operations, 
furthering links between the military and civilian aspects of an operation. The 
report finds a number of problematic areas which characterised previous 
interventions, namely poorly managed exit strategies, inadequate help with 
reconstruction projects, an inability to address the root causes of conflict, and 
                                                
4 China, France, Russia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United 
States of America. 
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insufficient recognition of any responsibility to rebuild after an intervention. From 
this, the Responsibility to Protect argues that there should be a ‘genuine 
commitment’ to building ‘a durable peace, and promoting good governance and 
sustainable development’, with international organisations working with local 
authorities. In a reference to the importance of cooperation between the military 
and civilian actors of a peacekeeping operation, the military component 
provides one instrument in a ‘broader spectrum of tools designed to prevent 
conflicts and humanitarian emergencies from arising, intensifying, spreading, 
persisting or recurring.’ However, the report places most emphasis on the need 
for local involvement in order to fully meet the peacebuilding needs. It finds: 
 
True reconciliation is best generated by ground level reconstruction 
efforts, when former armed adversaries join hands in rebuilding their 
community or creating reasonable living and job conditions at new 
settlements. True and lasting reconciliation occurs with sustained daily 
efforts at repairing infrastructure, at rebuilding housing, at planting and 
harvesting, and cooperating in other productive activities. External 
support for reconciliation efforts must be conscious of the need to 
encourage this cooperation, and dynamically linked to joint development 
efforts between former adversaries (ICISS, 2001; 39). 
 
Importantly, this shows strong links to the conflict resolution literature, which 
advocates that peacekeeping operations are used to provide space for 
peaecbuilding initiatives to flourish. Throughout this thesis, there is reference to 
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the development of military capacities to deal effectively with peacebuilding at 
the local level.  
 
When looking at the overall picture of how security has evolved, The 
Responsibility to Protect is a key component. It forms a foundation to UN 
initiatives, such as the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
(UN, 2004a) and the formation of the Human Security Commission (UN, 
2003a). Speaking in 2005, Annan once again re-iterated the importance of the 
protection of civilians of armed conflict and the role that the international 
community plays: 
 
if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then 
the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and 
well-being of civilian populations. 
(UN, 2005b; 31) 
 
In following current peacekeeping operations, it is therefore important to 
understand this conceptual backdrop. What can be observed from the 
‘operationalisation’ of a closer human security agenda is an increased 
emphasis on the role of military peacekeeping forces to protect civilians, but 
also a desire to further link the aspects of positive peace (a responsibility to 
rebuild), to negative peace (responsibility to intervene). Peacekeeping 
mandates and policy have come to reflect this change in practice, with 
operations becoming more robust, an increased emphasis on protecting 
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civilians in conflict environments, and a more systematic approach to 
peacebuilding. This has a further impact on the training needs of military 
peacekeepers.  
 
The development of the human security agenda also indicates an emergent set 
of cosmopolitan principles and values in the international system. Cosmopolitan 
democracy, as described by Held, ‘says that we live in a world where we must 
come to enjoy multiple citizenships: in our own communities, in the wider 
regions in which we live and in a form of cosmopolitan global community’ (Held, 
1997; 28). Within this framework, institutions are required to develop in order to 
‘reflect the multiplicity of issues, questions and problems which affect and bind 
people together irrespective of whether they are in one nation-state or another’. 
Such institutions should also exist to protect civilians and be able to uphold a 
‘global responsibility actively to protect individuals from being deprived of their 
rights and to aid them when protection has failed’. This strongly links the 
development of cosmopolitanism to the human security agenda (Elliot, 2004). 
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, writing in 2005, argue that the cosmopolitan 
agenda offers a framework for the development of peacekeeping operations for 
two reasons; firstly because it offers a post-westphalian response to crises; and 
secondly: 
 
 
 
It provides a way of consistently applying international humanitarian 
standards (the duty to protect civilians) through a consistent 
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rationalization, legitimation and operationalization of concepts of human 
security.  
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 141) 
 
When applying this to peacekeeping, one can ask how much current 
peacekeeping operations can operationalise such cosmopolitan ideals shown 
above. This thesis addresses this question, and adds to the emerging body of 
literature on cosmopolitan conflict resolution. It achieves this by investigating 
whether current military training for peacekeeping is reflecting a growing 
cosmopolitan dimension in international forms of conflict resolution. A further 
assessment of the cosmopolitan literature is made in the following chapter. 
The training dimension 
The development of human security therefore provides a backdrop to this 
thesis. The current context asks that peacekeepers posses certain skills beyond 
what is seen as traditional military techniques. A journalist recently noted the 
range of new techniques after a chance meeting with a group of soldiers on a 
Pan-African training course for UN Observer Missions in Mali: 
 
What was more interesting for me, as a former English language training 
specialist, was the focus on communication skills and the types of activity 
I was familiar with: team-work, role-play, dealing with the unexpected, 
how to behave in difficult encounters with interlocutors from different 
cultures. It all made sense: from paralinguistics (how to recognise danger 
- the tone of voice, the facial expression, and how these give signs of 
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suspicion, fear, aggression...), to response (how to show peaceful 
intentions, submission, hold up your hands, step back, back down...). 
(Daniel, 2006) 
 
These are not what are defined as ‘traditional’ military skills, and are found 
mainly in the conflict resolution literature. This thesis therefore charts where 
there is an identified need for skills such as those outlined above, and how that 
need is met through training programmes. Training in the military, as described 
by Arbuckle, is outlined below:  
 
An important aspect of the military organizational culture is training: if you 
want to do something, you train for it. There is individual training, which 
imparts the skills and the knowledge to do the job. Collective training 
builds the attitudes, skills and knowledge required to assemble an 
effective team. In professional advancement training, individual potential 
is built and tested, not for the present job but for future employment, 
thereby building collective capacities on the enhanced potential of 
individuals. Refresher training is designed to maintain skill levels 
especially where they may have been unused for a period. There is also 
lateral training, in which new equipments and techniques are introduced 
to experienced practitioners: a pilot changing aircraft types may undergo 
up to a year of cross-training to the new type. 
(Arbuckle, 2006; 151) 
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Thus, a number of different types of training exist within the military structure. 
Following this outline, the thesis focuses on levels of collective training, as well 
as ‘professional advancement training’. Peacekeeping is not at the core of 
military training: it is an addition to the central military skills. Where this addition 
is incorporated is an area for debate, as in some cases it is incorporated at an 
earlier stage than others. However, this thesis does not aim to examine the 
holistic cycle of military training, and where peacekeeping training fits into it; 
instead, the focus is on what the trained encompasses insofar as the 
requirements of specific peacekeeping skills. The thesis conclusions offer 
thoughts on the wider implications of peacekeeping training. The peacekeeping 
field is exceptionally large, with a high number of soldiers, training 
organisations, and training regimes. This makes it considerably difficult to gain a 
grounded idea in how training is carried out, and what influences it. Although 
not wishing to sell itself as a ‘definitive account’ of training, this thesis provides a 
valuable contribution to the literature through offering a broad selection of 
military organisations, and investigating to what extent conflict resolution 
influences and informs the training regimes on offer.  
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Thesis and research questions 
 
The following research questions inform the thesis. Supplementary questions 
are italicised:  
1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of 
conflict resolution theory and practice? 
1a) In what direction has training for military peacekeeping 
developed since 1994 5? 
2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military 
peacekeepers, is there evidence that training in non-traditional military 
skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the changing nature of 
deployment zones? 
3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan conception of 
peacekeeping? 
3a) Can we find evidence - both practically and in the 
peacekeeping literature - of the emergence of a different type of 
soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan ideals? 
 
In order to inform the answers to these questions, the thesis offers both a 
thorough analysis of academic and practitioner sources, as well as official 
documentation and policy. It is further based on a number of case studies, 
                                                
5 Fetherston’s 1994 project (entitled Towards a theory of United Nations Peacekeeping), 
examined the role of conflict resolution in training for peacekeeping. As this thesis shows – 
particularly in the following chapter – Fetherston’s thesis is still relevant now, particularly with 
regards to the overarching frameworks to conceptualise peacekeeping operations, but also with 
regards to how she outlines the specific conflict resolution skills to assist peacekeepers in their 
duties. 
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informed by field-based visits, which include interviews and observations. The 
case studies are: 
 
• United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) - in 
particular the Integrated Training Service; 
• Royal Military training Academy, Sandhurst (RMAS) - where officer 
cadets are trained to become Officers in the British Army’ and 
• United Nations Training School, Ireland (UNTSI) - which runs specialised 
courses in peacekeeping for military officers. 
 
In addition to these case studies, the following case studies have assisted in the 
development of this work: 
 
• The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres 
(IAPTC); 
• The NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany; and 
• The UK Ministry of Defence. 
 
A number of factors influence the choice of where the field study takes place. 
Firstly, my MPhil research into peacekeeping doctrine offers a solid foundation 
of peacekeeping doctrine and practice in both the United Kingdom (UK) and UN 
(Curran, 2004). With regard to the UK, this helped considerably with the 
choosing the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst as a case study. Although the 
UK in policy terms has moved away from providing the UN with peacekeeping 
troops, its position as a doctrinal ‘leader’ means that making the link between 
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doctrine and practice is pertinent here. Previous study has also meant that the 
author of this thesis has a sound understanding of UN’s peacekeeping 
apparatus, particularly with regard to peacekeeping operations since the 
publication of the Brahimi Report. The second influence was financial 
constraints. The impact of this factor was the need to seek fieldwork ‘closer to 
home’ and possibly for shorter periods of time. Fortunately, the training events 
which were observed (such as the exercise in Sandhurst, or training at UNTSI), 
were both concise and in-depth, offering an excellent opportunity for considered 
analysis. These visits were also complimented by funded visits to the UN 
headquarters in New York, which provided opportunities for interviews with 
DPKO staff. Finally, a degree of creativity has helped with the fieldwork. Without 
attending the IAPTC conference in 2007, there would have been little chance of 
establishing strong links with UNTSI, and the NATO School. Furthermore, many 
of the interviews in the UN led to further meetings with other personnel.  
 
This brings the chapter to the methodology and methods. Although there has 
been a shift towards quantitative methods and methodologies (Johnstone, 
2005, Bennet et al., 2005), and in the cases of some research projects, a mix of 
both qualitative and quantitative methods (Tomforde, 2005), this research 
design for this project follows a predominately qualitative methodology. There 
are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, a fundamental critique of quantitative 
methodology is that it does not ‘capture the real meaning of social behaviour’, 
and although quantitative research gives a solid statistical account of particular 
issues involved in peacekeeping (Fortna, 2008), a qualitative approach in this 
particular case offers a greater depth to the issues involved. Understanding the 
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role of conflict resolution skills requires a great deal of observation and 
interview, and focus on qualitative methods. Secondly, time and financial 
constraints on the research project mean that it is unfeasible to carry out a 
large-scale survey as well as in depth interviews and observation. Thirdly, the 
research is not intended to turn participants into ‘objects’ or ‘units’. A 
quantitative approach does run the risk of creating such conditions (Sarantakos, 
1998). As the research examines the incorporation of conflict resolution training 
into peacekeeping training, a significant amount of work is based on 
experiences in training establishments, interviewing practitioners and observing 
training. Therefore, distancing the researcher from those being researched will 
prove to have a negative effect.  
 
The research follows a ‘case study’ approach - arguably the most popular 
method of social science research (Burton, 2000) which offers the opportunity 
to cover a wide range of data collection methods, both qualitative and 
quantitative. Bell explains the case study approach as being an ‘umbrella’ for a 
number of research methods. She argues that it does not exclude any data 
collection method and allows for any to be called upon in any circumstance 
(Bell, 1993). This multi method approach (Gillham, 2000) reflects this particular 
project, which employs a number of data-collection techniques. In particular 
there are four main strands. First, a considered review of existing literature and 
library-based research was carried out, predominantly at the JB Priestly Library, 
University of Bradford6. Secondly is the use of interviews. The majority of my 
interviews lasted for one hour, and followed a semi-structured approach mainly 
                                                
6 A number of other libraries are planned to be used, in particular those which focus on similar 
areas (for example, Kings College London). The British library catalogue backs up this 
research. 
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consisting of open-ended questions, offering interviewees an opportunity to fully 
explain issues (supported by prompts and follow up questions should the need 
arise). This gave adequate time to explore a number of key issues in the 
research, and provided a manageable amount of data to be transcribed. Thirdly, 
the thesis is informed by observations of specific courses run at training 
institutions, with field based studies forming a key component of the research. 
Finally, and leading from the observations, a comprehensive set of field notes 
have been kept. These notes form the background to my experiences on 
fieldwork, provide a record of interviews, a description of the observations 
themselves, and a detailed description of the events I partook in.  
 
With all large research projects there are inevitable obstacles in achieving the 
goals set out. As this research project has relied on access to military training 
institutions, consideration has been paid to possible difficulties in access to data 
and participants. There are specific regulations that the military must work 
within, such as the Official Secrets Act 7. These have been followed throughout 
the research and writing up of the thesis, and strong links have been made with 
those who have assisted access. Although quotations and references to 
interviews are noted, they are not directly attributed to a named individual. As 
well as respecting anonymity, the research has also required solid background 
knowledge of the institutions’ work. As they have put a certain degree of trust in 
me, it was felt that it should be reciprocated.   
 
                                                
7 Found at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/Ukpga_19890006_en_1.htm (file accessed 01 
August 2010) 
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When undertaking this research project, it was important to show awareness of 
the assumptions, ‘truths’ and knowledge that I brought to the research. 
Acknowledging such assumptions has required reflexivity in the research. This 
is explained by Robson as ‘[a]n awareness of the ways in which the researcher 
as an individual with a particular social background has an impact on the 
research process’ (Robson, 2002; 172). Researching in an organisation such as 
the military also brings its own set of assumptions. Higate and Cameron’s work 
on reflexivity when researching the military raises important issues to be aware 
of when in the field. Once such issue is the interaction between military and 
civilian and the creation of ‘insider and outsider’ categories between the military 
and civilian researchers: 
 
the “them” and “us” dichotomy may impact on the practical problem of 
access to the organization and the nature of the interaction civilian 
researchers might have with their military participants 
(Higate and Cameron, 2006; 224) 
 
Understanding this offers a greater chance for preparation for research, and the 
authors advise on an increased awareness of the ‘autobiography’ used when 
talking to those in the military.  Furthermore Higate and Cameron argue that 
understanding a more reflexive approach offers ‘greater potential for both 
transparency and, ultimately, accountability in the research process’ (Higate 
and Cameron, 2006; 220). Thus careful consideration has been given to the 
institutions and personalities who are chosen. With regard to the researcher, 
this research takes account of the fact that it has being carried out by 
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somebody of a relatively young age, who has had no military experience, or 
experience as part of a peacekeeping operation. Nevertheless, one must not 
only look at these perceived ‘weaknesses’ when carrying out the research 
project, as a number of strengths have been brought to the research by the 
author, in particular, knowledge and experience of approaches to conflict 
resolution, a sound knowledge of peacekeeping doctrine and policy, and a 
considerable academic background. Although these skills do not compensate 
for the experiences which the military practitioners possess, they complement 
the ‘on-the-ground’ knowledge and experiences of the military practitioner.  
 
Finally, careful consideration is given to ethical issues and implications, and the 
University of Bradford Codes of Conduct for research ethics and other relevant 
codes are followed. In particular, attention is given to the Article 2.6 of the 
University Codes which requires the researcher to ‘ensure in particular that 
appropriate arrangements are made to obtain informed consent from each 
participant’ and article 2.8, which requires the researcher ‘report any conflict of 
interest’ (Bradford, 2003; 2) 
 
Social Constructionism provides the philosophical and epistemological 
background to this research. Peacekeeping, without any formal definition in the 
UN Charter, has been open to debate since its inception since 1956. The 
development of the Peace Support Operation, with the marriage of peace 
enforcement and traditional peacekeeping, has once again brought the 
definition into debate. The Human Security paradigm is also keenly contested 
among academics and practitioners, and is a field which is characterised by 
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having an open definition. Furthermore, as Chapter 4 shows, concepts of civil-
military cooperation are keenly contested, with different organisations defining 
the concept of the military working alongside civilian agencies in a number of 
different ways, each with differing consequences. This research is therefore 
aware of the multiple social constructions that exist within peacekeeping 
operations in the training programmes that are examined. The task of a 
researcher, according to Robson, is to understand the multiple social 
constructions of meaning and knowledge (Robson, 2002; 17). Furthermore, 
Bellamy  proposes a that those who research peacekeeping use a ‘social 
constructivist’ lens in how it is theorised: 
 
Subjectivist approaches… argue that as the social world is constructed 
rather than ‘given’, and that the nature and salience of ‘problems’ in 
troubled places and commonsense solutions to them are shaped by 
social actors rather than objective facts. In the case of the changing 
nature of peace operations in the 1990s, it was the predilections of the 
interveners themselves rather than the emergence of new problems that 
provided the impetus for change. Moreover, the narrow temporal frames 
produced by objectivist approaches obscure complex relationships 
between peace-makers, peacekeepers and peacebuilders and their 
targets and the long-term and structural consequences of their activities. 
(Bellamy, 2004; 29) 
 
Work by Bellamy and Williams (Bellamy, 2004, Bellamy and Williams, 2004), 
who have pushed for new ways to theorise peacekeeping operations is kept in 
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mind when throughout this research. Furthermore, work by those in the social 
constructionist field, such as Vivien Burr (Burr, 1995) and Kenneth Gergen 
(Gergen, 1999, Gergen, 2003), informs this research.  
The chapters 
 
The following chapter offers a survey of the conflict resolution literature, and 
how it relates to the field of military peacekeeping. It begins by looking at the 
wider field of conflict resolution, before focussing on research from the Centre 
for Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies (University of 
Bradford). This adds to the existing literature by outlining the development of a 
‘Bradford model’ of peacekeeping research, set within a distinctive conflict 
resolution framework. It also examines how Peace Studies scholars contribute 
to contemporary debates of future conceptions of peacekeeping, in particular 
critical approaches to peacekeeping operations, and cosmopolitan conceptions.  
 
Before the following chapter, there is a overview of current peacekeeping 
doctrine and practice. This leads into  Chapter two, which outlines the current 
working nature of peacekeeping in the UN. It pays particular attention to how 
the organisation has reacted to the publication of the Brahimi Report, the 
increasing institutionalisation of peacebuilding mechanisms, the impact of 
cross-cutting mandates, and the reorganisation of the structures within the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). With these larger structural 
changes influencing the DPKO and Integrated Training Service (ITS), the 
chapter analyses the ITS training strategy and strategic needs assessment of 
peacekeeping operations, the most up-to-date survey which asks specifically 
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what military personnel expect from their training. After this, the new UN training 
materials (the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials, hereafter CPTMs) are 
introduced, as well as debates within the UN over future needs for 
peacekeeping. An understanding of the decision-making structures that are 
behind peacekeeping policy and practice is crucial. Therefore, this chapter is 
integral insofar as understanding the training needs on military peacekeepers.  
 
Chapters three and four study the phenomenon of civil-military cooperation, in 
particular how the military interacts with civilian elements of a peacekeeping 
operation. This is of great importance in both effective functioning in 
peacekeeping operations, but also has increased importance if the aspects of 
peacekeeping operations can effectively open up space for peacebuilding. 
Therefore, these chapters add to both the conflict resolution and cosmopolitan 
literature by contributing to debates on the impact of civil military cooperation 
training on the ability of military peacekeepers to engage effectively with new 
avenues of power. Chapter three analyses much of the academic theory and 
practitioner analysis of civil-military cooperation. This chapter is split into two 
main parts. First is an analysis of the relationship between the military and 
civilian organisations within the peacekeeping operation. Second is an 
investigation of more contemporary debates in civil-military cooperation, namely 
the relationship between the military and civilian population within the 
deployment zone. Finally, the chapter looks at where training has been 
espoused as a key instrument to be used to facilitate more positive relations 
between the military and civilian organisations. 
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Chapter four takes these debates and links them up to fieldwork observations, 
in the form of simulations and lectures given to soldiers at training institutions. 
Fieldwork undertaken at UN Training School Ireland, Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst, and the UN is used here, as is an examination of the current UN 
Core Pre-deployment Training Materials. Through doing this, this chapter 
investigates how the observed militaries are adopting conflict resolution skills 
and terminology to assist them in their ability to effectively carry out civil-military 
cooperation strategies, and also how current UN training uses conflict resolution 
to enhance its civil-military cooperation training. Furthermore, Chapter four 
examines the new forms of civil-military cooperation outlined in the previous 
chapter, and how training organisations are attempting to deal with creating, 
maintaining, and at times repairing, positive relations with the local population. 
From this, the thesis contributes by providing an illustration of how the theory of 
civil-military cooperation is put into practice with soldiers, whether it represents 
a further manifestation of the links between peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution, where there may be problematic areas, and what impact this may 
have on international forms of conflict resolution.  
 
Chapter five expands on the fieldwork investigation element of the thesis by 
examining a number of different training approaches to non-traditional skills. It 
starts by offering an in-depth survey of the development of negotiation skills for 
military peacekeepers through a review of peacekeeping literature (outlining 
where negotiation has been noted in the literature), and also a brief (but in-
depth) history of how both practitioners and academics have noted the 
evolution of negotiation practice in peacekeeping operations. Then a fieldwork 
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observation of negotiation training at RMAS is used to illustrate the complexities 
involved with military peacekeepers negotiating at the tactical level. To help 
understand this, the negotiation exercise is linked to conflict resolution theory, 
both in the skills needed to assist the negotiator, but also in framing the 
negotiation in a wider framework.  
 
Chapter six brings the data gathered from the previous chapters, and 
examines exactly what this means for military peacekeeping. It relates to the 
five thematic areas which were set out in this introduction, and uses them as a 
springboard for a discussion on the role of military peacekeepers. This chapter 
therefore examines to what extent conflict resolution links with military 
peacekeeping operations, and how observed militaries are reacting to this. 
Following on, the chapter moves outwards and asks wider questions about 
possible developments in cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution: most 
notably whether the development of soldiers’ capabilities lend themselves to 
more cosmopolitan ethics, and whether this means that there are signs that 
there is movement towards the operationalisation of cosmopolitan forms of 
international conflict resolution. This adds once again to the conflict resolution 
literature, as it contributes to a cutting-edge debate of the conflict resolution 
capacities (both current and desired) of military peacekeepers, as well as 
outlining where there exists solid manifestations of the links between military 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution. It adds to the emerging cosmopolitan 
literature by using training as a means to examine whether militaries are moving 
towards cosmopolitan ethics, and what barriers exist which may hinder that 
progress. Finally, it adds to the peacekeeping literature, by examining the 
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pressures that peacekeeping operations put on military peacekeepers, and how 
training in ‘non-traditional’ areas affects the performance of soldiers who 
undertake peacekeeping duties.  
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Peacekeeping Doctrine: explaining the development of 
the practice 
 
When writing such a large body of work that focuses on the development of 
training programmes for military peacekeepers it is worth understanding what 
exactly is meant by the term ‘peacekeeping’. 
 
Although military observer missions had been deployed in the Middle East (the 
UN Truce Supervision Organisation) and on the India-Pakistan border (UN 
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), the dawn of what was seen as 
traditional peacekeeping was seen with the deployment of the UN Emergency 
Force in the Suez Canal in 1956. Peacekeeping during this time was widely 
seen to be an activity which involved the deployment of small, lightly armed, UN 
sanctioned, ‘blue helmets’ to patrol buffer zones and politically agreed ceasefire 
lines. Hillen adds: 
 
in the main… these operations consisted of no more than a few 
thousand lightly armed troops, structured around light infantry battalions. 
These troops were generally deployed in linear buffer zones between 
belligerents and used military force only in a passive manner 
(Hillen, 2000; 79) 
 
What became known as ‘traditional’ or ‘first generation’ operations were 
characterised by the Hammarskjold/Pearson Model of peacekeeping, which 
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relied heavily upon five key principles (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999; 
93-4): 
 
i. The principle of consent from the combating parties for the establishment 
of the mission; 
ii. The non-use of force by the peacekeeping mission except for in 
circumstances of self defence; 
iii. The principle of voluntary contributions from small, neutral countries to 
participate in the force; 
iv. The principle of an impartial peacekeeping force; and 
v. The principle of peacekeeping operations being controlled by the 
Secretary General. 
 
Peacekeeping operations which worked under such principles were generally 
seen as a successful tool of international conflict resolution, and in 1988 this 
was recognised as United Nations Peacekeeping Forces were collectively 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 (Nobel, 1988). With the endings of the 
Cold War, the enthusiasm that surrounded peacekeeping gave rise to a huge 
increase in the number of operations. Conceptual developments were also 
being undertaken with the publication of Secretary General Boutros Ghali’s 
Agenda for Peace in 1992 (Ghali, 1992), and developments in the human 
security agenda. This ‘second generation’ of peacekeeping saw a considerable 
rise in the number of deployments (from five operations in 1988 to fourteen 
operations in 1994), and an enormous increase in the number of military and 
police (9,605 in 1988 to 75,523 in 1994) (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 135). These 
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operations offered a wide number of tasks that covered far more than the 
traditional observation tasks and ceasefire monitoring (leading to them being 
referred to as multifunctional operations). Mandates covered issues such as 
police reform, electoral processes and increased coordination with Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This led to observers noting that UN 
peacekeeping operations were involving themselves in nation building (Jett, 
1999; 28). Such operations – and the complex nature these tasks involved – 
resulted in military peacekeepers being asked to liaise with a much wider 
number of civilian organisations, as well as learn to negotiate with local armed 
groups and facilitate agreements over ceasefires, aid delivery, and the return of 
refugees (Stewart, 1993). Doctrine at this point also developed to reflect the 
wider approaches to peacekeeping, with one such example being the UK 
publication Wider Peacekeeping8. United Nations peacekeeping was also 
deploying into more volatile environments, with operations deploying in intra-
state conflict, characterised by failing state structures and a higher number of 
belligerent groups, paramilitaries and armed forces9 (Wilkinson, 2000b; 65).  
 
Though the UN and its peacekeeping mechanisms experienced limited success 
in the 1990’s, the decade was overshadowed by a number of catastrophic 
failures in protecting civilians. In Rwanda, the UNAMIR operation was unable to 
prevent or stop a mass genocide of over 800,000 Tutsi civilians, which occurred 
over a period of four months in 1993 (Dallaire, 2003, Gourevitch, 1998). In 
                                                
8 Wider Peacekeeping is referred to in more detail in chapter five 
9 Wilkinson describes intra-state conflicts as being ‘conducted by irregular and undisciplined 
troops who are often indistinguishable from the people at large’, and adds that ‘all too often the 
ordinary people of the opposing ethnic group who become the targets of the militia gangs and 
human rights abuses, including incidents of genocide may become widespread’ (Wilkinson, 
2000b; 65)  
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Bosnia, UN  ‘safe areas’ defined in Security Council Resolutions (UN, 1993b, 
UN, 1993a) were over-run by belligerent forces. The most prominent being 
Srebrenica, where Serb Paramilitaries killed up to 8,000 Bosnian civilians in 
July 1995. While both of these failures were blamed on the UN for showing a 
lack of ‘teeth’ in the face of aggression, UN peacekeeping failed in Somalia (the 
UNOSOM II mission) largely due to over-aggression. In October 1993, Forces 
from the United States of America (who were deployed in support of the 
operation), entered into a fierce fire-fight with armed groups loyal to a local 
warlord, resulting in the deaths of 18 US soldiers. This led to the withdrawal of 
the US from Somalia (and resulting in US ambivalence towards UN 
peacekeeping outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 25), and the 
withdrawal of the operation in early 1995. It was these failures which largely 
informed practitioners, academics and defence academies in their 
reconceptualisation of peacekeeping doctrine.  
JWP 3-50 and Beyond: The Third Generation of Peacekeeping 
Operations 
 
The practice of peacekeeping towards the end of the 1990’s had changed 
radically since the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988. Hammarskjold and Pearson’s 
five principles were now under severe scrutiny, in particular those of consent (in 
the light of US peacekeepers crossing what came to be known as the 
‘Mogadishu Line’ in Somalia) (Rose, 1999b; 354) and minimal use of force 
(particularly after lightly armed troops were unable to protect the ‘Safe area’ of 
Srebrenica). Furthermore, serious debate took place over whether there was a 
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‘middle ground’ between peaceful interventions (under Chapter VI of the UN 
mandate), and forceful, robust intervention (under Chapter VII). 
 
As a result of these debates and the experiences of those on the ground in 
peacekeeping operations (Rose, 1999b, Stewart, 1993), a new doctrine was 
formulated. This was first outlined in the UK doctrine Joint Warfare Publication 
3-50: Peace Support Operations (JDDC, 1998) (hereafter referred to as JWP 3-
50). This doctrine was able to offer one solution to the debates that were taking 
place over the nature of peacekeeping operations. As a starting point, it 
ascertained that the term ‘Peace Support Operation’ (PSO) covered all peace-
related operations, including conflict prevention, peace making, peacebuilding, 
and humanitarian operations.  
 
Peace support operations were designed to be robust from the outset, and have 
been described as being ‘[s]ufficiently flexible, robust and combat-capable to 
deal with a wide range of scenarios, including operating in a non-permissive 
environment’ (Wilkinson, 2000a; 1). Experiences in Bosnia, where the UN was 
unable to effectively protect civilians, led observers to believe that 
peacekeeping should be deployed with a robust posture from the outset, with 
the aim of decreasing the level of force as the mission went on. Former 
UNPROFOR Force Commander General Sir Michael Rose was once quoted as 
saying: ‘With hindsight it is a tragedy for the people of Bosnia that the NATO 
and UNPROFOR did not deploy in the reverse sequence!’ (Rose, 1999a). Such 
use of force though would not be used in the way in which traditional military 
tactics would be used to achieve victory over an opposing army. JWP 3-50 
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clearly stated that the use of force be used ‘to set the conditions for the 
development of peace in the long term, rather than the means of defeating a 
designated enemy’ (JDDC, 1998; 4-6). 
 
The robust force posture also offers a strong indication of the role of consent in 
PSOs. In effect, PSO doctrine understands that a force is to be deployed in an 
area of low consent, a radical step when examined against the 
Hammarskjold/Pearson model. Instead, PSO doctrine places emphasis on the 
role of impartiality in the early stages of a PSO: 
 
The impartial nature of a PSO, and in their reference to and international 
mandate and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), rather than directly to 
national interests, makes them distinct. PSO are neither in support of, 
nor against a particular party, but they are designed to restore peace and 
ensure compliance with the mandate in an even-handed manner. 
(JDDC, 1998; 3-1) 
 
However, the use of force in an impartial manner is not the main goal of PSO 
doctrine, which is to gain consent of the local population for the peacekeeping 
operation. A ‘carrot and stick’ approach was adopted, where the ‘stick’ 
represented the use of force to punish those who ‘spoiled’ the peace process 
(through the use of force) and the ‘carrot’ represented consent-promoting 
incentives to the local population to follow a peace process. Here, JWP 3-50 
drew heavily from non-traditional military skills, in particular the conflict 
resolution field. Skills such as negotiation, mediation, civil affairs and 
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confidence building measures with the local population were highlighted as 
positive steps for an operation to be successful.  
 
The need to work alongside civilian groups also led PSO doctrine to seek to 
understand the wider complexities of peacebuilding. JWP 3-50 recognised that 
the military function of a PSO is not its only asset, and a large number of NGOs, 
civilian groups and political actors all feature heavily in a peace process. Thus 
the defined end goal of peace support operations is to hand over the operation 
to a civilian-led peacebuilding operation once the security is guaranteed. Here 
JWP 3-50 identified the multifunctional aspect of the operation and the need for 
the PSO forces to work effectively alongside these civilian agencies. This would 
require increased sensitivity to civil-military relations and the incorporation of 
training programmes to enhance soldier’s awareness of the issues involved.  
 
JWP 3-50 has had a significant impact on how peacekeeping is conceptualised. 
An increasing number of military organisations have taken PSO doctrine on 
board, including national militaries and regional organisations such as NATO. It 
is now believed that PSO has ‘consequently become the doctrinal basis for the 
launching of many modern peacekeeping operations’ (Ramsbotham et al., 
2005; 143). At the centre of this is the coupling of robust military actions (the 
stick) and soft-end skills more often seen in the conflict resolution literature (the 
carrot). Crucially, for the military to effectively adapt to such changes the role of 
training must evolve, particularly with regards to an increased incorporation of 
conflict resolution skills.  
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The United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was the first 
operation to be characterised by a PSO-style robust force being employed to 
create a secure area for a civilian-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
operation. Therefore it is worth investigating in order to understand where 
peacekeeping deployments have found themselves in this current context. 
Following the UN’s focus on human security, the UNAMSIL mandate specifically 
covered the protection of civilians - UN Resolution 1270, which created the 
operation stated: 
 
14. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the 
necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its 
personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford 
protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. 
(UN, 1999g) 
 
Although the operations mandate was strongly worded, the operation looked 
like it could fail in its initial stages. A weak peace agreement, coupled with non-
compliance by parties (in particular, the Revolutionary United Front, hereafter 
RUF), led to continued human rights abuses and ceasefire violations. Although 
the mandate emphasised the use of force under Chapter VII, UNAMSIL, as a 
fighting force, had severe difficulties in enforcing the peace agreement. 
Problems arose through disagreements from Troop Contributing Countries 
(TCCs) on what level of force to use, with many of the TCCs not subscribing to 
PSO doctrine (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 152) (CDS, 2003). It was not long 
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before rebel groups took advantage of this lack of agreement. This culminated 
in the kidnapping of 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers.  
 
It was at this stage the United Kingdom (UK) decided to become involved, 
sending a robust, unilateral combat capable force to evacuate UK citizens 
(CDS, 2003; 73). Although the force was not within the UN’s chain of command, 
it assisted UNAMSIL in securing the capital, Freetown. The force secured the 
airport for the UN forces, and used robust force against rebel militias to release 
UK soldiers taken hostage in August 2000. Furthermore, the UK force created a 
secure zone in and around Freetown, which gave the UNAMSIL operation a 
stable area to deploy and expand from. Through this action, the UK forces were 
able to conduct ‘operations across the complete spectrum of PSO and partial 
enforcement operations’ (Wilkinson, 2000a), and it was able to evolve from an 
evacuation force, to stabilisation force, to combat search and rescue force, to a 
training body for the national Armed forces (CDS, 2003; 77). 
 
The establishment of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone 
(UNIOSIL) under UN Security Council Resolution 1620 (UN, 2005f) is seen as a 
marker of success for the proponents of PSO doctrine. What began as a 
peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII mandate was able to hand over to a 
civilian-led peacebuilding operation. However, this has not been without 
difficulties. The force was underprepared from the outset, and suffered the 
embarrassment of having five hundred troops taken hostage. Furthermore, the 
operation opened new debates over the division of labour in PSO operations 
where individual nations and ‘coalitions of the willing’ to carry out the robust 
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tasks and UN forces carry out the ‘softer tasks’ of peacebuilding. Significantly, 
the UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL operations demonstrate a commitment to linking the 
processes of peacekeeping operations (led by the military) with peacebulding 
operations (led by civilian groups). This certainly encourages considerable 
awareness of civil/military relations in peacekeeping operations, and highlights 
the importance of non-traditional skills in the military.  
 
The UNAMSIL operation is not the only UN mission to be created since the 
evolution of PSO doctrine. Operations in Liberia10, Cote d’Ivoire11, Haiti12, 
Burundi13, the South of Sudan14 and Darfur15, as well as Timor Leste16, have all 
been deployed since 2000 and carry features of PSO doctrine. Furthermore, the 
MONUC operation in the DRC has relied heavily on its robust stance, with 
mandates relating strongly to the protection of civilians and protecting human 
rights (Månsson, 2005; 504). Although this operation is drawing down (and is 
now known as MONUSCO), it is seen as another example of the robust end of 
peacekeeping. 
 
 
 
                                                
10 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 
11 United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) 
12 United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
13 United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUC) 
14 United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
15 African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) 
16 International Force East Timor/United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 
(INTERFET/UNMIT) 
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Chapter 1. 
The Academic Community 
 
As the introductory chapter outlined, this research project aims to understand 
the role conflict resolution plays in the training for military peacekeepers, and 
the ways the training of military peacekeepers represents a further 
manifestation of the links between the two fields. In order to gain a solid 
conceptual base, this chapter examines where academic texts have noted the 
need for training in peacekeeping operations, the reasons, and also whether the 
needs are matched. What is drawn from such a survey is the first step towards 
a multi-levelled synthesis in order to locate where the call for increased conflict 
resolution training for peacekeepers is coming from, which is complemented by 
a survey of the ‘policy literature’ in United Nations (UN) documentation and 
practice, and practitioner and academic understandings of civil-military 
cooperation.  
 
The chapter offers an important contribution to the literature by exploring the 
contribution of the Department of Peace Studies to debates in the field, in 
particular, academics and PhD students within the department’s Centre for 
Conflict Resolution (CCR). This frames this particular research project within the 
research ‘culture’ of the CCR. Finally, the chapter touches on critical 
approaches to the study of peacekeeping and one particular response to these 
approaches: cosmopolitan peacekeeping. This growing field has come from 
work from Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, who link it to conflict resolution 
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approaches, as well as research from outside the CCR by Cheeseman and 
Elliot, on the changing nature of militaries to fit into a cosmopolitan framework. 
From this, the research also locates itself within this growing literature on 
cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping.  
A Sceptical Standpoint 
 
To start, it is worth taking a more critical view of envisaging the military as 
peacekeepers. Gordenker and Weiss’ 1991 study of peacekeepers in disaster 
zones offers a useful critique of the military being a tool for humanitarian 
assistance. In particular, the authors argue that ‘in the best of all worlds, use of 
the military should probably be avoided in disasters’, as militaries: 
 
1) Care little about undermining local cultures and values; 
2) Do not make maximum use of available local infrastructures for 
managing and distributing aid; 
3) Increase dependence from the local population on external sources of 
assistance; 
4) Do not Harmonize with local development efforts; 
5) Do not Contribute to the resolution of conflicts.  
(Gordenker and Weiss, 1991; 10) 
 
This is a particularly negative assessment of what the military bring (or fail to 
bring) to a disaster zone. Interestingly, points 2, 3 and 4 link with many current 
debates on the impact of peacekeepers on local populations. More importantly 
for the purpose of this study, is the observation that military peacekeepers are 
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likely to undermine local cultures and values (1), and have little or no ability to 
contribute to the resolution of conflict (5). Written in 1991, it could be argued 
that this view is somewhat dated in a Cold War framework where peacekeeping 
and conflict resolution was not high on the agenda of many national militaries. 
However, it does offer a starting point for this chapter.  
 
Moskos’ study of military peacekeepers in the UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is 
also sceptical. However, unlike the authors above, Moskos believes that the 
military possess sufficient training to intervene as third party peacekeepers 
(indeed, Gordenker and Weiss could actually look towards these arguments as 
justification of their scepticism about military involvement). Moskos’ research 
leads him to the conclusion that the level of training that military contingents 
receive makes little difference to their performance as peacekeepers, and notes 
that for the UNFICYP operation, each different nationality received a different 
level of training, from the most in depth (such as Canada and Sweden), to 
virtually no training at all (such as the United Kingdom). However, this training 
had a minimal impact when compared with the learning process of the troops 
once deployed. Moskos adds: 
 
It is important to stress the generalization that the constabulary ethic was 
primarily engendered by on-duty, in-the-field peacekeeping experiences. 
This is also to say that informal learning arising out of the field situation 
was a more determining factor in forging the constabulary ethic than was 
peacekeeping training prior to arrival in Cyprus. 
(Moskos Jnr, 1976; 96-97) 
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If anything, Moskos argues, the formulation of pre-deployment training for 
peacekeeping operations may ‘retard’ the emergence of a constabulary ethic 
amongst soldiers. Moskos contends that such training could lead to 
peacekeepers operating under false expectations of how they are accepted by 
the local population, or will lead troops to ‘believe the peacekeeping force will 
be fully efficacious in realizing permanent solutions’ (Moskos Jnr, 1976; 134). 
This is indeed a strong criticism of notions of training for peacekeeping 
operations. Possibly this view can be understood in the context in which it was 
written: the UNFICYP case study was (and still is) a traditional operation, and 
many of the tasks bestowed upon peacekeepers were in fact to keep 
belligerents apart along a designated ceasefire line. However, the ‘constabulary 
ethic’ that Moskos speaks about is still very much apparent in peacekeeping 
operations, so this argument must not be thrown away as a ‘dated logic’. As this 
thesis shows though, writings from Fetherston and Galtung offer substantial 
critique of the argument that specialised training is not a necessity for 
peacekeeping.  
Existing Studies in the Field 
 
Galtung’s study of Norwegian peacekeeping troops stationed in Lebanon and 
the Congo offers a counter-balance to the argument put forward by Moskos, as 
well as offering an early attempt to link the fields of peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution. In the study, Galtung asked soldiers their opinions on ‘how UN 
forces should be better able to carry out their job?’ In response, troops asked 
not for ‘better military training’, but for ‘better police training’. Moreover (and 
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linking to the ‘constabulary ethic outlined by Moskos) a number of the soldiers 
felt that ‘participants [soldiers] should be better informed about the conflict’, and 
‘better trained in dealing with people from other countries’. Taking this a step 
further, Galtung concludes that by mixing the peacekeeping role of a UN 
soldier, the peacemaking function of a mediator, and the peacebuilding function 
of a Peace Corps volunteer, deployments will be far more effective at bringing 
sustainable peace. This highlights a strong bond between the traditional 
functions of a military peacekeeper in promoting the ‘negative peace’ and the 
peacebuilding function of operations, which promote the ‘positive peace’. Such 
issues are still being grappled with in present deployments, in particular through 
civil military coordination within the peacekeeping force, to wider UN 
developments such as the Peacebuilding Commission and subsidiary bodies 
which have attempted to institutionalise peacebuilding as a component of 
peacekeeping operations (Galtung, 1976a; 278-9). 
 
Galtung’s study also reveals that although soldiers felt that they needed the 
skills outlined above to facilitate closer relations with the local population, they 
found that better arms and equipment were just as critical in bringing about 
success in a peacekeeping operation. Thus Galtung reasons that soldiers felt 
that their military role was ‘inadequate’ for the closeness needed with the 
population in low temperature situations (where this closeness would be 
needed to really understand the social and human conditions of the deployment 
area), and their level of arms was inadequate for situations when there was a 
high likelihood of combat: peacekeepers were sat uncomfortably in the middle. 
This logic leads Galtung to believe that the peacekeeping troops were in fact 
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not asking to be ‘disarmed military forces’, but ‘armed police forces’. He 
observes that: 
 
On the one hand there is a relatively clear minimum role definition in 
terms of guard and observation duty, keeping the parties apart with a 
very modest display of arms, showing behaviour rather than attitude. On 
the other hand there is another type of role: being involved, being apart 
and party to the entire conflict system, showing attitude as well as 
behaviour, but trying to mediate and trying to help build a new social 
structure encompassing the antagonists. The former role is possible but 
not very effective, the second is very effective but not possible.  
(Galtung, 1976a; 278) 
 
However, it is worth noting that like the two studies previous to Galtung’s, this 
study was within the traditional peacekeeping Cold War context. Although it 
does note some early signs of the role of conflict resolution in peacekeeping 
operations, this was set within the traditional peacekeeping context.  
 
Like Galtung, Thakur observes the similarities between peacekeeping and 
armed police roles. Thakur (writing in 1988) notes that peacekeepers have no 
military objectives, are barred from active combat, are located between rather 
than in opposition to hostile elements, and they negotiate rather than fight. 
However, this is acknowledged by a small number of UN member states, and 
the special preparation and training required for such deployments is not 
adequately provided (Thakur, 1988; 184-5). What is worthy of attention is the 
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emphasis placed on peacekeeping as a ‘constabulary’ role. This ‘policing’ value 
that is attached to peacekeeping is a critical debate to examine when looking at 
perceptions of peacekeepers and the role they carry out.  
 
Diehl, Druckman and Wall’s analysis of peacekeeping operations offers a more 
quantitative approach to understanding the differing roles of peacekeepers 
(Diehl et al., 1998). Reflecting on the peacekeeping experiences of the 1990’s, 
the authors found that in addition to conflict control mechanisms, peacekeeping 
had been extended to take account of peacebuilding and peacemaking. This 
had in turn led to an increased emphasis on mediation, facilitation, consultation, 
conciliation, and communication: important parts in the ‘modern peacekeepers 
toolbox’(Diehl et al., 1998; 36). They then went on to scale, through a 
framework derived from the conflict resolution literature17, the interrelationships 
between different peacekeeping functions, and found that the development of 
this ‘toolbox’ has serious implications on training. After outlining the 
relationships between a number of different aspects of peacekeeping, the 
authors note that each peacekeeping operation18, has a ‘mix and match’ of 
different skills. For example, some operations will have a higher emphasis on 
observation and monitoring, others would have increased emphasis on the 
restoration of civil institutions. The majority of skills that are inherent in these 
operations are non-traditional skills, and the minority of the overall skills needed 
are drawn from military and combat fields. This therefore has an influence on 
                                                
17 More specifically, by emphasizing two dimensions: 1) what roles do managers assume in the 
conflict and; 2) what is their bargaining orientation 
18 The 12 Types outlined were: Traditional Peacekeeping; Observation; Collective enforcement; 
election supervision; humanitarian assistance during conflict; state/nation building; pacification; 
preventative deployment; arms control verification; protective services; intervention in support of 
democracy. 
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how training is conceptualised and carried out. However, in a significant finding, 
Diehl, Druckman and Wall found that this expanded toolbox was not being 
reflected in the programmes that train peacekeepers. Through an examination 
of the practices of 79 peacekeeping training programmes, the authors found 
that only 13% of the training activities involved non-traditional skills (Diehl et al., 
1998; 51-2). This is important as it shows the first real attempt to chart the wide 
range of training programmes. Crucially, it also shows the low priority given to 
non-traditional skills at the end of the era of second generation peacekeeping: a 
period where military personnel were required to use this expanded toolbox 
more than ever before. 
 
Wall and Druckman expanded on this in 2003, through their examination of the 
importance of mediation in peacekeeping operations. They did this through an 
analysis of factors influencing and constraining peacekeepers in mediation 
scenarios with groups in conflict zones. The authors interviewed seven U.S. civil 
affairs officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who had recently 
returned from peacekeeping duty in Bosnia and twenty-seven Canadian officers 
who had completed peacekeeping duties in Bosnia or other UN operations, 
asking the interviewees to recount a situation where they had to mediate a 
dispute. The statistics show that a high number of peacekeepers enter 
mediation situations. In the first round of interviews (34 peacekeepers), 100% 
reported mediations; the second round (16 peacekeepers) 63%; and the third 
round of interviews (79 peacekeepers), 55% reported having a mediation 
experience (Wall and Druckman, 2003; 703). Each account was logged and put 
into a table (outlined in Box 1.1 below). From this, the authors found 28 different 
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reactions to mediating the dispute. Only in three of these cases did the reaction 
involve the threat of force or the preparation to use force (cases entitled 
‘threaten’, ‘set security’, and ‘force’) (Wall and Druckman, 2003; 693-705). 
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Box 1.1: Peacekeepers Mediation techniques (taken from Wall and 
Druckman’s analysis on Mediation in Peacekeeping Missions)  
(Wall and Druckman, 2003; 695)  
 
Meet separately:     Peacekeeper meets with disputant separately.  
Listen to disputant's side:   Peacekeeper has disputants state their points.  
Argue for concessions:    Peacekeeper argues for or proposes a specific concession 
or agreement point or negotiates a compromise.  
Gather information:    Peacekeeper collects or asks for information from the 
disputants or others and does research to obtain information.  
Educate/advise:     Peacekeeper educates, persuades, or advises on disputant 
as to how he or she should think or act.  
Have third party assist:    Peacekeeper offers or gets third party's assistance for the 
disputants or the peacekeeper and also gathers information 
or advice from the third party.  
State other's point of view:   Peacekeeper presents or argues other disputant's point of 
view and asks a disputant to see the other disputant's point 
of view.  
Meet together with disputants:  Peacekeeper meets together with disputants or puts them 
together.  
Apologize:      Peacekeeper has one disputant apologize or acknowledge 
his or her faults.  
Peacekeeper assists:    Peacekeeper personally offers or gives assistance and takes 
a specific action.  
Relax:      Peacekeeper makes specific statements to calm the 
disputants.  
Break time:       Peacekeeper stops the quarreling and has disputant rest.  
Peacekeeper's data:    Peacekeeper provides objective data about the dispute or 
the environment.  
Threaten:      Any threat from the peacekeeper  
Criticize:      Peacekeeper criticizes a disputant's person, attitude, and 
behavior or uses a specific label (e.g., "You are rude.").  
Call for empathy:     Peacekeeper enhances the other disputant or calls for 
respect of the other; peacekeeper puts a positive face on the 
other disputant, noting he or she is a good person.  
Cite dependency:     Peacekeeper expresses similarities or interdependence in 
disputants' goals, fates, and needs (includes mentioning 
personal costs of disagreement and benefits of agreement).  
Have drink with disputants:   Peacekeeper has a drink with the disputants prior to 
agreement.  
Analyze the disputants:    Peacekeeper analyzes disputants and grasps each 
disputant's characteristics.  
Example:      Peacekeeper cites example or similar case.  
Praise disputants:    Peacekeeper praises the disputant who is being addressed.  
Quote law or rule:    Peacekeeper quotes a specific law or rule that is relevant to 
the dispute.  
Written agreement:    Peacekeeper has disputants sign a quasi-legal written 
agreement governing their future behavior.  
Separate disputants:    Peacekeeper separates the disputants.  
Call higher authority:    Peacekeeper communicates with his headquarters to report 
information or ask for advice.  
Set security:     The peacekeeper takes steps to establish security for 
himself or his troops.  
Force:      The peacekeeper uses coercive force in some manner.  
Monitor:      Peacekeeper observes the disputants, their interaction, or 
factors in the Environment. 
 
The vast majority of responses focus on non-traditional skills, and a first glance 
of these techniques would highlight a number of conflict resolution techniques, 
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including conflict analysis (through the technique of ‘analyze the disputants’), 
negotiation (‘Meet together with disputants’), active listening (‘listen to the 
disputant’s side’), and conflict de-escalation (‘relax’, ‘break time’, ‘have drink 
with the disputants’). This framework therefore offers a clear outline of how 
conflict resolution skills are utilised in an operational environment. This is of 
crucial importance. Wall and Druckman’s analysis does however find that not all 
of the techniques on this list are compatible with operating orders given to 
peacekeepers, and many were an ad hoc reaction to specific circumstances. 
Out of the original 28 techniques, 14 remained after an examination of the 
operating orders for the particular missions19. 
 
The authors then studied influencing factors on such mediation efforts. In 
particular, they found three factors which would affect mediation processes. 
They are: dispute severity; time pressure and; peacekeepers rank. The analysis 
of these three factors resulted in the following hypotheses. These – and 
whether the evidence collated by Wall and Druckman support or reject them - 
are outlined in Box 1.2 
                                                
19 The cut down list is: separate disputants, meet separately, meet together with disputants, 
listen to a disputant's side, gather information, have third-party assist, relax, have a break, 
threaten, quote law or rule, call higher authority, force, monitor, and set security. 
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Box 1.2: Wall and Druckman’s Seven Hypothesis on Peacekeeping and 
whether they are supported by the empirical evidence 
(Wall and Druckman, 2003) 
 
Hypothesis 1: Peacekeepers will use more mediation techniques (i.e., a more complex and 
costly approach) in severe disputes than in nonsevere ones. SUPPORTED 
 
Hypothesis 2: Peacekeepers, on average, will use more of these techniques in severe 
(compared to nonsevere) disputes. SUPPORTED 
 
Hypothesis 3: Peacekeepers will more frequently use the set security techniques (bringing the 
security of their troops in line with current conditions) in severe (vs. nonsevere) disputes 
SUPPORTED 
 
Hypothesis 4: The "monitor" technique will be used more frequently in disputes that are not 
severe (vs. severe). SUPPORTED 
 
Hypothesis 5: The effects for the severe (vs. nonsevere) disputes will be greater when there is 
no time pressure (vs. when there is time pressure). REJECTED 
 
Hypothesis 6: Officers will report mediating more disputes while on peacekeeping duty than 
will NCOs. SUPPORTED 
 
Hypothesis 7: It is expected that the officers will use more of the techniques permitted by 
orders than will the NCOs. SUPPORTED 
 
 
What the above findings show is that peacekeepers will be more likely to resort 
to a wider amount of mediation techniques in severe disputes, including those 
which are more costly and complex. This indicates a gamble by peacekeepers 
in such situations. Furthermore, this is backed up with a possible increase in 
security for the peacekeeping troops. This indicates a link to the doctrinal 
developments which outline the use of consent promoting measures backed up 
by robust force. 
 
Furthermore, it is apparent from the findings that officers are more likely to 
decide to mediate and use a wide range of mediation skills on deployments 
than the NCOs beneath them. This indicates a critical link in peacekeeping 
operations, where the officer is placed. Much thought has gone into this from 
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defence academies, with terms such as the ‘soldier diplomat’ (Goodwin, 2005), 
and ‘the strategic corporal’ (Byrne, 2007), being two such examples. Diehl also 
notes on this critical link. Writing in 2008, Diehl outlines his concern that the 
micro-level disputes caused by a lack of training has real effects on the overall 
mission. He argues that: 
 
The lack of appropriate negotiation skills at a roadblock inspection of 
vehicles could damage relations and cooperation with the local 
population; it might also undermine trust in the operation by other conflict 
actors who rely on peacekeepers to detect weapons smuggling. 
(Diehl, 2008; 165) 
 
This role of the ‘soldier diplomat’ in such an operational environment is 
discussed at greater length in Chapter six. 
 
Diehl’s recent addition to the literature outlines military training for 
peacekeeping operations as one of ten challenges that face peacekeeping in 
the twenty-first century. Here, he notes how the expansion of peacekeeping 
operations has created missions more akin to peacebuilding, meaning that the 
skills needed for traditional operations need to be developed. While traditional 
military training might be sufficient for some operations, Diehl argues that other 
missions ‘depend for their effectiveness on a complex set of what has been 
referred to as “contact” (more diplomatic) skills’ (Diehl, 2008; 164). Operations 
which attempt to work through the whole cycle of peacekeeping-peacebuilding 
require a 
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much broader range of skills, including  interpersonal and intergroup 
relations, communications, negotiation, and, in the case of military 
operations, a mix of combat and political skills. 
(Diehl, 2008; 164) 
 
From this analysis, Diehl draws two critical questions. The first is whether 
soldiers are actually being trained in these contact skills. Although noting that 
militaries have developed training for peacekeeping over the past decade, Diehl 
argues here that there is a ‘significant gap’ between training and practice in 
peacekeeping operations. This is a key observation, as Diehl (in his 1998 
paper) had already assessed training programmes. This provides him with a 
historical anchor on which to make these claims. Secondly, he asks whether the 
different types of training received by military personnel on peacekeeping are 
compatible, and whether soldiers can shift techniques and orientations, as 
missions evolve. In particular, Diehl asks what impact the development in these 
skills has on the traditional wear fighting skills of military personnel. This 
question is also of crucial importance, as it asks to what extent soldiers can be 
peacekeepers. This is discussed at greater length in Chapter six (Diehl, 2008; 
164). 
 
Leeds’s study into culture, conflict resolution and peacekeeping finds that the 
role of the peacekeeper requires a considerable amount of training into different 
skills in peacekeeping operations. Noting the variety of tasks that are involved 
in current peacekeeping operations, including civil administration, monitoring 
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elections and human rights enforcement, Leeds finds that peacekeepers need 
to be equipped with particular skills drawn out of the conflict resolution field. In 
particular, these activities ‘require cultural sensitivity and self awareness, and 
also basic communication, negotiation and mediation skills’. Once again, this 
places a considerable emphasis on the role of conflict resolution training for 
peacekeeping operations (Leeds, 2001; 92). 
 
The work of Stephen Ryan in formulating serious links between peacekeeping 
and conflict resolution is key to understanding the role that conflict resolution 
has in peacekeeping training. In 1998, Ryan argued that the division between 
conflict management and conflict resolution must be rejected, and more thought 
be put towards creating comprehensive peace strategies (Ryan, 1998). In 2000, 
he takes this a stage further through outlining the difficulties of separating 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding due to the development of second-generation 
peacekeeping operations assuming many of the tasks of peacebuilding under 
the guise of military-led peacekeeping. Furthermore, Ryan notes how military 
peacekeeping may be essential in the early stages of the peacebuilding 
enterprise. Though he mainly restricts this to the provision of security for 
returning refugees, humanitarian relief, civilian projects, and election monitors, 
there is a recognised need for the military to work closely with non-military 
components. This importance, Ryan asserts, shows peacekeepers ‘acting less 
like a conflict manager and more like a midwife at the birth of a new society’ 
(Ryan, 2000; 40).  
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Williams’ 1998 study of peacekeeping and civil military relations reflects on the 
nature of post-1990 deployments, and states that military training must be 
specifically geared to ‘peacekeeping’s demands’, adding that appropriate 
military training and education is ‘essential’ if peacekeeping deployments are to 
be effective. In particular, Williams draws attention to the need to emphasise 
the ‘softer aspects of military science’, such as managing resources, civilian 
control and human rights and that peacekeeping units should be trained in 
humanitarian reporting and assessment, mediation and conflict resolution 
techniques (Williams, 1998; 72). Williams also finds that lessons from Bosnia 
and Somalia have taught the valuable lesson that peacekeepers need to be 
better prepared for the cultural challenges faced in deployment areas. This can 
be rectified to some extent through peacekeepers being made aware of cultural 
norms of behaviour. Underlying this, Williams argued, was the ‘importance of 
collaboration with civilians, both within missions and on their fringes’ (Williams, 
1998; 73). The issues raised in Williams’ and Ryan’s research are key to the 
thesis as both authors provide valuable analysis of the complex nature of 
peacebuilding tasks in post conflict environments, and the effects that this has 
on military peacekeepers. As stated, this thesis examines the role of conflict 
resolution in training for military peacekeepers. The intricate nature of 
peacebuilding requires military peacekeepers to possess number of skills drawn 
from the conflict resolution field. In turn, training programmes have developed to 
meet such demands.  This is most clearly seen in Chapters 3 and 4, which 
analyse civil-military cooperation theory and practice. 
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Tillett’s analysis of training practiced in the Australian Defence forces offers an 
example of the practical application of conflict resolution theory, in training for 
military peacekeepers. He argues that there needs to be a serious re-evaluation 
of training for UN operations, stating that for those preparing to undertake 
peacekeeping operations ‘training in conflict resolution is essential’ (Tillett, 
1996; 10). Informing this, Tillett argues, is the number of challenges which 
military peacekeeping personnel face. These include a lack of power to coerce, 
no way of easily identifying the status or power of the person with whom they 
are dealing, a limit to the amount of communication with the local population, 
and that they are ‘subject to instructions which require them to act in a policing 
rather than a military role’ (Tillett, 1996; 3). Furthermore, he notes the 
considerable challenges that being deployed on a peacekeeping operation can 
pose to a soldier trained in traditional skills, and what is required in the soldiers’ 
toolbox in order to meet such challenges. Tillet explains: 
 
...[peacekeeping] involves the psychological change from an adversary 
to a pacific role; from confrontation to third party imposition. In 
peacekeeping there is no enemy: the object is to avoid hostilities, to 
improve communication between the parties, and to advance the 
process of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the 
causes of the conflict—political, military and economic—as well as the 
social and cultural environment.  
(Tillett, 1996; 3) 
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Tillett outlines the training process that Australian forces undertook to 
incorporate conflict resolution processes in order to prepare them for 
deployment. The training consisted of three components: 1) An introduction to 
conflict and conflict resolution; 2) the concept of analytical problem solving; 3) 
the application of the concept. In particular, Tillett focussed on incorporating 
Burton’s Problem Solving approach to the training. This was done through 
participants being asked to develop an inventory of potential conflict areas 
within the experience of peacekeeping operations, and then to identify and 
explore options for eliminating, minimising, or surviving each incident of conflict. 
This involved identifying appropriate resources, personal and interpersonal 
skills and support mechanisms. Tillett adds that this process was not just an 
exercise in developing a list of potential problems and their solutions: it gave 
‘the participants practical experiences in an analytical and (to use Burton’s term) 
proventive approach to conflict resolution’ (Tillett, 1996; 6).  
 
Goodwin also works extensively on training the military in non-traditional skills. 
In particular, her work specialises on negotiation skills for soldiers in the British 
military, whom she trains at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Much of this 
has informed her work, especially on the emergence of the ‘Soldier Diplomat’. 
This important body of work forms a central pillar of Chapter 5, which deals with 
the training of negotiation skills to military peacekeepers. Goodwin underlines 
differences between the tasks of peacekeeping and war fighting, stating that 
emphasis is on ‘talking, liaising and negotiating one’s way out of a difficult 
situation’, as well as ‘building working relationships within an operational 
area’(Goodwin, 2005; 129), which indicates the need for ‘contact skills’ to look 
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for non-violent solutions to conflict (negotiating out of a difficult situation) as well 
as for relationship building with civilian actors and NGOs in a deployment zone. 
Moreover, Goodwin finds that peacekeeping duties demands that soldiers have 
to modify pre-existing knowledge of conventional warfare. This means that 
soldiers can either adapt the knowledge, or ‘learn new, related skills’. This links 
to the argument put forward by Diehl et al for an expansion of the peacekeepers 
‘toolbox’, to incorporate a greater breadth of skills. 
 
To a small extent Goodwin agrees with Moskos, by contending that pre-
deployment training has its limitations when compared with actual deployment 
on the ground. However, she is clear in stating that there is an important role in 
training soldiers for peacekeeping purposes, in particular negotiation skills, 
arguing that good negotiation training ‘increases one’s ability to understand and 
handle human conflict and its resolution’ (Goodwin, 2005; 138). Goodwin goes 
on to say that: 
 
Any pre-deployment training ought to replicate, as explicitly as possible, 
the mutability of the peacekeeping role and the emphasis on negotiating 
skills, tempered with military knowledge.  
(Goodwin, 2005; 137) 
 
Goodwin is concerned that ‘speedy’ briefings in a deployment zone (with little 
preceding deployment) may result in soldiers entering a country with a limited 
knowledge of the culture, customs and even the political situation. Furthermore, 
a reliance on such briefings leaves soldiers with little or no practice in what she 
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terms as ‘essential peacekeeping skills’, such as negotiation (Goodwin, 2005; 
136). 
Work in the Department of Peace Studies 
 
This section deals with research from the Centre for Conflict Resolution and 
Department of Peace Studies, but it is worth firstly to locate this research within 
debates in the wider peacekeeping literature. Within the field of peacekeeping 
research, critics find shortcomings due to research being too occupied with 
particular needs and operations. Paris argues that the literature on peace 
operations is ‘too limited in the scope of it’s enquiry and devotes too much 
attention to “policy relevance”’ (Paris, 2000; 27), and that there is a serious lack 
of engagement with the central theoretical debates of International Relations. 
Furthermore, Whitworth’s  analysis contends that peacekeeping research 
throughout the 1990’s focussed on short-term operational responses, and as a 
result has overlooked ‘larger critical questions that could be posed’(Whitworth, 
2004; 24). What studies have failed to achieve, Bellamy argues, is to ‘place the 
evolving practices and conceptions of peace operations within a global concept’ 
(Bellamy, 2004; 18). Much of this is based on critiques of the ‘problem solving’ 
approach which has characterised the majority of peacekeeping research. 
According to such critiques, the problem solving approach - which has been 
successful at identifying problems, proposing strategies and ways forward for 
decision makers - ultimately fails to address key issues such as the ‘extent to 
which dominant peacekeeping or peacemaking practices… actually help 
reproduce the social structures that cause violent conflict in the first place’ 
(Bellamy, 2004; 19).  
 77 
 
However, one can see that these micro-level debates can be aligned with larger 
scale understandings of the role of peacekeeping. Before looking at how this is 
done in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, it is worth 
returning to Galtung. His research considered that a basic dilemma for 
peacekeeping is distinguishing between, and reacting to, different types of 
violent conflict. Peacekeeping, for example, can work effectively to deal with 
horizontal conflicts, which he defines as conflict between ‘equals with no 
element of dominance’ (i.e. between two states). However in conflicts where 
both parties are not equal (i.e. a conflict between the centre and periphery 
within a state), peacekeeping runs the danger of preserving a status quo as a 
result of intervening. Galtung argues that the peacekeeping force is actually 
taking a side in the conflict through the preservation of the status quo (Galtung, 
1976c; 284). 
 
Looking at international peacekeeping, Galtung notes how peacekeeping, at 
least during the Cold War, is an activity for the periphery (areas outside of the 
influence of the major powers). Galtung sees that this needs to be addressed 
either through bringing peacekeeping to the centre (the great powers,) or by 
excluding the centre from peacekeeping in periphery areas. Interestingly 
Galtung notes that doctrines of non-intervention in the affairs of a state must be 
rejected. Through rejecting these doctrines, Galtung argues that peacekeeping 
operations would ‘unequivocally… break through these artificial walls called 
regions and states mankind has built around itself’ (Galtung, 1976c; 286). From 
this, Galtung examined three ways which peacekeeping is conceptualised in the 
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context of how it should react to vertical conflict (conflict between a strong 
centre and weaker periphery):  
 
1. the formalistic stand (third party intervention which will handle any war in 
the same way);  
2. the let-it-work-itself-out stand (with no third party intervention);  
3. the use-peacekeeping-on-the-side-of-peace stand (where third party 
intervention seeks to remove both direct and structural violence).  
 
Galtung rejects the first two approaches outright, and chooses to explore the 
third strand. Although he outlines problems in it, Galtung argues in favour of the 
use-peacekeeping-on-the-side-of-peace approach. He states that: 
 
A peacekeeping operation in a vertical conflict should be more like a 
one-way wall, permitting the freedom fighters out to expand the liberated 
territory, but preventing the oppressors from getting in. 
(Galtung, 1976c; 288) 
 
This certainly takes away the consent-based impartiality of peacekeeping 
operations, and may lead to peacekeepers taking very obvious sides in a 
conflict. It is also particularly difficult in determining the nature of a ‘freedom 
fighter’. However, it could well be seen that with peacekeeping mandates 
pushing for the protection of civilians, that a type of one-way wall is being 
created; possibly not for the ‘freedom fighters’ but for the civilian population.  
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This provides a critical insight. Importantly, Galtung was able to link the 
negative peace aspects of military peacekeeping to the pursuit of positive 
peace and removal of structural violence. This was very much incorporating 
peacekeeping to conflict resolution theory, and places military forms of 
peacekeeping into a wider project of transformation. It is also cosmopolitan in 
nature, as it outlines a desire to use peacekeeping to protect alternative 
sources of power. This thesis revisits Galtung’s conceptions later in this chapter 
when examining cosmopolitan approaches to peacekeeping. 
 
Very much following in this tradition, ongoing work within the Department of 
Peace Studies link the micro- and macro-level debates -through linking 
particular ‘policy areas’ of peacekeeping with wider theoretical debates in the 
field of conflict resolution - and has cultivated an in-depth research culture into 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Much of this literature provides the 
conceptual foundations of this particular research project. To start, Fetherston, 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse’s analysis of the UNPROFOR operation in 1994 
offers a solid point of departure20. There has been a number of studies into 
peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia –with some of the more 
popular pieces written by the peacekeepers themselves (Stewart, 1993, Rose, 
1999b). However, this particular analysis posed a number of areas where the 
field of conflict resolution could contribute to improving the operation21, including 
the need to re-evaluate existing methods of training for peacekeepers. The 
authors found that military peacekeepers, who are trained for war, are placed in 
                                                
20 The impact of the UNPROFOR operation is revisited in Chapter 5. 
21 The areas were: the nature of conflict; stages and types of conflict intervention; levels of 
conflict intervention; ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power intervention options at macro- and micro- levels; 
relations with conflict parties; relations between military and non-military mission components; 
multinationalism and multiculturalism; the training of peacekeepers. 
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highly unstable situations where they are unable to resort to the use of military 
means, and asserted that peacekeepers lacked the necessary skills needed to 
facilitate what is ultimately a peaceful conflict management role. It is here where 
Fetherston et al argued that conflict resolution could make a serious 
contribution. They pointed towards the need for contact skills, defined as ‘those 
skills which support activities which support involving direct contact with armies 
and militias, civilian populations, humanitarian agencies, and other contingents 
of the peacekeeping force’ (Fetherston et al., 1994; 196). The relevance of 
contact skills for this thesis is outlined below in this chapter. Noting the 
considerable reorganisation of national training programmes, Fetherston et al 
argued that tried and tested concepts of conflict resolution can greatly inform 
such programmes. However, it was recognised that there was still some way to 
go before the specific contact skills required for micro-level peacekeeping 
activity would be fully incorporated into wider programmes.  
 
The article outlines important contributions that conflict resolution can make in 
other areas. There are three such areas outlined in this paper which contribute 
to this particular research project. Firstly, a great deal can be learned from using 
conflict resolution practices to help understand how peacekeepers relate to the 
parties to a conflict. This is particularly relevant in the pre-deployment stage, 
where peacekeepers benefit greatly from understanding the social dynamics of 
belligerent groups, as well as the dynamics of groups they are sent to protect. 
Training military peacekeepers to understand this is crucial if they are to provide 
security and open up avenues for peacebuilding. It also raises the chances that 
operations will engage with groups who may not have had access to power 
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structures during the conflict.  Secondly, the help that conflict resolution can 
provide in facilitating relations between the military and non-military 
components of the operation. This aspect of training for peacekeeping 
operations, (what is now termed CIMIC, or Civil Military Cooperation), is 
something which this research project focuses on in the Chapters three and 
four. Finally, in developing an understanding of the multinational and 
multicultural aspects within peacekeeping deployments, Fetherston et al firmly 
place conflict resolution as a tool which can develop understanding between 
contingents and nationalities. The importance of this cannot be understated. 
Peacekeeping is still a global undertaking (more-so than in 1994). For 
peacekeeping operations to effectively function, there is a requirement for 
military peacekeepers to understand cross-cultural communication, within the 
operation, as well as towards external actors.  
 
Fetherston’s work also provides a solid conceptual base to understand the 
impact of conflict resolution in training for peacekeeping operations. Firstly, in 
linking her research to wider debates about the role of peacekeeping in conflict 
resolution, Fetherston’s critique suggests that definitions of peacekeeping are 
‘inadequate’ because they ‘have not been placed within a larger framework’. 
From this, Fetherston attempts to offer a theoretical framework to ‘analyze the 
utility of peacekeeping as a third party intervention and as a tool of conflict 
management’ (Fetherston, 1994b; 139-40). She further argues that: 
 
It is not enough to send a force into the field with a vague notion that 
they should be impartial and help to facilitate settlement. To act as a third 
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party in a protracted violent, polarized conflict is an extremely difficult and 
delicate task. Diplomats, academics and others who have acted in the 
capacity of a third party are generally well trained, highly experienced 
individuals with a good base of knowledge about the particular conflict. 
On the whole, peacekeepers have limited preparation and experience. 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 140) 
 
Noting that peacekeeping operations represent a form of third party intervention 
(incorporating both conflict resolution and conflict settlement strategies), and 
that there exists no framework for understanding when to intervene, (and how 
interventions can be effective), Fetherston links peacekeeping to Fisher and 
Keashly’s contingency model. Arguing that it ‘seems to offer the best possibility 
for a more effective management of conflict’ (Fetherston, 1994b; 123), 
Fetherston uses this contingency approach as it offers a suitable ‘middle 
ground’ between those highly empirical forms of conflict analysis, and the 
school of thought which argues against any formulated analysis of intervention. 
The contingency model, as outlined in Fisher and Keashly’s 1990 research, is a 
model devised to match third party intervention to certain characteristics of the 
conflict. Fisher and Keashly’s research outlines four main stages of a conflict: 
(1) Discussion, (2) Polarization, (3) Segregation, and (4) Destruction. From this, 
they match third party strategies to each stage. Stage 4 of this (destruction) is 
where peacekeeping is the strategy of choice, to ‘assist in the separation of the 
parties and the control of violence’. This is the first stage of intervention at the 
most destructive level, which aims to give space for other forms of third party 
intervention (Fisher and Keashly, 1991). Fisher follows this up in his 1994 
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research which espouses the important role of peacebuilding as a bridge 
between peacekeeping and peacemaking. Fisher’s diagram (in Box 1.3) helps 
to illustrate this 
 
 
Box 1.3: Approaches to Peace in a contingency model  
(Fisher, 1993; 258) 
 
Stage of  Sequence of    Outcomes for 
Escalation  Interventions    De-escalation 
 
 
Destruction  Peacekeeping    Control Violence 
 
      Peacebuilding 
 
 
 
Segregation  Peacepushing    De-escalate or  
control hostility 
      Peacebuilding 
 
  
Polarization   Peacebuilding    Meet basic needs  
improve  
      Peacebuilding   relationship 
 
 
Discussion  Peacemaking    Settle interests 
 
  
       
Thus, in order for peacekeeping to be effective in this model, Fisher argues that 
the sooner that the need ‘to control overt violence is followed by other 
interventions’, the better. Fetherston agrees with this assessment in her 
investigation and advocates that effective coordination must be made between 
the traditional security aspects and the civilian peacebuilding aspects of the 
operation. Without this, in Fetherston’s view, operations face ‘insurmountable 
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odds’ of moving beyond controlling violence and maintaining a status quo22 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 150). Within this framework, peacekeeping can be 
visualised in a two-tiered approach. Firstly one can see the peacekeepers 
‘working in the area of operation at the micro-level facilitating a more positive 
atmosphere’, and secondly peacekeeping operations ‘cooperating and 
coordinated with peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts at the macro-level’ 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 150). Fetherston suggests that peacekeeping can play a 
valuable role in the successful resolution of conflicts by creating an environment 
that is conducive to a further resolution of conflict (much like the important role 
of pre-negotiation). She finds that: 
 
Co-ordinating peacekeeping at the micro-level at least begins the 
groundwork of what might be called a ‘pre-resolution’ or a ‘pre-
peacebuilding’ phase. This has taken the form of coordination of local 
level resolution processes, either at the initiative of local people or at the 
initiative of the peacekeepers.  
 (Fetherston, 1994b; 151-2) 
 
Examples of such local level resolution initiatives were observed in both 
Namibia and Cyprus, where efforts went  beyond ‘dealing with one specific 
problem at one point in time and tried to establish a longer-term process which 
would deal with future problems’, thus linking up the micro- and macro-level of 
peacekeeping (Fetherston, 1994b; 157).  
 
                                                
22  This argument is also analysed in Chapter 4 which deals with civil-military cooperation. 
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Thus, peacekeepers were seen as a critical interface between micro- and 
macro-approaches to conflict resolution. Fetherston emphasises the importance 
of ‘contact skills’ for peacekeepers. In this, there are two types of contact skills – 
skills in conflict resolution, such as mediation, negotiation, conciliation, and the 
skills important for effective cross-cultural interaction. Fetherston emphasises 
the importance of these contact skills for deployed peacekeepers, arguing that 
the ‘essence of peacekeeping as a third party intervention must be contact 
skills’ (Fetherston, 1994b; 219). She adds: 
 
It is through the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, 
facilitation, mediation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate 
potentially violent or manifestly violent situations and facilitate movement 
toward conflict resolution. Non-contact skills are functional and differ 
depending on the specific mandate of the specific mission. It is also the 
case that contact skills require more time and effort on the part of the 
trainer and the trainee. 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 219) 
 
Fetherston’s findings show that there is a lack of training in contact skills for 
military peacekeepers, and where these skills are covered, it is usually a 
minimal contribution (so minimal, that Fetherston questions its usefulness). Her 
findings also support the view that there is great importance in ‘providing 
specific training to effect a shift from a military to a peacekeeping attitude and to 
learn and practice contact skills’(Fetherston, 1994b; 217). Moreover, Fetherston 
outlines a contradiction in the justifications for this lack of contact skills training 
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for peacekeeping operations. She finds that although there is recognition of the 
third-party role played by peacekeepers, it is widely believed that junior levels 
already have these skills, thus not justifying the need for specialist training. 
Much of this is due to a fundamental contradiction in peacekeeping operations, 
where military peacekeepers keep ‘distance’ from the conflict parties, yet have 
to demonstrate ‘closeness’ in their third party conflict resolution based roles 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 223). These findings echo Galtung’s conclusions (from his 
study of Norwegian peacekeepers outlined above), which also illustrated the 
difficult position of peacekeepers in a conflict zone.  
 
Fetherston’s work goes on to examine training initiatives for the Canadian 
Forces, Irish Defence Forces, and regional cooperation between Nordic 
Countries. Through examining these specific case studies, Fetherston reasons 
that the training for peacekeeping heavily overlaps training for traditional military 
roles, leaving the peacekeeper unprepared for his or her role as a third party 
intervener. More specifically, Fetherston outlines four key problems with the 
training approaches:  
 
1)  a lack of standardization;  
2) a lack of coherence in training and in the development of training 
programmes;  
3)  a lack of evidence and research supporting training goals based on 
training needs; and 
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4) a lack of clear objectives and methodology which directly reflect a 
wider approach to the peaceful resolution of conflict and which are then 
related directly to peacekeeping activities. 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 203-208)  
 
This work is supplemented by Fetherston’s 1994 article Putting the peace back 
into peacekeeping (Fetherston, 1994a). In it, Fetherston outlines the importance 
of training for peacekeepers. She argues that a lack of training for 
peacekeepers means that the task that peacekeepers undertake in 
representing the international community’s message of ‘non-violent consensual 
conflict management’, becomes increasingly difficult. Fetherston finds a number 
of problems exist in training arrangements. Mainly, the findings point to 
generally poor training for deployment to new missions, for officers for specific 
UN Military Observer (UNMO), and UN Staff Officer (UNSO) positions, and that 
training for peacekeeping outside the top-seven contributors is ‘generally poor 
or non-existent’. Finally, Fetherston finds that there is little standardisation of 
training or empirical research to confirm the effectiveness of training and how it 
relates to activities in the field. In a 1998 article, she warns that without basic 
work in thinking about what peacekeepers do and why they do it ‘training will 
continue to be inconsistent and inappropriate’. She added ‘[i]f we only prepare 
people for war it is far more likely that is what we will get’ (Fetherston, 1998; 
178). Fetherston’s work is of key importance when framing this particular 
project. Her work establishes an important link between the micro-level issues 
such as military negotiation, civil-military cooperation, and ‘pre-peacebuilding’, 
with wider debates about the role and function of peacekeeping operations. 
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furthermore, through outlining contact skills, Fetherston defined a set of non-
traditional techniques that are critical into the effective functioning of a 
peacekeeping operation. Throughout this thesis there will be referral to 
Fetherston’s contact skills. Finally, like Diehl, Fetherston provided a substantial 
analysis of arrangements of the provision of training for military peacekeepers. 
This thesis provides an updated analysis, and asks where developments exist 
in training provision.  
 
Duffey provides an important analysis of the difficulties of training for 
peacekeepers, particularly in the light of the changing nature of peacekeeping 
mandates at the beginning of the 1990’s. Because of such changes, Duffey, like 
Fetherston, advocates the incorporation of contact skills into military training for 
peacekeeping operations (Duffey, 1998; 106). Her thesis argues that military 
peacekeepers preparing for Cold War operations received virtually no 
specialised peacekeeping training in ‘mediation, negotiation and other conflict 
resolution skills’. Because of this, they would often find themselves in 
‘dangerous and stressful situations unprepared to effectively handle them’ 
(Duffey, 1998; 129).  
 
Of importance to this thesis, one of the conclusions of Duffey’s analysis is that 
cultural training is an essential element in peacekeeping training. This training 
should have two components. Firstly is culture-general training, which focuses 
on basic understandings of culture (including how culture influences one’s own 
assumptions, values, actions and reactions, including intercultural 
communication skills, and developing an awareness of other organisational 
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cultures). Secondly is culture specific training, which would concentrate 
developing an understanding of the specific culture in which the intervention will 
take place (i.e. the host culture, origins of the parties to the conflict, history, 
local customs, language and religion, and the ‘indigenous conceptions of 
conflict and traditional methods of responding to conflict’) (Duffey, 1998; 270). 
Duffey finds that this second step requires further research and evaluation of 
how feasible it is to incorporate pre-deployment cultural training for military 
peacekeepers. Overarching this, Duffey finds is the need for all involved in 
peacekeeping (including the military, civilian agencies and conflict resolution 
scholars) to carefully consider the ‘culturally appropriate ways of re-evaluating 
and reforming peacekeeping’ (Duffey, 1998; 271). 
 
Duffey’s work on culture and peacekeeping provides one of the contributions to 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse’s 2001 publication Peacekeeping and Conflict 
Resolution. The publication is an important contribution of conflict resolution in 
the peacekeeping field, as it offered the viewpoints of both academics, who 
applied conflict resolution theory to peacekeeping practices, and ‘experienced 
military peacekeepers seeking to enrich peacekeeping by uses of conflict 
theory’ (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000; 6). David Last’s contribution to 
this collection asserted that there is a ‘peacebuilding capability gap’ in the 
international community’s response to conflict between stopping the violence 
(putting the hawks back in the box) and pursuing positive peace (letting the 
doves out of their box). Much of this is due to interveners not being completely 
successful in deploying necessary skills for (what Last sees as) the four major 
peacebuilding requirements: Security; Governance; Relief and Development; 
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Reconciliation. Last goes on to contend that although the military can deploy 
quickly ‘they lack key peacebuilding skills, particularly those involving language, 
culture and relationship building’ (Last, 2000; 87). This is an important 
observation, particularly in terms of this thesis. It also links to the critiques 
raised at the beginning of this chapter by Gordenker and Weiss.  
 
Byrne and Keashly’s contribution to Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution 
highlights non-traditional military training as a positive step for effective conflict 
resolution. The authors note that ‘training and education’ is one of a number of 
integral interlinked strategies which contributes to the transformation of war-torn 
societies into peaceful societies. The authors find that research, training and 
education are a ‘critical’ component of any peacebuilding system ‘because 
these efforts attempt to influence perceptions and attitudes, and build a culture 
of peace’ (Byrne and Keashly, 2000; 108). The authors cite the positive steps 
made by the Canadian Government in the creation of the Pearson 
Peacekeeping Centre (PPC). They find that the PPC acts as a tool to assist 
national and international dialogue concerning peacekeeping issues through 
workshops, training and educational courses. Furthermore, Byrne and Keashley 
are enthusiastic about the role of the internet as a positive tool for 
peacebuilding, and make a strong case for a robust internet system. They 
argue that a world-wide Internet system would promote ‘cross-regional 
fertilization’ by: 
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broadening the scope of shared knowledge and experience, and by 
promoting participation in the gathering and analysis and rapid 
dissemination of early warning information from a variety of multiple 
sources. 
(Byrne and Keashly, 2000; 113) 
 
This provides a good opportunity to discuss Levy’s research on the Internet. 
This research shows how the practitioner/academic focus of the CCR has been 
strengthened through translating theories of peace, violence and conflict into 
practical tools (in this case the internet), to work with war-torn communities. 
Levy’s work also provides an opportunity to discuss further doctoral research at 
the CCR. After providing an overview of Levy’s thesis, the chapter examines 
two bodies of doctoral research that are both important in outlining the research 
activity at CCR: Yuka Hasegawa’s research on UNAMA and Andreu Sola i 
Martin’s analysis of UN mission in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). 
 
Levy sought to document the real-world uses of the Internet by organisations 
operating in the post-conflict context of Kosovo in the period 2000-2003 (under 
an overall research question ‘in what ways can the Internet contribute to post-
conflict peacebuilding?’). She considers five topics (the digital divide; 
democracy and governance; civil society; organisational change and knowledge 
management; education), which show the potential impact of Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) on peace and conflict issues. Levy then 
offers practical examples of how the Internet has been used as a vehicle of 
change in the working practices of peacebuilding organisations, and how it 
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already functions as a tool and a space for peacebuilders (Levy, 2004; 61-97). 
Informing this is the importance Levy attaches to ‘the emergent uses of ICTs in 
this environment [post-conflict Kosovo], in order to formulate ideas on how ICTs 
could be best used to build stable, peaceful and just societies in the aftermath 
of war’ (Levy, 2004; 1-2).  
 
In terms of peacekeeping, Levy links the role of ICTs to recommendations in the 
UN’s Brahimi Report (UN, 2000c), which was explicit in making the case for 
ICTs to be used to link together peacekeeping operations. Levy notes that the 
Brahimi Report found that information sharing between the UN, military and 
civilian agencies in post-conflict missions had been impeded by a lack of 
common data formats, integrated computer systems, field training and 
dedicated staff members. Furthermore, Levy highlights the positive role of the 
Internet as a tool to harmonise work done by military peacekeepers and civilian 
agencies, through citing the example of Geographic Information Systems (GIS). 
This tool provides the humanitarian community with a standardised way for 
collecting and disseminating information. The GIS Data can, for example, be 
used to add mine locations, road and house reconstruction, and other activities 
onto a shared map to be used by all agencies. This ‘interoperability’ has already 
been used in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Liberia and is widely seen as a 
valuable utensil to enhance Civil-military coordination (Levy, 2004; 108). As 
Chapter 6 discusses, ICTs play a valuable role in current training provision for 
military peacekeeping, with the CCR currently providing a e-learning course for 
military peacekeepers.   
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Yuka Hasegawa’s research focuses on the UN operation in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) and considers the role of the UN in dealing with conflicts, through an 
examination of the role of peace operations in the protection and empowerment 
of human security. Hasegawa relates the conflict transformation framework to 
UN Peacekeeping operations. In this framework, the role of the third party can 
be ‘understood as a contributing factor in transforming conflict and a 
manifestation of the will to transform violent conflict into a peaceful situation’ 
(Hasegawa, 2005; 27-28). In this framework, peacekeeping operations can be 
seen as being a more effective method of conflict resolution than the 
appointment of mediators. Hasegawa’s research asserts the importance of UN 
peacekeeping forces as a third party intervener, with its impartiality based on 
the value of human security (as a ‘satisfyer’ of Burton’s Human Needs theory). 
Impartiality, according to Hasegawa, is derived from the UN’s pursuit of basic 
human security, and this impartiality is the most important fact to peacekeeping 
operations. In the case of UNAMA, the pursuit of its impartiality was key in its 
effectiveness (Hasegawa, 2005; 337). 
 
Hasegawa concludes that the significance of UN peacekeeping missions is that 
they represent a collective means to address issues of human security, as 
opposed to it being ‘yet another tool with which to coordinate various interests 
both at the global and micro levels’ (Hasegawa, 2005; 332-337). Through 
addressing issues of human security, UN peace operations derive their 
impartiality: a fundamental aspect of how effective a peace operation can be. 
This provides an important conceptual foundation to the thesis. In many ways it 
can be seen as a positive response to critiques from the critical theory school, 
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which contend that peacekeeping operations are tools to replace the existing 
global order which caused the outbreak of violent conflict in the first place.  
 
Sola i Martin’s research offers a sound analysis of MINURSO. His analysis 
seeks to understand why the mission failed to provide space for transformative 
conflict resolution (and the achievement of positive peace), after the successful 
reduction of violent conflict. Sola i Martin finds that the constraints on the 
operation as a result of power politics  (and Morocco’s unwillingness to allow 
the UN to organise a process of self determination for the Western Saharan 
people). Thus the UN, according to the author, needs to strengthen 
mechanisms to protect communal groups (Sola i Martin, 2004; 22). 
 
The second part of the research examines the potential of new theoretical ideas 
in peacekeeping research, in particular, through the use of a Foucauldian 
analysis of power/knowledge to assess peacekeeping operations in relation to 
power relations at a local and international level. Sola i Martin finds that through 
the examination of the parties’ production of power/knowledge, conflict 
resolution can have a larger impact on peacekeeping research. In particular, 
through exploring how power politics influences peacekeeping ‘as an institution, 
and to what extent peacekeeping and its projection of power/knowledge in 
some cases… serve the interests of politico-military elites’ (Sola i Martin, 2004; 
241-244). 
 
Sola i Martin’s work shows how the failure to pursue peace with positive change 
has meant that the MINURSO peacekeeping operation is frozen at the stage of 
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negative peace. Through his exploration of theoretical critiques of 
power/knowledge relations and how they affect understandings of 
peacekeeping operations, Sola i Martin outlines issues of power politics on 
operations. Importantly, he highlights the importance of conflict resolution as a 
tool to understand peacekeeping operations as an alternative to the power 
politics model. Like Hasegawa, Sola i Martin emphasises the transformative 
nature of peacekeeping operations, and also emphasises how an increased 
focus on culture has led conflict resolution to adapt to local understandings of 
conflict and ensure participation from all levels of the social ladder.  
 
The three examples of PhD research show the ‘conflict resolution culture’ which 
is cultivated at the CCR. This culture means that CCR research into 
peacekeeping operations is unique in its appreciation of peacekeeping 
operations having the potential to be part of a wider transformation of positive 
change from violence to peace. This research project is firmly embedded in this 
approach.  
 
Providing a background to research on peacekeeping and conflict resolution at 
CCR is the continual analysis of peacekeeping operations undertaken by 
Professor Tom Woodhouse. Work undertaken by Woodhouse (often with 
Professor Oliver Ramsbotham) has led to peacekeeping being increasingly 
conceptualised alongside conflict resolution.  
 
At a theoretical level, Woodhouse has firmly established the links between 
military forms of peacekeeping and the theoretical field of conflict resolution. A 
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number of books and articles can be cited here. The 1996 paper (alongside 
Ramsbotham) Terra Incognita: Here be Dragons, applied Azar’s Protracted 
Social Conflict theory to contemporary conflict. From this, Woodhouse and 
Ramsbotham suggested that peacekeeping operations deployed in 
International-social conflict (ISC): a conflict neither purely inter-state, not intra-
state, but somewhere between the two. Using this framework, Woodhouse and 
Ramsbotham’s response to the failures of peacekeeping deployments was to 
advocate the use of the ‘middle ground’ between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 1996). The 2000 publication 
Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping: Critiques and Responses identified 
strong critiques of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations existent in the 
literature, and provided a robust response, drawn strongly from the conflict 
resolution literature (Woodhouse, 2000a). Most recently, Woodhouse has 
contributed to theoretical understandings of peacekeeping through exploring 
cosmopolitan conceptions of conflict resolution. This new addition to the 
literature will be explored below in the chapter. 
 
Alongside Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, Woodhouse offers a 
considerable contribution to the literature through Contemporary Conflict 
Resolution. This contribution (also written with Miall and Ramsbotham) gives a 
comprehensive understanding of the conflict resolution field and the role of 
peacekeeping within it. Contemporary peacekeeping and the development of 
the PSO has been incorporated, with an emphasis on the impact on conflict 
resolution processes, and new areas identified where conflict resolution can be 
promoted. Looking forward, the authors aim towards a cosmopolitan vision 
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where conflict resolution theory (and peacekeeping) forms a critical part of 
international conflict management. 
 
As well as work at the theoretical level, research by Woodhouse has provided 
analysis in national policies, such as the development of UK doctrine and 
practice, (Woodhouse, 1999b). The body of research offers contributions to 
understandings of specific operations, such as UNPROFOR (outlined above) 
and UNAMSIL (Fetherston et al., 1994, Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). As 
referred to in Chapter 6, Woodhouse further contributes to the psychological 
aspects of peacekeeping, and the requirements for military personnel to 
understand conflict resolution concepts and techniques (Woodhouse, 1998). 
 
Tom Woodhouse’s work has covered a considerable amount of the conflict 
resolution spectrum. However it is work done alongside the military, in the 
training and preparation for peacekeeping with is particularly pertinent to this 
thesis. Woodhouse’s work in (a) charting and (b) advancing the influence of 
conflict resolution on peacekeeping operations has opened up opportunities for 
projects such as this to further bring peacekeeping and conflict resolution 
together.  
 
A considerable number of references in this thesis will be drawn from 
International Peacekeeping (in particular, Chapter 5 reviews a sample of articles 
to understand how Negotiation practice has been theorised). Created and 
edited by current Professor at the CCR, Professor Michael Pugh, the journal is 
a cornerstone when examining contemporary debates in the field. It has 
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succeeded in becoming an ‘important source of analysis and debate for 
academics, officials, NGO workers and military personnel’ (Pugh, 1994), with a 
number of cutting edge articles and eyewitness reports from the field. 
Furthermore, it has become a useful testing ground for new theoretical 
concepts in peacekeeping operations, and a number of ‘special editions’ have 
been able to focus on areas which have reflected the changing nature of 
peacekeeping operations (Gender in Peacekeeping, Peacekeeping and Conflict 
Resolution, Thinking Anew About Peacekeeping Operations, Peacebuilding and 
Police Reform, to name a few). International Peacekeeping has greatly 
informed the background to this research. In particular, the post-Brahimi picture 
of peacekeeping has been greatly reflected in the journal, covering aspects 
from deployments on the ground (and the development of PSO) to theoretical 
debates over how peacekeeping is understood in the context of global politics. 
Throughout this research, the journal is a considerable source of information. 
The Critical Theory Approach 
 
The challenges to ‘accepted’ understandings and theories of peacekeeping 
have come mainly from the critical theory background. Paris critiques the 
‘problem solving’ approaches to peacekeeping, arguing that the focus on 
design, conduct and outcome of operations have paid little attention to ‘broader 
implications of peace missions for our understanding of international politics’ 
(Paris, 2000; 29). Bellamy and Williams take these critiques a stage further in 
their edited edition of International Peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2005). 
The edition examines peacekeeping from a critical theory standpoint, 
challenging many of the overarching conceptions of peacekeeping. Bellamy and 
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Williams begin by offering a substantial critique of problem solving approaches 
to peacekeeping operations: 
 
By failing to question the ideological preferences of interveners… 
problem-solving theories are unable to evaluate the extent to which 
dominant peacekeeping or peacemaking practices may actually help 
reproduce the social structures that cause violent conflict in the first 
place. 
(Bellamy, 2004; 19) 
 
The authors therefore suggest that critical approaches to peace operations will 
open up a ‘new stage’ in how they are theorised. Previous thinking in 
peacekeeping operations, the authors argue, has taken a ‘value free’ approach 
to the role of peacekeeping in the global order. One such ‘value free’ 
assumption was that ‘‘good’ governance equates to Western-style statehood, 
democratization, neo-liberal economics and the existence of an active civil 
society (Bellamy, 2004; 19). Without challenging these assumptions and 
examining the structural causes of violent conflict (such as the liberal based 
global economy), the authors argue that any attempts of reassessing 
peacekeeping would be as useful in the long run as ‘rearranging deckchairs on 
the Titanic’ (Bellamy, 2004; 21). Pugh elaborates on this line by arguing that 
peacekeeping operations are not ‘neutral’, but serve an existing global order 
within which problem solving adjustments can occur. In this framework, 
peacekeeping can be considered ‘as forms of riot control directed against the 
unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace’ (Pugh, 2004; 41). 
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Furthermore, Pugh argues that the ‘enfeeblement’ of the UN in dealing robustly 
to threats to peace and security and the strengthening of regional arrangements 
and national militaries only adds to the strengthening of regional and 
international hegemons (such as the US). This, according to Pugh, is 
strengthened by the UN’s willingness to enter into regional ‘partnerships’.  
 
Although assessments from the critical theory perspective play a crucial role in 
deepening understandings about the role of peacekeeping, a difficulty with such 
an approach is a lack of concrete proposals to move peacekeeping within this 
transformative framework. Bellamy and William’s work is of great importance in 
order to understand the pitfalls in the international system which lead to the 
situations where peacekeepers are deployed. However, this thesis contends 
that that Bellamy and Williams do not offer material steps forward for 
peacekeeping operations to take. The techniques espoused for the 
development of peacekeeping operations, as argued by Bellamy and Williams 
are: Dialogue ethics (‘free and open dialogue about what constitutes ‘good 
practice’’); Inclusivity (‘dialogue should include all parties that might be affected 
by the course of action under discussion’) and; Fallibility (where ‘theorists and 
practitioners of peace operations must recognize that their most dearly held 
beliefs are fallible and therefore open for revision’) (Bellamy, 2004; 33). These 
recommendations are far away from clear policy and operational changes. As 
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham argue, although highlighting such debates and 
the need to ‘think anew’ is essential, calls for a radical transformation of 
peacekeeping are not elaborated sufficiently on how ‘this might be achieved in 
policy or other operational terms’ (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 152). 
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This may not be the case for all who argue from this critical theory standpoint. 
Pugh finds a role for deployments akin to peace support operations (PSO) in a 
transformative framework. He argues that PSOs will be likely to be increasingly 
subtle and flexible in responding to crises, providing expert teams similar to 
disaster relief specialists, providing preventative action, economic aid and 
civilian protection. Pugh contends that this may only happen if such forces are 
released from the ‘state-centric control system’, making them ‘answerable to a 
more transparent, democratic and accountable institutional arrangement’ (Pugh, 
2004; 53). Moreover, Pugh finds that such a scheme would be based on a 
permanent military volunteer force ‘recruited directly among individuals 
predisposed to cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values’ (Pugh, 2004; 53). 
A Cosmopolitan Framework 
 
This moves the discussion onto Woodhouse and Ramsbotham’s work on 
cosmopolitan peacekeeping. The framework of cosmopolitan peacekeeping, the 
authors state, is situated in conflict resolution theory and practice, and provides 
a concrete way forward for peacekeeping operations, engaging with 
peacekeeping in a way in which the authors believe critical theory does not 
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 141). Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 
note that the revival of UN peacekeeping operations since the dilemmas in the 
mid-1990’s, where the number of peacekeepers has risen (the rise has been 
apparent throughout the life of this research project; the number of 
peacekeepers in December 2005 was 69,838 (UNDPKO, 2005a); in December 
2007 84,309 peacekeepers were deployed (UNDPKO, 2007a); in April 2010 the 
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figure is 101,882 (UNDPKO, 2010a)), and note that this shows a commitment 
by the international community to peacekeeping as a ‘vital instrument in 
pursuing conflict resolution goals internationally’ (Woodhouse and 
Ramsbotham, 2005; 142).  
 
Within this cosmopolitan framework, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse point to two 
distinct areas where capacity building is required and empowerment needed or 
the development of a cosmopolitan framework for peacekeeping. Box 1.4 
(below) explains in more detail and shows the direction where this capacity 
building is required. 
 
Box 1.4: Conflict Levels and Focal Points in the Development of 
Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping 
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 143) 
 
 
1. Global: (Rapid Reaction Emergency Forces/Services) 
 
 
 
International 
SHIRBRIG (limited to Chapter 6 operations) 
UN Standby Arrangements System 
Sixteen extant missions (Jan 2004) 
 
 
 
2. Regional: Regional Peacekeeping Coalitions (EU, AU, NATO) 
 
3. Sub-regional: ECOMOG and other African sub-regions 
 
4. National: Lead Nations (UK in Sierra Leone; Australia in East Timor; France in Ivory 
Coast) 
 
 
 
5. Conflict party/Conflict locale 
CIMIC and Community Liaison and Mediation Programmes:  Cross community 
peacebuilding and post conflict reconstruction programmes 
 
Key: Arrows show desired direction of capacity building and empowerment needed for 
the development of cosmopolitan peacekeeping 
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Through investigating training in ‘non traditional skills’ such as Civil Military 
Coordination, negotiation and mediation, this particular research project can be 
situated at point (5) of the framework, as the role of training is key to developing 
a positive base for peacebuilding activities.  
 
Importantly, there are strong links between all levels of this model. Therefore 
this research project considers national and sub-regional efforts to enhance 
peacekeeper training, and looks towards the development of international 
capacities for carrying out cosmopolitan-based peacekeeping deployments. In 
order to situate the research here, it is the view of this thesis that peacekeeping 
is a form of international conflict resolution. Taking note of Hasegawa’s work, 
peacekeepers and the operations which they represent are part of a 
transformative process which sees war-torn societies move towards societies 
based on values of social justice and positive peace.  
 
Looking towards future debates over the development of peacekeeping, 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse see five main standpoints23. One such 
standpoint is Cosmopolitanism, which ‘argues for deeper reforms, an 
accountable permanent rapid reaction or a standing UN force and an enhanced 
resolution capacity, including gender and culture aware policy and training’ 
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 152). This particular research fits into 
this analysis by examining how the researched militaries are enhancing conflict 
                                                
23 The full list is: Realism which rejects the whole concept of enhanced UN peacekeeping; 
Pluralism which only countenances a limited form of traditional first generation peacekeeping; 
Pragmatic solidarism which favours the incremental development of existing arrangements; 
Cosmopolitanism which argues for deeper reforms, an accountable permanent rapid reaction 
or a standing UN force and an enhanced resolution capacity, including gender and culture 
aware policy and training; and Transformation which argues for radically reconstructed 
peacekeeping configurations. 
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resolution capacities while maintaining their peace enforcement capabilities, 
what this means for conflict resolution, and whether there is an emergence of 
militaries with cosmopolitan ethics.  
 
Woodhouse follows this work on in an article with Curran, (Curran and 
Woodhouse, 2007) which investigates the emergence of a cosmopolitan ethic in 
African peacekeeping through the emergence of the African Union’s (AU) 
standby brigades and conflict prevention network, as well as the response to 
the peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation in Sierra Leone. The authors 
find that African developments to create standby brigades (in particular policy 
following the Joint G8–African Union Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to 
Undertake Peace Support Operations) can be conceptualised in a cosmopolitan 
framework. Curran and Woodhouse argue that the emergence of thinking and 
institutional capacity in Africa takes theorizing about peacekeeping closer to a 
cosmopolitan ethic, based on safeguarding Human Security. Furthermore, they 
conclude that peacekeeping in general, and African Peacekeeping in particular 
is seen as a: 
 
…force in the making for cosmopolitan governance, characterized by an 
impartial, universal, democratic, cosmopolitan community which 
promotes human security (positive peace) over national security and 
state-centric interest 
(Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; 1070) 
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Linking this to further work in the Department of Peace Studies, Joâo Gomes 
Porto’s co-authored book (with Ulf Engel) provides a comprehensive analysis of 
the development of African peace and security architecture. The collection 
analyses a number of facets of the architecture including the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early 
Warning System, and the African Standby Force (ASF) initiative. Significantly, 
Engel and Porto reflect on the ‘multi-dimensionality and pluralism’ of 
regionalism on the African continent. They suggest that: 
 
In a situation where the African state is often the main threat to the 
security of its citizens as well as its neighbors, a perspective on security 
which transcends the traditionalist view of security as the business of the 
state and the state alone is surely called for.  
(Porto and Engel, 2010; 144) 
 
The authors further outline the ‘profound’ link between security and 
development as a key guideline to move the organisation towards a human 
security framework to work under.. Engel and Porto’s edited collection shows 
the clear links between theoretical developments in human security, and the 
operationalisation of conflict resolution capacities based on protecting civilians. 
For example, Cilliers and Pottgeiter’s discuss the evolution of the African 
Standby Force (ASF). Through doing so, they provide a quality overview of the 
historical development of the ASF, what is envisaged of the force, and the 
challenges that it currently faces. Their article also links the six defined 
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scenarios under which the ASF would be deployed24 with the realities of 
training, equipping, financing and preparing multinational deployments. Included 
in this assessment is the training design for the organisation, which the authors 
note is designed around ‘technical, tactical and specialized knowledge in a 
multinational environment’ (Cilliers and Pottgieter, 2010; 118). Significantly, this 
edited collection indicates an emergence of cosmopolitan norms and values in 
African security frameworks. It is important not only in highlighting further work 
from the Department of Peace Studies, but also shows that cosmopolitan 
values can be operationalised in regional security architechture. 
 
Cheesman and Elliot offer an important contribution to this debate. Their edited 
collection of articles examines the role of the military in a cosmopolitan 
framework, with the aim to explore the idea that militaries can, or should, be 
used to ‘defend the moral community of humankind’ as well as defending 
‘territorially bounded political communities’ (Elliot and Graeme, 2004; 1). The 
authors find that this framework would alter military structures and tasks, and 
point out that militaries could soon be required to ‘become the security 
guarantors for the whole process of civil reconciliation and reconstruction’ (Elliot 
and Graeme, 2004; 4). 
 
                                                
24 Scenario 1) AU/Regional military advice to a political mission deployed within 30 Days of a 
mandate provided by the PSC; Scenario 2) An AU observer mission codeployed with a UN 
peacekeeping mission deployed within 30 days of a mandate; Scenario 3) A stand-alone AU 
observer mission deployed within 30 days of a mandate; Scenario 4) A peacekeeping or 
preventative deployment mission under Chapter VI of the UN charter, deployed within 30 days 
of a mandate; Scenario 5) An Au peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional 
peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers, is deployed within 90 days 
of an AU mandate, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days; Scenario 6) An 
AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not 
act promptly. Here, it is envisaged that the Au would have the capability to deploy a robust 
military force within 14 days. 
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This has implications for training. Elliot argues that forces deployed for 
cosmopolitan purposes are expected to train for ‘contact’ as well as combat 
roles, referring very much to Fetherston’s concept of contact skills for the 
military espoused in her early work (Elliot, 2004; 26). Furthemore, Cheeseman 
and Elliot conclude that military forces, in order to carry out the new tasks and 
roles designated to them, require soldiers to ‘posses skills and attributes that 
extend well beyond the values and duties normally associated with the 
profession of arms’. This in turn, the authors find, would require a considerable 
rethinking of existing doctrine, force structures, command and control, 
ideological structures and training regimes (Cheeseman and Elliot, 2004; 278). 
 
Cheeseman and Elliot’s contribution here is important when attempting to 
understand developments in military forces as a result of cosmopolitan 
frameworks for international conflict management. Their work is further 
analysed in this research project, in particular when examining differences 
between traditional conceptions of the military and where the military is situated 
in a cosmopolitan framweork. 
 
To achieve cosmopolitan ends, peacekeeping operations must be part of a 
wider process to remove the causes of structural violence in societies. Earlier in 
this chapter, Galtung argued strongly against peacekeeping operations being 
placed in positions where they are unassumingly supporting the status quo in 
vertical conflicts. For peacekeeping to be effective, he argued, it must be to 
protect those who are trying to alter the status quo and remove the violent 
structures that are creating the conflict. This is also an area where theorists 
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from critical theory have made an important contribution to ongoing research 
into the area. The critical theory school argues that without a strong body of 
research into the role of peacekeeping in global politics and the global 
economy, it will more likely fail to alter the status quo. 
 
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham’s work on cosmopolitan peacekeeping provides 
a possible answer to these issues. Through linking peacekeeping operations 
directly to cosmopolitan values, it links strongly to wider initiatives associated 
with removing structural causes of violence. Their work has also carried the 
initiatives in Bradford’s Peace Studies Department a stage further. Furthermore, 
it elaborates on Galtung’s ‘one-way wall’ concept of peacekeeping operations, 
but instead of protecting what Galtung termed the ‘freedom fighter’, it protects 
the vulnerable groups within conflict zones as well.  
Conclusions 
 
This chapter examines how the academic field of conflict resolution 
understands and contributes to the practice of peacekeeping operations. It 
contributes to the thesis by offering a solid conceptual base to further study 
training for peacekeeping, and also by understanding how - through the 
academic study of peacekeeping - there are further manifestations between the 
two fields. When revisiting the research questions25 that outline this research 
                                                
25 1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution 
theory and practice? (In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 
1994?) 2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there 
evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the 
changing nature of deployment zones? 3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan 
conception of peacekeeping? (Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping 
literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan 
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project, this chapter also goes some way to answering the first question - In 
what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict 
resolution theory and practice? (and the supplementary question: In what 
direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 1994?). As well 
as this, further conclusions can be reached with regards to the academic survey 
undertaken.  
The role of contact skills in the academic literature 
 
A number of the authors outlined above note the increased need for contact 
skills for peacekeepers. First encapsulated by Fetherston in 1994, it is apparent 
that the need has not diminished. Duffey has linked the need for contact skills to 
her work on culture, arguing that such skills be incorporated to assist 
peacekeepers to be more culturally sensitive towards those they are charged to 
protect. Diehl sees such skills as being ‘more diplomatic’, taking into account a 
political awareness of such actions (Diehl, 2008; 164). 
 
Fetherston’s initial description of contact skills as being ‘communication skills, 
methods of negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and conciliation’ has conflict 
resolution aspects, placing a great deal of emphasis on non-violent solutions to 
conflict situations (Fetherston, 1994b; 219). It may be worth noting that the 
political emphasis that Diehl places on contact skills, as well as emphasis from 
other corners may end up shifting the emphasis of contact skills away from the 
non-violent options for the soldier and towards managing the political 
                                                                                                                                          
ideals?) 
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consequences of using force. This is an interesting dilemma and may link to the 
further securitisation aspects of peacekeeping operations (which is further 
discussed in Chapter 4 which examines relation to civil-military coordination 
strategies). 
 
Furthermore, Fetherston’s work on contact skills is now almost fifteen years old. 
Yet still there is much being written about the need for increased contact skills 
for the military. Although it is heartening to see that the issue is still very much 
being written about, there is still too much of an emphasis on the introduction of 
contact skills, rather than amending existing programmes of contact skills. This 
brings us now to the next conclusion 
The existing provision of training 
 
As stated, there is still too much of an emphasis on the introduction of contact 
skills as opposed to amending existing programmes. Galtung’s research 
indicated an early desire for such training from soldiers deployed in the Middle 
East, and Tillett’s work showed how training could practically be incorporated 
with the Australian Defence Forces. Furthermore, Byrne and Keashly’s work, 
like Fetherston, highlighted the emergence of peacekeeping training centres 
which dealt with the wider aspects of training for peacekeeping. Most authors 
agreed that training had come a long distance since the early 1990’s, and now 
soldiers are at least being trained to expand the ‘toolbox’ of skills. However 
there still remain problems. Fetherston’s work highlighted the lack of existing 
training programmes in the military. Diehl, Druckman and Wall’s 1998 study of 
79 peacekeeping training programmes worldwide found that only 13% of the 
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training activities offered involved non- traditional skills. This, the authors argue, 
is problematic. Diehl’s 2008 study brings the debate up to date, and finds that 
even now not enough is being done to train soldiers in the unique skills needed 
for peacekeeping deployments.  
 
Some of the articles outlined above indicate possible reasons why training is 
not accepted as a necessary prerequisite. For example, Moskos finds that the 
level of training is not important when it comes to peacekeeping deployments, 
arguing that the skills are cultivated purely in the deployment zone. One can 
see reliance here on the perceived suitability of the ‘natural skills’ of the soldiers 
deployed in a peacekeeping environment. This reliance gives critics of such 
training a foundation to argue from. Fetherston finds this misleading assumption 
as a key obstacle in training peacekeepers effectively. The ‘nature’ versus 
‘nurture’ debate is examined in Chapter 6, with an analysis of whether 
traditional military cultures are able to adapt to the demands of contemporary 
peacekeeping deployments. 
 
Finally, the perceived lack of standardisation in training regimes for 
peacekeeping requires further attention. This issue has been outlined by 
Fetherston’s extensive work on training for UN operations. A lack of 
standardisation creates significant difficulties for the UN, at a time when it 
desperately needs military peacekeepers. In effect, what is being seen is that 
different contributors are offering troops which have vastly different training 
backgrounds. As the following chapter shows, this problematic area was key in 
the development of the UN’s Brahimi Report.  
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The conceptual location 
 
The conceptual location of this research has been explored in this chapter. 
Foremost, this is located within the field of conflict resolution research. 
Informing this is research emanating from Bradford’s Centre for Conflict 
Resolution. Much of this existing research takes international peacekeeping as 
a form of positive conflict resolution and transformation. This greatly informs the 
thesis, which starts with the underlying assumption that peacekeeping is a 
mechanism to facilitate a positive change from violent war-torn societies, to 
societies of peace. However, there has been a valuable contribution from the 
critical theory field, especially in exploring the existing assumptions of 
peacekeeping. Having a critical, reflexive approach benefits the research, as 
does the understanding of the multiple social constructions of peacekeeping, 
what defines success, and what different groups define as priorities for military 
peacekeepers.  
 
As well as contributing to the field of conflict resolution, this thesis aims to 
contribute to literature on cosmopolitan peacekeeping. The research project 
builds on existing work by Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, as well as 
Cheeseman and Elliot to explore how increased awareness of conflict 
resolution skills benefits a cosmopolitan model of peacekeeping. Elliot asserts 
that training is a key step in the creation of the ‘cosmopolitan soldier’, just as 
Goodwin outlines the importance of negotiation training for the ‘soldier 
diplomat’. In both cases, they observe a development of roles for military 
peacekeepers which are more in line with the cosmopolitan ideals espoused by 
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Woodhouse and Ramsbotham. Within the cosmopolitian framework, there 
exists an increase in non-traditional training for the military, to prepare soldiers 
for increased interaction with civilian groups and actors, as well as preparing 
them for being what Fetherston described as the ‘non-violent consensual 
conflict management’ face of the international community (Fetherston, 1998; 
178). If there is to be a cosmopolitan system based on the spread of positive 
peace, then it is military peacekeepers who are critical to the development from 
peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Ryan’s assertion of military peacekeepers 
being the ‘midwifes’ at the birth of new societies testifies to this. 
Next steps 
 
Next, this project provides an analysis of another layer of this multi-level 
synthesis: the UN. Here, the thesis examines the calls made for increased 
training of peacekeepers from practitioners and policy makers in the 
organisation. It outlines steps made within the UN to enhance training 
programmes, and how these developments are set within a larger development 
of UN policy which aims to incorporate peacebuilding mechanisms into 
operations, as well as incorporating cross-cutting themes to mandates. Through 
offering this, the chapter provides a consideration of the desire within the UN 
community to enhance conflict resolution skills for military peacekeepers.  
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Chapter 2.  
The development of training structures in the United 
Nations 
 
This chapter outlines how developments in the United Nations (UN) have 
impacted on training for peacekeeping operations, and UN documentation, 
policy, and guidelines that highlight an increased need for training in skills from 
the conflict resolution field. As the first chapter demonstrates, there is an 
emergent recognition from within the academic literature of the links between 
military forms of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This chapter examines to 
what extent the policy community – in this case, the UN – reflects that 
recognised need. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates that room exists within 
the policy community for increased interaction between the fields of military 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution, particularly through the area of training 
soldiers for peacekeeping operations. In doing so, it provides a solid base for 
the subsequent chapters of the thesis, and adds to the multilayered synthesis of 
academics and practitioners who call for closer collaboration between these two 
disciplines. 
 
Although peacekeeping is now undertaken by a multitude of actors at a national 
and regional level, it is important to focus on the UN for two main reasons. The 
first reason is the figure of deployed personnel. The number of UN 
peacekeepers has grown exponentially since 2000. In 2006, the Under-
Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations stated that the UN ‘operates 
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the second largest global military deployment’ (Guéhenno, 2006), and currently 
the UN has (according to its April 2010 figures) 101, 882 peacekeepers in the 
field, with 86, 357 being military personnel (DPKO, 2010). In addition, observers 
note that although its administrative capacities are relatively small in size, the 
UN currently deploys and supports more troops in the field than any other actor 
in the world (other than the United States Department of Defense), and that 
current UN deployments are larger than the cumulative numbers of deployed 
personnel from the UK, France, Russia and China (Jones et al., 2009; 35). Thus 
with such a large deployment, understanding how the UN is organised in terms 
of peacekeeping operations is essential. 
 
Secondly is the role of the UN as a ‘legitimate’ source of peacekeeping. This 
links both to conflict resolution and cosmopolitan scholars, who understand the 
role of the UN as a legitimate third party intervener in conflict. Goulding argues 
that the UN’s peacekeeping activities ‘can include military tasks which are 
wholly or partly cosmopolitan in nature’. Such activities, in Goulding’s view, 
involve coercive action against a government or illegal regime ‘for reasons that 
are at least partly cosmopolitan’, protection of humanitarian and civilian 
operations, guarding vital institutions, threatened communities, prominent 
personalities, using force to uphold human rights, and demining activities 
(Goulding, 2004; 108). Cheeseman and Elliot note that the UN Charter 
‘resounds in cosmopolitan values’, possesses a membership which is ‘broadly 
representative’, and highlights a shifting balance from the importance of the 
rights of states to the rights of the individual to the extent that ‘humanitarian 
intervention may have become an accepted, if still somewhat qualified, norm in 
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international relations’ (Cheeseman and Elliot, 2004; 278). Furthermore, 
cosmopolitan authors see the UN as a stepping-stone to more cosmopolitan 
conceptions of international relations. Archibugi examines reform proposals of 
the UN - in particular an ‘Assembly of the Peoples’, reform to the International 
Court of Justice, and modifications to the Security Council - to establish a 
stronger sense of democracy in international society, as a way of incorporating 
a more cosmopolitan set of mechanisms to confront the ‘ills of the 
world’(Archibugi, 1995). Held’s assessment of the ideas and principles of the 
UN highlight the cosmopolitan nature of the institution. He argues that 
 
The UN Charter system has been distinctively innovative and influential 
in a number of respects. It has provided an international forum in which 
all states are in certain respects equal, a forum of particular value to 
developing countries and to those seeking a basis for ‘consensus’ 
solutions to international problems. It has provided a framework for 
decolonisation, and for the pursuit of the reform of international 
institutions. Moreover, it has provided a vision, valuable in spite of all its 
limitations, of a new world order based upon a meeting of governments 
and, under appropriate circumstances, of a supranational presence in 
world affairs championing human rights. Indeed, this vision, if carried to 
its logical extreme, challenges the whole principle that humankind should 
be organized as a society of sovereign states above all else. (Held, 
1995; 88-89)  
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From the conflict resolution field, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall also find 
that the UN as a ‘manifestation of clear progress having been made over the 
last fifty years’, and make the case that the UN may evolve as ‘the only 
genuinely global political institution capable of delivering authoritative 
endorsement of fundamental international values, and of conferring legitimacy 
on the most difficult international undertakings’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 326). 
Thus, in their view and for those engaged in conflict resolution, the UN offers a 
framework that is essential for the realisation of conflict resolution goals.  
 
Rubenstein sees the legitimacy of the UN embedded in the ‘root metaphor’ of 
the organisation. He argues (in an article outlining a cultural approach to 
understanding peacekeeping operations) that the legitimacy of the UN rests on 
it symbolising a world order ‘not dominated by national interests’, and goes on 
to say that within such a world order: 
 
The weak are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and 
conflicts settled peacefully. 
(Rubinstein, 2005; 356-357) 
 
Peacekeeping, as a function of the UN has therefore manifested itself within 
this root metaphor, using a ‘military without weapons in the service of peace’ to 
reinforce an image of an international community ‘acting in a neutral, 
consensual manner to sustain a stable world economy’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 356-
357). Rubenstein does argue, however, that the root metaphor of the UN is in 
some doubt due to the radical changes seen in peacekeeping operations. For 
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instance, Rubenstein deems the peacekeeping ‘failures’ in the 1990’s - in 
particular, operations in Somalia, Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia - and the 
range of reasons for such failures occurring as being one reason why 
operations have ‘lost much of their culturally constituted and symbolically 
achieved legitimacy, standing, and authority’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 539). Moreover, 
UN responses to more violent operating environments - usually through the 
acceptance that peacekeepers will use more force themselves - has in turn 
taken peacekeeping to work ‘outside of the core meanings of the symbols of 
peacekeeping’ and have ‘come close to, if not crossed, the edge of what the 
root metaphor can support’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 539). Rubenstein asserts that 
there seems to be a tacit agreement that the organisation represents a 
considerable step forward in terms of pursuing conflict resolution and 
cosmopolitan goals, however, its actions through the post cold war period, have 
tarnished that image. This is important for this thesis, as it highlights the 
difficulties of allying the core principles of the UN to the difficult operating 
environments into which its peacekeeping operations are deployed. This 
chapter will revisit Rubenstein’s argument in its conclusions, and try to 
understand to what extent current UN policy meets its ‘root metaphors’.  
 
This chapter examines a number of different areas of the UN system, and 
charts what impact they have on peacekeeping operations. The point of 
departure is the 2000 ‘Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’, more 
commonly known as the Brahimi Report. The chapter then examines the 
increasing institutionalisation of peacebuilding and the development of the 
‘integrated missions’ concept and mechanisms within the UN. Both of which are 
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of critical importance when examining peacekeeping operations and have 
influenced the role of peacekeepers, and their subsequent training needs. The 
second main area of study is the role of mandates and Cross Cutting 
Resolutions, as both illustrate where the decisions made at a Security Council 
level have serious ramifications on the activities of military peacekeepers. 
Finally, this chapter analyses how the developments within the UN system have 
manifested into the new Integrated Training Service, and updated training 
strategy. From this survey, the thesis outlines a considerably up-to-date 
account of training within the UN system, and shows where there is space in the 
‘policy community’ for increased training in conflict resolution skills for military 
peacekeepers. 
The Brahimi Report and subsequent change 
 
With the recognised failure of the UN to protect civilians in Rwanda and 
Srebrenica (examined in self-critical reports into the failures (UN, 1999b, UN, 
1999d)), Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned the Brahimi Report in 
order to ‘assess the United Nations ability to conduct peace operations 
effectively, and to offer frank, specific and realistic recommendations for ways in 
which to enhance that capacity’ (UN, 2000a). It was contended that ‘[w]ithout 
significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed 
commitment on the part of Member States’ (UN, 2000c; viii). The report argued, 
‘the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping 
and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months 
and years’ (UN, 2000c; viii). In March 2000, the Brahimi report was presented to 
the Security Council, containing some 57 explicit recommendations and over 
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100 implicit recommendations which covered areas such as doctrine, 
deployment, staffing and the use of Information technology (Guéhenno, 2002; 
73). Much of the recent change in the UN has stemmed from the Brahimi 
Report. 
 
A key area of the Brahimi recommendations was to develop peacekeeping 
doctrine. In this respect, the effects of Peace Support Operations26 (PSO) 
doctrine were clearly felt. Like PSO doctrine, Brahimi recognised that consent 
was a phenomenon that could easily be manipulated by belligerent groups. It 
examined the characteristics of intra-state conflict, such as smaller fighting 
forces and paramilitary groups with little or no ties to political structures, and 
found that such types of groups would be less likely to offer full consent to the 
deployment of UN peacekeepers27. Therefore, in understanding the ‘fluidity’ of 
consent in war zones, the Brahimi Report proposed that UN peacekeepers use 
force in an impartial manner against what it termed as ‘spoilers’ to a peace 
process28. Furthermore, in a significant development for peacekeeping 
operations, this use of force was not only to protect UN peacekeepers but it was 
now also used to protect civilians. The Report argued that: 
 
Rules of Engagement should not limit contingents stroke-for-stroke 
responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of 
deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they 
are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations, should 
                                                
26 Developments in doctrine leading up to and involving PSO doctrine are outlined on page 43. 
27 The experience of the UNPROFOR intervention in Bosnia, where consent was manipulated 
by some groups to create ‘breathing space’ to re-arm, was an influencing factor here. 
28 The term ‘spoilers’ also being used in the UK peacekeeping doctrine JWP-3-50 Peace 
Support Operations. 
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not force United Nations Contingents to cede the initiative to their 
attackers. 
(UN, 2000c; 9) 
 
This was a significant step forward in the light of the UN’s failures to protect 
civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica . Reports into failures in both cases had 
been damning about the inability of the UN to prevent catastrophe and the 
mass killing of civilians. Furthermore, the Brahimi Report outlined that the use of 
force in an impartial manner was essential for the success of UN peacekeeping. 
Impartiality, defined in the Brahimi Report, was the adherence to the ‘principles 
of the [UN] Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those 
Charter principles’ (UN, 2000c; 9). Once again, this showed a clear 
development of the proposals outlined in JWP 3-50. More importantly, it is a  
proposal that carries a considerable impact on the need for soldiers to 
understand the level of force that can be used, and how force - when employed 
in what can be considered as a non-impartial manner - can have an effect on 
the operation.   
 
Looking at the preparedness of peacekeepers, a trend was noted in 
peacekeeping operations where member states were finding it more difficult to 
convince national legislatures and public of the need to deploy into 
peacekeeping operations. Coupled with downsizing of militaries and a growth in 
regional peacekeeping initiatives, this led the report to reason that this trend 
was indicative of a depletion in the ‘pool of well-trained and well-equipped 
military contingents from developed countries to serve in United Nations-led 
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operations’ (UN, 2000c; 18). It went on to outline the frailties in peacekeeping 
operations: 
 
Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations, and in any case 
the various contingents in an operation are unlikely to have trained or 
worked together before. Some units may have no personnel who can 
speak the mission language. Even if language is not a problem, they 
may lack common operating procedures and have differing 
interpretations of key elements of command and control and of the 
mission’s rules of engagement, and may have differing expectations 
about mission requirements for the use of force.  
(UN, 2000c; 18) 
 
This, in the view of the report’s authors, posed a considerable challenge to 
effective peacekeeping. Not only did it challenge the UN’s guidelines of quick 
and effective deployment, but it also impacted on effective mandate 
implementation and the ability of a peacekeeping operation to foster ‘secure 
local environment for peacebuilding’ (UN, 2000c; 5).  
 
It was partly because of this explanation of the operational environment that led 
the panel to propose the idea of Brigade Size forces to be constituted from 
member states to be ready for effective deployment for a ‘traditional operation’ 
(30 days after a mandate was passed) and/or a ‘complex operation’ (60 days 
after a mandate was passed). This assessment also led the panel to 
recommend that in order to operate as a coherent force, troop contributors, at 
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the very least, should ‘have been trained and equipped according to a common 
standard, supplemented by joint planning at the contingents’ command level’ 
(UN, 2000c; 19). The Brahimi Report advised on common standards, placing 
responsibility with the UN Secretariat in particular recommending that the UN 
establish ‘the minimum training, equipment and other standards required’ for 
forces to participate in operations. It also recommended that better equipped 
member states assist troop contributors from ‘less developed countries’ to 
enable them to reach the UN’s minimum standards (UN, 2000c; 19). Finally, the 
Report recommended that the Secretariat should send a training team to 
confirm the level of preparedness of each potential troop-contributing country to 
‘meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite 
training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment’. In the report’s view, 
those states who do not meet the UN’s standards ‘must not deploy’ (UN, 2000c; 
20).  
 
Concerns over the preparedness of military peacekeepers in the Brahimi report 
were heavily influenced by the near-failure of the UNAMSIL operation in Sierra 
Leone, which suffered as a result of poorly trained and equipped troops, 
although it was mandated by a particularly strong resolution from the Security 
Council. This is reflected in the report, where it noted that the problems of 
command and control that arose in that particular operation was the ‘most 
recent illustration of what cannot be tolerated any longer’, and strongly advised 
that troop contributors ensure that the troops which they provide fully 
understand the’ importance of an integrated chain of command, the operational 
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control of the Secretary-General and the standard operating procedures and 
rules of engagement of the mission’ (UN, 2000c; 45). 
 
Importantly, it was not only in the remit of military doctrine where the Brahimi 
Report made recommendations for training and preparedness. In the field of 
human rights training, the Report identified that there was a need for 
peacekeeping personnel to be trained in fostering a greater understanding of 
the intricacies of the area. It recommended that the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘coordinate and institutionalize’ human 
rights field work in peacekeeping operations, and organize human rights 
training for all personnel in peace operations (UN, 2000c; 41). Importantly, the 
Report finished with a profound note to what peacekeepers need to understand 
with regards to gender and culture issues. Though this does not necessarily 
result in an outright recommendation, it highlights the need for UN 
peacekeepers to be sensitive to the conflict environment: 
 
United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others, are 
obliged to respect local norms, culture and practices. They must go out 
of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know 
their host environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture 
and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding 
that they are guests in someone else’s home, however destroyed that 
home might be, particularly when the United Nations takes on a 
transitional administration role. And they must also treat one another with 
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respect and dignity, with particular sensitivity towards gender and cultural 
differences. 
(UN, 2000c; 45-46) 
 
Such a statement illustrates a recognized need for effective training 
programmes in what Fetherston outlined as ‘contact skills’ for military 
peacekeepers (Fetherston, 1994b; 219)29. Although there is no specific 
recommendation, the Report clearly refers to the need for cultural awareness, a 
deep understanding of the deployment zone, and an awareness of gender 
issues.  
 
Following the Brahimi Report, there were three separate Secretary General 
Reports, which specifically dealt with the implementation of Brahimi’s 
recommendations. The main developments of training pertained to structural 
changes, and creation of new material in human rights and gender.  
 
An obvious impact of the Brahimi report was a considered restructuring of the 
UN’s capabilities, particularly with regards to the need for strengthening the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (An outline of the initial 
recommendations will be outlined now, before a more detailed examination later 
in the chapter). The main change involved improving training capacities, with 
the Secretary General (in his first report to the Security Council), outlining his 
desire to ‘enhance the Secretariat’s capacity to assist Member States with 
training initiatives’ as well as his request for additional resources to facilitate 
                                                
29 Fetherston outlines contact skills as ‘the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, 
facilitation, mediation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate potentially violent or 
manifestly violent situations and facilitate movement toward conflict resolution’. 
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these changes (UN, 2000b; 16). This meant that there was a recognised need 
to strengthen and expand the DPKO’s Training Unit – a recommendation made 
in 200030 (UN, 2000b; 24). The Secretary General also advocated the 
development of the UN Military Staff College, which aimed to train middle level 
mission leadership in the UN system (UN, 2000b; 16).  In response to the 
recommendation about sending teams out to assess peacekeeping personnel, 
the Secretary General stated that the costs of sustaining contingents who do 
not have necessary training or equipment ‘is an unnecessary expense to the 
organisation, both in financial terms, and to its reputation’ (UN, 2000b; 17). His 
report added that in some of the instances where a training team was sent out 
to a troop contributing country (in the pre-deployment phase), there has been 
prevention of deployments that would be otherwise ‘premature’ (UN, 2000b; 
17). Such calls were expanded upon in 2001, when the Secretary General 
stated that a ‘much greater effort’ needed to be devoted to enhancing and 
improving programmes for facilitating Member States’ training of personnel 
before deployment (UN, 2001a; 16). 
 
In December 2001, the Secretary General reported that there was movement in 
a number of UN structures that dealt with training of military peacekeepers. 
Progress was noted in the translation and dissemination of official UN training 
publications, so that all publications would be in the official languages of the 
UN, and ‘material reaches all those responsible for peacekeeping training’ (UN, 
                                                
30 The Secretary General said in his report: ‘I am proposing not only to strengthen the Military 
Division, but to extensively restructure it as well, as described in the request for additional 
resources. In summary, the Military Division would consist of the following: (a) Office of the 
Military Adviser; (b) Current Military Operations Service; (c) Military Planning Service; (d) Force 
Generation and Military Personnel Service (including United Nations standby arrangements 
system management); (e) Training and Evaluation Service’ (UN, 2000b; 24). 
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2001b; 12). Further progress was noted in training personnel in mission, with 
the creation in Mission Training Cells in a number of UN operations. 
Furthermore, the December 2001 report added that the DPKO would further 
develop the Standard Generic Training Modules, as well as improving ‘train the 
trainer’ courses, and revitalising the DPKO website. Finally, the December 2001 
report noted that the DPKO was working on developing pre-deployment training 
assessment standards, as well as understanding methodologies to assess 
contingents prior to deployment (UN, 2001b; 12-13). 
 
Responding to the issue of increased training for UN personnel in human rights, 
the June 2001 follow-up report was critical of the UN’s capacities to effectively 
train personnel in human rights, stating that support provided to Human Rights 
components in operations was ‘inadequate’, due to the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) having insufficient staffing or 
resources. It recommended that OHCHR needed to be in a position where it is 
closely involved in planning peacekeeping operations which address human 
rights. The Secretary General argued that: 
 
If such operations are to have effective human rights components, 
OHCHR should be able to coordinate human rights fieldwork in 
peacekeeping operations; second personnel to integrated mission task 
forces in New York; recruit human rights field personnel; organize human 
rights training for all personnel in peacekeeping operations, including the 
law and order components; and create model databases for human 
rights field incorporating gender perspectives throughout. 
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(UN, 2001a; 44) 
 
The need for effective training in gender issues was highlighted in the June 
2001 response, with the report noting that as a result of insufficient attention 
being paid to gender issues, strained relations had developed between 
‘peacekeeping personnel and the host communities, between internationally 
and locally recruited staff and among internationally recruited staff themselves’ 
(UN, 2001a; 29). By the time of the December 2001 report, the Secretary 
General noted that the DPKO had developed a training curriculum on ‘gender 
awareness and sensitivity’ for military and police contingents which had been 
tested four operations31. Such packages went hand in hand with packages 
designed for members of civilian UN staff. Both these areas have been assisted 
by the UN mandates that specifically address human rights and gender issues 
(discussed further below).  
The institutional development of Peacebuilding in the UN 
 
Following on from the Brahimi Report, there has been a number of initiatives in 
the UN that attempt to institutionalise the peacebuilding components of 
operations, taking them far beyond the ‘securitisation’ tasks of traditional military 
peacekeeping. In turn, and significantly for this thesis, importance is attached to 
training as an ‘enabler’ for peacekeeping to transfer to peacebuilding. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, Last noted that there were two ‘capability caps’ 
in peacekeeping operations. The first was to control violence, or putting the 
                                                
31 The operations were UNTAET (East Timor), UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea), MONUC (DRC), and 
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone). 
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‘hawks in a box’; and, the second was ‘our ability to rebuild the trust that permits 
cooperation between parties and lets the doves out of their boxes’. He argues 
that there is a gap between the skills of the organisations involved in 
peacekeeping operations and their physical capabilities. Whilst finding that the 
NGO communities have skills needed for peacebuilding but not the capabilities 
to reach small areas, Last finds that ‘military peacekeeping deployments quickly 
reach small communities, but lack key peacebuilding skills, particularly those 
involving language, culture and relationship building’ (Last, 2000; 85-87). 
 
It is in this nexus where training needs go beyond the remit of the ‘traditional 
military skills’ of security and military operations. This crossover has most 
clearly been seen in the development of peacekeeping operations in Burundi 
and Sierra Leone. As the peacekeeping component of the UNAMSIL operation 
has been examined above, an overview of the peacebuilding component of the 
operation is now provided. On the 1st January 2006, The Peacekeeping 
operation, UNAMSIL was replaced by the peacebuilding operation, UNIOSIL 
(UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone)32. At the heart of the UNIOSIL operation 
was a civilian-led peacebuilding mandate, which was designed to build on the 
negative peace of the UNAMSIL operation. UN Security Council Resolution 
1620 mandated the operation to assist the government of Sierra Leone in a 
number of peacebuilding measures including: 
 
building the capacity of State institutions to address further the root 
causes of the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress 
                                                
32 UNIOSIL has since been replaced (after Security Council Resolution 1829 (2008)) by the 
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). 
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towards the Millennium Development Goals through poverty reduction 
and sustainable economic growth, including through the creation of an 
enabling framework for private investment and systematic efforts to 
address HIV/AIDS. 
 (UN, 2005f) 
 
The transition from the UNAMSIL operation, which at its height involved the 
deployment of over 17,000 peacekeepers, to the politically-led UNIOSIL 
operation demonstrates the new phase in peacekeeping operations, where the 
crossover between the military and political sections are crucial to the success 
of the operation. Speaking in 2005, Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that 
the UNAMSIL exit strategy gave a clear space for the establishment of 
UNIOSIL: 
 
The Mission’s exit strategy, which was based on a carefully calibrated 
gradual drawdown of the Mission’s military component and guided by 
specific benchmarks, was also an innovative approach by the Security 
Council. This approach gave Sierra Leone the requisite security space to 
consolidate peace over the past three years.  
(UN, 2005d) 
 
Linking this to Last’s observation made above, military peacekeepers are 
directly involved in the transition from security related tasks to those which 
promote development. In Sierra Leone, this was the case. In addition, a number 
of contingents deployed throughout the country applied their skills to develop 
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local capacities, both through providing extra security and through Quick Impact 
Projects33 (UN, 2003b; 28). The UNAMSIL public opinion survey noted this: 
 
Sierra Leoneans described that the UN peacekeepers had built roads 
and bridges, road networks, shelters, health centers, radio stations, 
schools, mosques, churches, and market structures. They gave out free 
medical care and medicine, free school supplies, food, and clothing. 
They built quality water wells, rehabilitated prisons, carried out night 
patrols, and built town clocks. All of this builds good will and trust with the 
local population. Building roads, schools, and other development projects 
enables people to strengthen their own capacities to be productive and 
return to normal life, ultimately contributing to peace. 
(Kranso, 2005; 9) 
 
Furthermore in 2005, General Assembly Resolution 60/180 and Security 
Council Resolution 1645 established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). This 
again illustrates the drive to institutionalise peacebuilding in the UN.  The PBC 
(which is supported by the PBSO and PBF) is comprised of 31 member 
countries34, and is mandated to: 
                                                
33 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale projects carried out predominantly by military 
personnel. The Sierra Leone Lessons Learned report notes how QIPS were commonly used in 
‘potentially volatile areas’, so that ‘a peace dividend could be seen immediately’ (UN 2003a; 28).  
34 The Full list of member countries: Seven from the Security Council (including the five 
permanent members); Seven from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), giving 
particular consideration to countries with experience in post-conflict recovery; Five from the top 
10 financial contributors to the UN budgets, including voluntary contributions to UN agencies 
and programs and the Peacebuilding Fund; Five from the top 10 providers of military personnel 
and civilian police to UN missions; and Seven additional members, to redress geographical 
imbalance and include countries with post-conflict experience, to be elected by the General 
Assembly. 
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focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts 
necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of 
integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable 
development. 
(UN, 2005g) 
 
The crossover between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is apparent here, and 
can be linked to the UN’s ‘integrated missions’ concept (outlined below) and 
developments in civil-military relations (outlined in the Chapter 3).  
 
Therefore, at an institutional level, the UN is attempting to develop a ‘system’ to 
cover the development from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Importantly, this 
highlights the importance the UN places on the transfer of ‘negative peace’ into 
‘positive ‘peace’. Through these policies, the UN has also acknowledged that 
there is a fundamental shift of how long-term security is perceived and that this 
is based on more than a traditional military response. This development means 
there is an increased need for training to account for the crossover between the 
military and civilian aspects of peacekeeping operations. The effects that this 
has on the changing nature of UN training are discussed below, and the impact 
it has on specific training regimes is referred to throughout this thesis. 
The integrated mission concept 
 
Linked to the developments outlined above, the integrated missions concept 
represents an institution-wide attempt by the UN Secretariat to offer a more 
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holistic approach to operations, and is related to attempts made in the UN to 
address causes of conflict (the peacebuilding tasks) whilst the peacekeeping 
deployment is taking place. It is important to recognise when examining UN 
practices, that the drive to integrate the security and civilian/political aspects of 
operations is high on the agenda. The integrated mission concept is a 
development from the ‘linear’ model of peacekeeping-peacebuilding which 
dominated UN thinking since Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda or Peace, into a much 
more holistic concept, where peacebuilding activities begin as soon as an 
operation is deployed. The UN’s 2006 Integrated Missions Planning Process 
Guidelines describe integration (in the context of a peacekeeping operation) as: 
 
the guiding principle for the planning, design and implementation of 
complex UN operations in post-conflict situations, for linking the different 
dimensions of peace support operations (political, development, 
humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security), and 
integrating the imperatives of each dimension into its strategic thinking 
and design; 
(UN, 2006b; 3) 
 
The development of this approach comes from the UN Secretariat wishing to 
implement structures to the ad hoc nature of relationships that have been built 
up in peacekeeping operations. It is also viewed by UN policymakers as a 
pragmatic response to difficulties encountered throughout the 1990’s when the 
UN began attempts to develop its peacekeeping mechanisms so that 
operations could provide an increasingly all-encompassing approach to address 
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underlying causes of the conflict as well as providing the negative peace 
aspects. However, difficulties encountered in operations such as Somalia 
(which required a significant amount of aid delivery as well as the traditional 
security tasks) meant that the UN had to call on a much wider range of 
expertise than once envisaged. Jennings and Kaspersen argue that the impulse 
to move to integrated missions grew out of ‘a conviction that the peacekeeping 
failures of the 1990’s were at least partly attributable to the various elements of 
the UN acting separately, and occasionally at cross purposes’ (Jennings and 
Kaspersen, 2008a; 445). The Brahimi Report noted these challenges and called 
for integrated mission task forces to coordinate peacekeeping operations. The 
task forces would comprise of a number of agencies including OCHA, DPA, 
UNHCR, and UNDP to name a few (UN, 1999a; 34). This process of linking the 
UN agencies has led to the concept of the integrated mission.  
 
 
 
 
Since the Brahimi Report, the UN has placed increased emphasis on this 
concept of integrated missions. In 2005, the UN Executive Committee on 
Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) commissioned a report to study the effectiveness 
of integrated missions, entitled Report on Integrated Missions: Practical 
Perspectives and Recommendations. This report found that integrated missions 
were an instrument needed to address situations which require ‘a system-wide 
UN response’ which encompasses a number of actors and approaches ‘within 
an overall political-strategic crisis management framework’(Eide et al., 2005; 
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14). In 2006, Secretary General Kofi Annan outlined integrated missions as 
being based on a ‘common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the 
priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at 
various stages of the recovery process’ (UN, 2006a; 1). His report, Note of 
Guidance on Integrated Missions develops this idea, commenting that clear 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of different actors is required in 
order to ensure effective coordination between the mission, UN agencies and 
other external bodies. Though this concept places emphasis on the 
peacebuilding aspect of operations, the larger picture of military peacekeeping - 
as one component of a larger-scale operation (as seen in PSO doctrine) - is 
essential. This in turn emphasises the need for cooperation amongst different 
actors in a deployment. Secretary General Annan added that: 
 
Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad 
range of actors, including the national authorities and the local 
population, in a long-term peacebuilding effort. The rationale for the 
integration of activities undertaken by the United Nations is to assist 
countries to make this transition from conflict to sustainable peace. The 
UN’s presence must therefore be based on a clear and shared 
understanding of priorities and willingness by all actors to contribute 
toward the achievement of peace. 
(UN, 2006a; 1) 
 
This process led to the adoption in 2006 of the Integrated Missions Planning 
Process Guidelines, as well as structural changes in the UN, including the 
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splitting of the DPKO into two different cells (which is discussed below) and the 
creation of Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) and Joint Operation 
Centres (JOCs). These changes have led Jennings and Kaspersen to conclude 
that integration ‘seems to have become an entrenched principle that will guide 
the planning, development and implementation of UN peace operations in years 
to come’ (Jennings and Kaspersen, 2008a; 446). In De Conning’s view, the 
integrated mission concept provides a strong bond between the security 
functions of peacekeeping with wider peacebuilding tasks 
 
integrated missions thus refers to ‘integration’ across the UN System, in 
that it combines the peace and security responsibilities of a UN peace 
operation with the development and humanitarian mandates typically 
represented in the UN Country Teams that are present in most 
developing countries, even in the absence of a conflict or natural 
disaster. 
(De Conning, 2007) 
 
This series of changes to the institutional culture at the UN shows the 
development of a more encompassing view of peacekeeping operations, which 
also incorporates the development of the PBC. However, like the development 
of peacebuilding, it also brings challenges to understandings of civil-military 
cooperation within a peacekeeping operation, and the consequences for 
training - an aspect of the integrated mission concept explored in the following 
chapter. Nevertheless, in order to outline the ‘working culture’ of the UN, it is 
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important to understand that integration is a driving force behind much of the 
operational developments in the organisation.  
UNSC Mandates and Cross cutting resolutions 
 
Analysing Security Council Resolutions is important for two reasons. Firstly, 
Security Council Resolutions create UN peacekeeping missions, give missions 
a series of objectives, and dictate how the mission should achieve those 
objectives. Secondly, Resolutions also offer norms and guidelines for 
peacekeepers to work under. This may be through specific Resolutions 
mandating operations, or through more general Resolutions, which cover 
thematic issues. Colonel Bob Stewart, who commanded the first British 
deployment in the UNPROFOR operation, said of UN mandates: 
 
A founding principle of the United Nations is unanimity of purpose. But 
unanimity is impossible without compromise in any political system and 
the United Nations is most certainly that. For us in the field this means 
that any instructions we receive are likely to be a compromise between 
the aspirations of all the nations drafting out instructions. Mandates will 
thus normally be the sum of the ‘bottom line’ option that each state can 
accept. This is a fact of life and it is no good ranting and railing about it. 
We have to get on with the job. In my view people should be realistic and 
thankful when a mandate can be agreed. It is up to us in the field to 
implement the mandate in a practical way and interpret events on the 
ground in a way perhaps the Security Council cannot. 
(Stewart, 1993; 315) 
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Security Council mandates are not always perfect. Mandates will continue to 
be, as Stewart said a ‘bottom line’ of the consensus of the Security Council, and 
the values they promote, will have a continued impact on what military 
peacekeepers need to know and how they carry out their tasks. A recent 
Foreign policy magazine article outlining the ‘10 Worst U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions Ever’, included resolutions on sanctions, terrorism, land disputes, 
and the internal structures of the UN Peacekeeping operations which 
constituted four of the ten on the list, with two contemporary operations (Darfur 
and Somalia), and two 1990’s operations (Rwanda and Bosnia) also highlighted 
(Lynch, 2010).  
 
A small sample was taken of current UN missions to see where training 
appears35. This sample shows that training most notably appears in two distinct 
areas. Firstly, UN mandates refer to training as part of wider security sector 
reform programmes, or in building national capacities. For the MINURCAT 
operation, much reference was given to training the Détachement intégré de 
sécurité (DIS) (the Chadian gendarmerie) (UN, 2009j), as well as supporting 
efforts ‘aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governments of Chad and 
the Central African Republic and civil society’ through training in international 
human rights standards (UN, 2007d). The UNAMID mandate (set out in the 
2007 report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission), mandates UNAMID to train community police in camps for IDPs, 
as well as supporting the Government of Sudan in reconstructing the police 
                                                
35 Operations were chosen at random from the ‘current operations’ section of the DPKO 
website: MINURCAT (Chad), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIS (Sudan), UNMIL (Liberia), MONUC (DR 
Congo), MINUSTAH (Haiti). 
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force, which involves a degree of training and mentoring (UN, 2007a). Requests 
for training to support police reform were outlined in UNSCR 1812 which formed 
the basis of the UNMIS operation, (UN, 2008e) UNSCR 1509, which outlined 
the UNMIL operation (UN, 2003e), Resolutions 1493 and 1756, on the MONUC 
operation (UN, 2003d, UN, 2007c),  and resolutions 1542 and 1780 , which both 
concerned the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti (UN, 2004e, UN, 2007e). Some 
resolutions are more explicit on what they wish to see trained: for example, 
resolution 1906 regarding the MONUC operation asked MONUC to provide 
military training in areas of human rights, international humanitarian law, child 
protection and the prevention of gender-based and sexual violence (UN, 
2009m). 
 
The second main area is linked to the UN’s policy on prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse by UN personnel in the field. This is tackled in more 
detail in the next chapter, but it is worth noting that a considerable amount of 
reference to training is made with regard to training being one of a number of 
strategies designed to stop peacekeepers transgressing. Resolution 1712 
(UNMIL) offers an example of the wording used with regards to training: 
 
6. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by UNMIL to implement the 
Secretary- General’s zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and 
abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United 
Nations code of conduct, and requests the Secretary-General to take all 
necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council 
informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate 
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preventive action, including the conduct of predeployment awareness 
training, and to take disciplinary and other action to ensure that 
allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse against their personnel are 
properly investigated and, if substantiated, punished 
(UN, 2006d) 
 
In varying degrees, this appears in all resolutions that mandate operations. It 
may be more direct in some cases, such as in the case of MONUC where 
allegations were made against UN troops serving in that particular mission, but 
it remains a constant feature in all operations.  
 
Returning to the UNAMSIL operation, one mandate that specifically mentioned 
training was the resolution establishing UNAMSIL. Resolution 1270, passed 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was very specific about what training 
should be carried out for UNAMSIL personnel. The Security Council underlined 
the importance of training UNAMSIL personnel in ‘international humanitarian, 
human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, 
negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military 
coordination’ (UN, 1999g). This resolution appears to be the exception rather 
than the rule on UN mandates, and (as was shown in the Brahimi report) it is 
debatable how effective the mandate was in influencing the deployment of fully 
trained troops throughout the mission, as it suffered almost catastrophic failure 
in the summer of 2000.  
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In addition to the two recurring themes within mandates, there has been the 
evolution of what have been termed ‘cross cutting resolutions’. These 
resolutions are focussed on three overarching themes: Children in armed 
conflict; Protection of civilians in armed conflict; Women and peace and security 
and will be examined below.  
Children in armed conflict 
 
This thematic area has seen eight resolutions passed through the UN Security 
Council, beginning with UNSCR 1261 (UN, 1999e), which requests that the 
Secretary General ensure that UN peacekeeping personnel have access to 
‘appropriate training on the protection, rights and welfare of children’, and urges 
states, regional and international organisations to ensure that ‘appropriate 
training’ is included for personnel involved in similar activities. Security Council 
Resolution 1314 (UN, 2000e) builds on this by calling for child protection staff to 
be included in operations, and the provision of training to personnel about the 
rights of women and children. In 2001, UNSCR 1379 added that training is 
required in where international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law has 
a relevant impact on children (as well as assessing at the impact of HIV/AIDS) 
(UN, 2001c).  
 
Since UNSCR 1379, the Security Council has mainly passed resolutions that re-
iterate the need for effective measures to deal with children in armed conflict. 
Resolution 1460, passed in 2003, calls for an ‘era of application’ of international 
norms and standards pertaining to the protection of children affected by armed 
conflict, and repeated the need to have effective training in child protection 
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issues (UN, 2003f). However, Resolution 1539 (passed in April 2004), noted 
with some concern the lack of progress on the ground, where ‘parties to conflict 
continue to violate with impunity the relevant provisions of applicable 
international law relating to the rights and protection of children in armed 
conflict’ (UN, 2004d). Despite three more resolutions being passed after 
Resolution 1539, it was only Resolution 1612 which dealt specifically with 
training. However, this was (like many of the mission-specific mandates), as 
part of a wider call for UN peacekeeping to deal with allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse (UN, 2005e). 
Protection of civilians in armed conflict 
 
As the introduction to this thesis outlines, mandates pertaining to the protection 
of civilians in armed conflict was a watershed moment in international 
peacekeeping efforts. Linked to the development of more narrow conceptions of 
human security, these resolutions also offer a good indication of what the 
Security Council deems to be adequate training for effective protection of 
civilians in conflict zones. Importantly, Resolutions 1265 and 1296, give a 
quality outline, offering an opening for ‘contact skills’ in operations. This is a 
critical statement in charting the impact of non-traditional skills in policy circles. 
Resolution 1265 states the following: 
 
14. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that United Nations 
personnel involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building 
activities have appropriate training in international humanitarian, human 
rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, 
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negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-
military coordination, and urges States and relevant international and 
regional organizations to ensure that appropriate training is included in 
their programmes for personnel involved in similar activities; (UN, 1999f)  
 
Resolution 1296 develops this by further requesting that the Secretary General 
to ensure that UN personnel have appropriate training, and urging that member 
states to disseminate ‘appropriate instructions’ and to ‘ensure appropriate 
training’ is included for peacekeeping personnel (UN, 2000d). Resolutions 1674 
and 1738 (both passed in 2006) make little reference to training for military 
peacekeepers, focussing mainly on protection of journalists and media 
personnel and calling on parties to respect civilian protection issues (UN, 
2006c, UN, 2006e). On the tenth anniversary of Resolution 1265, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1894, which restated the need for appropriate 
training for personnel in issues of civilian protection, as well as requesting 
member states to configure training programmes to raise awareness and 
responsiveness to issues of civilian protection, and, reflecting the ‘trends’ in 
mandates since UNSCR 1265, ‘including training on HIV/AIDS and zero 
tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions’ (UN, 
2009l). 
Women and peace and security 
 
Four resolutions have been passed on the topic of ‘women and peace and 
security’ since the landmark UNSCR 1325, passed in 2000. Resolution 1325 
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made a direct reference to training for peacekeeping operations, requesting the 
Secretary General to:  
 
provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the 
protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the 
importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building 
measures, 
 
It also invited member states to incorporate such elements into training, as well 
as HIV/AIDS training, into national training programmes (UN, 2000f). Resolution 
1820, passed in June 2008 focused on women being targets of violence, and 
requested the Secretary General (alongside Security Council, the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant 
States) to develop training programmes to help peacekeepers ‘better prevent, 
recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against 
civilians’. Furthermore, it also requested the Secretary General to develop 
training as part of a strategy to combat sexual exploitation and abuse, to ensure 
‘full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel’ (UN, 
2008f). 
 
Resolution 1888 reiterated the need for training and guidance for personnel in 
the area of addressing sexual violence in conflict zones, as well as asking for 
greater training in terms of combating sexual exploitation and abuse. In 
addition, the resolution encouraged member states to deploy a greater number 
 146 
of female military (and police) personnel, and to provide peacekeepers with 
adequate training to ‘carry out their responsibilities’ (UN, 2009k). 
 
Such cross-cutting resolutions have an influence on deployed operations, and 
have impacted the training needs for military peacekeepers. Immediately, one 
can identify an increased need to understand international humanitarian and 
human rights law, particularly pertaining to civilians in armed combat, and 
women and children. Furthermore, the responsibility to protect civilians in areas 
of armed combat has led to increased training requirements, with soldiers being 
required to provide a greater deal of accompaniment to civilians, as well as 
increasing patrols in civilian areas. This is apparent in the Secretary General’s 
2009 progress report on the MONUC operation, in which the Secretary General 
stated that as part of the protection of civilians mandate, the mission ‘has also 
continued to patrol key axes to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, and has provided armed escorts on market days to ensure that 
villagers can travel to and from the marketplace’ (UN, 2009c). This has led to a 
notable development in the training requirements for UN peacekeepers. At a 
recent United Nations Association Conference, the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General for the MONUC operation, Alan Doss, explained that 
such accompaniment and protection has led to a recognised need for 
contingents to communicate on a more regular basis with the civilian 
population, and this has led to a development in training (Doss, 2010). 
Nevertheless, intentions from the Security Council can be vague, and gaps 
remain over how operations implement protection mandates. A DPKO 
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commissioned report into the operationalisation of measures designed to meet 
the needs of civilian protection notes how this impacts on training. 
 
These gaps [in understanding the Security Council’s intentions] also 
manifest themselves in the extremely limited training that… uniformed 
personnel receive on the protection of civilians prior to deployment. This 
leaves senior mission leaders and contingent commanders to make 
decisions about mission strategy and tactics in the absence of clear 
guidance from the Council, the Secretariat, Member States or the 
General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-
34). Even the ability of talented senior leaders to craft coherent 
approaches is compromised by issues of preparedness, as they often 
serve without a clear understanding of what protection of civilians 
mandates mean, how it is to be addressed and whether it is a priority 
 (Holt and Taylor, 2009; 8) 
 
Thus through the Brahimi recommendations, the incorporation of peacebuilding 
at an institutional phase, the process of integrated missions, and the cross 
cutting resolutions, a picture emerges illustrating the driving force behind the 
internal processes in the UN. It is now worth examining how these have 
impacted the set up of bodies to assist peacekeeping operations in the 
organisation, and how the UN’s training body is institutionally placed to deal 
with new challenges. 
Further restructuring of the DPKO 
 
 148 
In his 2007 report to the General Assembly, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon36 
reported that the ‘aggressive reform’ of the UN peacekeeping machinery 
instigated by the Brahimi Report had by and large brought ‘large successes’ to 
the organisation, and the missions that it deploys. The Secretary General 
further added that with the expansion in operations in the immediate aftermath 
of the Brahimi Report, there was a need for a new five-year agenda to be 
coordinated. This came in the form of ‘Peace Operations 2010’, which identified 
five areas that required ‘priority attention’. These were: doctrine; personnel; 
partnerships; organisation and; resources.  
 
A significant change to the UN’s capacities came at the headquarters’ level, 
with a reconfiguration of the DPKO itself, and creation of the Department of 
Field Support. The following section highlights these changes in order to 
demonstrate how the UN, at a structural level, has placed training within the 
wider scheme of the DPKO. Firstly, the descriptions of these new departments 
are provided. Box 2.1 (below) outlines what the Secretary General envisages as 
the new setup of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: 
                                                
36 Ban Ki-moon replaced Kofi Annan as Secretary General of the UN in January 2007. 
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Box 2.1: DPKO and Field Support, as outlined by the Secretary General in 
the Comprehensive report on strengthening the capacity of the United 
Nations to manage and sustain peace operations37  
(UN, 2007b; 24) 
 
The DPKO 
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations would continue to plan, direct, manage 
and provide political and substantive guidance to all field operations currently under the 
responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Department would 
lead the integrated planning process, assisting in the development of a comprehensive 
United Nations approach to the resolution of conflict and ensuring that all components 
of mission planning — policy, support, military, police and civilian elements — work 
together to provide efficient and coherent support to the field as well as an identifiable 
and accountable interlocutor for Member States and both United Nations and non-
United Nations partners. The Department would be responsible for the conduct and 
management of peacekeeping operations and policy issues, including the continued 
development of best practices, guidance and procedures that would form the basis for 
the design and delivery of peacekeeping training programmes. It would manage the 
Secretariat’s interaction with troop- and police-contributing countries and reporting to 
the Security Council as well as to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.  
 
The DFS 
The Department of Field Support would be responsible for delivering dedicated support 
to United Nations field operations, including on personnel, finance, procurement, 
logistical, communications, information technology and other administrative and 
general management issues. The Department of Field Support would be a provider of 
services to the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs. To 
strengthen the efficiency and coherence of support provided to the field and to ensure 
effective oversight, existing Headquarters capacities related to field operations would 
be consolidated and assigned to the Department of Field Support 
 
 
Thus the DPKO is separated into two distinct divisions: one division to deal with 
the policy of peacekeeping, and the other to deal with the logistics and 
procurement aspects. Between these two departments is the ‘Policy, Evaluation 
                                                
37 The descriptions are taken directly from the report. 
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and Training Division’. This division, as described by the Secretary General 
provides an 
 
integrated capacity for the development of peace operation doctrine and 
policy, informed by the systematic capturing of best practices and 
lessons learned, the standardization, design and delivery of training 
based upon doctrine and/or policy and the evaluation of mission 
performance in implementing mandates. 
(UN, 2007b; 21) 
 
The rationale for creating the division was the continued call from member 
states to have lessons learned capacities closely allied with creating common 
doctrine and training. The division remains central to the two Departments, and 
is planned to facilitate the sharing of ‘policy development, common doctrine, 
best practices and evaluation and training capacities’, and ensure that ‘common 
approaches and standards’ are applied in both the DPKO, DFS, and also within 
missions. Thus a number of departments (the Peacekeeping Best Practices 
Section and the Integrated Training Service as well as new Evaluation and 
Partnerships Sections) were amalgamated into one that is responsible for the 
evaluation of best practices, lessons learned, doctrinal guidance, and 
development of common training standards. This change is significant, as it has 
placed training at the centre of the DPKO. Consequently, this means that the 
Integrated Training Service is ideally placed to draw on lessons from operations 
and have a critical impact on DPKO practices.  
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The impact: The ITS Training Strategy and Strategic Training 
Needs Assessment 
 
Within the new structure, the Integrated Training Service (now part of the Policy, 
Evaluation and Training Division) developed a training strategy. The strategy, 
created in May 2008, had six main areas: 
 
• Centralised structure focussing on defined strategic priorities 
• Set standards, develop policies and provide guidance 
• Oversight 
• ITS role in training development and delivery 
• Decentralisation of substantive or technical training 
• Link training to doctrine 
• Leverage information technology and partnerships 
 
The first stage of this plan was to assess training needs, to ‘identify current and 
future training priorities’ (UN, 2008d; 3) in the field. This would mean a regular 
training evaluation exercise (every three or five years), resulting in the 
development of training standards. The strategy also outlined how it would 
enhance support to field missions and member states, how to develop 
leadership and management training, how training will become ‘integrated and 
prioritized’ in the UN system, and finally how partnerships and information 
technology will be used effectively. In order for the ITS to demonstrate its 
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progress, there is now a permanent web link to the progress made in the ITS’ 
strategic planning38 (UN, 2008d).  
 
The first step in this re-envisaging of peacekeeping was the Strategic Training 
Needs Assessment, which was carried out in order to identify gaps in the skills 
and knowledge required for peacekeepers to be able to carry out their jobs 
effectively and also to identify where training has succeeded in equipping 
peacekeepers. This also illustrates the desire of military peacekeepers for 
increased levels of training aligned with conflict resolution skills.  
 
Almost 6,000 peacekeepers from seventeen different operations responded to 
the web survey, which constituted a major part of the data collection39. From 
this figure, 11% came from the military, 64% from civilian backgrounds, and 
25% from the Police. Military respondents covered a wide range of professions 
within the UN system, ranging from higher-ranking soldiers on secondment to 
the UN, to members of a contingent, observers, and commanders40.  
 
In order to continue charting the training requirements of military peacekeepers, 
this chapter therefore focuses on the military respondents. It is important to 
                                                
38http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/Public/viewprimarydoc.aspx?doci
d=757 - referenced 4th May 2010. 
39 Data for the needs assessment was gathered in the following ways: Interviews and panel 
meetings held with peacekeeping personnel in the field and headquarters, including senior 
leadership, IMTC field trainers, and UN peacekeeping partners; Web-based survey for all 
peacekeeping personnel; Surveys collected from member states and national and regional 
peacekeeping training institutions; Consultations held with member states and national and 
regional peacekeeping training institutions as well as IMTC field trainers. 
40 The full list of military professions who responded: On secondment at the D level or above to 
UN HQ or to a Peacekeeping mission by a member state; On secondment at the P level to UN 
HQ or to a peacekeeping mission by a member state; International staff contracted at the D 
level or above (employed by the UN); International staff contracted at the P level (employed by 
the UN); Contingent member; Contingent commander; Military observer; Staff officer in a 
PKO/UNHQ. 
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recognise the importance of this particular training survey, insofar that it is one 
of the few training surveys which has taken into account the views of a wide 
range of military peacekeepers from a number of contingents in a number of 
operations (UN, 2008b; 4). 
 
A note about Standard Generic Training Materials 
 
The Standard Generic Training Materials (SGTMs) were the principle pre-
deployment training modules for UN peacekeepers up until May 2009. The 
SGTMs were focussed on three main areas, dependant on the level of military 
personnel being trained. Level 1 SGTMs were aimed at soldiers at officer level, 
and consisted of thirteen modules41 covering a wide range of topics pertinent to 
peacekeeping operations.  
 
The authors of the assessment found that there were significant weaknesses in 
the provision of pre-deployment training, as provided by the SGTMs. The 
authors found that that the SGTM content ‘is too generic and voluminous, and 
does not adequately address key operational and mission-specific challenges’ 
(UN, 2008b; 7). This was based on the finding in the report that less than 40% 
of military and police personnel indicated that the topics in the SGTMs were 
‘useful and applicable’ to their jobs.  
                                                
41 The list is as follows: 1a - The UN system; 1b - UN peacekeeping operations; 2 - structure of 
UN Peacekeeping Operations; 3 - Legal frameworks for UN peacekeeping operations; 4 - 
Stress management; 5a - Code of Conduct/Code of Conduct Case Studies; 5b - Cultural 
awareness; 5c - Gender and peacekeeping; 5d Child protection; 6 - Personal security 
awareness; 7 - Landmines and UXO Awareness; 8 - Human rights for peacekeepers (inc. 
human rights roles for peacekeepers and human rights exercise; 9 - Humanitarian assistance; 
10 - UN Civil-military coordination; 11 Communication & Negotiation; 12; Disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration; 13 - Media relations. 
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On the issue of what topics were addressed by the UN and how this relates to 
the training needs of personnel, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 offer an insight into the 
training needs identified by soldiers when compared to the level of training that 
they are receiving. Table 1 examines the top five topics that military personnel 
have received training on: 
 
Table 2.1: Top five topics which military personnel have received training 
on  
(UN, 2008a; 7): 
 
Notable in this list is HIV/AIDS training, training in Prevention of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse, and the Code of Conduct. This is linked to 
developments in UN policy and mandates, which all strongly emphasise the 
need for a comprehensive approach to prevention of indiscretion from 
peacekeepers (as seen above). Thus the impact of these policies and 
mandates has had on the training regime can be observed. However, if one 
looks at Table 2.2, which examines the Top five subjects which military 
Topics - TOP 5  
I received training on this 
topic  
HIV/AIDS 84.10% 
Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 83.10% 
Code of Conduct 82.90% 
Introduction to United Nations Peace Operations 80.70% 
Introduction to the United Nations System 80.20% 
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peacekeepers deem to be ‘relevant’ to their work, a different conclusion can be 
reached: 
 
Table 2.2: Top five topics which military personnel deem to be relevant to 
their work  
(UN, 2008a; 7) 
 
Here, it is immediately obvious that the need to train military personnel in 
HIV/AIDS and Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse is not shared by the 
personnel who have responded to the questionnaire. One can speculate about 
the absence of training on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse: possibly 
because of the relatively small (but significant) number of peacekeepers who 
were involved in the abuse scandals may not be representative of the wider 
military community; or it could represent a trend in the military that sexual 
exploitation and abuse is not seen as important as it is to other parts of the UN. 
Nevertheless, training is still of critical importance on this topic and is examined 
further in Chapter 4.  
 
Topics - TOP 5 
Training on this topic is 
relevant to my job 
Introduction to United Nations Peace Operations 40.10% 
Structure of UN peace Operations 38.40% 
Communication and Negotiation 37.20% 
Introduction to the United Nations System 36.70% 
Code of Conduct 36.60% 
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Also notable from this list is that ‘Communication and Negotiation’ is in the top 
five of subjects which military personnel believe to be pertinent to their job. This 
can be linked to a question in the survey which asked peacekeeping training 
institutions whether there were any additional topics to be added to the pre-
deployment training roster. One topic which was cited was ‘communication and 
language skills (UN, 2008b; 8).  Taking this on board, one can conclude that 
there exists a recognised need in the military community for communication and 
negotiation skills to be taught to soldiers. This desire for better training in 
communication skills certainly echoes much of the academic theory discussed 
in Chapter two, and is a constant theme throughout this thesis - whether it is 
improving civil military cooperation, relating with the local population, or in 
negotiation contexts. 
 
Furthermore, soldiers were asked a more open-ended question pertaining to 
what subjects were more and less relevant to their jobs. These are outlined in 
tables 2.3 and 2.4 below: 
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Table 2.3:Training Relevance  
(UN, 2008a; 15) 
 
 
 
Much of Table 2.3 pertains to ‘administrative tasks’ such as budgeting, 
contracts management, human resources and procurement, but also involves 
two areas which at first would appear to be important to military personnel - 
‘Gender mainstreaming’ and ‘Reducing exposure to the risks of fraud and 
abuse’. However, it is in table 2.4 where there appears another considerable 
gap in the training needs for military personnel in peacekeeping operations. 
This table shows the areas that constitute a ‘top priority’ for peacekeepers: 
Training on this topic is less relevant for my job 
Results-based budgeting 
Contract management 
Managing human resources (including recruitment) 
Procurement rules and regulations 
Gender Mainstreaming 
Project Management 
Project Development 
Project Implementation 
Reducing exposure to the risks of fraud and abuse 
Compliance with financial and other accountability rules and regulations 
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Table 2.4: Training Priorities  
(UN, 2008a; 15) 
 
 
Importantly, this table highlights a considerable number of areas akin to skills 
drawn from the conflict resolution field (including one topic entitled ‘conflict 
resolution skills’). Understanding cultural norms and customs (and how to 
communicate effectively between them), team building, and negotiation skills all 
point to non-traditional skills being at the forefront of the needs of military 
personnel in peacekeeping operations. This is a critical finding, as it 
demonstrates (alongside Table 2.2) that military peacekeepers feel that they 
require further ‘contact skills’ in order to carry out their job effectively, and that 
gaps still exist in training provision for non-traditional skills. Through analysing 
training programmes in negotiation, cross cultural communication (manifested in 
civil-military cooperation and negotiation with the host population), and 
 
Training on this topic is a top priority for my job 
Mission Mandate/DPKO and DFS Role/Mandate 
Different cultural norms of mission staff and host country 
customs 
Code of Conduct of UN peacekeeping staff 
Cross-cultural communication skills 
Team building 
Security in the field 
Conflict Resolution skills 
Report Writing 
Authority, command and control in the mission 
Negotiation skills 
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understanding different cultural norms (most clearly illustrated in civil-military 
cooperation), this thesis contributes by providing analysis of these critical areas. 
 
As well as looking at the topics and skill-sets related to peacekeeping, the 
survey also examines the methods of teaching peacekeeping skills to military 
(and other) personnel. Survey respondents were asked to indicate from a list of 
learning methods that were the ones they considered to be most effective for 
peacekeeping training. The military responses are outlined below in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Learning Methods  
(UN, 2008a; 26) 
 
 
Added to this, table 2.6 illustrates firstly what peacekeeping training centres’ 
believe to be the most effective forms of training peacekeepers, and to what 
extent such methods are used: 
This learning method would be effective for peacekeeping learning 
"Lessons learned" case studies 
Simulations or scenario-based learning 
Teaching others/sharing my experience 
Cross-training/exchange with other sections 
Exchange programmes between field and HQ 
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Table 2.6: The most effective learning methods for delivering 
peacekeeping pre-deployment training according to PKTI42 respondents 
(UN, 2008a; 46) 
 
These tables demonstrate that understanding how programmes train military 
peacekeepers is a critical facet of any wider attempt to understand training. The 
results of both tables reveal a preference for a wide range of learning methods. 
                                                
42 Peacekeeping Training Institute. 
Learning method 
This method is 
effective 
Our 
institution 
uses this 
method 
Encouraging participants to share their 
experiences 63% 77% 
Inviting guest experts and specialists 63% 82% 
Classroom instruction 63% 83% 
Simulation or scenario based learning 58% 70% 
Lessons learned case studies 57% 67% 
Audio-visual/CD/DVD/Tape 57% 77% 
Hands-on Practice 55% 63% 
Mentoring/coaching system 33% 40% 
Exchange programmes 32% 32% 
Facilitating the shadowing of experienced 
personnel 27% 43% 
Distance Learning 23% 17% 
E-learning programmes 22% 25% 
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Hence there is a defined need to understand to what extent methods of learning 
assist military peacekeepers. The analysis of civil-military cooperation in the 
following chapter illustrates a desire for joint training with military and civilian 
bodies. Observations of training programmes to enhance soldiers’ awareness of 
civil-military cooperation training and negotiation highlight the benefits of 
simulations/scenario-based learning. They also show that room exists for what 
Lederach terms as elicitive responses, based on the knowledge of the 
participant, as opposed to the trainer43. The thesis further contributes by 
outlining the development of e-learning programmes in Chapter six. There is 
also significance attached to the type of learning for military peacekeepers, and 
how more elicitive approaches aid the development of military peacekeepers. 
This critical area will be analysed in Chapter six.  
 
From this assessment, the report’s authors found that there exists a ‘strong 
belief’ amongst peacekeeping personnel - including military, civilian and police - 
that training is ‘essential to carrying out their tasks effectively’ (UN, 2008b; 20). 
The authors also found that although there is a keen interest in peacekeeping 
training, there exists ‘serious gaps’ at all levels of provision. Thus there was a 
need to ‘review, update and streamline’ the existing pre-deployment curriculum, 
in order for it to reflect DPKO/DFS policy and doctrine. It was also found that 
additional specialist pre-deployment training materials covering mission specific 
information (UN, 2008b; 20). Moreover, there appeared to be a development 
into the e-learning field from the training needs assessment. The conclusions of 
the report outlined the desire to develop an ‘online toolbox’ for peacekeepers, 
                                                
43 Lederach’s elicitive approach is analysed in more depth in Chapter 4. 
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which would include case studies, videos, photos, testing and evaluation tools, 
and e-learning tools. In addition, was the concept of developing ‘online 
communities of practice’, and using the Internet to facilitate communication 
between operations and personnel.  
The Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials 
 
A significant result of the needs assessment was the replacement, in May 2009, 
of the SGTMS with the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs). The 
CPTMs thus provide the latest attempt to impart the ‘essential knowledge’ 
required for peacekeeping personnel - military, police and civilian - to function 
effectively in a UN operation, and provide them with a ‘shared understanding of 
the basic principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping to ensure that 
UN peacekeeping operations can function effectively in a coherent manner’ 
(UN, 2009b; 1). They have been in use since 2009, when they were introduced 
to replace the Standard Generic Training Modules, resulting from a recognised 
need in the DPKO that ‘training materials needed to be updated to reflect newly 
developed policies within DPKO and DFS and made more relevant to the work 
of peacekeeping personnel in the field’ (UN, 2009b; 1)44.  
 
Thus, as part of the overhaul of training that has been undertaken in the UN, 
the CPTMs form one part of a set of ‘comprehensive pre-deployment training 
standards’ for all categories of personnel, and are designed to go hand in hand 
                                                
44 Although the SGTMs have been replaced, they represent a considerable amount of the 
existing knowledge that is in the UN system at the present time, so throughout the thesis, 
specific SGTM modules are referred to. However, as this chapter is examining the recent 
changes that are being undertaken in the UN, it focuses specifically on the CPTM programme. 
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with what are termed as ‘specialized training materials’, which will focus on 
specific skills. The materials are not intended to be as specialised as the 
SGTMs, which had a curriculum of more specific modules, and thus cover a 
more broad range of topics45. They are split into four distinct units. These are 
described in Box 2.2 below: 
Box 2.2 : UN CPTM Units - official descriptions 
(UN, 2009b) 
 
Unit 1: A Strategic Level overview of United Nations Peacekeeping 
‘Addresses strategic level issues and outlines the basic definitions and rationale for United 
Nations peace and security activities, while familiarizing participants with the fundamental 
principles of UN peacekeeping.’ 
 Part 1 - Introduction to UN Peacekeeping 
 Part 2 - Fundamental Principles of UN Peacekeeping 
  
Unit 2: The Establishment and functioning of UN Peacekeeping Operations 
‘Moves from the strategic to the operational level, by explaining how the Security Council 
establishes mandates for UN peacekeeping operations and how those are operationalized by 
the UN Secretariat and the mission leadership. It also familiarizes participants with key 
elements of command and control in UN peacekeeping and mission management structures.’   
Part 1 - Establishment and Operationalization of Security Council Mandates 
in Peacekeeping Operations 
Part 2 - How United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Function 
 
Unit 3: Effective Mandate Implementation 
‘Addresses those cross-cutting issues which all peacekeeping personnel must know to 
implement their mandate effectively at the operational level to ensure sustainable peace and an 
eventual handover to local actors and the UN Country Team (UNCT).’    
 Part 1a - International Law Relevant to Peacekeeping Operations 
 Part 1b - Human rights Protection in UN Peacekeeping Operations 
 Part 1c - Women, Peace and Security: The Role of UN Peacekeeping 
Operations 
Part 1d - Protection of Children: the Role of UN Peacekeeping Operations 
Part 2 - Working with Mission Partners 
 
Unit 4: Standards, Values and Safety of UN Peacekeeping Personnel 
‘Addresses policies and procedures related to individual peacekeeping personnel. (Tactical 
level issues will be addressed primarily in induction training because they are mandate-
specific.)’ 
Part 1- Conduct and discipline 
Part 2 - HIV/AIDS and UN Peacekeeping Operations 
Part 3 - Respect for Diversity 
Part 4 - Safety and Security 
 
                                                
45 The CPTMs are to be supplemented by ‘Specialised Training Materials’ (STMs), but at the 
time of writing they have not become available. 
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The contents of the CPTMs illustrate how the UN has responded to the needs 
assessment explained above. The CPTM curriculum contains a great deal of 
information on how peacekeeping operations work at a strategic level, and the 
impacts this has on the ground. Returning to Table 2.2 (outlined above), the five 
topics that military personnel felt were the most relevant to their job were: 
 
• Introduction to UN peace operations 
• Structure of UN peace operations 
• Communication and negotiation 
• Introduction to the United Nations system 
• Code of conduct 
 
The modules in the CPTMs reflect this to some extent, with the first two units 
explaining the background of peacekeeping operations at the strategic level, 
and the third unit explaining the impact of the UN’s cross cutting resolutions on 
peacekeeping operations. It also reflects the need outlined by Colonel Bob 
Stewart (discussed earlier in the chapter) for the ‘bottom line’ nature of UN 
mandates to be further understood. In turn, units three and four examine the 
more operational aspects of peacekeeping deployment, and how to put some of 
the more strategic policies, such as increased awareness of human rights and 
international humanitarian law, into practice. Throughout the fieldwork chapters 
of this thesis there is reference to specific parts of the CPTM programme, in 
particular where it covers civil-military cooperation, negotiation skills, and the 
requirements for cross-cultural communication.  
 
 165 
With regard to assessment and supplementary work, the CPTMs encourage 
tutors and instructors to supplement units with their own activities and 
resources, plus offer the option of assessment to be a more formal or informal 
process (the informal being based on group discussion amongst participants). 
Moreover, the CPTM package advises that different training modules have 
different instructor profiles. Such profiles range from instructors who understand 
the UN, and its history, those who have had personal experience in the UN, 
those who have a ‘thorough understanding’ of international humanitarian and 
human rights law - particularly in relation to the rights of women and children, 
and those who have had dealings with cases of misconduct. Although this is a 
tough challenge to get such a range of instructors, it does at least show that in 
the training guidelines, the UN is asking trainers to take seriously their 
obligations to training for peacekeeping operations (UN, 2009b; 3-7). The 
CPTMs are referred to through the thesis, notably in Chapters four and five, 
which specifically deal with fieldwork case studies. 
United Nations’ Principles and Guidelines 
 
Linked to the changes in training, the DPKO created the ‘United Nations 
Principles and Guidelines’, (which in its earlier guises was known as the 
‘Capstone Doctrine’). The intention of the Principles and Guidelines is to 
‘articulate the principles and concepts for the full spectrum of the multi-
dimensional UN peacekeeping Operations conducted today’ (Solinas, 2007). In 
doing so, they offer an indication of what the DPKO believes to be the current 
and future projections are in peacekeeping operations - what they term as the 
‘scope and core business’ of deployment (UN, 2008c; 9). However, the 
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Principles and Guidelines is clear in its restrictions, outlining that it is not a 
doctrine which seeks to override military doctrines of individual member states, 
or a doctrine which covers military tactics, techniques and procedures. This has 
led some to question their doctrinal strength (Gowan, 2008; 466). 
 
The main intention of the Principles and Guidelines is ‘to support civilian, police 
and military personnel who are training and preparing to serve in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations’ (UN, 2008c; 9-10). Throughout, there are references 
to the need for awareness of a whole host of issues that are common in 
deployment zones, but not fully related to the traditional needs of soldiers. 
 
To start, the Principles and Guidelines outline the ‘Normative Framework’ of UN 
peacekeeping operations, and what this framework means for peacekeepers. 
As well as outlining the three cross cutting themes46, the principles and 
guidelines are clear in stating that peacekeepers must possess a ‘clear 
understanding of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law and 
observe them in situations where they apply’ (UN, 2008c; 15-16).  
 
The Principles and Guidelines then move onto defining the spectrum of peace 
operations, and offers the following definitions for peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and peace-enforcement.  
                                                
46 Women and Peace and Security, Children in Armed Conflict, Protection of civilians in armed 
conflict. 
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Box 2.3: How the UN Principles and Guidelines Define Peace operations47 
(UN, 2008c; 18) 
 
Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where 
fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the 
peacemakers… peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing 
cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex 
model of many elements – military, police and civilian –working together to help lay the 
foundations for sustainable peace.  
 
Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security 
Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such 
actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where 
the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, 
regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.  
 
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or 
relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict 
management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. 
Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for 
sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent 
conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that 
effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the 
State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions. 
 
Added to this (in the glossary) is the definition of ‘robust peacekeeping’. This is 
an important addition to the peacekeeping lexicon. It is defined as: 
 
The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the 
tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend its 
                                                
47 Definitions taken directly from the Principles and Guidelines. 
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mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk 
undermining the peace process. 
(UN, 2008c; 98) 
 
This demonstrates an attempt to define the ‘grey area’ between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement, carrying a serious impact on the peacekeepers 
themselves and the rules of engagement that they are sent out to employ whilst 
deployed. The Principles and Guidelines outline this by stating the differences: 
robust peacekeeping maintains the consent of the host government and/or the 
main parties to the conflict; peace enforcement may involve the use of force at 
a ‘strategic or international level’. However, the Principles and Guidelines 
recognise that the line between robust forms of peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement may become ‘blurred’ at some times, especially when in the midst 
of a deployment.  The level of force in a peacekeeping operation is not the only 
‘blurred line’ that the Principles and Guidelines outline. Every activity - be it 
peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, or peacebuilding - operates in a fluid 
environment, and according to the Principles and Guidelines although they 
mutually reinforce each other when carried out effectively, the system has 
limitations in combining such activities, which has caused critical gaps in the 
international response, resulting in further threats to international peace and 
security. Thus it is critical that peacekeepers understand the inherent difficulties 
that they are deployed into (UN, 2008c; 19). Leading on from this is research 
into the ‘type’ of soldier this is creating - one who has a more nuanced view of 
the complexities and ‘grey areas’ of the deployment zone48. This again has a 
                                                
48 This is further discussed in Chapter six. 
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critical impact on training, and also has an impact on decision-making 
frameworks for the soldiers themselves. 
 
The issue of rules of engagement and use of force returns again when the 
Principles and Guidelines examine the principles that direct UN peacekeeping 
operations. The basic values which the Principles and Guidelines offer are 
similar to some of the fundamental ideas that have guided operations since 
their inception, but with one notable difference. The principles espoused are: 
consent of the parties; impartiality; non-use of force except in self-defence and 
defence of the mandate (UN, 2008c; 31). Notable here is the add-on of ‘defence 
of the mandate’ as an exception to the non-use of force. This is where more 
open interpretations of the use of force are introduced into the Principles and 
Guidelines. There are a number of areas where this can be pointed out. With 
regard to consent, the Principles and Guidelines offer a similar approach to that 
of the Brahimi Report by arguing that: 
 
Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, 
characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of 
any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers. 
(UN, 2008c; 32) 
 
Bearing this in mind, the Principles and Guidelines argue that deployment 
zones are often characterised by the ‘presence of militias, criminal gangs, and 
other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a 
threat to the civilian population’ (UN, 2008c; 34). Therefore there is an identified 
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need for robust forms of peacekeeping to be deployed, where mandates will 
ask the operation to use ‘all necessary means’ to deter attempts to disrupt an 
agreed peace process, protect civilians, or assist local authorities in maintaining 
law and order. The Principles and Guidelines offer a positive outline of how 
force can be used: 
 
By proactively using force in defense of their mandates, these United 
Nations peacekeeping operations have succeeded in improving the 
security situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term 
peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed. 
(UN, 2008c; 34-35) 
 
The military must therefore be able to show a high degree of discretion in the 
use of force, and possess a considerable knowledge of when force can be used 
‘proactively’ in order to help a peace process. One could argue though that this 
‘proactive’ use of force to support peacebuilding tasks fits into cosmopolitan 
conceptions of using force to protecting civilians and cosmopolitan 
peacebuilders (Elliot, 2004). It again fits into Galtung's concept of peacekeeping 
being used as a wall of protection for ‘freedom fighters’ as outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
It is not only in relation to the use of force that military peacekeepers require a 
further understanding of their surroundings. In outlining how missions operate, 
the Principles and Guidelines outline what it terms as the ‘core business of 
United Nations peacekeeping’ (UN, 2008c; 20). In order to do this, the doctrine 
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outlines what it believes to be the ‘typical’ types of conflict zones into which UN 
operations deploy: 
 
Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed in 
the aftermath of an internal conflict face a particularly challenging 
environment. The State’s capacity to provide security to its population 
and maintain public order is often weak, and violence may still be 
ongoing in various parts of the country. Basic infrastructure is likely to 
have been destroyed and large sections of the population may have 
been displaced. Society may be divided along ethnic, religious and 
regional lines and grave human rights abuses may have been committed 
during the conflict, further complicating efforts to achieve national 
reconciliation 
(UN, 2008c; 19) 
 
From this, the Principles and Guidelines outline what it believes to be the ‘core 
functions’ of such an operation. They are: 
 
• Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s 
ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human 
rights;  
• Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and 
supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of 
governance; and 
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• Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other inter 
national actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and 
coordinated manner. 
(UN, 2008c; 23) 
 
Military peacekeepers predominantly fit into the first function - the creation of a 
secure and stable environment. However, in order to facilitate the second and 
third points, military personnel must enter into the ‘spirit’ of dialogue, 
reconciliation, coherence and coordination. This is outlined by the Principles 
and Guidelines, which state that multidimensional operations play a ‘catalytic’ 
role in critical peacebuilding activities, such as DDR, Mine action, SSR, 
protection of human rights, electoral assistance, and support to restoration of 
state authority. This also links the Principles and Guidelines to the 
institutionalisation of peacebuilding and integrated missions discussed earlier in 
the chapter (UN, 2008c; 26). Furthermore, the Principles and Guidelines offer 
advice on the role of Quick Impact Projects49 (QIPs) - described as: 
 
small-scale projects, designed to benefit the population… to support the 
mission’s objectives, by building confidence in the mission’s mandate 
and the peace process  
(UN, 2008c; 30) 
 
Although intended to primarily effect the population, the QIPs (and other related 
tasks) demonstrate how military actors need to enter into a peacebuilding 
                                                
49 Described above in the context of the UNAMSIL operation. 
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mindset from the moment of deployment. This also links to civil military 
conceptions of coordination and coherence amongst military and civilian actors. 
Thus although there is a need to be able to provide security, the ‘blurred lines’ 
between peacekeeping and peacebuilding mean that the military must be able 
to show fluidity in their actions.  
 
In order to maintain consent to the operation, the Principles and Guidelines 
make reference to the need for peacekeepers to show specific awareness of 
certain issues familiar to the conflict resolution field. In particular, the Principles 
and Guidelines, (as the Brahimi report did ten years previously), suggests that a 
UN peacekeeping personnel  
 
have a thorough understanding of the history and prevailing customs and 
culture in the mission area, as well as the capacity to assess the evolving 
interests and motivation of the parties. 
(UN, 2008c; 32) 
 
The Principles and Guidelines further ask that Peacekeepers understand the 
cultural misunderstandings that exists between civilian and military actors in an 
operation, as well as showing awareness of the importance of national and local 
ownership of peace processes as a multiplier of legitimacy of the peacekeeping 
force. This directly relates to the civil-military dimension of operations, where a 
need is identified in training programmes to understand issues of local and 
national ownership of a peace process50. 
                                                
50 CPTM modules on such topics are examined in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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Finally, the Principles and Guidelines advise that serious attention is paid to 
managing the impacts of the mission itself. The Principles and Guidelines split 
this up into three distinct areas: 
 
• Social impact (for example, in the conduct and behavior of staff);  
• Economic impact (for example, on housing and staple foods and materials); 
and 
• Environmental impact (for example, waste management or water usage).  
 
The document makes it very clear that personnel should be alert to ‘potential, 
unforeseen or damaging consequences of their actions and manage these as 
quickly and effectively as possible’. Without doing this, the Guidelines and 
Principles argue, the legitimacy and credibility of the mission will be 
jeopardised, and its popular support lost. The most obvious example of this is 
the ‘social’ impact, created by scandals such as sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Thus it is essential, in the view of the Principles and Guidelines, that UN 
peacekeeping personnel must adhere to national laws (where these do not 
violate fundamental human rights standards), respect local culture, and 
maintain the highest standards of personal and professional conduct (UN, 
2008c; 81-82). This also reflects a degree of awareness of the growing literature 
on the unintended consequences of UN peacekeeping operations, which 
examines both social and economic consequences of deployment (Pouligny, 
2006). 
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The potential impact of the Principles and Guidelines remains unclear. What 
can be seen from the document is that it, like many other UN documents 
produced in the past ten years, has followed the path treaded by the Brahimi 
Report. Through outlining ‘robust peacekeeping’, and the absence of consent in 
conflict zones, there is a clear link between the message of the Brahimi Report 
and the Principles and Guidelines. Furthermore, the Guidelines follow UN policy 
on integration, cross-cutting themes (as outlined in the mandates), and the 
need to stamp out sexual exploitation and abuse. Although the document is not 
designed to offer tactical guidance and there is little direction to the particular 
difficulties that military personnel will encounter whilst deployed, it does offer a 
wider summary of the number of challenges that UN personnel are placed in. In 
turn, therefore, one can see again the considerable range of training needs that 
are required in order to create effective military peacekeepers. 
The future? The New Horizons Project 
 
The most recent initiative at the DPKO is the ‘New Horizons Project’. The 
project’s report - prepared by the DPKO and DFS - is described as a 
contribution to the ‘dialogue’ on the future direction of peacekeeping operations, 
intended to stimulate discussion leading up to the 2010 Session of the General 
Assembly. The Horizons paper starts by noting five ‘critical operational 
challenges’:  
 
• Supporting a ceasefire between two or more parties 
Here, the New Horizon paper picks up on the longer-standing ‘frozen 
missions’ of the UN, such as operations in Cyprus, the Middle East, or the 
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Kashmir, which has led to the criticism that the presence of UN 
peacekeepers create a form of stability which does not encourage 
belligerent groups to find a more permanent solution.  
 
• Supporting a peace process and national authorities after civil conflict 
This refers to the pressing demands on peacekeeping operations 
(particularly in DRC and the Sudan), where operations are ‘struggling to 
strengthen’ political processes which are dependent on regional and 
international support. Here also, the New Horizons paper picks up on the 
capability gap between efforts to protect civilians, the limited capabilities and 
agreement on what robust peacekeeping can and is expected to achieve. 
 
• Extending initial Security and Stability gains into longer Term 
Peacebuilding 
This refers to the need for peacekeeping operations to not only focus on the 
security aspects of their deployment, but also the peacebuilding aspects. 
The paper argues that because the military exit strategy highly depends on 
a secure and stable environment, ‘UN peacekeepers must improve their 
ability to contribute to peacebuilding and, where called upon, to coordinate a 
broader effort’(UN, 2009a; 5). 
 
• Providing Security and protection in response to conflict 
The Chad and Darfur operations are relevant here, where peacekeepers are 
primarily involved in activities pertaining to humanitarian aid delivery and 
protection of civilians. Such operations are in highly remote areas and are 
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operating under political uncertainty. With such problems, the paper argues 
that ‘mitigating the conflict and preventing mission failure are the only viable 
strategies’ (UN, 2009a; 5). 
 
• Supporting other Peace and Security Actors, including through 
capacity building 
This directly emanates from the UN’s efforts to assist the African Union in 
deployments in Darfur, Sudan and Somalia, as well as the DPKO’s efforts in 
providing experts in a number of fields (military, police, judicial, prison, DDR, 
SSR and mine action) to other parts of the UN system. Although there is 
high demand for this, the paper finds that UN peacekeeping is ‘currently not 
configured to consistently deliver comprehensive support to others’ (UN, 
2009a; 5). 
 
In response to these challenges, the New Horizons report proposes a broad 
strategy with three main ‘prongs’ - the Security Council, Member States and the 
Secretariat - which has been termed the ‘Global Partnership’. At the Security 
Council level, there is a requirement for ‘achievable and credible mandates’ 
allied to unified political efforts to keep parties ‘on the path to peace’ and 
encourage support for peacekeeping operations from member states. Member 
states are encouraged to provide resources (troops, police and finances) in a 
timely manner and to the required levels as required by the mandates. The 
Secretariat on the other hand is asked to ‘retain confidence’ through providing 
appropriate information and advice ‘and ensure its systems for planning and 
managing operations meet the highest standards’ (UN, 2009a; 6-7). The ‘global 
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partnership’ is much more strategic, but it is predicted to have a serious impact 
on the requirements of deployed peacekeepers, and on how they are trained.  
 
These impacts come in three areas: peacebuilding, protection of civilians, and 
robust peacekeeping. Where peacebuilding is concerned, the New Horizons 
Paper notes the critical role that peacekeepers play in building peace 
immediately after a conflict, in the establishment of conditions for ‘recovery and 
development activities’, as well as some of tasks essential to stabilization and 
‘early consolidation of peace’ (UN, 2009a; 22). However, it finds that due to the 
high visibility of peacekeepers on the ground, they face unrealistic expectations 
of what they can achieve in terms of peacebuilding (much like what Galtung 
found in his 1977 study outlined in Chapter 1). This leads to peacekeepers 
attempting ‘to fill gaps’ in the provision of international support in areas where 
they have little capacity or resources, resulting in ‘overstretch’. With a safe and 
secure environment being a precondition for the exit of military peacekeepers, 
there is a further need for peacekeepers to be effective in their peacebuilding 
tasks, in order not to prolong the operations (UN, 2009a; 23). 
 
On the protection of civilians, there is a disparity noted between the goals set by 
the UN and the capabilities that peacekeepers have to carry them out. The 
Horizons paper notes that national militaries do not traditionally maintain 
proactive civilian protection doctrines, operating concepts or tactics ‘beyond the 
requirements of international humanitarian law’ (UN, 2009a; 20). When 
peacekeepers are therefore deployed into conflict zones, expectations of what 
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they can perform are often set high, from both the international community and 
the host population. The Horizon Project argues that operations: 
 
are regularly assigned a broad range of tasks that go well beyond 
providing physical security, including support for the voluntary return of 
refugees and displaced persons, and protection of civilians from sexual 
violence.  These tasks require the engagement of all parts of the mission, 
whether military, police or civilian. 
(UN, 2009a; 20) 
 
Yet the mismatch between the declared policies and the lack of concrete 
abilities and capabilities on the ground, results in a ‘significant credibility 
challenge’ to the UN. Linked to this are difficulties arising from the development 
and institutionalisation of what the Principles and Guidelines referred to as 
‘Robust Peacekeeping’. The Horizons paper finds that there has been a 
vagueness about the role and functions of ‘robust peacekeeping’, arguing that a 
lack of shared understanding amongst Member States has prevented a full 
examination of the operational impacts of robust peacekeeping on missions, 
partners, and local populations. This has potentially dangerous consequences 
with operations resorting to robust postures without ‘political consensus and 
practical support’ necessary to fulfill such tasks (UN, 2009a; 22).  
 
Thus many of the reform proposals made in the Brahimi Report and subsequent 
doctrinal publications are still to be fully realised. To combat this, the paper 
proposes that regular joint training and exercises in the field are required, as 
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well as scenario-based planning. Furthermore, there is a call in the Horizons 
Project for soldiers to develop a number of skills, in particular delegated 
authority to ‘take difficult decisions in the field’, informed by ‘enhanced 
situational awareness and risk analysis’ (UN, 2009a; 21). As with much of the 
UN’s documentation outlined throughout this chapter, developments in training 
are given critical importance. Attached to this is the desire to enhance the 
situational awareness of military peacekeepers. As Chapter six illustrates, 
training military peacekeepers to effectively develop their decision-making 
capacities requires a considerable understanding in conflict resolution skills and 
techniques.  
 
The Horizons paper also noted that soldiers were still deployed in the field 
without effective preparations (much like the Brahimi report). Such under-
preparation, the paper notes, is particularly acute in ‘challenging and remote 
environments’ where units are immediately asked to begin operations on 
deployment (such as Darfur). Moreover there are other factors which influence 
the performance of the operation that can be avoided by improved training. The 
paper finds that the level of morale and good conduct of peacekeepers has 
important repercussions on the mission. Arguing that the success or failure of a 
mission relies on the good conduct of its personnel, the New Horizons paper 
argues that: 
 
The United Nations pledges a duty of care to its military, police and 
civilian personnel, who deploy in some of the most harsh and insecure 
conditions.  In turn, these personnel pledge a duty of service, through the 
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dedicated performance of their duties and dignified and ethical 
professional and personal conduct.  Failure of either side to keep its 
pledge harms not only the United Nations and those who serve under its 
flag, but, more important, it harms those we are meant to serve. 
(UN, 2009a; 34) 
 
Finally, there is a need for peacekeepers to be ‘good communicators’, at a 
global and local level. In terms of local communication, the paper notes that 
‘every component’ of an operation impacts on the perceptions and lives of the 
people in the deployment area. In the past, ineffective information and 
communication - linked to a limited understanding of local culture, or diversity of 
views, ethnicities, and gender distinctions in a conflict zone - has hampered the 
success of operations. At worst, the paper noted that operations had failed ‘to 
manage expectations, to adapt to real and perceived needs on the ground, and 
to sustain local support’. Thus, the New Horizons paper argues that 
peacekeepers need to communicate to host authorities and population as much 
as possible through public information strategies. Thus, a further incorporation 
of contact skills in training programmes is essential to facilitate effective 
communication strategies. With regards to how training can best be 
disseminated, the New Horizons report looks towards sharing training practice 
amongst member states, and suggests that states with more peacekeeping 
practice to share experiences with less developed states (UN, 2009a; 15). 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter illustrates the current state of peacekeeping strategy at the UN, 
and argues that there exists a fundamental need to ensure that training for 
peacekeeping covers far more than traditional military skills. It reviews current 
peacekeeping policy, in addition to the academic review in the previous chapter, 
and illustrates another connection between the fields of conflict resolution and 
military peacekeeping - in this case, through the increasing focus on the 
peacekeeping-peacebuilding link, and a commitment to protection of civilians. 
 
Some themes are present throughout the documents analysed. Firstly, the 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus is firmly entrenched in UN thinking. Whilst 
conceptually this is still the subject of debate - particularly the economic models 
introduced, and the drive for ‘democratisation’ - it represents a considerable 
change to the role and function of military peacekeepers. At a minimum, greater 
understanding of the peacebuilding functions of an operation is now required in 
the military. Any further tasks - including liaising with civilian components, 
providing assistance to civilian organisations, understanding the needs of the 
civilian population within the deployment zone, and when to actually provide a 
form of peacebuilding in the guise of Quick Impact Projects (such as was seen 
in Sierra Leone) - is arguably not an uncommon feature of a modern 
peacekeeping operation. Thus the role of ‘civil-military cooperation’ is becoming 
increasingly important in peacekeeping operations. This is discussed, both 
conceptually and with fieldwork examples, in the following two chapters. 
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The chapter demonstrates the recognised need for peacekeepers to show an 
increased understanding of legal norms and customs pertaining to the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict. Although militaries are subject to a 
number of conventions and legal norms, the cross-cutting mandates have 
tasked military peacekeepers to be even more aware of issues pertaining to 
children in armed conflict and women, peace and security. Again, this poses 
another challenge on training institutions and programmes to ensure that those 
soldiers who are to be deployed at least have an understanding of the cross 
cutting issues that appear in their mandates. Added to this, and with the 
example of the MONUC operation in mind, there exists within mandates 
pertaining to the protection of civilians a need for peacekeepers to understand 
that such protection mandates will mean more than using robust force against 
‘spoilers’ to the peace process. The example of the resolution for the UNAMSIL 
operation is a notable example of what mandates can include when the Security 
Council seeks to place considerable emphasis on training for peacekeeping 
operations. 
 
Furthermore, the chapter illustrates the desire from within the UN to enhance 
knowledge of cultural awareness and sensitivity to local ownership in their 
peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report still resonates some ten years 
after its publication. This can be seen in both a positive and negative light. On 
the positive side, it is encouraging that the UN still encourages peacekeepers to 
possess a deeper understanding of the cultures that they are to be deployed 
into. However, like the previous chapter demonstrates, mistakes are still being 
made, and the recommendations of the Brahimi Report are still relevant today. 
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It is difficult, however, to chart progress and impact of cultural awareness 
training, and this should be borne in mind. It is worth highlighting what the UN’s 
own lessons learned reports elucidate about a lack of cultural awareness. The 
1995 Lessons Learned report from UNOSOM (Somalia) identified that 
contingents arrived in the mission area without the ‘slightest knowledge’ of 
Somalia, its history, culture and conditions on the ground. Although it does not 
point to anything more specific than the standardisation of training as a solution, 
there is a recognised deficiency in skills outside of the traditional military sphere 
(UN, 1995; 17). The UNAMIR (Rwanda) lessons learned report also offers an 
indication of the need to have peacekeepers trained in a wider number of skills. 
Although the mission ultimately suffered catastrophically as a result of being 
deployed during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, the lessons learned report did 
focus on a range of issues. One such issue was training. In particular, the report 
highlighted the need for an expanded set of briefings to supplement traditional 
military skills. The expanded briefings would include: 
 
The history, culture and traditions of the host country, the nature of the 
conflict, the mandate of the mission, and the role and functions of the 
different components and agencies that are operating in the area, and on 
the standards of behaviour expected of United Nations staff in the 
conflict area. 
(UN, 1996; 12) 
 
Both of these lessons learned reports illustrate the importance attached to 
cultural training for military peacekeepers. This is further investigated in the 
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following two chapters, which outline approaches to civil-military cooperation 
training. As part of the wider assessment of civil-military cooperation, the 
chapters explain the importance of understanding the cultural nuances of the 
host population. 
 
The training needs assessment offers similar lessons. Again, it is encouraging 
to see that peacekeepers are proactively requesting an increase in ‘contact 
skills’ in their training programmes, with a desire for increased negotiation and 
communication skills being a constant theme running through the results. 
However, like the conclusions of the previous chapter, this desire is still 
apparent many years after Fetherston argued for increased ‘contact skills’ for 
military peacekeepers. This can be explained by the high turnover of 
peacekeepers, and the higher turnover of nationalities taking part in 
peacekeeping - the current list of contributing nations being at 115 (UNDPKO, 
2010b). With such a considerable change in personnel, difficulty exists in the 
capacities for training to be fully effective. However, referring to the training 
needs assessment, the top five topics which were taught to the soldiers did not 
include negotiation skills, meaning there is to some extent, organised ongoing 
pre-deployment training which does not focus on contact skills.  
 
The developing role of the soldier as a peacekeeper is another important finding 
in this chapter. The New Horizons project report suggest that soldiers become 
better prepared to for taking ‘difficult decisions in the field’, informed by 
‘enhanced situational awareness and risk analysis’ (UN, 2009a; 21). 
Additionally, the Principles and Guidelines indicate that there is an increasing 
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number of ‘grey areas’ in peacekeeping operations which soldiers will have to 
decipher, particularly the blurred lines between peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. Most importantly in this area is the blurred distinction between 
peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Since the 
Brahimi Report, the UN has attempted to clarify this area through the Principles 
and Guidelines and Security Council mandates. However, it is still up to the 
troop commander and soldiers under his/her command to understand the 
situation, context, and consequences of the level of force to be used. This 
poses a particular challenge to peacekeepers themselves, and also to the UN, 
which is at times mandated to ‘protect civilians’ at times with pre-emptive force, 
but must also not stray too far away from what Rubenstein referred to as its 
‘root metaphor’. UN Lessons Learned Reports point to the need of 
developments in understanding the levels of force. The report for Operation 
Artmedis, the EU’s intervention in the Bunia region of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (alongside the UN operation, MONUC) finds that peacekeeping 
training should ‘consistently and clearly address’ the authority to use force in 
peacekeeping. The report states that: 
 
UN peacekeeping training materials on mandates, rules of engagement 
and the use of force for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping 
operations should be reviewed to ensure clarity and a more active focus 
on the use of force in UN peacekeeping operations under both chapters VI 
and VII of the Charter. 
(UN, 2004b; 8) 
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In the case of Sierra Leone, the UN’s 2003 Lessons Learned Report had strong 
words on the role of training for robust peacekeeping operations. When 
referring to the crisis of May 2000 (when UN forces were being attacked in 
Freetown), the report pointed to training as a main cause of the crisis: 
 
One of the causes of the May 2000 crisis was the lack of proper pre-
deployment training for incoming contingents. For many there was simply 
no time for preparation as their deployment plans had to be speeded up. 
Some contingents were ignorant of the conflict situation and were 
mentally not prepared to be in the midst of an ongoing conflict. Poor 
knowledge of the mandate and the rules of engagement further 
contributed to their uncertainty when faced with hostile actions.  
(UN, 2003b; 38) 
 
The requirement for soldiers to understand the appropriate levels of force (if 
any) to achieve particular ends is reflected in research undertaken by conflict 
resolution and cosmopolitan scholars. Fieldwork observations of training 
programmes (in Chapters four and five) outline programmes which allow 
soldiers to reflect more on the operating environment and context of their 
actions. This is reflected on, with reference to work undertaken in the conflict 
resolution and cosmopolitan fields, in Chapter six. 
 
On a conceptual level, it is important to ask to what extent the UN follows 
Rubenstein’s ‘root metaphor’, outlined at the beginning of this chapter.  The 
principle, as outlined by Rubenstein is that the legitimacy of the UN rests on it 
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symbolising a world order ‘not dominated by national interests’, where ‘The 
weak are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and conflicts settled 
peacefully’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 356-357). Within this root metaphor, 
peacekeeping is a ‘military without weapons in the service of peace’ designed 
to reinforce an image of an international community ‘acting in a neutral, 
consensual manner to sustain a stable world economy’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 357). 
Today it is difficult for UN peacekeeping to be referred to as a ‘military without 
weapons in the service of peace’. Both where the UN deploys and the post-
Brahimi language of robust peacekeeping means that its ‘neutral’ and 
‘consensual’ image is slightly disfigured. However, there is enough to suggest 
that the root metaphors still exist to a certain extent. Firstly through the cross-
cutting mandates, where the UN Security Council - a body which failed in the 
mid 1990’s to offer any protection to the civilians of Rwanda and the Safe Areas 
of Bosnia - has mandated itself and the UN organisation to place the protection 
of civilians as a high priority. Although it is apparent that peacekeepers are now 
far from the ‘military without weapons’, they still possess through the mandates 
pertaining to the protection of civilians a ‘legitimate’, and possibly ‘cosmopolitan’ 
reason to recourse to the use of force. Again, this must be carried out 
responsibly and thus the pressure is transferred to the force commander, 
contingent commander, or infantry soldier, but there is a spirit and a framework 
that offers some sense of legitimacy. A 2009 report commissioned by the DPKO 
into the protection of civilians states that protection is ‘central to the legitimacy 
and credibility of the entire UN system’ (Holt and Taylor, 2009). Further, 
mandates pertaining to the protection of children, as well as the role of women 
in international peace and security mean that as an institution, the UN is setting 
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itself values which directly relate to its Charter. Linked to the conflict resolution 
field, the UN appears to be attempting to align its institutional mechanisms with 
the peacebuilding needs of an operation. This must be welcomed and seriously 
considered, as it illustrates recognition that sustainable peace will not be built if 
it is based purely on the security requirements of the military component. 
Finally, the organisation is still regarded as a considerably robust organisation 
in terms of how it deals with threats to international peace and security with few 
resources, a limited logistical capability, and a limited budget. If its shackles are 
removed, it may once again come close to Rubenstein’s root metaphor where 
the ‘weak are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and conflicts 
settled peacefully’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 357). 
 
Through this and the previous chapter, this thesis offers a significant 
contribution to the literature by offering multi-layered synthesis which outlines 
where - in both the academic and policy fields - there is a desire to see 
enhanced conflict resolution skills in training programmes for military 
peacekeepers. This also provides a springboard for the remainder of this thesis. 
The following chapter examines the issue of civil-military cooperation. The 
desire to further link peacekeeping and peacebuilding components of an 
operation is highlighted throughout this chapter, and Chapter three analyses 
how the phenomenon has appeared, how it is conceptualised, where the 
problem areas are, and how training in conflict resolution skills can assist 
military peacekeepers in carrying out civil-military functions effectively. Chapter 
four develops this analysis by outlining fieldwork investigations and 
observations of civil-military relations theory. Chapter five focuses on 
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negotiation training for military peacekeepers, contributing to debates over the 
‘grey areas’ of operations with relation to the limited use of force.  
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Chapter 3. 
Working with non-military entities in a conflict zone: 
implications for training 
 
 
The previous chapter outlines policy at the UN level which has emphasised the 
development of non-traditional training for military peacekeepers.  It also 
illustrates steps taken in the UN to ‘institutionalise’ the peacebuilding 
component in operations, requiring a greater effort on the part of the military to 
understand and cooperate with their civilian counterparts. This chapter explores 
civil-military cooperation: a feature of modern operations described as a ‘front 
line’ for military personnel in their interactions with civilians and civilian 
organisations (Sandhurst, 2008a). Civilian actors, which form a considerable 
part of any peacekeeping operation, can take a multitude of forms including 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) International Non-Governmental 
Organisations (INGOs), local NGOs, and the civilian population who live in the 
deployment area.  
 
This chapter examines the training requirements of this relationship (hereafter 
referred to as civil-military cooperation51), through an analysis of key 
documentation, practitioner experience, and academic study. It does this firstly 
through an examination of formal relationships between military and civilian 
organisations. The chapter sets the scene by looking at the convergence of 
                                                
51 Civil-military cooperation is used, except where policy refers to it a different name. 
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civilian and military organisations in conflict zones. It then provides an analysis 
of attempts to formalise these encounters, and of difficulties experienced by 
both military and civilian actors in relations with each other. Within this, the 
integrated missions concept – a recent phenomenon in UN operations referred 
to in the previous chapter – is scrutinised. The second part of the chapter 
examines the less formal - but equally important - relationships that are fostered 
with the host population. Literature pertaining to relations between the military 
and the local population is surveyed, including an investigation of cultural 
clashes as well as the impacts of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse 
against UN peacekeepers. This section of the chapter deals with more recent 
literature on the topic, which takes an approach from the views of the civilian 
population. To conclude, the chapter evaluates where increased training has 
been presented as a technique designed to assist the military in relating with 
civilian groups, NGOs and the local population.  
 
This chapter adds to the expanding literature on civil-military cooperation, 
particularly in terms of drawing together existing concepts (which built on the 
formal relationships between NGOs and Military peacekeepers) and new 
concepts (built on the experiences of the civilian population in the deployment 
zone). It provides a conceptual foundation for the following chapter, which 
examines fieldwork studies of civil-military cooperation training. The chapter 
contributes to the conflict resolution field in three ways: firstly by charting where 
such skills have entered the military discourse in peacekeeping operations; 
secondly, through addressing the question of how increased training in contact 
skills can be used to make the relationship better coordinated; and thirdly, by 
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dealing with how effective conflict resolution training for military peacekeepers 
can facilitate the change from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. It also 
contributes to the literature by continuing to identify calls from the practitioner 
community for the increased awareness and understanding of conflict resolution 
skills and techniques in training programmes for military peacekeepers. 
 
Before entering the debates about civil-military cooperation, the chapter charts 
where the phenomenon can be placed within larger debates about the role of 
peacekeeping operations. As explored in the previous chapter, peacekeeping 
has undergone a number of theoretical assessments which has critiqued its role 
in global politics. From the critical theory perspective, the function of 
peacekeeping operations is far removed from any issues of empowerment of 
alternative discourses and forms of power. Pugh’s analysis offers a robust 
examination of this, arguing that peacekeepers are a form of ‘riot control’, 
projected against ‘unruly’ parts of the world which do not fit into the liberal, 
market-dominated international society. These ‘trouble shooters’, in Pugh’s view 
inherently favour an international society which ‘structures inequalities and fails 
to fulfil human needs’ (Pugh, 2004; 40). In terms of promoting alternative 
avenues of power, Pugh argues that there is little to suggest that peacekeeping 
adequately pursues this task. The process of peacekeeping and the function of 
peacekeepers, in his view, are to replicate normative and ideological 
assumptions that enable the dominant states to manage the system ‘in their 
own image’ (Pugh, 2004; 55). 
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Linked to this is Richmond’s insightful critique of peace operations, as a means 
to create a meaningful and lasting peace, which examines the historical 
developments of peacekeeping as a maker of ‘peace’. Returning to the 
traditional era of peacekeeping, Richmond argues that peacekeeping missions 
sought to restore to an earlier version of ‘peace’ (i.e. the peace existed before 
the outbreak of violent conflict in the host countries). For Richmond, this is 
problematic because it was an interveners interpretation of the right kind of 
peace to be achieved, as ‘often there was not a local peace that could be 
revived, unless one looked back before the advent of colonial powers or 
regional conflicts’ (Richmond, 2005; 92). Thus, UN mandates implemented a 
view of peace heavily based on colonial processes, and not associated with the 
disagreement of the conflicting parties on the ground. Emanating from this, in 
Richmond’s view, has been the emergence of the liberal peace theory, which 
has been normalised through Security Council Resolutions in the traditional era.  
 
Richmond further argues that initial peace agreements that occur in immediate 
post-conflict environments are based on ‘balancing of interests, issues, and 
resources, perhaps dependent upon external guarantors’ (Richmond, 2005). 
This ‘negative peace’ in Richmond’s view, is based on a perpetual and relative 
balance, and is thus closer to a victor’s peace in the favour of the dominant 
party or even the third party intervener, who will use notions of neutrality, 
impartiality and consent ‘to disguise the fact that third parties are self interested’ 
and look for a type of peace that is defined by their own interests (Richmond, 
2005). Therefore, the ‘negative peace’ aspects brought on by peacekeeping 
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either brings a victor’s peace for the stronger disputant, or a ‘suitable’ peace for 
the third party. This ‘suitable peace’ is the liberal peace. Richmond argues that: 
 
Effectively, peacekeeping, and the complexity of tasks now associated 
with it became part of a nascent form of global governance where conflict 
zones provide interveners the opportunity to construct a liberal peace. 
(Richmond, 2005; 96) 
 
Such interpretations suggest that peacekeepers are no more than the faces of 
the western neo-liberal system, the riot shields of a process which keeps the 
powerful at the top and the not so powerful at the bottom. However, this thesis 
argues that developments in peacekeeping operations have demonstrated that 
they can play a more transformative role. In the view of this particular thesis, the 
space where the military meets the non-military – be it INGOs, local NGOs, 
religious leaders, or local civil society groupings – is a key area where the more 
transformative processes can begin.  
 
From the conflict resolution literature, Lederach argues that peace processes 
must focus on more than the short-term challenges of getting belligerents to the 
negotiating table (which, by itself links to Richmond’s assessment of the 
problems of balancing power), and ‘must include tasks like broader 
transformation, reconciliation and social reconstruction’ (Lederach, 1995; 203). 
In order to achieve this, a comprehensive approach that targets all levels of the 
society is required, from the political leaders at the top, through the local 
leaders in the middle, down to the local grassroots and combatants at the 
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bottom. Lederach argues that for a fully transformative model to work, it must 
intentionally devise frameworks for integrating people at all levels of the conflict 
setting. Critical to this is the bottom level, where the vast majority of the 
population are based, and local indigenous empowerment can take place 
between the local population and outsiders. Lederach argues that conflict 
transformation (in this case, peacekeeping) must ‘actively envision, include, 
respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given 
setting’, and thus not see the insiders as the ‘problem’ and outsiders as the 
‘answer’ (Lederach, 1995; 213). This involves an international effort to ‘identify, 
validate and support’ peace making processes, in the form of people and 
‘cultural processes’ that are rooted within the conflict setting (Lederach, 1995; 
220). As outlined in the academic survey of conflict resolution theory and 
peacekeeping practice, Fetherston asserts that military peacekeeping plays an 
important role in setting the right conditions for peacekeeping - a ‘pre-resolution 
phase’. This is where peacekeeping operations can make a valuable 
contribution to conflict resolution efforts, and where forms of civil-military 
cooperation, if carried out correctly, can effectively coordinate micro-level 
initiatives which will feed into macro-level structures (Fetherston, 1994b; 157). 
As Chapter two stated, Fetherston highlights a need to coordinate the conflict 
settlement approaches of peacekeeping with the conflict resolution activities of 
peacebuilding organisations. She argues that: 
 
Peacekeeping operations are not equipped to mediate settlement 
packages or to put into place large-scale socio-economic programmes. 
Peacekeeping should be seen in much the same way that pre-
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negotiation is, as laying the groundwork for more comprehensive 
peacebuilding and peacemaking activity, or in providing the first crucial 
phase of an already negotiated settlement package. This is also in liner 
with the philosophy of many humanitarian aid organisations which see 
emergency aid as the first step toward re-establishing self-reliance. 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 153) 
 
Civil-military cooperation can also be located in the cosmopolitan literature, 
particularly with regards to cosmopolitan forms of conflict management. Kaldor 
argues that any effective response to what she terms as ‘new wars’ has to be 
based on an ‘alliance between international organisations and local advocates 
of cosmopolitanism’ in order to construct legitimacy (Kaldor, 2001; 122). She 
urges that local groups need to be supported, and that their advice, proposals 
and recommendations be taken seriously. This requires a serious commitment 
by intervening forces to create a joint partnership with the local population. 
Elliott argues that in addition to defending societies from violence, cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping missions may be expected to, where necessary: 
 
Restore civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from 
criminal activities or various destructive forms of particularist politics, and 
to engage in rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic 
practices. 
(Elliot, 2004; 25) 
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Civil-military cooperation can therefore be located in the cosmopolitan and 
conflict resolution literature. Therefore success (or failure) in this area not only 
has implications on the success of the mission (and the ‘policy relevant’ 
literature), but it also feeds into the wider peacekeeping and conflict resolution 
literature.  
Do positive relations improve chances for overall success? 
 
Before assessing the complex network of doctrine, interactions and problematic 
areas, it is worth briefly exploring a study which qualitatively goes some way to 
arguing that ‘effectiveness of contemporary peace operations will depend on 
the collaboration of military and civilian actors’ (Kofi Abiew, 2003a; 7). In 1998, 
the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) undertook a 
sizeable study into issues of training for peacekeeping operations. As well as 
examining civil-military relations, the study explored a number of different topic 
areas, under the more general themes of  ‘weapons control, disarmament and 
demobilization’ during peacekeeping operations (Gamba, 1998; 4-5). The data 
was predominately compiled from the military, which made up 90.47% of the 
171 respondents (the civilian components of the mission make up the other 
9.53%)52. Although the study is over ten years old, and questions covering civil-
military relations cover a small part of the overall questionnaire, it offers insight 
into attitudes to the relationship between the military and civilian organisations. 
 
A brief analysis of Gamba’s research into the UNIDIR questionnaire shows a 
                                                
52 Within the military respondents, the majority are observers (43.45%), followed by HQ staff 
(20.83%) and infantry (16.07%). 
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valuable link between the level of cooperation between the military and civilian 
elements and the performance of operations. The study cites responses to a 
UNIDIR questionnaire which asked: “Would you consider the relationship 
between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during 
the mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?” Out of the 
responses 23% agreed that the relationship was very good, 42% that it was 
adequate and 35% that it was inadequate. This shows a significant number of 
respondents felt that a less than adequate relationship existed in operations 
(Gamba, 1998; 6).  
 
Furthermore, Gamba’s interpretation of the UNIDIR study finds that in 
operations that were deemed as a ‘success’ in the eyes of the UN, the majority 
of respondents felt that the relationship between the military and civilian 
components was very good. In the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 
generally considered from within the UN to be a successful intervention, the 
proportion of interactions reported as adequate was 85% versus 15% for 
interactions classified as inadequate. However, in operations that struggled to 
find success, the vast majority of respondents felt the relationship to be 
inadequate. In the case of Somalia, 16% of the respondents considered civil-
military interactions to be good or adequate, whereas 84% of respondents 
found them to be inadequate (Gamba, 1998; 7). These statistics led Gamba to 
argue that: 
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It is possible to say without doubt that the two principal problems that 
have emerged in the context of civilian-military interactions in MPSO’s 
are those related to a) the lack of coordination between these 
components, and b) the extent to which each is able to accommodate 
the other before and during an MPSO53. 
(Gamba, 1998; 7) 
 
Gamba adds that if missions suffer from a lack of coordination as well as 
negative perceptions, suspicions and inability for one side to accommodate the 
other (or both sides refusing to accommodate each other), then the success of 
the mission itself is in jeopardy (Gamba, 1998; 4).  
Doctrinal Definitions of Civil-military Cooperation 
 
This chapter now surveys different definitions of civil-military relations, by 
analysing policy and doctrine from an international organisation (the UN), an 
international military organisation (NATO), a regional organisation (European 
Union) and two national militaries (the United Kingdom and Ireland). The 
differing ideas of what constitutes civil-military cooperation has been formalised 
through policy, working papers and doctrine. It is yet to be seen whether these 
attempts to formalise what has traditionally been an ad hoc series of 
engagements have been successful. It is worth understanding, that such 
differences are important, with organisations keeping themselves distinctive 
from others. The UN offers the clearest ‘warning’ on wrongly defining civil-
military cooperation: 
                                                
53 MPSO - Multi-Functional Peace Support Operation. 
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In the area of civil-military interaction there has been a proliferation of 
conflicting and inappropriate titles, job descriptions, and training 
standards. This creates confusion in responsibilities (particularly with 
civilian counterparts in the humanitarian community), inhibits 
understanding, and ultimately decreases efficiency and effectiveness. In 
addition, some of the titles have conceptual meanings that detract from 
the UN integrated approach. The term “CIMIC” is an example of this, as it 
is generally accepted to refer to interaction that is purely related to 
achievement of a military commander’s military mission (i.e. it may not 
take into account the wider objectives of a UN integrated mission). 
(UNDPKO, 2008; 4) 
 
The UN has devoted much time to developing a working relationship in the field 
between the civilian and military bodies. Following the strategic developments 
outlined in the previous chapter, there has been a series of policy developments 
designed to encompass peacekeepers in the field. The very make-up of the UN, 
and its deployments in the field, has meant that serious attention has been 
given to harmonising efforts whilst deployed in a peacekeeping operation. Thus, 
there has been the development of a multitude of policy papers, guidelines and 
memorandums to guide peacekeepers (whether they be military, civilian or 
police) whilst in the field. Ultimately, this has led to the UN defining their version 
of civil-military cooperation as CMCoord, or Civil-Military Coordination. Box 3.1 
offers a good guideline to ‘background documentation’ for the development of 
UN CMCoord policy. The information is derived from the 2008 publication Civil 
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Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies (IASC, 2008) 
Although these guidelines are mainly for a humanitarian audience, they give a 
comprehensive overview of the development of the policy: 
Box 3.1: The UN’s Applicable Civil-Military Guidelines, Concepts, 
Standards and Law54 
(IASC, 2008; 18) 
 
 
 
A plethora of different documents exist, which in varying degrees outline the 
UN’s policy on civil-military coordination. However, a difficulty is encountered 
when examining the definition from both a civilian perspective and a military 
perspective. This can be seen clearly in two definitions from different wings 
within the UN: the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Firstly, the Inter Agency Standing 
Committee’s (IASC) definition offers this understanding of CMCoord: 
 
                                                
54 MCDA Guidelines – UN Guidelines On The Use Of Military And Civil Defence Assets To 
Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities In Complex Emergencies 
IASC – Inter Agency Standing Committee. 
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The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military 
actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and 
promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize 
inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic 
strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a 
shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. 
(IASC, 2004; 5) 
 
The weight of importance is attached to the protection and promotion of 
humanitarian principles. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
offers its own interpretation of CMCoord. This interpretation could possibly be 
aimed at a military audience. CMCoord is defined as: 
 
The system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, 
de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military 
elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, or 
the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives. 
(DPKO, 2002; 1-2) 
 
Thus, on the one hand, through the IASC, civil-military coordination is aimed 
towards the humanitarian community; and on the other hand, the DPKO points 
towards the military stakeholders. This highlights an inherent difficulty in 
attempting to specify an acceptable definition of the phenomenon within the UN. 
With so many agencies covering civilian and military issues, it is hardly 
surprising that there is divergence. However, the DPKO (an organisation which 
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deals most with military issues) does offer a level playing-field definition of civil-
military cooperation, which is a less militarised view than other military 
organisations which, as is suggested below, emphasise the special importance 
of military control in civil-military cooperation.  
 
European Union (EU) led deployments in Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Chad and the Balkans have prompted the organisation to work on its own 
definition of civil-military cooperation to guide EU forces (both military and 
civilian) when deployed. This definition states that: 
 
Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, 
in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis 
Management Operations and civil actors (external to the EU), including 
national population and local authorities, as well as international, national 
and non-governmental organisations and agencies. 
(EU, 2002) 
 
Within this definition, the EU concept has three key strands of CIMIC: Firstly, 
Civil-Military Liaison, which identifies liaison between military components and 
civilian organisations; secondly, Support to the Civil Environment, which refers 
to the use of military resources or activities to sustain the humanitarian needs of 
the host population or to support a civil authority or organisation; and finally 
Support to the Military Force, which covers arrangements and activities needed 
to ensure the maximum co-operation of civil authorities, organisations and 
populations in supporting the mission of the military force and sustaining its 
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presence in a crisis situation. This offers a holistic approach to the area, with 
relations with humanitarian actors, the local civilian population and the civil 
authority being paid equal attention. The final facet is more akin to a ‘hearts and 
minds’ approach, which aims to maintain high levels of consent for the 
peacekeeping force. The second point is also an interesting area, as it focuses 
on the role the military can play in providing assets for humanitarian purposes.  
 
Though this thesis does not explicitly examine NATO versions of peacekeeping, 
it is worth presenting how a predominately military organisation sees civil-
military cooperation and how this can have an influence on the development of 
national doctrine and practice. The NATO definition is: 
 
The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between 
the  
NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and 
local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental 
organisations and agencies. 
 
Rollins, a Lieutenant Colonel in the UK army, emphasises this NATO view, 
asserting that in order for civil-military cooperation to work effectively, a military 
force commander effectively ‘controls’ the project. He argues that civil-military 
cooperation is the coordination and cooperation that ‘a NATO Commander 
employs with all the civilian actors within his area of operations in order to carry 
out his mission’ (Rollins, 2001; 123). The NATO definition of civil-military 
cooperation has had a strong influence on how the process is conceptualised in 
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the United Kingdom (UK). The UK’s definition, as outlined in Joint Warfare 
Publication 3-90: Civil Military Cooperation deems civil-military cooperation to 
be: 
 
The coordination and co-operation, in support of the mission between the 
[NATO] Commander and civil actors including the national population 
and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-
governmental organisations and agencies. 
(JDDC, 2003; 1-2) 
 
The UK’s definition has three main functions: firstly, liaison between military and 
civil agencies, which is liaison between the military and NGOs and INGOs; 
secondly, support to the force, which argues that cooperation will be used to 
find resources, supplies, infrastructure and expertise of the indigenous 
population to support the force; and thirdly, support to the civil environment, 
which spans a wide range of support for the civil community or a civilian 
organisation. However, this support generally comes ‘where and when it is 
required to create conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the military 
mission… and/or because the appropriate civil authorities and agencies are 
unable to carry out the task’(JDDC, 2003; 1-4). 
 
The UK’s definition of ‘CIMIC’ is in support of the military mission, and like the 
NATO definition, is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the IASC definition in 
terms of how civil-military cooperation is carried out. In one respect, it 
encompasses the military taking care not to compromise the humanitarian 
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principles of humanitarian agencies, while it also emphasises military control 
over civilian agencies in order to support the mission. The DPKO definition is 
placed in between the UK and IASC definition.  
 
What ties the definitions from the EU, NATO and the UK together are the words 
‘in support of the mission’. Different interpretations of what the ‘mission’ is and 
who controls it may have consequences for the relationship between the 
military and civilian organisations. If the military is controlling the mission, then 
this could mean that the civilian aspect of the mission is marginalised. This is 
what Rollins would argue about NATO operations and the importance of the 
commander’s intent. Whoever is in ‘control’ of the mission will be of great 
importance. What may also be occurring is that this divergence of ‘all 
encompassing’ views on civil-military coordination can lead to a level of 
confusion amongst soldiers deployed. For example a regular soldier from an EU 
member state with NATO Membership may find him/herself ‘jumping’ from one 
working definition of CIMIC to another. 
 
Considerable debates also exist within national militaries over the role and 
understanding of civil-military cooperatrion doctrine. One of the observed case 
studies - the Irish Defence Forces (DF) - is currently undergoing internal debate 
over its civil-military coordination structures. Current Irish CIMIC doctrine is 
outlined below, and mainly follows the NATO lead: 
 
CIMIC is co-operation in support of the Mission, between components of 
EU and UN-led Crisis Management Operations/Peace Support 
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Operations and the civil actors in theatre which includes the national 
population and local authorities as well as international, national and 
non-governmental organisations and agencies. 
(O'Shea, 2010; 85) 
 
Such doctrine requires there to be continued cooperation between the military 
and civilian components of the mission, as well as civilian authorities and 
populations in order to ‘create the best possible moral, material and tactical 
conditions for the achievement of the mission’ (O'Shea, 2010; 86). O’Shea, who 
has carried out extensive research on civil-military cooperation, finds that the 
DF place their own approach somewhere between EU and NATO doctrines, 
and even referred to it as the ‘soft face’ of the NATO doctrine (O'Shea, 2010; 
95). This ‘soft face’ however brings difficulties. O’Shea highlights a 2008 report 
by the University of Hull and the Calrow Centre Institute of Technology, entitled 
Strengthening Partnership in Humanitarian Supply Chains, which arues that 
there is a critical need for the DF to develop their own CIMIC doctrine, as 
opposed to officially  operating under a contested NATO definition: 
 
unless the DF develops its own CIMIC doctrine, reflecting DF values and 
experience in the area of humanitarian-military relations, it runs the 
danger of subscribing to an effort which is currently seen as alienating 
the very community that it is designed to facilitate. A divide exists 
between the “softer face” of CIMIC that is part of DF identity and 
experience, and the doctrine that it subscribes to and teaches.  Mimicry 
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of the NATO doctrine does not reflect the DF concept and practice of 
CIMIC. 
(Heaslip et al., 2008; 12) 
 
The report identifies that the DF should review its own CIMIC doctrine and it 
encourages major consultation with civilian organisations, which have been 
alienated (in its view) by NATO doctrine and practice. A significant point is 
contributed here. Taking this example, it is clear that within the doctrine (which 
in itself looks solid and non-negotiable) there exists a great deal of debate and 
conjecture on what exactly the term ‘civil-military cooperation’ actually means. 
This, in turn highlights the difficulties that exist in achieving effective 
coordination between military and civilian actors. 
 
Whether there can be a working definition of civil-military cooperation, CIMIC, 
CMCoord or any of the other guises that this relationship officially works under 
is unlikely. This chapter demonstrates that each actor within a peacekeeping 
operation has their own constructed opinion of how this relationship works, how 
it is meant to work, and how it can fail. At best, one can hope for a minimum 
understanding based on examples and working practice. 
 
What can be agreed, as a minimum, would be a definition of what civil-military 
cooperation cannot be; i.e. starting from fundamentally correct and incorrect 
procedures, as in the following UN definition that in a civil-military partnership: 
 
Humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as 
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part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from 
presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers.  
(IASC, 2008; 11) 
 
This basic understanding of the job roles may offer a starting point for how civil-
military cooperation in peacekeeping operations is conceptualised. 
Military and civilian organisations: Recognition that they work 
together 
 
Although there is no solid definition shared amongst actors, there exists 
recognition at a strategic level of an increased amount of cooperation on an ad 
hoc basis. The 1996 UN DPKO paper Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons 
Learned from Recent Experience gave an early indication of the need to 
formalise relations between the civilian and military components. In particular, it 
advocated the use of guidelines which would include ‘information on the role, 
function and organisation of coordination mechanisms, such as a joint civilian-
military coordination or operations centre’ (DPKO, 1996; 4). This was an early 
attempt to give the ad hoc nature some structure. 
 
UN policy reflects the fact that military peacekeepers provide relief and services 
to local populations and, at the same time, a significant number of humanitarian 
actors in war zones are subject to greater risks in the field, thus requiring an 
increased security presence from military forces on a case-by-case basis. The 
UN’s IASC, created to enhance cooperation between humanitarian agencies in 
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complex emergencies, notes this. Their 2004 reference paper, (written in 
tandem with the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs) recognises 
that through recent interventions, ‘practical realities on the ground have 
gradually necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for 
humanitarian operations’ (IASC, 2004; 3). 
 
Slim’s seminal 1996 paper on civil-military cooperation noted the changing 
nature of militaries involved in second generation peacekeeping operations. In 
these deployments, military peacekeepers attempted to incorporate a number 
of new roles including emergency provision of water and medical care, 
protection of relief agencies or supplies, and disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration programmes. Because of this crossover, Slim’s article likens the 
military to a ‘relief agency’ (Slim, 1996; 129-130). Moreover, Slim finds common 
ground shared by the military and civilian components of peacekeeping 
operations, which requires increased dialogue between both groups. This 
‘dialogue’ represents an effort to incorporate joint training programmes which 
would create common standards within and between civilian and military 
components (Slim, 1996; 139). Similarly, Kofi Abew argues that the military 
needs to support its traditional tasks of controlling violent conflict with support 
and coordination of civilian instruments, in order to achieve the goal of peace 
and stability. Problems arise however, when the military acts outside of its 
‘comfort zone’ and enters into the humanitarian sphere of operations. This is 
inevitable, since political, humanitarian, security, socio-economic, legal, and 
other issues ‘cannot be separated into watertight compartments and are 
inextricably linked’ (Kofi Abiew, 2003b; 28). Gamba highlights this through her 
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study of the UNIDIR questionnaire and argues that the civil-military relationship 
in the field will be affected by the type of humanitarian role that the military 
adopts, whether it is one of technical assistance or of security provision 
(Gamba, 1998; 8). 
 
In addition, Spence notes that the size of problems which operations encounter 
are too large for one single component to address. Spence finds that a 
coordinated strategy is needed to enable a sustainable resolution to a crisis. In 
order to achieve and sustain positive peace, a complementary approach 
involving political, economic, military, humanitarian and administrative 
components is required (Spence, 2002; 165).  Linking the framework to a more 
generalised view of peace support operation (PSO) doctrine, Spence sees the 
aim of the military role in such deployments is to hand over assumed ‘civilian 
tasks’ to the appropriate authorities at the earliest possible opportunity. This 
work emphasises where doctrinally, the civilian-military interface is being 
incorporated. The UK has highlighted CIMIC in both their main peace support 
operation doctrine (outlined in Joint Warfare Publication 3-50) and also the 
doctrine publication on Civil Military Cooperation.  The UK’s approach to CIMIC 
is based on the premise that ‘[m]ilitary success alone will achieve little beyond 
containment of a situation unless the conditions for the pursuit of civil objectives 
by civil actors are created’ (JDDC, 2003; 1-1), emphasising the need for 
transformation from negative to positive peace.  
 
The UK’s overarching peace support operations doctrine urges the force 
commander to liaise with a full range of civilian actors, including international 
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organisations and NGOs, local authorities, civilian leaders, and the general 
population.  It does have a particularly military mindset, stating that CIMIC is an 
‘important military element’ in the planning for a deployment, and asserts that 
liaison is a necessary aspect of operations in order to ‘manage the impact of the 
civil sector on the military operation (and vice versa), and to harmonise plans 
and activities in support of the civil environment, both to reduce friction and to 
increase effectiveness’ (JDDC, 2004; 5-11). PSO Doctrine also states that 
CIMIC should be fully integrated into all levels of the mission as it ‘enables the 
interface for cooperation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning and 
information exchange’ between the military and civilian components (JDDC, 
2004; 5-11). This complements the approach that the CIMIC doctrine 
publication took, which emphasised the different levels of where CIMIC is 
evident (strategic, operational, tactical). On the tactical level (where this thesis 
focuses), the CIMIC doctrine publication states that: 
 
This is the level at which interaction between the military and civilian 
sectors takes place on the ground and hence is the concern of all military 
personnel. It is the level at which the CIMIC process and activity have the 
most immediate effect and may have implications through to the strategic 
level. 
(JDDC, 2003; 2-1) 
 
It is significant that CIMIC Doctrine emphasises the importance of this level, as 
it is at this stage where differences in culture, opinion and working practices are 
first noticed, and most felt.  
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The inevitable consequence of such close cooperation, mixed with multiple 
different constructions of the term ‘civil-military cooperation’, has been an 
uneasy working relationship between the military and civilian actors. Gamba’s 
analysis finds that the interactions between the military and civilian 
organisations can impact the ‘normal course’ of the civilian agencies work. This 
is because, she argues, the ‘humanitarian objectives of different agencies and 
NGOs cannot be separated from military and political objectives’, and that 
humanitarian aid is now an aspect of military objectives. (Gamba, 1998; 6). 
Pugh also picks up on this point, and makes the argument that: 
 
The coercive orientation of peace support operations means that the 
civil-military relationship is more politically and ethically ambiguous than 
in traditional peacekeeping. 
(Pugh, 2000; 229) 
 
This ambiguity has led to a great deal of frustration, disagreement and negative 
stereotyping between the civilian and military actors in peace operations. This is 
due to a number of factors. The UN’s Challenges Project55, argues in its first 
report that ‘fundamental obstacles’ to close relations between the two groups 
exist in peace operations. Most pertinent are ‘major differences in culture, 
mandates, resources, levels of authority and experience, as well as problems of 
personality (in leadership) and functional areas of responsibility’(TCP, 2002; 
146-147). Byman argues that humanitarian emergencies are commonly 
                                                
55 The International Forum on the Challenges of Peace Operations was set up in 1997 to 
promote dialogue over sharing best practice amongst 16 partner countries. It has created two 
reports, referred to as Challenges I, and Challenges II. 
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hamstrung by a ‘lack of prior coordination, limited military familiarity with relief 
agencies and strategic and operational chaos’ (Byman, 2001; 98). Hugo Slim’s 
analysis notes that on a technical level, relations are characterised by issues of 
competence and competition. With both components essentially working 
towards the same goal, the military are criticised for crossing over into work 
essentially designated for humanitarian organisations. (Slim, 1996; 134-138). 
This chapter now analyses two important areas which impinge effective civil-
military coordination strategies: culture and consent. 
Culture  
 
Culture clashes have frequently been highlighted as a major stumbling block for 
effective civil-military cooperation. Duffey’s findings outline relations strained by 
inherent institutional culture clashes and mutual unfamiliarity between the 
military and civilian actors, resulting in each actor forming ‘ill informed’ 
stereotypes. She explains: 
 
The military is often characterized as an insensitive, ill informed, 
controlling, and inflexible war-machine, while NGO personnel are often 
seen as sandal-wearing, two faced, undisciplined and uncoordinated 
liberals. 
(Duffey, 2000a; 149) 
  
These cultures frequently clash in methods of decision making, accountability, 
operational and management styles, use of force, approaches to time and 
success, media styles, and relationships with the local population. Pouligny’s 
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more recent assessment of the daily culture clashes between civilian and 
military organisations notes that the ‘infinite variety’ of training and professional 
careers, cultural origins, interstate factors, and differences in communication 
and language, combine to complicate interactions. Additionally, Pouligny points 
out that missions now have almost one hundred different nationalities working 
within the civilian side. Added to the multitude of nationalities in the military 
deployment, the chances for cultural harmonisation becomes smaller and 
smaller (Pouligny, 2006; 133). Gamba observes that the make-up of 
humanitarian organisations can lead to negative interpretations of the other 
group. She finds that international humanitarian organisations ‘tend to be made 
up of people who have deep reservations about militarism’, and thus ‘at a 
profound moral level, the humanitarian has more problems with the military than 
the military with the humanitarian’ (Gamba, 1998; 7). Gamba also finds that 
although there is a generally recognised principle that long-term political and 
developmental issues need to be resolved, military and civilian approaches to 
achieving this may appear radically different. She argues: 
 
The military operational approach is not geared to implement 
development activities. The military aim to do something for, rather than 
with, people and tend to give little thought to the long term management 
implications of what they construct or repair, Civilian agents on the other 
hand – particularly NGO’s – are very much aware of such differences. 
 (Gamba, 1998; 9) 
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Rubenstein, Keller and Scherger expand on this cultural approach, particularly 
the ‘disparate understandings of the meanings of partnership and cooperation’ 
(Rubinstein et al., 2008; 543). They argue that the dominance of military 
concerns in mission planning has exacerbated these cultural 
misunderstandings, which have ‘complicated the search for interoperability’ 
(Rubinstein et al., 2008; 544). The authors offer an example of the barriers 
which were put up by both military and civilian actors in the field, which is worth 
quoting at length: 
 
…during field research we frequently listened to conversations between 
civilian humanitarians and their military counterparts concerning the need 
for coordination. These conversations had a distressing commonality, 
regardless of location, as if following a script. The conversations always 
began with professions of respect for one another’s concerns and an 
expression of a desire to work as partners. This was followed by a 
discussion of the practicalities of operating together, which inevitably 
revealed differing preferences and incentives. The stumbling points could 
be at any level, including the humanitarians’ concern for the preservation 
of humanitarian space as a key symbolic component of their world view, 
the military’s concern for unitary command and coordination also as a 
key symbol of their world view, and disagreements about the proper site 
for mission activities. At this impasse, the earlier professions of respect 
and partnership were repeated. The conversation resumed with an 
examination of the practicalities involved, only to clash once again. 
Depending on the patience and will of the interlocutors, this pattern of 
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profession of respect and partnership, followed by disagreement, 
returning to a profession of respect and partnership, could continue for 
some time. But, nearly universally, the conversations we observed ended 
with the parties failing to reach genuine agreement – reaching a false 
consensus, at best. Typically, the military interlocutor would 
communicate, directly or by indirection, the idea that ‘yes, we want to 
partner with you, as long as you follow our lead and instructions’ – not an 
expression of respectful partnership but an assertion of dominance and 
control. 
 (Rubinstein et al., 2008; 544) 
 
This raises a number of important issues. Firstly, one can see that Rubenstein 
et al find that there is no ‘genuine agreement’ found with regard to a common 
approach to civil-military cooperation, and at best one can expect to find a ‘false 
consensus’. This can be linked to questions over whether there can ever be an 
overall arching ‘doctrine’ for civil-military cooperation. Next, is the claim that the 
military assume dominance over the model - a claim reinforced when looking at 
the NATO and UK doctrine for civil-military cooperation.  
 
To a certain extent, UN documentation understands the culture clashes outlined 
above. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and 
Guidelines, (referred to in Chapter 3) notes the ‘significant’ cultural differences 
that exist between components in an operation. Providing a significant obstacle 
is the management culture of each organisation. The Principles and Guidelines 
notes that while civilian organisations function with ‘a high degree of tolerance 
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for ambiguity and highly flexible management models’, military organisations 
‘tend to seek to minimize ambiguity by making informed assumptions within a 
strong planning culture’. Therefore, in order for missions to be effective, the 
Principles and Guidelines suggests that such different institutional cultures need 
to be reconciled, however without stifling the ‘cultural diversity that constitutes 
one of the United Nations main strengths’ (UN, 2008c; 71). 
Consent  
 
Underlying the clashes in culture is the danger of a loss of consent to the 
military presence. Slim argues that the essential component to the success of 
civil-military cooperation is the level of consent to the military presence, and 
when levels of consent drop (as they do in peace operations) humanitarian 
organisations attempt to distance themselves from the military. Gamba also 
finds that when a peacekeeping operation becomes unwelcome and unpopular, 
civilian staff attempt to distance themselves from both the civil affairs officers of 
the mission and from the international military force (Gamba, 1998; 9). Though 
this distancing (often seen in a flurry of press releases and statements) is 
required from a humanitarian standpoint, it often has a baffling effect on the 
military actors, and gives humanitarian actors ‘something of a reputation in 
military circles for equivocation’ (Slim, 1996; 131-132).  
 
The issue of consent is now even more pertinent largely due to the 
development of robust peacekeeping and the impact that this has had on the 
practice of UN peacekeeping deployments. With the evolution of third 
generation peacekeeping, the principle of consent in UN peacekeeping is no 
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longer the ‘Rubicon’ that it once was. In the Brahimi Report, consent is raised 
as an issue which could be ‘manipulated’ by combatants and belligerent groups 
and accordingly, this has led to peacekeeping forces to expect a loss of consent 
from ‘spoilers’ to a peace process. This could be problematic, as deployments 
where military peacekeepers are encouraged to rely on the impartial use of 
force as opposed to ensuring consent, run the risk of hampering the ability of 
humanitarian organisations to carry out their work in a consent-based 
environment. Gordon argues that: 
 
The convergence of peacekeeping doctrines on more robust 
approaches, combined with the increasing prevalence of integrated 
missions, is likely to have profound and unintended consequences in 
terms of the maintenance of humanitarian space generally. 
(Gordon, 2007; 116) 
 
This is a significant finding, and one which UN operations are still learning to 
deal with. In operations with numerous belligerent groups who do not align 
themselves to a formal peace process, there exists a fine balance between 
attempting to defeat such groups militarily, and risk losing the support of the 
civilian actors. Such a balance places a high amount of pressure on military 
peacekeepers, and those who command them. Consequently, this has a 
significant impact on the decision making frameworks on soldiers and the 
requirements of training programmes designed to prepare them. 
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Taking relations a stage further: The integrated mission 
concept 
 
The previous chapter outlined the development of the integrated missions 
concept56 and the efforts in the UN to integrate the political, humanitarian, and 
security aspects of their operations under one overall umbrella. Although it is in 
its early stages, the process carries with it serious implications on how civil-
military cooperation is understood, and has divided opinion on whether it helps 
or hinders cooperation. This chapter observes that it is obvious that all groups 
will enter a peacekeeping operation with different expectations and 
constructions of the conflict57. Eide et al (who authored a commissioned report 
for the UN on integrated missions) note that categorical differences exist 
between different actors in a peacekeeping operation (most notably 
peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian actors) over the approaches to 
integration and benchmarks for success (Eide et al., 2005; 13). The integrated 
missions concept is partly designed to create one common drive for operations, 
and reduce the chance of further categorical differences. 
 
While this may be the case, observers note that the integrated mission concept 
puts pressure on the independence of humanitarian actors in the field. Eide et 
al highlight this: 
                                                
56 To serve as a brief reminder to what the integrated mission concept, it is worth revisiting the 
UN’s 2006 definition as outlined in the Integrated Missions Planning Process Guidelines: ‘the 
guiding principle for the planning, design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-
conflict situations, for linking the different dimensions of peace support operations (political, 
development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security), and integrating the 
imperatives of each dimension into its strategic thinking and design’ (UN, 2006b; 3). 
57 It is important to remember that each group can be further divided into smaller groups 
(military peacekeepers for example can be separated into rank, nationality, or geographic 
location of deployment). 
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In contrast to its Cold War days, the United Nations of today does not 
shy away from taking a side in a peace process, for instance in favour of 
an internationally recognised transitional government and against the 
“spoilers” trying to undermine the transitional process. On the other hand, 
for some humanitarian actors, be they humanitarian agencies or NGOs 
working closely with the UN, the well-established humanitarian principles 
of humanity, neutrality and impartiality must still be upheld. 
(Eide et al., 2005; 6) 
 
This is a significant dilemma. Gordon argues that although the DPKO 
understand this concept as a rational step forward in the development of 
peacekeeping operations, it does lead to significant problems in differentiating 
the responsibilities, mandate and actions of humanitarian actors and the ‘UN 
politico-military strategy’, which accordingly has ‘obvious implications’ for 
humanitarian space and independence (Gordon, 2007; 115). This is a strong 
critique of the concept, which argues that humanitarian actors are going to be 
adversely affected by the strategy of the integrated mission. The UN’s 
Principles and Guidelines also flag that integration can create difficulties for the 
humanitarian and development components of an operation, particularly ‘if they 
are perceived to be too closely linked to the political and security objectives of 
the peacekeeping mission’. In the worst case, this can lead to personnel and 
operations being placed in danger and leads the Principles and Guidelines to 
recommend that ‘appropriate dialogue, communication and contingency 
planning’ are carried out to ensure that such eventualities are prepared for (UN, 
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2008c; 54). Again this is significant, and relates to the point made above 
regarding the loss of consent for an operation. 
 
However, Eide et al argue that the security of humanitarian space will be further 
protected through the integrated mission structure as the ‘humanitarian 
perspective is now part of the mission itself’ (Eide et al., 2005; 7). From their 
perspective, it is better to be influencing the operation from ‘within’ than from an 
outsider’s perspective (though critics of this view could point to the fact that it is 
a UN commissioned study). Some observers take this a stage further. Harmer, 
reflecting on the targeting of humanitarian staff in countries where 
peacekeeping operations are deployed, argues that humanitarian agencies can 
no longer rely on perceptions of neutrality to safeguard them. She argues that in 
situations of increased vulnerability, the humanitarian agencies relationship 
with, and influence over, political and military agencies in integrated missions 
could be ‘crucially important’ to humanitarian operations (Harmer, 2008; 529).   
 
There are other important issues which demonstrate the delicate state of the 
integrated missions concept. Campbell and Kaspersen argue that the very 
nature of where peacekeeping operations are deployed bring a significant 
number of complexities to integrated missions. In stark contrast to the ‘linear 
planning frameworks’ that the UN has been developing, post-conflict 
environments are ‘dynamic, complex endeavours with uncertain outcomes’. 
This makes the UN’s project of contributing to the peaceful development of a 
‘liberal democratic state featuring rule of law, free markets and liberal 
democracy’ a far from simple task, where successful peacebuilding projects are 
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the ‘surprise, not the exception’ (Campbell and Kaspersen, 2008; 481). This is 
also dependent on whether the host state actually agrees the UN’s 
conceptualisation of peace and development. Gowan has written extensively on 
how the UN faces a ‘paradigmatic crisis’, where their traditional conceptions of 
peace are challenged by states which are hosting peacekeeping operations. 
This is highlighted most notably in the case of Afghanistan where the national 
leadership, through rejecting the appointment of Lord Ashdown to the UN 
Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), showed that they preferred their 
own political autonomy over the benefits of an integrated UN plan (Gowan, 
2008; 462-463). 
 
Moreover, national governments with seats on the Security Council and 
General Assembly rarely have their own codified strategy to deal with ‘failed 
states’, making the task of forming a uniformed multi-governmental approach 
difficult. Doss adds to this, by noting his experiences in the field where 
mandates often arrived as a result of political compromise. Such compromises, 
he argues, can result in a mismatch between expectations and outcomes. This 
in turn has an immediate effect on the credibility of a mission as ‘coherence and 
credibility go hand in hand’ (Doss, 2008; 572). To underline this Doss points to 
mandates pertaining to the protection of civilians, which often raise expectations 
of the local population, yet are extremely hard to match with limited resources, 
thereby jeapordising the credibility of the operation. Furthermore, the UN’s very 
own structures are characterised by, what appears to be at a field level, 
‘irrational constraints and barriers’ (Campbell, 2008; 558). This can have a 
negative impact on the operations as such barriers often lead to disillusionment.  
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This impacts on civil-military cooperation. As well as issues of the ‘humanitarian 
space’, the impacts of what Doss terms as ‘mandate expansion’ for integrated 
missions creates the need for better coordination between peacekeepers and 
‘other players’ - which includes UN actors, NGOs and civil society 
organisations. Doss argues that much of the debate about the coherence in 
integrated missions revolves ‘around the interaction (and friction) between 
political-security actors and their humanitarian counterparts’ (Doss, 2008; 574). 
Furthermore, noting the susceptibility that civil-military cooperation has to 
misunderstandings on mandates and motivation, Doss finds that an integrated 
mission concept will not - and possibly should not - change these attitudes 
overnight. What an integrated mission should aim to achieve, in Doss’ opinion, 
is to use integrated approaches in order to get each actor to understand, 
consider, and accommodate differences (Doss, 2008; 576). 
 
Imposing this understanding through top down approaches is, according to 
Doss, unworkable. Instead, he argues for a structure which enables shared 
recognition of others objectives (Doss, 2008; 580). Campbell and Kaspersen 
agree, noting that cases of successful integration are largely due to ‘ad hoc 
initiatives, with high transaction costs, undertaken by individual staff voluntarily 
circumventing barriers’ (Campbell and Kaspersen, 2008; 470). Thus, it is 
argued that there is a requirement for information to be gathered, mechanisms 
created at the country level, and processes fed up the chain. Instead of 
imposing a ‘type’ of integration, the UN could be a facilitator and monitor of 
successful initiatives (Jennings and Kaspersen, 2008b; 585) (Campbell, 2008; 
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566). As well as highlighting difficulty of attaching a blueprint to such 
interactions, this has considerable implications for training programmes. Far 
from having a unifying doctrine, there is every chance that military and civilian 
actors will continue to rely on their ad hoc relationship in each particular 
context. The ad hoc nature of interaction will not only require soldiers to 
understand the complex nature of peacebuilding tasks and organizations: it will 
further require them to understand the implications of their actions on the wider 
operation.  
New challenges: recognising the local population 
 
Further to the organisational clashes that appear between the military and 
humanitarian organisations in the field, the impact of the peacekeeping 
operations on the local population is critical to its success or failure, and is 
significant for the study of civil-military relations. This is a relatively new area of 
analysis, as up until the late 1990’s, the bulk of civil-military relations literature 
focussed on how the military related with NGOs, UN agencies, and large 
international aid agencies. More recent studies have examined ‘unintended 
consequences’ of peacekeeping deployments that go far beyond the day-to-day 
activities outlined above. These consequences are mainly focussed on the local 
population and how they are affected by a large deployment. The second half of 
this chapter explores the challenges posed through ‘unintended consequences’ 
that arise, and links this literature to that of civil-military coordination. It does this 
through the assessment of the following four main areas: the impact of 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against UN peacekeepers in the 
field; the expectations of the local population; cultural misunderstandings of the 
 227 
host population; and economic impacts that peacekeeping operations have on 
the host population. 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
 
Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers 
(military, civilian and police) have resulted in a crisis for particular operations as 
well as the UN system as a whole. These allegations also put a huge strain on 
relations between the military and civilian population. Importantly for this thesis, 
the institutional reaction of the UN to allegations of SEA has had an impact on 
training for military peacekeepers. 
 
High-publicity cases of SEA have tarnished the image of the UN in the past. In 
1993, the UN Special Representative for the Secretary General in Cambodia, 
Yasushi Akashi, drew a considerable amount of criticism from different quarters 
because of his reaction to drunken behaviour and sexual misconduct by UN 
personnel. Whitworth notes that in responding to allegations, the SRSG 
responded by stating that ‘it was natural for hot-blooded young soldiers who 
had endured the rigours of the field to want to have a few beers and to chase 
“young beautiful beings of the opposite sex”’ (Whitworth, 2004; 71, 
Independent, 1994). 
 
In 2001, allegations surfaced of acts of SEA committed by UN personnel 
(including military, civilian and police) on vulnerable members of the local 
population. A UNHCR investigation into the matter resulted in a leaked report, 
which exposed the UN organisation to some of the most damaging allegations it 
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has received in modern times. In response, the Secretary General’s office 
released a policy bulletin containing special measures for protection for SEA. It 
opened by offering definitions of sexual exploitation and abuse:  
 
“sexual exploitation” means any actual or attempted abuse of a position 
of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, 
but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the 
sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the term “sexual abuse” means 
the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by 
force or under unequal or coercive conditions. 
(UN, 2003c; 1) 
 
The bulletin outlined rules and regulations governing actions by UN personnel 
deployed in the field, and gave a zero-tolerance approach to acts of SEA. 
Security Council Resolutions mandating operations were also adapted to take 
note of SEA allegations, with mandates for operations in Sierra Leone and DRC 
outlined concern for allegations of sexual abuse and misconduct by UN 
personnel. Security Council Resolution 1265 (on the MONUC mission in DRC) 
offers an example of how mandates began to address the issue of SEA. In 
expressing ‘grave concern’ about the allegations of SEA by MONUC personnel, 
the Security Council mandated the Secretary General to fully investigate all 
allegations. Furthermore, it encouraged MONUC to: 
 
conduct training for personnel targeted to ensure full compliance with its 
code of conduct regarding sexual misconduct, and urges troop-
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contributing countries to take appropriate disciplinary and other action to 
ensure full accountability in cases of such misconduct involving their 
personnel; 
(UN, 2004c) 
 
However, allegations continued to surface in operations in the DRC, Haiti, 
Burundi and Liberia (SCR, 2006, 1-2). With the UN facing one of its largest 
emergencies since its inception, the Secretary General commissioned a much 
wider report into the allegations. This resulted in the publication of ‘A 
comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in 
United Nations peacekeeping operations’, more commonly known as the Zeid 
Report58. This examined a number of large thematic areas: how guidelines and 
legal jurisdiction (or the lack of jurisdiction) governs UN peacekeepers (inclusive 
of police, civilian and military); how the UN investigates allegations of SEA; how 
the UN as an organisation can prevent such acts in the future; the 
accountability of managers and commanders; disciplinary and financial 
accountability on both an individual level and institutional level; criminal 
accountability of perpetrators; and criminal accountability of the UN 
organisation.  
 
The Zeid Report outlines a number of consequences of acts of SEA. At the top 
of the list is that an act of SEA ‘damages the image and credibility of a 
peacekeeping operation and damages its impartiality in the eyes of the local 
population, which in turn may well impede the implementation of its mandate’ 
                                                
58 After the author of the report, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein of Jordan. 
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(UN, 2005a; 9). This highlights the direct implications on the relations at the 
civilian/military interface of the operation. The Zeid Report outlined further 
consequences, including how such acts are against international law, that they 
constitute a loss of discipline within the mission, allegations foster a lack of 
legitimacy on the part of the operation, and create an increased risk of 
retaliatory violence and blackmail. Further unintended impacts relate to sexual 
misconduct, including the possible spread of sexually transmitted diseases, a 
rise in the prostitution and sex work trade, and the number of women and 
children left behind by UN staff and peacekeepers (Kyooama and Myrttinen, 
2007; 36-37). 
 
Significantly, the Zeid Report outlines a key factor which has important 
ramifications on how peacekeepers carry out their functions: 
 
A consistent theme throughout the history of the Organization is the 
degree to which peacekeeping personnel have often failed to grasp the 
dangers confronting them, seduced by day-to-day conditions that can be 
viewed as benign. In other words, United Nations peacekeeping 
personnel have often read normalcy into a situation that is far from 
normal. And it is this inability on the part of many peacekeepers to 
discern the extent to which the society is traumatized and vulnerable that 
is at the root of many of the problems addressed in the present report. 
Peacekeeping is — and always will be — dangerous, demanding and 
exceptional, and no participant should assume peacekeeping to be 
“normal”. 
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(UN, 2005a; 2) 
 
Here, the report picks up on a critical issue (and one which this thesis revisits in 
later chapters): that of the mindset of peacekeepers. The report outlines a 
number of characteristics of peacekeeping deployments which were brought to 
the attention of its authors, such characteristics are far from the ‘normality’ of 
day-to-day life in peacetime. Included is an erosion of the social fabric of the 
host population, a high number of children with little family support, high levels 
of poverty and lack of income-generating possibilities, and ‘high incidence of 
sexual violence against women and children during the civil conflict coupled 
with discrimination against women and girls’, which in the report’s view, leads 
‘to a degree of local acceptance of violent and/or exploitative behavior against 
them’ (UN, 2005a; 10). It is into this environment where peacekeepers arrive. 
According to the Report, it is the failure of a number of peacekeepers to treat 
this environment as non-normal that leads to them becoming involved in acts of 
SEA. Murphy observes that: 
 
The reality of prostitution and sexual exploitation in this context is all the 
more disturbing as UN peacekeepers are supposed to facilitate a return to 
normality in a war-torn society and not to breach the trust placed in it by 
the local population. The UN presence is intended to protect those most 
vulnerable, not to exploit them. 
 (Murphy, 2006; 531) 
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Although perpetrators come from all parts of the peacekeeping community, 
military peacekeepers have become more synonymous with such activities. A 
2008 report by Save the Children UK found that troops associated with the 
DPKO ‘were identified as a particular source of abuse’ in areas that were 
studied (Csáky, 2008; 8). Although the Report adds that certain operations will 
have a higher proportion of military peacekeepers (and this may influence 
figures), areas with a more mixed representation of military, civilian and police 
peacekeepers appeared to have higher allegations made against military 
peacekeepers (Csáky, 2008; 8). Murphy notes that between 1st January 2004 
and 9th December 2005, 278 investigations were carried out against 
peacekeeping personnel (military, civilian and police), resulting in the dismissal 
of 16 civilians, and the repatriation of 16 members of formed police units and 
122 military personnel (including six commanders) on disciplinary grounds 
(Murphy, 2006; 532). These figures are in addition to number of high profile 
cases involving peacekeepers from Italy, Denmark, Slovakia, America, 
Germany and Pakistan (to name a few) (Csáky, 2008; 10). Furthermore, 
research carried out by Kyoama and Myrttinen into the activities of battalions 
taking part in the UN mission in East Timor show a number of discrepancies by 
different nationalities within the mission. They find that while some of the 
nationalities (including the Australian battalion) placed limits on the number of 
alcoholic drinks per day for soldiers to drink, other battalions were less strict. 
For example, the Portuguese Battalion (PorBatt), was described by the authors 
to have a more ‘laissez faire attitude towards the nocturnal activities of its 
soldiers’. Thus, PorBatt soldiers gained a certain notoriety in the area and were 
known to regularly visit massage parlours, be involved in bar-room brawls and 
 233 
some were even known to have fathered children from the area (Kyooama and 
Myrttinen, 2007; 36-37). 
 
Such substantial evidence, both anecdotal and statistically, coupled with the 
lack of preparedness for the unique environment of a post-conflict society, 
presents an important challenge for military peacekeepers. It is clear from 
reading the UN’s literature, that the impact of SEA is felt at all levels of a 
peacekeeping operation. Importantly for this particular research, it erodes the 
delicate relations between the civilian body and military intervener. Such actions 
lead to the operation losing credibility, trust of the local population, and any 
momentum gained in pursuing any positive peace.  
Expectations and reality of a deployed operation 
 
It is vital for military training for peacekeeping operations to prepare military 
peacekeepers to understand the reactions of the local population to certain 
actions, (and at times, the lack of action). Ammitzboel offers a description of the 
process that follows after the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. With the 
deployment of the mission, the population have an initial ‘state of optimism’. 
What generally follows this is a ‘general state of frustration’ as time passes, as 
the ‘livelihoods and living conditions of the local people do not improve as 
expected or even deteriorate’ (Ammitzboell, 2007; 70). Pouligny (who has 
written extensively on how peace operations are perceived from the local point 
of view) notes how much of this could be down to the on-the-ground activities of 
those involved in the operation, and argues that along with the influx of the 
‘white all-terrain vehicles’ and workers who occupy hotels and move around the 
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towns, are serious reservations from the local population who argue ‘we don’t 
see what they are doing’ (Pouligny, 2006; 108). She finds that: 
  
…the resulting incomprehension was expressed in exactly the same 
terms: they are seen ‘running around everywhere in their big white cars’ 
or ‘travelling around’, but basically ‘They solve nothing’, ’They do 
nothing’, ‘They just look around’ quite often impatience also appears: ‘If 
it’s to find out about the situation, we don’t need them/ there exist 
thousands of findings and reports. Everybody knows what’s wrong in this 
country. Why spend more money for that? 
(Pouligny, 2006; 108) 
 
Pouligny argues that there is a critical gap between expectation and reality 
pertaining to the relationship between the civilian population and peacekeeping 
operation. In particular, she argues that relief projects and ‘quick impact 
projects’ are not met with undue support. In fact, Poulingy finds that rather than 
giving peacekeepers credit for these projects, ‘people readily stressed that ‘if 
they [peacekeepers] had wanted, they could have done so much more’’ 
(Pouligny, 2006; 117). This in turn has a negative impact on those within the 
military who have been keen to stress the development of such projects as part 
of a wider civil-military endeavour. Likewise, Galtung’s work on the local 
acceptance of the UNEF operations59 in the Middle East examined the ‘good 
deeds’ of UN soldiers whilst they deployed in the region in comparison with 
work done by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). While the good 
                                                
59 United Nations Emergency Force (Middle East). 
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deeds undertaken by UNEF soldiers were generally well received, those done 
by UNRWA were received with little gratitude and ‘much aggression’. This, 
Galtung asserts, was due to the local population judging UNRWA on ‘what they 
did not do’, whereas the population had little expectation of good deeds by 
UNEF troops, and were thus pleasantly surprised by any good deeds from the 
troops. This led Galtung to conclude that if troops were to train specifically to 
offer these ‘good deeds’, they should be careful not to draw anyone to the 
conclusion that they will automatically be the recipients of a good deed. If this 
happens ‘the deed is no longer unexpected’ and the peacekeeper ‘may also run 
the risk of being evaluated in terms of leaving undone what could have been of 
material benefit to the local population’ (Galtung, 1976b; 249).  
 
Of importance are also the actions of the military contingents when placed 
under pressure in situations that, although tense, would not require a traditional 
military response. Pouligny outlines one such circumstance where the lack of 
response was seen in two totally different lights: 
 
When a battle broke out between two rival gangs, in a lower-class area 
of Ca Haitien… in the north of the country, the blue-helmeted troops ‘had 
a few rocks thrown at them, so they left. In reality they did not know how 
to control the situation’. For the senior officials of the mission the reaction 
was in accordance with instruction: both soldiers and police were 
supposed to avoid getting involved in that sort of event; they must simply 
watch to see that things did not get worse, and for that reason they 
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generally returned to the scene after the event. For the inhabitants of the 
district, it was a sign of ill will and incompetence. 
(Pouligny, 2006; 111) 
 
This is a key area for the military in its civil-military cooperation with the host 
population. In the UNPROFOR60 mission, highlighted the importance of the 
actions (or inaction) of peacekeepers and the interpretations of such actions. 
General Sir Michael Rose argued that his unplanned crossing of a Sarajevo 
bridge (which was a major point of fighting) in the first 24 hours of a ceasefire 
successfully demonstrated confidence in the peace process61 (Rose, 1999b; 
77-109). However, the UNPROFOR case study also highlights the negative 
aspects of how actions impair local perceptions. Vaughn Kent-Payne (who 
commanded a UK battalion in UNPROFOR) writes of how members of his unit 
found disused landmines and were transporting them back to the UK for training 
purposes. The units’ vehicles were searched by Bosnian troops who detained 
the UK troops, as they believed the landmines were destined for Croatian 
forces (who were, at the time, fighting the Bosnian Army). Kent-Payne remarked 
that ‘whenever I denied accusations that the UN favored one side or another, 
the locals would trot out: ‘But we know that a UN vehicle was stopped when it 
was carrying mines to the Croats’’ (Kent-Payne, 1999; 27). Thus, in order to 
fully understand civil-military relations with the local population, attention must 
be heeded to the effects of such examples of action or inaction: 
 
                                                
60 United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia). 
61 Rose also extends this reasoning to his mid-afternoon runs around the front line. 
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This has, to an extent, begun with the UN developing a way of quantifying the 
opinions of the local population in areas of peacekeeping deployments. 
Between 2005 and 2006, the DPKO published four public opinion surveys. In 
2005, surveys for MONUC (DRC) and UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) were 
published, followed by surveys for UNMIL (Liberia) and ONUB (Burundi)62 in 
2006. These public opinion surveys represent a development in UN policy, 
which at least seeks to capture the mood of the host population, and offer it as 
an assessment of the operation. The surveys also signify a developing set of 
methods to foster understanding of the host population’s views63. For example, 
the MONUC study found that the perception of the operation was greatly varied, 
but results were directly related to which part of the country peacekeepers were 
(or were not) deployed - those in the west of the country - where MONUC’s 
deployment was minimal - were far less favourable toward the operation than 
those in the north-west of the country, where the MONUC deployment was 
significantly higher (UNDPKO, 2005b). 
 
 
Cultural (mis)understandings of the local population 
 
LaRose et al’s report into non-traditional training for Canadian military 
peacekeepers identifies the serious implications for operations if peacekeepers 
                                                
62 MONUC - United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de 
l'Organisation des Nations Unites en République démocratique du Congo), UNAMSIL - United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone, UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia, ONUB 
- United Nations Mission in Burundi. 
63 Surveys were either carried out by academics, with assistance from local NGOs (New York 
University carried out studies in UNMIL, UNAMSIL, and ONUB) or research organisations 
(Bureau d'Etudes, de Recherche et de Consulting International carried out the MONUC study). 
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possess a lack of knowledge about the culture of the host population. Firstly, 
they argue that such a lack of knowledge of the cultural context leads to 
‘misreading of individuals’ and groups’ intent’ as well as ‘a failure to recognize 
opportunities for concessions, agreements, cease-fires, or other steps forward 
in peacekeeping objectives’ (LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997; 52). For the 
peacekeepers themselves, this lack of understanding of the local population will 
increase feelings of isolation and stress, and ‘contribute to the perception of 
surrounding populations as “them,” and thus possible antagonists’ (LaRose-
Edwards et al., 1997; 52).   
 
Rubenstein’s anthropological approach to peace operations notes that there are 
two main concerns that drive militaries to develop cultural awareness through 
increased training and education. Firstly, there is the need to decrease 
‘organizational-cultural misunderstandings’ amongst the different components 
of a peacekeeping operation (such as the difficulties encountered between 
NGOs and the military outlined above). Secondly, is the need to increase 
understanding of the local cultures in which the mission is deployed. This can 
certainly be linked to the impact (both positive and negative) of culture on civil-
military cooperation (Rubinstein, 2005; 528). Much of Rubenstein’s work is 
directed towards emphasising the need for interveners (in this case, the military) 
gaining a deeper understanding of culture than the ‘surface’ meanings that are 
identified in training manuals and pre-mission briefings. Rubenstein recognises 
the point in basic briefings on cultural knowledge, insofar as they offer ‘useful 
recommendations’, for example, when deployed in the Middle East not to show 
the soles of their feet, or avoid seeing a woman without her hijab. However, he 
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argues that such briefings are seen as being akin to travelers’ advice: although 
the information is useful on a base level, they ‘provide no generative 
understanding that can be used to think through novel situations which 
interveners inevitably face’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 532). This leads to the danger of 
cultural simplification: that interveners can lead to an ‘assumption of 
homogeneity’ for the host population, developing into a ‘uniform’ set of 
assumptions and expectations of the host population, how they will act, and 
how they will understand and react to the intervention. The danger of this, 
according to Rubenstein, is that interveners miss the ‘great variation in the ways 
that culture is understood and enacted among people within a society’ 
(Rubinstein, 2005; 531). Such simplification can manifest itself in a plethora of 
negative ways. Rubenstein argues that a simplified approach towards culture 
amongst Canadian forces in Somalia, which viewed all Somali teenagers as 
looters, led to all Somali teenagers caught stealing from the camp being treated 
as such. This ‘looter’ frame of reference had ramifications on how the youths 
were treated, and how ‘peacekeepers thought about these Somalis’ rights’. 
Ultimately, Rubenstein argues, this factor contributed to the torture and murder 
of sixteen year old Shidane Abukar Arone, who was caught breaking into the 
regimental compound in March 199364 (Rubinstein, 2005; 531-532). 
 
Rubenstein also argues that although such peacekeepers may be well briefed, 
it does not mean that their actions will be interpreted differently by other 
cultures. The actions of the interveners are always ‘doubly meaningful’, with the 
intervener maintaining his/her view on the issues and actions taken, and those 
                                                
64 This, according to the New York Times is one of the ‘most jarring episodes in recent 
Canadian history’ http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/world/the-killing-of-a-somali-jars-
canada.html, accessed 18th August 2009. 
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who receive the intervention making similar actions meaningful from ‘within their 
own experience and cultural framework’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 529). Such double 
meaning, in Rubenstein’s view leads to a gap in understanding. Furthermore, 
Rubenstein argues that in order to be fully culturally aware, interveners must 
pay attention to the: 
 
learned systems of meaning, transmitted through natural language and 
other symbol systems, having representational, directive, and affective 
functions, and capable of creating cultural entities and particular senses 
of reality. 
(Rubinstein, 2005; 533) 
 
Following this, Rubenstein suggests that interventions are based around three 
social constructions: legitimacy, standing and authority. Therefore, in order for 
peacekeeping operations to be truly effective, understanding the meaning 
system attached to these three areas from both the peacekeepers perspectives, 
as well as those who they are sent to protect, is of crucial importance 
(Rubinstein, 2005; 53). 
 
Appreciating the cultural make-up of the local population has to some extent 
been investigated in military doctrine. The UK’s CIMIC Doctrine notes that a 
cultural understanding of ‘civil actor values, customs, ethnicity, religion, culture 
and ways of life’ is a critical facet for the success of operations. It goes on to 
add that violating a local law or custom (whether unintentionally or not) will have 
serious implications on how the local population perceive the peacekeeping 
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force, and ‘depending on the seriousness, a lack of cultural awareness could 
potentially undermine mission success’ (JDDC, 2003; 3-2). This links to Duffey’s 
work on culture discussed in Chapter one, which argues that in order to gain the 
consent of the local population, a better cultural understanding of the conflict - 
and its belligerent groups - is required. Duffey reasons that consent will be 
promoted if the parties ‘feel understood and are made shareholders’ of the 
peace process and that the process of making positive relations with the local 
population relies on the peacekeepers’ understanding of the culture of the host 
population. Although in theory this is a positive set of assumptions, Duffey finds 
that in reality peacekeepers show little cultural insight, which in turn severely 
hampers positive community relations. The example of catastrophic failings of 
the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, where the UN failed to understand 
local Somali culture, is used to underline this. Duffey notes that frequently when 
the peacekeepers arrive in a conflict zone, they realise that ‘the society has 
different conceptions of the conflict, different ways of managing it, and different 
approaches to seemingly simple everyday tasks’ (Duffey, 2000b; 149-153). 
 
Studies have examined attempts within militaries to recognise the significance 
of their own cultural impact on deployment areas. Bosman-Femke and Ait Bari’s 
study of Dutch Muslim soldiers serving in peacekeeping operations in Muslim 
countries offers an insightful example of research into this area. In order to gain 
a full understanding of the complexities of these soldiers working in such an 
environment, the authors interviewed a number of Dutch soldiers ‘with roots in a 
Muslim society’ (be it children of first-generation migrant workers or asylum 
seekers), who had recently been deployed. The authors did this on the 
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understanding that ‘culturally sensitive interaction and communication with the 
local population is essential’ (Bosman et al., 2008; 695-696). 
 
Their research raises a number of astute conclusions. Most importantly, it seeks 
to understand how the soldiers think about their culture, how it fits in with the 
military model that they work under, and also how it informs their reactions to 
the host population. On this last point, the authors were able to group the type 
of encounters that soldiers experienced. Firstly, the ‘positive encounter’ which 
outlined the positive interactions that soldiers had with the host population, 
particularly after the soldiers had recited verses of the Koran in order to 
convince members of the local population that they were not American or 
Russian, and were in fact  ‘fellow believers’. This is in contrast to the attitudes 
that non-Muslim Dutch soldiers received from sections of the host population, 
who, although not seen as being enemies in the eyes of the host population, 
were certainly seen as ‘strangers’(Bosman et al., 2008; 696). 
 
Not all encounters were positive though. The authors note that soldiers 
encountered ‘loyalty issues’ during operations. Here, soldiers spoke of 
members of the host population specifically asking for the Muslim 
peacekeepers to deal with issues, leading to increased pressure placed on 
them due to the local population seeing them as fellow ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’. 
This would result in the host population believing that they could ask more of 
the soldiers and that the soldiers would favour them over other groups (Bosman 
et al., 2008; 701). Linked to this is what the authors describe as the ‘masked 
encounter’, where soldiers attempted to conceal their Muslim identity. This 
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approach was more common in situations where the Muslim population of the 
deployment zone clearly showed antagonism towards another group, or was 
also overtly separated, or was disliked (Bosnia being the clear example here). 
Finally, the soldiers described the ‘hostile encounter’. This, however, prioritized 
operating orders over culture. In the authors’ words: 
 
In these types of encounters, multiple identities are not ambiguous any 
more. The will to survive dominates; it is the only thing that matters 
irrespective of one’s background, ethnicity or identity. The identity of a 
professional Dutch serviceman prevails. 
(Bosman et al., 2008; 704) 
 
Therefore, when examining culture as a key determinant of fostering positive 
relations with the host population, Bosman Femke and Ait Bari’s work offers 
positive working examples of how the soldiers themselves understand culture 
and the impact their actions have on the host population. It also highlights the 
importance of the ‘specific cultural dynamics’ of interacting with local 
populations in Muslim societies. Furthermore, it has training implications as the 
knowledge of Muslim soldiers is being increasingly used by the Dutch military to 
assist in the instruction of other soldiers in cultural awareness training for 
peacekeeping deployments.  
 
Linked to this study is the 2004 study undertaken by Soeters, Tanerçan, 
Varoğlu, and Siri into Turkish-Dutch encounters in peacekeeping operations, 
which compared approaches of both militaries in their relations with the host 
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population during peacekeeping operations, in particular the Kosovo and 
Afghanistan interventions (both interventions in areas with a high Muslim 
population).  
 
In terms of fostering positive relations with the host population, Soeters et al 
were able to give a quality overview of the impact of a lack of cultural 
awareness by soldiers from northern European militaries. One such example is 
cited below: 
 
This led to serious incidents, for example when the German G3 decided 
to transport the body of a Bosnian to Pristina on a Friday during the 
weekly prayer meetings. The Turkish commander, to whose sector the 
body was being transported, had not been informed. The first time he 
heard of it was when he was confronted with unrest in his area. This led 
to a serious argument, in the course of which the German was accused 
of cultural ignorance and the Turkish officer was accused of a lack of 
recognition of status and expertise’. (Soeters et al., 2004; 361) 
 
As well as highlighting the negative consequences of such actions, the article 
highlights the positive results of effective cultural awareness by intervening 
forces, in particular, the cultural understanding shown by Muslim Turkish 
soldiers and commanders. Soeters et al find that the Turkish commander of 
ISAF from 2003-2004, General Hilmi Akyn Zorlu, instigated a number of policies 
for ISAF forces. Such policies ‘stressed that during Ramadan nothing was to be 
eaten or drunk in the presence of the local population’, and told soldiers that it 
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was not permissible to ‘search women at random in the street without good 
reason’ (Soeters et al., 2004; 366). The authors also found that Zorla’s 
approach to the ISAF force itself, stressing it as being ‘one big family’, strongly 
related to the strength of family relationships in Turkish society. It may be 
difficult to quantify the importance of such policies, in comparison to the 
physical building of structures and facilities, but in terms of gaining a positive 
working environment for deployed peacekeepers, fostering of such relations is 
critical. The authors explain: 
 
Traditionally, CIMIC provides ‘hardware’, such as civilian protection, the 
restoration of public utilities and the repair of roads and buildings. But it 
could also include appropriate social policies to win the hearts and minds 
of the host societies, which in turn could be significant in operational 
terms. 
(Soeters et al., 2004; 366) 
 
As the next chapter shows (in particular an example from the Operation 
Broadsword training exercise), this important aspect – that effective civil-military 
cooperation is more than the ‘hardware’ – is being offered in training to soldiers 
at an early stage.  
Economic impacts on the host population 
 
Economic factors can play a role in helping or hindering relations with the host 
population. The ONUB mission in Burundi was criticised in certain areas for 
increasing inflation, creating a rise in the price of merchandise, and also a 
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notable price rise in the housing sector. Although it was not a major criticism of 
the operation, it did contribute to a sense of ambivalence from sections of the 
Burundian population (UNDPKO, 2006b; 23-24).  
 
Ammitzboel notes a number of economic consequences of peacekeeping 
operations, including the emergence of a dual public sector syndrome where 
aid agencies, through mistrust of government practices and desire to use their 
funding, are creating a ‘mirrored’ public sector on reconstruction projects. She 
also finds that economic adjustment programmes result in low salaries being 
paid to government employees, as the government has to show early signs of 
economic growth and will cut wages to show this. These programmes can also 
make host governments wary of public spending projects and this results in a 
lack of infrastructure. Furthermore, the analysis finds that: inflation skews local 
markets; the price of goods go beyond what the local population can afford; a 
bottleneck is created in the local housing market, due to the influx of workers 
looking for accommodation (which also drives housing prices up); salary 
disparities between those working for international organisations and local 
salaries; and incentives for teenagers to leave their education to pursue work 
with the international organisations. This leads to a reconfiguration in the 
relationship between the peacekeepers and those who they have been sent to 
protect. In the case of UNMIK (the UN Mission In Kosovo), there were strong 
feelings that the people were actually worse off under UNMIK. There were also 
allegations of bias in recruitment towards the local Serb population. These 
economic dimensions are significant and if soldiers are to effectively build 
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positive relations with the local population, they need to be conscious of them 
(Ammitzboell, 2007; 76-86).  
Negotiating the complexities of interactions with the civilian 
population: what not to do? 
 
There is no exact science to human-human interactions, particularly when one 
side has been through a cycle of violence, and the other is a newly arrived 
military contingent from another country. However, one can certainly argue that 
there are lines which peacekeepers should not cross, in particular the 
boundaries encompasses by International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law, the Geneva Conventions and elaborated in the Zeid Report. Pouligny 
gives suggestions of what peacekeepers should refrain from in a peacekeeping 
deployment: 
 
 
[The peacekeeper] has to be aware that his behaviour in a foreign setting 
is assessed in exactly the same way as if he was in his own village or 
district: as a ‘foreigner’ not speaking a word of the local language, 
arriving in a big car driving at all sorts of speed, splashing and running 
over those who had the misfortune to be in his way, breaking all the laws 
of politeness and normal propriety, and beginning to flirt with his 
daughter and, in the worst case, rape her. 
 (Pouligny, 2006; 178) 
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Pouligny’s assessment is particularly pertinent in light of the allegations that led 
to the Zeid Report but this is not the first time that peacekeepers have been 
recommended to relate the challenges of deployment to something more 
familiar. Brigadeer Michael Harbottle, who wrote extensively about 
peacekeeping in Cyprus (under the UNFICYP operation), argued against 
increasing the use of force in the mission by stating that it would be akin to: 
 
…turning on your host in his own house and hitting him over the head, 
after you have accepted his invitation to stay for the weekend and help 
settle an argument between him and a neighbor. The likelihood would be 
that you would find yourself seized by the scruff of your neck and 
bundled ignominiously out of the house, never to be invited again – a 
fate equally likely to be meted out to a UN Peacekeeping force. 
(Harbottle, 1970; 7) 
 
Calls for increased understanding also come from the UN’s Peacekeeping 
Operations Principles and Guidelines, which state that operations must be 
aware of, and proactively manage, their impact. The Principles and Guidelines 
state that: 
 
United Nations peacekeeping personnel should be careful to mitigate the 
possible negative consequences of the mission’s presence. United 
Nations peacekeeping personnel must adhere to national laws, where 
these do not violate fundamental human rights standards, respect local 
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culture, and maintain the highest standards of personal and professional 
conduct.  
(UN, 2008c; 81-82) 
 
As outlined briefly in the previous chapter, the Principles and Guidelines also 
highlight that missions should be aware of possible side effects of the UN 
presence. It finds that: 
 
Poor driving and vehicle accidents and lax waste management practices 
are just some of the negative impacts that may seriously undermine the 
perceived legitimacy and credibility of a mission, and erode its popular 
support. The size of a United Nations peacekeeping operation’s human 
and material footprint is likely to have a direct bearing on its impact, or 
perceived impact, in the community. 
 (UN, 2008c; 81) 
 
In particular, it asks that three impacts be kept in mind in planning. Firstly, the 
social impact which involves sources of friction that result from different cultural 
norms of mission staff and the population of the host population. Secondly, the 
Principles and Guidelines ask that the economic impact is understood, in 
particular the driving up of local house prices and accommodation, as well as 
the demands on local producers for staple foods and materials (which could 
result in shortages for the local community). The final aspect is the 
environmental impact, and the effects of poor waste management and levels of 
water usage. Overarching this is the general rule that UN personnel should be 
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alert to any ‘potential, unforeseen or damaging consequences of their actions’ 
and be prepared to manage such consequences (UN, 2008c; 81). This shows 
that the UN is beginning to understand such aspects of deployment. 
 
To assist civil-military cooperation, it is also of critical importance to understand 
the local population as something considerably more positive than just the 
victims of violence. Pouligny argues that peacekeepers must think of the people 
that they encounter as ‘genuine actors, rethinking their situation and expressing 
something about it’ (Pouligny, 2006; 67). An example of how this has been 
incorporated into Security Council debates is in UN Security Council Resolution 
1325, which reaffirmed the ‘important role of women in the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding’, stressed the importance of the 
equal participation and full involvement of women ‘in all efforts for the 
maintenance of peace and security’ and pushed for a much higher involvement 
of women in decisions pertaining to conflict resolution and prevention. Though it 
has taken time to filter through all chains in the UN peacekeeping hierarchy, 
and there exists considerable debate over the effectiveness of resolution 132565 
(Willett, 2010) this thesis suggests that a baseline understanding has emerged 
which recognises the local population as solutions to the conflict as well as its 
victims. 
                                                
65 The journal International Peacekeeping recently published a special edition outlining the 
impact of Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security: International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17: 
2, 2010. 
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The desired impact of training on the enhancement of civil-
military cooperation 
NGO-Military Relations 
 
Joint training between the military and civilian organisations has been outlined 
as a key component to improving relations between military and humanitarian 
organizations. Gamba, states that: 
 
it is clear that some specialized training is needed for successful 
participation in peace operations… specialized training must not replace 
traditional military training, which should, in fact, be modified to cover the 
unique tasks of peace operations. 
(Gamba, 1998; 10)   
 
In 1997, the Canadian Military reflected on the need to enhance their training 
programmes to encounter civilian groups. In their study of non-traditional 
techniques of training for military forces, LaRose-Edwards et al argue that 
awareness of cultural and functional variations of other peacekeeping partners 
is of ‘key importance’ in the success of an operation. Their report recommends 
that: 
 
Canadian military receive training on dealing with other military and 
civilian field partners, so as to increase Canadian ability to play a role in 
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enhancing unity of effort by all civilian-military components of a UN field 
operation. 
(LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997; 51) 
 
Gamba’s study of the UNIDIR survey on peacekeeping training (discussed 
earlier in this chapter) recommends that pre-deployment training should be 
updated to incorporate ‘more integrated civil-military peacekeeping training’ 
(Gamba, 1998; 11). This development would, in Gamba’s view, be beneficial to 
military peacekeepers. However, there is a shortage of training initiatives which 
cover joint training of civilian and military peacekeepers. This means that the 
training is mainly on-site once peacekeepers are deployed. This ad hoc nature 
to civil-military training for peacekeeping operations carries a serious risk of 
high levels of unfamiliarity and misunderstanding (Gamba, 1998; 11).  
 
Importantly, there have been developments in training provisions. The UN’s 
2002 publication, Department of Peacekeeping Operations Civil-Military 
Coordination Policy, gives an enhanced focus on the level of training received 
by military forces. The policy advocates that training be delivered through a mix 
of UN and Member State initiatives. At the ‘lowest level’, the policy outlines the 
importance of the UN’s own Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTMs) 
in training peacekeepers66 (DPKO, 2002; 5-6). The draft Report of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services on the effectiveness of integrated peacekeeping 
training in peacekeeping operations finds that there are areas that cross over 
the traditional military/civilian boundaries. In order to address such issues, the 
                                                
66 The SGTMs are examined in the following chapter. 
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Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) suggest training in a number of key 
areas which involve more than one component of a peacekeeping operation: 
 
Cross-cutting functions performed by more than one component such as 
DDR, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and HIV/AIDS, and training 
and education in areas of single or dual component specialization whose 
cross-cutting effects bear on other components, such as the military’s 
Rules of Engagement affecting the freedom of movement of civilian staff.  
(OIOS, 2007; 6)  
 
Eide et al’s commissioned Report on Integrated Missions: Practical 
Perspectives and Recommendations (written for the UN) argues that common 
training is a valuable tool ‘for enabling better interoperability between conflicting 
organisational cultures’ and offers a number of recommendations for the design 
of missions (Eide et al., 2005; 37). Importantly, these include the development 
of a common training framework and on-the-ground training facilities (Eide et 
al., 2005; 41). This reaffirms notions that coordination between civilian and 
military groups can be best formulated through training programmes and the 
reliance on the ad hoc nature of engagement is unreliable at best. However, the 
report finds that although the UN is taking steps in the right direction, there must 
be more of a ‘buy in’ from the whole UN community. 
 
Linking to the issue of coordination, the UN’s Inter Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) recommends that the military actively seek to understand the complex 
network of humanitarian assistance, including local, national and international 
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NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. They urge the military to 
understand what impact they have on the local actors and parties to the conflict, 
arguing that military personnel must be made aware of the importance of 
responsiveness towards local sensitivity and ‘adherence to the actuality and 
perception of impartiality and independence’ whilst deployed in a peacekeeping 
environment (IASC, 2004; 6). Using training as a way of highlighting these 
dilemmas is a positive step. Both aspects here relate to a greater need to 
understand issues wider than the ‘traditional’ remit of military training and bring 
the military into the ‘grey areas’ in deployment. As the following chapter 
illustrates, training programmes in civil-military cooperation consider the impacts 
of the operation on civilian agencies, and also recommend that communication 
skills are used to facilitate positive relations.  
 
There have been numerous pertinent critiques of current civil-military training 
techniques. The International Forum on the Challenges of Peace Operations 
report entitled ‘Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and 
Coordination’ (hereafter referred to Challenges II67) highlights a relevant issue 
in the coordination of training programmes, by suggesting that courses on civil-
military cooperation are too focussed on military procedures and techniques. 
Consequently, too few courses are providing such training from the viewpoints 
of all actors involved in peacekeeping operations. Challenges II therefore 
argues for a multi-disciplinary environment where ‘military, police, and multiple 
civilian perspectives can be folded into the discussion’ (Project, 2005; 131). 
Member states and organisations which specialise in training for peacekeeping 
                                                
67 Named because it is the second published report from the International Forum on the 
Challenges of Peace Operations (see footnote 4 for more details). 
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operations are recommended to create modules which ‘emphasize the 
principles and techniques of cooperation and coordination, across organizations 
and disciplines’ (Project, 2005; 123). This is a significant approach. Placing 
cooperation and coordination at the centre of such training takes peacekeeping 
training for the military firmly out of its ‘traditional’ setting, with techniques such 
as negotiation and cultural awareness being advocated.  
 
The military recognition of the enhanced emphasis on cooperation is 
acknowledged in Challenges II. The report finds that the military has 
demonstrated interest in cooperating with civilian actors through adding a 
civilian aspect to training scenarios68. The report also finds that militaries have 
recognised the need for non-military contributions to scenarios and role-play 
exercises to add realism for the soldiers, and to gain a ‘greater training value for 
the military itself’. With these ideas in mind, Challenges II encourages closer 
ties within training for operations. Underlining the argument that ‘participants in 
peace operations shouldn’t meet for the first time in the maelstrom of a peace 
operation’, Challenges II recognises the need to embed a ‘culture of 
cooperation’ as a principle operational requirement. This would be done through 
bringing civilian knowledge into the design of training exercises for the military 
(Project, 2005; 124-125).  
 
A deeper understanding of civilian roles to facilitate general relationships 
between the military and civilian groups is therefore vital. The UK’s PSO 
doctrine stresses this by stating that staff at all levels should be aware of the 
                                                
68 This thesis explores one such scenario at the Royal Military Training academy, Sandhurst in 
the following chapter. 
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‘underlying tenets of CIMIC and the operating norms of other agencies’, in order 
to function effectively together (JDDC, 2004; 3-6). Additionally, with regard to 
briefings given by the military to civilian actors, PSO doctrine spells out the 
importance of training to enhance the process: 
 
Dialogue, trust, and understanding between military and civil actors is a 
delicate area that requires personnel trained in, and familiar with, the 
respective agency’s agenda. Those briefing civilian agencies should 
have undergone additional training and should not simply be intelligence 
specialists delivering a standard military threat assessment. Officers 
briefing civil sector representatives must ensure that their information is 
of the highest quality and currency as the lives of IGO and NGO workers 
may well depend upon the data offered. In addition, the long-term 
credibility of the PSF [Peace Support Force] and the CIMIC staff, in 
particular, will depend upon the quality of these briefings, the perceived 
value to all concerned, and the rapport achieved. 
(JDDC, 2004; 3-10) 
 
Spence finds that in order for the transition from the military peacekeeping 
stage to the civilian peacebuilding phase to be successful, each actor must be 
aware of the other at the earliest possible stage. This involves the need for 
training and joint exercises between the components. Spence uses the example 
of work being undertaken by the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) 
which runs a series of joint planning exercises and advocating the placement of 
military staff on NGO training exercises (Spence, 2002; 167-170). This is linked 
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to Wilkinson’s assessment of PSO Doctrine, where there is a desire for a switch 
from ‘the PSO force to the peacebuilding activities of the civilian components of 
the mission’ (Wilkinson, 2000b; 78). 
 
Military relations with the local population 
 
As seen above, issues of SEA have highlighted the impact of negative actions 
of peacekeepers on the mission, and the UN as an institution. With regard to 
building positive relations with the local population, and ensuring effective civil-
military cooperation, it is one of the few areas which has seen a radical 
overhaul of training. Resolution 1820 requested the Secretary General, in 
cooperation with the Security Council, Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
Operations and its working group, as well as relevant states, to: 
 
Develop and implement appropriate training programs for all 
peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United 
Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Council to help 
them better prevent, recognise and respond to sexual violence and other 
forms of violence against civilians  
(UN, 2008f) 
 
Combating SEA by UN peacekeepers is a multi-faceted task, with training 
identified as a key component in reducing and preventing further incidents. As 
noted in the UN’s mandate for MONUC (outlined above), training is outlined as 
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a pre-requisite for those embarking on the mission. Taking the case of MONUC 
a stage further, Dahrendorf’s lessons learned study (commissioned by the 
DPKO) of the activities of the MONUC Office for Addressing SEA finds that 
training is ‘the most effective preventative measure against sexual exploitation 
and abuse’, and recommends that train the trainer programmes be set up with 
the support of the UN headquarters and Public Information Office (who can 
provide training materials and audio-visual tools) (Dahrendorf, 2006; 16). Kent 
also argues that that pre-deployment training must be enhanced, and that the 
focus should be on human rights, with issues related to gender, culture and 
SEA looked at from a ‘rights-based approach’ (Kent, 2007; 60). 
 
Moreover, the Zeid Report recommends that intensive training be organised by 
the DPKO for peacekeepers arriving on missions as well as in-mission training 
for troops. The report places obligations on troop contributing countries to 
ensure that contingent commanders ‘are aware of their responsibility to ensure 
that their contingents attend and receive such training prior to deployment’ (UN, 
2005a; 18). Much of this training should be aimed to convey the messages set 
out in the Secretary General’s bulletin, as well as outlining the ‘importance that 
the Organization attaches to the elimination of sexual exploitation and abuse’ 
(UN, 2005a; 18).  This attachment to responsibility at the level of contingent 
commander is critical. Dahrendorf’s report finds that although training of a 
contingent can go so far, unless the responsibility goes up the command chain, 
little is achieved69: 
 
                                                
69 OASEA - Office for Addressing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation; BOI - Board of Inquiry; FPU - 
Formed Police Unit. 
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 A day after arriving in MONUC, a 120-member Formed Police Unit 
(FPU) was briefed by the OASEA and the SRSG on sexual exploitation 
and abuse. All members including senior officers attended the briefing 
session. That same day, and continuing for several weeks, a number of 
FPU members used the services of a young man to procure prostitutes. 
The OASEA investigation found that the Commanding Officer and his 
senior officers knew that members of the FPU were visiting prostitutes 
but had failed to implement measures that would have prevented their 
subordinates from engaging in such activities. The BOI concluded that 
nine FPU members had engaged in activities prohibited by the Code of 
Conduct and that the Commanding Officer had failed to exercise proper 
command and control. The entire FPU was withdrawn by the Police 
Contributing Country. 
(Dahrendorf, 2006; 11) 
 
This raises an essential issue of leadership in peacekeeping, as well as using 
the threat of punishment as a deterrent. Training programmes provide great 
value in imparting essential knowledge to military peacekeepers. However, 
without developments of a zero tolerance policy and a strengthening of 
leadership, the path to eliminating SEA will be much more precarious. It is clear 
though, that events in the last ten years in relation to SEA from deployed 
peacekeepers has critical implications on civil-military cooperation. The 
response to this through observed training models is explored further in the 
following chapter.  
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In his assessment of civil-military relations, Williams reinforces the need for 
militaries to develop training for cooperation with the civilian population. He 
argues that peacekeeping forces need a deeper understanding of International 
Human Rights standards to address abuses, from both conflicting parties and 
the peacekeeping mission itself. This would be greatly informed by an increase 
in training which specifically addresses Humanitarian Law in peacekeeping 
operations, as without such training, the credibility of a mission can be 
undermined (Williams, 1998; 73-74). 
 
LaRose et al argue that more research into ‘cultural behaviour patterns’ is 
required and that this research should be incorporated into training. Briefings 
which utilise cultural training specialists and prepared representatives of the 
host population be prepared in the run up to the peacekeepers deployment, 
should also be employed. LaRose recommend that the Canadian military 
prepare a ‘guide to the mission’s cultural behaviour context’ and distribute it to 
all those deploying on a mission. LaRose et al also recommend that a training 
session covering ways to interact with the local population be incorporated into 
each unit’s pre-deployment preparation. Such training would come from 
nationals from the mission area or subject matter experts (LaRose-Edwards et 
al., 1997; 52).  
 
Linked to this, Williams notes that many of the problems that occurred in Bosnia 
and Somalia might have been avoided if the forces that were deployed had 
better prepared for the cultural challenges which they encountered in the 
conflict zone. This led him to conclude that peacekeeping forces ‘need to be 
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made aware of local culture and norms of behaviour’, and that there should be 
emphasis placed on the ‘importance of collaboration with civilians, both within 
missions and on their fringes’ (Williams, 1998; 73). Duffey expands on this by 
arguing that intercultural skills are ‘essential tools in any third party’s toolbox’. If 
such skills (which Duffey argues are closely related to contact skills) are not 
developed, then peacekeepers will lack an understanding of the conflict, 
including the ‘local conceptions of the conflict and cultural means for resolving 
it’ (Duffey, 2000b; 163). While the understanding of local cultures may 
encourage peacekeepers to ‘build upon local resources’, or employ more 
sensitive processes of intervention, Duffey argues, a result of a lack of such 
training exacerbates the potential for cultural misunderstandings and 
undermines relations with local populations. 
 
The UN’s Challenges I report finds that relevant training into cultural and 
religious awareness will help peacekeepers to work in the society in which they 
are deployed. Such training would range from the generic knowledge of the 
conflict, to specific knowledge of the area. It states that such training will assist 
in peacekeepers to avoid imposing their mindset on others. This finding may be 
strongly related to the calls to treat the local population as peacebuilders as well 
as the victims of the conflict (TCP, 2002; 239).  
Conclusions 
This chapter adds to the literature by offering a detailed consideration of the 
facets of civil-military cooperation, and highlights calls for the need for further 
understanding of conflict resolution techniques from the academic and 
practitioner community.  The concept of civil-military coordination has little 
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shared meaning amongst different military actors in a conflict zone, let alone the 
multitude of civilian agencies that are involved in a peacekeeping operation. 
This opens space for an ad hoc development, which by its very nature, has led 
to culture clashes, differences in opinions, debates about priorities, and 
disputes over desired ends and the means to achieve them.  
 
However, it is clear from the existing research carried out into civil-military 
cooperation that positive relations are critical to the perceived success of an 
operation. As the chapter outlines, a critical way to improving this harmonious 
relationship is through joint training initiatives and mutual understanding. As an 
attendee at a workshop on ‘Challenges to Peace Operations in the 21st Century’ 
stated: 
 
Nothing creates more misunderstanding, generates more emotion and 
results in more confusion in modern peacekeeping than the subject of 
civil-military relations; yet nothing, absolutely nothing, is more important 
to successful peacekeeping in the new millennium than the cooperation 
and coordination between the principal contributors to a peacekeeping 
mission, military and non-military.  
(TCP, 2002; 145) 
 
With regard to the issue of the local population, the chapter illustrates that this 
is a grey area. While the structures that govern NGOs and international 
humanitarian organisations offer a small clue as to the possible actions and 
reactions of staff, the relations with the local population are more sporadic. As 
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the following chapter notes, military personnel are being trained to deal with a 
much larger range of problems and issues than what would normally be seen in 
the traditional sense of civil-military cooperation.  
 
Recent literature also picks up on the impacts, both intended and unintended, of 
actions by peacekeepers. Although some actions (for example, sexual 
exploitation and abuse) have obvious ramifications, more subtle areas are 
being uncovered (such as the economic impact). This thesis argues that it is 
vital that military peacekeepers gain a sound knowledge of the cultural make-up 
of the area in which they are deployed.  
 
There is room for skills to be drawn from the conflict resolution field. As with the 
previous chapter on the UN, this chapter outlines the policy needs for increased 
training in conflict resolution. The very fact that analysis of civil-military 
coordination is undertaken by conflict resolution scholars, and is linked to works 
by Lederach (referred to at the beginning of this chapter) demonstrates that 
there is a further manifestation of the links between the two fields. With regard 
to wider debates about the role of peacekeeping as an international form of 
conflict resolution, the development of civil-military cooperation can have an 
impact at all levels. Even though it is at the very early stages of a peacebuilding 
process, failure to effectively understand the civilian dimension could have 
severe consequences for the operation. 
 
Furthermore, an inability to consult the local population, or consult only those 
who have gained power through use of violence, will not have long-term 
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benefits for the vast majority of the local population. More worryingly, there is a 
danger that operations will not listen to alternative voices, under-represented 
groups or those whom they see as unimportant. The danger of pursuing such 
policies (intended or unintended) is that dominant systems in global politics, 
which may have led to the context for the violent conflict in the first place, may 
be replicated in the host country; and this is what those from the more critical 
studies perspective (Pugh and Richmond) argue that peace operations are 
doing.  
 
In order to realise their conflict resolution potential, peace operations must 
understand civil-military relations as being more than a coordination policy with 
international NGOs. In order to move towards a cosmopolitan form of 
international conflict resolution, operations will have to be able to react to the 
needs of the local population, and also be prepared to place a great deal of 
effort in what Elliot describes (at the beginning of this chapter) as ‘rebuilding 
local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices’ (Elliot, 2004; 25). 
 
The next chapter examines how the problem areas with civil-military 
cooperation have been addressed through observed training programmes. It 
investigates how conflict resolution skills have assisted such programmes, how 
conflict resolution terminology is used to help soldiers understand their roles in 
civil-military cooperation, and how it assists them in carrying out civil-military 
cooperation in deployment zones. From this analysis, a picture is built 
reinforcing further connections between the field of conflict resolution and 
military forms of peacekeeping.  
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Chapter 4.  
Fieldwork Investigations: Civil-military Cooperation 
 
In order to develop a fuller understanding of civil-military cooperation, this thesis 
now offers an account of experiences gained during fieldwork investigations. 
This adds practical examples to reinforce the previous chapter’s findings: 
notably that civil-military cooperation is traditionally conceived as a practice of 
coordination and understanding between the military and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), that there now exists new forms of civil-military 
cooperation more aligned with ideas of conflict transformation at a local level 
and focussed on relationships with the civilian population, and that training 
informed by the field of conflict resolution can greatly enhance the abilities of 
military peacekeepers. This chapter therefore explores how peacekeepers are 
being prepared to meet these challenges and play a key role in the 
transformation from negative to positive peace.  
 
Returning to the first chapter, the role of UN peacekeeping (as outlined by 
Hasegawa) is ‘understood as a contributing factor in transforming conflict and a 
manifestation of the will to transform violent conflict into a peaceful situation’ 
(Hasegawa, 2005; 27-28). In order for operations to fit into such a framework, 
the civil-military dimension is critical to encourage peacebuilding projects at the 
local level. The wide range of informative fieldwork visits, meetings, and 
interviews offer an analysis of the extent to which military personnel are being 
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trained to do this. Linking the field of conflict resolution to the traditional field of 
civil-military coordination further illustrates the manifestation of the links 
between military peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Such observations also 
contribute to the emerging cosmopolitan literature. Chapter six, (which looks at 
overall areas for discussion) uses observations from this and the following 
chapter, and compares them to what cosmopolitan scholars contend are the 
core tasks for cosmopolitan-minded militaries. 
 
Further links between the fields of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping 
are outlined in this chapter (and the following chapter) through analysis of how 
training is carried out. This is primarily carried out through linking Lederach’s 
models of elicitive and prescriptive training to military training for peacekeeping 
operations 
 
Lederach’s training models 
 
Although based on experiences of mediation training sessions with civilian 
groups, Lederach's work on theorising a prescriptive and elicitive model of 
training provides a useful tool for interpreting what was observed, both in terms 
of teaching civil-military cooperation and other conflict resolution skills70.  
 
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the prescriptive and elicitive forms of 
training, Lederach firstly distinguishes between implicit and explicit knowledge 
                                                
70 For example, negotiation skills (outlined in the following chapter). 
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bases. When understanding conflict and conflict resolution, participants in a 
given setting will have either an implicit or an explicit knowledge and 
understanding of conflict. Lederach finds that implicit knowledge refers to 
accumulated knowledge of how ‘conflict operates in our given milieu of origin 
and how it is handled in out cultural context’: how we have understood conflict 
from our own experiences (Lederach, 1996; 44). Explicit knowledge, on the 
other hand, refers to a ‘focussed, intentional effort to increase one’s knowledge 
about conflict and how to handle it’: where one actively seeks to gain further 
knowledge from a variety of sources such as studying, researching, training and 
focussed experience (Lederach, 1996; 44-45). Understanding these two very 
different forms of knowledge is essential in order to understand how training 
processes work. Lederach suggests that both knowledge bases are present in a 
training session, and that the role of the two knowledge bases will vary in 
relation to the training model provided.  
 
With this in mind, Lederach finds that training for conflict resolution comes in 
two distinct forms. Firstly, the prescriptive model, which ‘assumes that the 
expert knows what the participants need’ (Lederach, 1996; 48-49). Thus, the 
trainer/expert will bring ‘packages’ built around his or her specialised knowledge 
and experience in the field of conflict resolution. In this model, the knowledge 
flow is predominately from trainer to receiver, with the knowledge of the trainer 
being a ‘key resource’, which is transferred to participants, who attempt to 
emulate it. The benefits of such an approach: 
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lie in its capacity to outline and permit participants to interact with an 
approach to conflict resolution and to understand and master the 
particular strategies and techniques it entails. 
(Lederach, 1996; 51-52) 
 
This interaction is useful to participants who wish to expand their knowledge of 
new models of conflict and conflict resolution. It also provides opportunity for 
‘new thinking, improving skills, and feeling more confident’ about how to deal 
with situations of conflict (Lederach, 1996; 58). Furthermore, Lederach finds 
that the training benefits from the considerable experience and knowledge 
gained from the trainer, whose techniques can also be useful in a number of 
settings and provide participants with concrete set of ideas and skills.  
 
The elicitive approach, on the other hand, is centred on the implicit knowledge 
of the participants. This type of training is therefore based on how participants 
understand conflict and its resolution. The foundation of this is: 
 
implicit indigenous knowledge about ways of being and doing is a valued 
resource for creating and sustaining appropriate models of conflict 
resolution in a given setting. 
(Lederach, 1996; 55) 
 
Although this is different from the prescriptive approach, Lederach argues that 
the focus on indigenous knowledge does not exclude comparison with other 
models of conflict resolution. It in fact ‘brackets’ them, with the focus primarily 
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on discovering ‘what people already have in place and already know about the 
strengths and weaknesses of their own models of conflict resolution’ (Lederach, 
1996; 56). It also does not blindly trust the participants’ knowledge over other 
models, as it is designed with a degree of trust in participants to ‘have the 
capacity and creativity to identify, name, critique, create, and recreate models 
that correspond to needs they experience and identify’ (Lederach, 1996; 56). 
The role of a trainer in this scenario is more akin to a facilitator who ‘brackets’ 
his or her own experiences and techniques, in order to develop a ‘participatory 
process of discovery’ (Lederach, 1996; 56-58). Lederach therefore outlines two 
distinct forms of training. Each of these forms possess alternate roles for the 
trainer, the delivery, the focus on implicit and explicit knowledge, and the overall 
training model. 
 
Significantly, it is the role and importance of culture where one can see a critical 
difference, and one which may be pertinent for this current discussion of 
training for peacekeeping operations. The prescriptive approach ‘assumes a 
certain amount of universality’, suggesting that the transfer of knowledge can 
take place across cultures, and that techniques are culturally neutral (Lederach, 
1996; 65). Learning ‘culture’ in the prescriptive model is seen as something of 
an ‘advanced stage’ of development, with effective training reduced to short 
‘recipes’, (for example, recognising cultural differences, working alongside 
ethnic groups and how to negotiate effectively across cultures). The prescriptive 
approach also offers a ‘universality of technique’, based on the understanding 
that models can be transferred into different cultural contexts (with minor 
adjustments), or through attempting to minimise the importance of the cultural 
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context (Lederach, 1996; 65). Lederach argues that this is a negative aspect, 
finding that what becomes universal ‘may be the homogenization of people to fit 
into the approach’ (Lederach, 1996; 68). The approach also leaves itself open 
to criticism that the cultural ‘universality’ is actually based on an underlying 
assumption that the trainer ‘knows best’, and the culture from where the trainer 
gained his or her knowledge has dominance over the culture to which he or she 
is teaching in. 
 
The elicitive approach is very much based on the cultural setting in which it is 
placed, and is therefore deemed by Lederach to be less imperialistic. As the 
focus of this model is based on the participants’ knowledge and life 
experiences, the cultural elements – language, heritage, and local forms of 
conflict resolution – will all form the base of the training. Lederach finds that the 
validation of these cultural elements as resources is the ‘fundamental goal of 
the training endeavour’ (Lederach, 1996; 67).  
 
The significance of cultural specificity is important in the context of the military, 
and this thesis will explore this in more depth when examining military culture71. 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is worth bearing in mind to what extent 
militaries can be culturally sensitive to the needs of the soldiers it trains, and 
where such training can be informed more by the participants (soldiers) than the 
trainers.  
 
                                                
71 Particularly in Chapter six. 
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Thus, this chapter explores both what is being trained in the observed 
exercises, and how the knowledge is being imparted. With regard to the 
question of what is being trained, the chapter examines what ways soldiers are 
being prepared for more traditional conceptions of civil-military relations. It then 
looks at where there are signs of more contemporary forms of civil-military 
cooperation, focussed on fostering relations with the host population and civil 
society groups. With regard to how soldiers are being trained, the chapter 
revisits Lederach’s approaches and applies them to military training for 
peacekeeping operations, thus further adding to the links between 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This informs following chapters, which 
examine differences between traditional conceptions of what militaries are 
designed for, and the demands placed on them by increased conflict resolution 
skills. 
 
A note about fieldwork visits 
 
Civil-military cooperation is incorporated into the training exercise Operation 
Broadsword, observed at the Royal Military Training Academy Sandhurst 
(RMAS). In Broadsword, the cohort of officer cadets are deployed in a civilian 
environment over a 10-day period. The cohort is split into three groups and 
each group is rotated through three roles: deployment as soldiers in a built-up 
area; deployment as soldiers in areas outlying the built up area; and 
deployment as civilians in the built up area. Each group rotates through the 
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roles, with all roles played at the same time (thus at any one time, cadets will be 
playing civilians, soldiers in the urban area, and soldiers in the outlying area) 72. 
 
Operation Broadsword is based on the UK’s Operation in Afghanistan73, 
reflecting deployment into a contemporary PSO-style environment74. The 
overarching scenario of Broadsword focuses on a deployment of a NATO force 
in the country of Hampshiristan, in support of a wide reaching peace agreement 
in the country. In particular, the UK forces (who are part of the NATO Force) are 
deployed in the Helmand Province and its regional capitol Longmoor. This 
province is characterised by a high degree of lawlessness, a number of different 
tribes, and belligerent groups. The deployment zone also contains ‘spoilers’ to 
the peace process in the form of Banital forces, who oppose the UK presence 
and have resorted to violent tactics in order to achieve their objectives75. The 
region is holding elections for the provincial council, which are threatening to 
split tribal groups in the area76. 
 
The key task of the UK mission in Broadsword is to ‘create a neutral and stable 
environment in which the [regional] elections can take place’. This role play is 
therefore primarily designed to use a full range of skills and techniques in order 
to facilitate the voting process: The traditional skills - to create a secure area for 
                                                
72 In terms of the Broadsword Exercise, cadets are referred to as military/soldier, and civilians 
(unless they are training staff, in which case that shall be made explicit). When describing 
scenarios the term ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ will be used. When looking at lessons learned, the 
term ‘cadet’ will be used. 
73 The exercise is historically attached to real-life examples of UK troop deployment into civilian 
environments. In particular are operations in Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina (the 
Longmoor village still contains graffiti from the different case studies). 
74 The development of peacekeeping doctrine is outlined on page 43.  
75 Banital forces were played by Ghurka Troops. 
76 The tribal groups are differentiated thus: Pashtun Tribes, of which there are seven different 
types (which are fragmented, but generally resent the extension of the Hampshiri Government 
and western control which the UK forces represent); Hazara; Uzbek; Tajik. 
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voting; and wider skills to ensure that the prospects of peace are more 
appealing than those of instability (Sandhurst, 2007). Throughout the role-play, 
cadets are asked to react to ‘serials’ - loosely scripted role-plays played by 
other cadets. 
 
Staff from the UK’s Joint CIMIC Group assesses officer cadets taking part in the 
CIMIC exercises at Broadsword. At the centre of the military base in Longmoor 
is the ‘CIMIC House’77. This is the physical centre where civilians meet with the 
military. According to those who run the training exercise, Broadsword is held in 
high regard as the incorporation of a CIMIC House means that the it is one of 
the few exercises which specifically run civil-military cooperation scenarios 
(Sandhurst, 2008a). The House is also seen by those designing the exercise as 
a key place to showcase an overt role for negotiation and other non-traditional 
skills to cadets. In discussions with staff from the Joint CIMIC Group, it was 
interesting to note that they believed that the CIMIC House, and civil-military 
cooperation in general were the ‘front line’ in new deployments, and provided a 
‘flashpoint’ for the military. In terms of this particular role-play, it was noted by 
the trainers that the recreation of the CIMIC House was not as close as it 
possibly could be, but still offers the cadets ‘a great deal’ (Sandhurst, 2008a). 
 
The visit to the United Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI) coincided with 
their training programme on civil-military cooperation for members of the Irish 
Defence Forces (DF). This visit provided the opportunity to gain a flavour of how 
the DF were preparing their troops for civil-military cooperation. Furthermore, in 
                                                
77 This house also served as an entry point to the military base, and was adjoined to meeting 
rooms, a communications room, as well as an area designated for intelligence gathering. 
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the same week of the visit, the Irish government had announced that Irish 
forces would be sent to Chad as part of a European peacekeeping force. As 
shall be demonstrated, this particular deployment was to inform parts of the 
civil-military relations course. 
 
Further fieldwork contributes to this chapter, including meetings at the UN 
Headquarters in New York with staff working in the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operation’s Best Practices Unit. This covered issues of civil-
military cooperation and coordination, and provided the opportunity to discuss 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) Standard Generic Training 
Module (SGTM) on civil-military coordination, which is used as a case study of 
UN training guidelines. More recently, the SGTMs have been replaced with the 
Core Pre Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs). These were released in May 
2009, and have followed on from the UN’s Strategic Training Needs 
Assessment (referred to in Chapter 2). The CPTMs will be referred to in this, 
and the following, chapter.  Finally, fieldwork is informed by a visit to the NATO 
Training School in Oberammergau, Germany, and an interview with a senior 
trainer on the ‘Peace Support Operations’ module that is taught at the school. 
The trainer had served with NATO forces in Kosovo where he was charged with 
establishing contact with civilian organisations.  
Processes of Coordination between the military and civilian 
organisations 
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As the previous chapter outlines, civil-military relations have traditionally been 
seen as a process of coordinating activities involving the military, NGOs, UN 
agencies, and civilian bodies formed from the host population. This involves 
debates regarding coordination, who controls the process and what effects such 
arrangements have. This chapter firstly examines forms of training for 
coordination, based on briefings and prescriptive-based training, as well as 
training which takes a less restrictive approach thereby allowing more 
interaction with participants.   
 
To begin, it is worth stressing the ad hoc nature of coordination, which in many 
cases catches military peacekeepers by ‘surprise’ with the roles that they must 
assume. This can be illustrated through an example given by a CIMIC officer at 
RMAS. The officer explained that while deployed in Basra, a task for the UK 
CIMIC team was to convene meetings between themselves, the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DfID), and local organisations. 
However, the team soon found out that there was a serious coordination 
problem between the major donor (DfID) and the local organisations. Although 
DfID had the financial backing for projects, they did not possess the local 
knowledge and expertise to use it – this expertise would be provided by the 
local organisations. However, DfID staff were located in a Basra Palace 
previously owned by Saddam Hussein, which was inside a UK military base. 
The local organisations were reluctant to use such a place for meetings (due to 
its historical attachments), and were also reluctant to be seen entering a UK 
military base. Likewise, the DfID staff were reluctant to leave the palace and 
travel outside of the military compound to meet with the local organisations, as 
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this meant that their safety could not be guaranteed. This scenario left the 
CIMIC team as the only body capable of meeting with both organisations in an 
environment that was suitable. The officer remarked that the CIMIC team often 
had to apologise for DfID (who would not exit the base), or the local 
organisations (who would not enter). This, in the soldier’s view, made the ‘the 
job of CIMIC difficult’ (Sandhurst, 2008a). 
 
This ad hoc approach was also referred to in an interview with a senior trainer 
at the NATO School. The trainer remarked that when he took up his NATO 
posting in Pristina (in the aftermath of the Kosovo war) a main task was to 
improve relations between the military and NGO community. In order to achieve 
this, a strategy was carried out where all international NGOs were invited to a 
meal every Sunday, thus giving the civilian organisations a chance to meet 
each other and the military informally. The trainer remarked that the ‘Sunday 
Dinner’ concept worked extremely well, and led to the civilian organisations 
deciding that it would be beneficial to hold a more formal meeting amongst 
themselves and the military after the dinner. It was also decided that if groups 
came to the dinner, they would have to go the meeting afterwards.  The trainer 
argued that had the military imposed meetings on the NGO community then 
very little would be achieved. However, offering space for the NGO community 
to meet in an informal environment gave them the ownership of the process.  In 
his view, it was this process which led the civilian organisations to be far more 
comfortable with the military presence in the area (NATO, 2008).  
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Switching to the training aspects of such coordination, the observed training 
institutions do offer a more regulated set of scenarios and briefing for how 
military peacekeepers can coordinate their work with civilian groups. Such 
briefings may offer guidelines, and what is expected of soldiers if a situation 
arises.   
 
The UN Training School, Ireland offers a briefing which provides officers with 
guidelines on how to conduct CIMIC meetings, giving soldiers the chance to 
learn a number conflict resolution techniques. For example, the instructor stated 
that techniques (such as establishing ground rules, brainstorming, and voting to 
resolve issues) should be used in meetings. Figure 4.1 illustrates a number of 
rules for conducting meetings. Soldiers were asked to be aware of a great deal 
of issues, beyond that of the immediate security situation. The instructor further 
encouraged soldiers to look toward win-win scenarios, as well as 
communication techniques. 
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Figure 4.1: CIMIC conduct of Business  
(UNTSI, 2007c) 
 
 
 
The meetings also taught soldiers about the importance of negotiation skills in 
meetings.  
 
Figure 4.2: Golden rules for negotiators  
(UNTSI, 2007c) 
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As well as the briefing about the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the meeting process, the 
instructor was keen to point out the ‘cultural minefield’ that soldiers must 
negotiate during such meetings and the effect of cultural misunderstandings 
and different national approaches towards negotiations. The main context-
specific reference came from Somalia, an example which has come through the 
academic text, notably Duffey’s work (Duffey, 2000b), but also resonates with 
the military community. Furthermore, the trainer stated that body language was 
important, as was the notion of hard and soft approaches to negotiations. Much 
of this is not too dissimilar to approaches seen in training scenarios for a non-
military audience, and certainly goes some way to moving training towards non-
traditional routes of conflict management to manage meetings and improve 
coordination efforts.  
 
The development of civil-military coordination in UN peacekeeping training 
manuals are a solid illustration of the development of how civil-military 
cooperation is perceived, moving from strict definitions to a more ‘fluid’ state of 
affairs. It also shows that there can be a development of the model of training, 
from a rigid set of assumptions towards a model that encourages an increased 
degree of input from participants.  
 
Here, it is worth examining the UN’s Strategic Generic Training Module on Civil-
Military Coordination. Surrounding the development of the SGTM on civil-
military cooperation was a wider debate within the UN concerning the very 
concept of Civil-military Coordination (CMCOORD). This is outlined in the 
previous chapter, where UN had to contend with competing views of the focus 
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of civil-military relations. At one end of the scale are the humanitarian agencies, 
and the other end is the DPKO, which by its very nature encompasses a 
stronger military viewpoint. Interviews conducted during fieldwork visits to the 
UN in 2007 highlighted such difficulties. It was felt that the UN’s official 
CMCOORD policy was markedly different from the more militarised ‘CIMIC’ 
terminology used by the Troop Contributing Countries. The development of 
CMCOORD was partly a result of a fear of humanitarian bodies that if the term 
‘CIMIC’ was used, then the military would end up enveloping the humanitarian 
agencies. Thus, CMCOORD has been the modus operandi for operations. 
However, this adoption has led some to feel that the DPKO went ‘too far’ with 
the adoption of the CMCOORD policy. While the policy has been favoured by 
humanitarian bodies (as it puts the military and civilian organisations on a 
distinctly equal footing), the troop contributing countries found it less favourable 
for the exact same reason. Furthermore, troop contributors did not share the 
CMCOORD ‘optimism’ that there would be a high enough degree of trust and 
understanding to ensure an equal share of coordination and activities 
(UNDPKO, 2007b).  
 
Significantly, this example provides a clear instance of how training is 
influenced by policy considerations. In examining the SGTM 10 (introduction to 
civil-military relations) one can see that these debates have found their way into 
training policy, resulting in a relatively minimal role espoused for the military. 
The SGTM notes that in order to ensure that different components of the 
peacekeeping operation work together, civil-military coordination mechanisms 
are used to ‘facilitate coordination, support, joint planning and the constant 
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exchange of information’(UN, 2006f; 4). The SGTM outlines six components of 
a peacekeeping operation, of which the ‘peacekeeping force’ is one 78. The 
peacekeeping force is responsible for the establishment of a ‘safe and secure 
environment’, pointing to a limited role for military peacekeepers, very much 
based on filling the security vacuum (UN, 2006f; 3-4). Moreover, the training 
module goes on to state that the principle of exchanging information, be it 
through meetings, written or electronic communication or joint operation centres 
is at the centre of coordination (UN, 2006f; 7). Thus, the key roles for military 
peacekeepers within missions are to be at the centre of information exchanges 
and assist with the securitisation of a conflict zone. Although both are critical to 
the success of the operation, one could argue that they do not offer a wide 
range of possibilities for effective civil-military relations  
 
The SGTM also offers advice on where and how military peacekeepers should 
become involved in humanitarian efforts. The tasks for military peacekeepers 
identified are to provide security, gather information, escort convoys, construct 
tents and other buildings, provide clean water supplies, and offer manpower. 
The module also asks that the military carry out ‘confidence building measures’. 
These measures come in two forms. Firstly, through civil military coordination 
patrols, which specifically include in their objectives ‘the gathering of information 
for humanitarian purposes’ and establishing of good relations with the host 
population through ‘disseminating information about the UN mission’. The 
second method is the organisation of cultural and social activities. For example, 
                                                
78 The full list of mission components: Special Representative of the Secretary General; the 
Humanitarian Coordinator; the Civilian Police; the Human Rights Unit; the UN Development 
Fund; and the Peacekeeping Force. 
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the military peacekeepers organising social events, environmental clean ups, 
and the training of local farmers in agricultural skills (UN, 2006f; 11). 
 
These tasks are set within a wider context that could indicate that the UN SGTM 
is set within restricted boundaries. This can be seen through the local and 
national partners, which the SGTM understands as critical to mission success. 
The importance of coordinating with ‘official partners’ is highlighted at an early 
stage in the training module, which states that coordination is needed among 
the components within a UN operation, between the UN mission and other 
‘international, bilateral and NGO components’, and between the mission ‘local 
Government/Administration and the parties to the conflict’ (UN, 2006f; 1). Here, 
one can see that there is importance attached to the ‘traditional’ structures 
within a post-conflict environment. On an international level, there is reference 
to the international and bilateral providers as well as NGOs. On a local level, 
there is emphasis on the local authorities and government, as well as parties to 
the conflict, but no emphasis on local groups which are not belligerent groups, 
or active political groups outside of governance structures.  
 
Thus, the SGTM offers a conservative view of the role of the military within the 
operation surrounded by an equally restrictive view of whom the UN 
peacekeeping mission should be consulting with. In terms of opening civil-
military cooperation up to a genuinely wide remit of transformation, the SGTM 
does not achieve much more than advising the military component to stick to 
the relatively ‘simple tasks’. 
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One can see significant development in the UN through the recent introduction 
of the Core Pre Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) in 2009. Whereas the 
SGTMs showed a conservative view of the role of civil-military cooperation, the 
CPTMs have broadened the role of the military in terms of coordination. They 
do this by making strong links between effective coordination between military 
and political components and the ability of the operation to fully carry out its 
peacebuilding functions. The CPTMs also outline current UN thinking on 
pursuing positive as well as negative peace, through arguing that the success 
of peacekeeping missions is ‘measured by more than just the absence of 
conflict’ and that the ‘reestablishment and development of strong institutions 
and respect for the rule of law are also important conditions for success’. This is 
further underlined by the CPTMs’ argument that the building of such institutions 
cannot be achieved ‘through the threat, or use, of military force alone’ (UN, 
2009e; 48). 
 
The CPTMs go much further than the SGTMs by offering a wide range of 
examples where coordination has been more than simple information gathering 
and sharing. The CPTM outlines projects in the DRC, Liberia and Haiti, which 
include the provision of security for elections, the use of combat operations in a 
particularly unstable area of a city in order for police judicial services to work in 
relative security, assistance in DDR programmes, and the joint organisation of a 
rubber plantation in a task (UN, 2009e; 50). Such examples widen the military 
role in coordination to one that is more than simple information gathering and 
sharing, and are more akin to strengthening the peacekeeping/peacebuilding 
link. 
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Finally, this particular module offers an exercise for participants to discuss 
issues of mission leadership. This is done through an organised panel 
discussion where speakers – ideally two or three ‘persons who have recently 
held various higher positions in a UN peacekeeping operation’ – present their 
experiences and are asked questions from participants (UN, 2009e; 66). 
Although this does not encompass the elicitive approach, it does offer some 
flexibility in the prescriptive based approach that UN training offered through the 
SGTMs. 
Exercise Quick Fix – 28th November 2007 
 
Training in CIMIC assessment forms (see Figure 4.3) at UNTSI encouraged 
military peacekeepers to consider cooperation with the NGO community, and 
gave soldiers the opportunity to discuss the ‘grey areas’ of such cooperation. 
This training was based on previous experience that the Irish Defence Force 
had of working in Kosovo. The class was split into small groups, and were given 
a document outlining conditions in the village of Rabovce, in Kosovo. It states: 
 
The village of RABOVCE has been identified as one where there are 
pressing humanitarian need [sic]. This is a mixed village of mainly Serb 
and Albanians and has been a flash point for the Bn [Battalion] since 
taking up it [sic] duties in KOSOVO in Oct 2006 
 
You are a member of the Bn Tac CIMIC Team [Battalion Tactical Civil 
Military Coordination Team] serving in KOSOVO. You have been tasked 
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with conducting a quick village assessment of RABOVCE, to include any 
comments on the general situation in the village 
(UNTSI, 2007e) 
 
Using the information, soldiers were tasked to fill out a Rapid Village 
Assessment form of the village. This form covered issues including the numbers 
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s), water, sanitation, access to food, 
shelter, and health (the attached form offers a more comprehensive list). 
Although the soldiers were asked to fill out the quantitative data involved in the 
assessment, the trainers stated that a soldiers should pay attention to the 
Action taken and Remarks sections of the assessment – sections which relied 
heavily on the soldiers interpretation of the situation, and what they thought 
would be the best course of action to take.  
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Figure 4.3: Rapid Village Assessment form – UNTSI Fieldwork visit 
(UNTSI, 2007e) 
 
 
 
 
 
The observed smaller group analysed the best course of action to combat 
particular problems in the village. Observation notes offer an impression of what 
was discussed79: 
 
• Ensuring safe sanitation by building a fence around an existing water 
well; 
                                                
79 UNHCR - Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 
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• Organising a meeting with the World Food Programme, community 
leaders and the local police chief to iron out problems with food 
distribution; 
• Contacting UNHCR for a list of missing persons; and 
• Clearing a house of unexploded ordinances. 
(UNTSI, 2007e) 
 
As well as the more traditional tasks of cordoning off an existing water-well and 
checking a house for unexploded ordinances, there are further tasks that 
require coordination with civilian agencies. Soldiers identified a need for 
coordination and information sharing with UN agencies, in particular the World 
Food Programme and UNHCR. As well as holding meetings with local 
authorities (a police chief), the soldiers found that local community leaders were 
an important part of the process. This shows awareness of the importance of 
including a much wider group of the host population, and not just those in 
positions of authority. 
 
The groups then fed back into the main class, where soldiers spoke about the 
issues they encountered in their analysis of the situation. Once again, a 
reference to the observation notes highlights the main points of the discussion: 
 
• Issues over who does what. It was believed that the military could not 
be seen to do everything so NGOs would have to be sourced for 
certain jobs. 
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• Getting a meeting with all for the food distribution was seen as the 
best way forward. 
• Impartiality. This issue came up with the rebuilding of a house in the 
village. As people from one group (Serb) lived in that particular 
house, there would be wider implications rebuilding it and not a house 
belonging to another group. 
• The emphasis was on representing the force commanders’ mandate, 
the UN, the national contingent and the mandate.  
(UNTSI, 2007e) 
 
Significant points can be drawn raised from this discussion. Firstly, there was 
discussion over the roles and responsibilities of each of the main actors in a 
peacekeeping operation. Group members remarked that there had to be some 
kind of division of labour in how certain tasks are carried out. This showed 
awareness in the role and function of the NGO community, and a willingness to 
coordinate activity. Secondly, for the food distribution to be successful, it was 
argued that attention would have to be paid on meeting with all concerned 
parties. In a multi-ethnic area, such as Kosovo, this will take a great deal of 
coordination with local leaders who are both within the official administration, 
and those who are not.  The issue of impartiality within a mission was also seen 
as important to the soldiers, and the consequences (both intended and 
unintended) of actions, such as rebuilding a house, were discussed at length.  
 
Crucially, the discussions during and after Exercise Quick Fix at UNTSI show 
that military actors in a peacekeeping operation can do a great deal more than 
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the more traditional and relatively straightforward concepts of coordination and 
information sharing. Coordination of military and civilian activities is certainly a 
fundamental aspect of civil-military relations. However, the process of 
coordination does not stop with information sharing between the military and 
NGOs. Coordination means a great deal more: it will incorporate joint meetings, 
understanding both direct and indirect consequences, and incorporate civilian 
groups into the picture, all in order to ultimately hand over the peacebuilding of 
the process to civilian actors. Understanding the process as a restrictive set of 
actions of what peacekeepers do and what they do not do will not lead to 
effective civil-military relations. The process requires a considerable amount of 
fluidity. 
Military understanding the cultural nuances of NGOs 
 
The previous chapter outlines the cultural nuances and markedly different 
organisational structures that exist within a mission, and how they cause great 
difficulties between the military and civilian actors. Meetings conducted in the 
UN with DPKO officials further point to the cultural clashes which are prevalent 
between the military and civilian organisations. A significant perspective was 
offered by a DPKO official, who cited a lack of conflict resolution skills as being 
a key factor in difficulties endured during the start-up phases of UN missions. 
The official outlined the most pertinent difficulties as being between amongst 
professions as opposed to ethnicities or nationalities. This points once again to 
a recognition of institutional culture clashes at the heart of a peacekeeping 
operation. Crucially, it was in this particular official’s view that conflict resolution 
skills would benefit operations. This could be because the development of such 
 292 
skills could open up effective channels of communication as well as 
encouraging effective understandings of the conflict situation, strategies for 
intervention and division of responsibilities. (UNDPKO, 2007b) 
 
Further meetings at the NATO School helped to define this complex 
relationship. The trainer that was interviewed explained the different working 
cultures and operating procedures of the international organisations that he had 
encountered. At the one end of the scale were the more professional 
organisations, which needed a great deal of coordination at the highest levels. 
For example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) had little contact with NATO 
forces in Afghanistan, but could coordinate activities if those in the highest 
echelons of NATO headquarters in Brussels spoke with their counterparts at 
MSF headquarters. Such discussions would have an immediate impact at the 
field level. At the other end of the scale, were smaller organisations that had 
few channels of communication and were far more disorganised. The trainer 
also noted how militaries need to be aware of their impact on humanitarian 
organisations, using an example of an ICRC80 worker in Afghanistan who had 
full access around the country before the NATO intervention, but suffered from 
restricted access since NATO intervened in the country (NATO, 2008). 
 
Interviews at the NATO school also highlighted the difficulty of organisational 
differences, and the inability for some in the military to understand the civilian 
organisations. The trainer noted that the military like ‘paragraphs’: short, brief 
statements which, for example, outline ‘who does what and why’. Unfortunately, 
                                                
80 ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross. 
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for those who work in such ways, the unorganised nature of the post-conflict 
environment makes this extremely difficult. It is important that this is first 
recognised in order for effective strategies to be developed to adapt to this 
behaviour, and understand the culture of the military (NATO, 2008). This is a 
crucial finding, and one which can be directly related to the review of the civil-
military cooperation literature in the previous chapter. It can also be related to 
the desire shown from within the military community to use training programmes 
to develop decision-making frameworks for military peacekeepers (discussed in 
Chapter 6). 
 
The UN CPTMs attempt to foster a better understanding of the humanitarian 
community, and introduce the military audience to recognise the consequences 
of their actions on the civilian agencies. The CPTM Unit 3 (Part 2) entitled 
Working with Mission Partners begins by acknowledging that some 
humanitarian organisations will feel that their principles of impartiality and 
neutrality will be ‘jeopardized’ if they are too closely associated with the military 
component, or the UN operation as a whole. Because of this, the CPTM states 
that: 
 
When working with humanitarians it is important to recognise their 
independence, respect their principles and be sensitive to their approach 
in remaining neutral and impartial. 
(UN, 2009g; 102) 
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The CPTM predicts that this will have an impact on the mission’s activities and 
advises that ‘Quick Impact Projects’, are designed clearly with the aim of 
increasing consent for the mission and not ‘considered to be humanitarian 
assistance’81. Finally, the CPTM makes clear the role of the UN peacekeeping 
mission, and its military components: 
 
UN peacekeeping operations… are generally not humanitarian actors 
themselves although they may provide a secure and stable environment 
which allows other humanitarian actors to carry out activities. 
(UN, 2009g; 102) 
 
This offers a greater explanation of why the military must refrain from offering 
humanitarian assistance. Through giving reasons of why the humanitarian 
organisations are uncomfortable with the military presence, it provides a context 
for the military to work in.  
Relations with/expectations of the host population 
 
The previous chapter highlights that awareness of the relationship between the 
military and the local population as being a relatively new area in training for the 
military, and is an aspect which has received critical appraisal from both the 
academic community and practitioners (Pouligny, 2006). This section provides 
an overview of where fieldwork observations have encountered this aspect of 
the civil-military relationship.  
 
                                                
81 Quick Impact Projects are outlined in Chapter 2. 
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The observation of the Broadsword exercise offers examples of how cadets are 
made aware (both through planned scenarios and unintentional actions) of the 
consequences of their actions on relations with the host population. Throughout 
the exercise, the CIMIC House is used by the military primarily to hold meetings 
with the civilian population in order to gain information, build relations, and 
attempt to solve problems. Throughout the observation, officer cadets were 
asked to carry out ‘open sessions’ in the CIMIC House where they, and cadets 
who were playing the civilian population, role-play’ a session where the civilian 
population bring questions and concerns to the military. The military are 
encouraged to discuss the issues, make a note of them, and see if they can 
provide any solution. In the particular session that was observed, the soldier 
took sessions with civilians and NGO representatives. Although a small part of 
the general exercise, this role-play placed emphasis on the use of listening and 
communication skills by the officer, encouraged dialogue with the civilian 
population, and provided a subtle introduction of some of the more non-
traditional skills needed for deployment (Sandhurst, 2007). 
 
The CIMIC House also provided a centre-point for a planned serial, which 
highlighted the importance attached to relations with the host population in the 
exercise. It centred on two men being chased by an angry mob into the CIMIC 
House. The angry mob was from a different ethnic group than the two men, and 
had accused them both of sexually abusing women from that particular group. 
The task for the military was to react to this particular event and to calm 
relations. In this particular case, however, the military (identified in the field 
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noted as ‘ISAF forces’) were unable to stop this from happening. The 
observation notes explain: 
 
In a short space of time, both men were dragged out by the angry mob 
and executed by a lone gunwoman. ISAF forces were present at the time 
of the shooting, and were seemingly unable to stop the executions. The 
gunwoman then fled and the crowd carried the bodies away as trophies. 
It was clear that the mob were from a different tribe than the two men 
who were executed.  
(Sandhurst, 2007) 
 
The value of this particular exercise was in the observed debrief received by the 
cadets. Immediately after the event, all soldiers who were staffing the CIMIC 
House were taken ‘out of role’ and asked to reflect on the events. Firstly, the 
trainer asked the cadets for their version of events, and how each cadet 
reacted. Answers from the cadets at this stage were, overall, factual and 
focussed on the particular part of the house which they were in, and what they 
did. The debrief progressed to identifying the possible perpetrators, which 
ethnic group they came from, and what implications this would have on the 
overall security situation in the area. Most importantly (in terms of fostering 
relations with the local population), soldiers were then asked to suggest 
possible responses to the situation. As well as increasing the number of patrols 
and instituting a possible curfew (in order to maintain the security), a number of 
initiatives were suggested which were intended to foster relations with the local 
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population in order to decrease chances of violence escalating. The fieldwork 
notes describe the discussion 
 
In terms of CIMIC, the task was to engage local leaders and the civilian 
population to ensure that reprisal killings would not happen. The role of 
CIMIC here was very much to engage with the local population to ensure 
the security of the deployment zone. This would rely on the skills of the 
CIMIC officers to communicate effectively with local leaders, elders, 
police forces, and outside agencies. The full CIMIC operation was now 
just starting after the event, at a time where most people would want a 
rest! 
(Sandhurst, 2007) 
 
In the concluding discussion about civil-military relations, the senior trainer 
stated that  ‘CIMIC is not just painting schools, it is engaging the local 
population to ensure the security of the area which you are deployed in’ 
(Sandhurst, 2007). This clear message gave the cadets a strong impression the 
civil-military cooperation was more than an exercise in which soldiers ‘provided’ 
for the local population (as the UN SGTM outlines), be it building schools, or 
delivering aid. In this debrief, cadets were strongly given the impression that 
civil-military cooperation is a process with a great deal more depth. 
 
This observation outlines how civil-military relations are perceived in this 
particular case study, and illustrates the value of such a training exercise. 
Significantly, the serial helped the cadets to fully understand the implications of 
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such inaction on the local population, even though it appeared that they had 
initially failed in their task to stop the killings. Although it appears that the 
conclusion (the public execution of two civilians) is slightly extreme, it provided 
cadets with a good working example of what would happen if such situations 
were left to get out of control82. 
 
In the case of the debrief, a number of points become apparent. Firstly, there is 
an emphasis on fostering relations with the local population. This is not only 
through formal channels (i.e. the local police), but also through sourcing local 
community leaders and elders. This approach offers a voice to those sections of 
the host population who may not have had access to such channels during the 
conflict, showing that the military can be instrumental in offering the early 
channels of communication to such groups. However, this is, in the military’s 
terminology, a way of achieving security in a deployed zone, so it may be 
apparent that there is still a degree of control over who is spoken to. The 
emphasis on security is understandable particularly when the lives of the 
military personnel are at risk. Nevertheless, an over-emphasis on the security 
aspects may lead to a restrictive approach from the military, which may be 
averse to taking such risks and feel more comfortable with consulting safe 
groups, which may be seen as needless in highly pressurised environments. 
This debate over ‘force protection’ is examined at in Chapter six. 
  
Secondly, the observation highlights the role of non-traditional skills in this 
context. One can see the importance placed on an understanding the conflict 
                                                
82 As these scenarios are taken from real life situations that have been reported back from 
operations, the exercise maintains its reality. 
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and identifying the groups involved, offering an example of very basic forms of 
conflict mapping. There is also emphasis on ability which officer cadets have to 
communicate with the local population, something of critical importance when 
establishing effective relations. Again, if we go to Fetherston’s definition of 
contact skills - ‘the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, 
facilitation, mediation, and conciliation’ - we can see part of this being 
highlighted in the debrief (Fetherston, 1994b; 219). Thirdly, the scenario-based 
learning environment empowered the cadets to a certain degree, as the trainer 
acted more as a facilitator to the group - as opposed to a lecturer - linking 
directly to Lederach’s work on elicitive approaches to learning. 
 
As well as the scripted scenarios, the observation encountered one non-
scripted scenario which offered a very good example of how cadets are taught 
to be aware of instances when military actions create unintended 
consequences. During the exercise a small group of soldiers were walking 
through the village wearing camouflage cream on their faces. The civilians in 
the village noticed this and immediately let it be known that they were uneasy 
with the use of camouflage cream by soldiers. The reasons why they showed 
unease was the message that it portrayed: camouflage cream indicates an 
escalation in force, and is used when the military are executing a ‘deliberate 
operation’. In effect, the camouflage cream was ‘war paint’. Although it later 
transpired that the soldiers were on a deliberate operation outside of the village 
(thus requiring the cream), the message was clearly made from the cadets role-
playing the civilian population. This offered a valuable lesson of unintended 
consequences of actions (Sandhurst, 2008b). 
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Providing the ‘umbrella’ to both these scripted and unscripted serials is the 
context of the military being deployed in a largely civilian environment 
composed of a population that is sceptical of the military presence. Cadets 
playing the role of the civilian population are asked to be suspicious at the least, 
and abusive at the worst, toward the military contingent deployed in Longmoor. 
The fieldwork notes pick up on this facet of the exercise (note that the term 
‘ISAF’ is used when describing the cadets role-playing the military): 
 
It was interesting to note that the local population were, in general, very 
much opposed to the ISAF. When patrols were taking place, the civilian 
population ‘baited’ ISAF troops. The ISAF troops were to not let this get 
to them and still try and improve community relations, partly to ensure a 
positive working environment, partly to gain information and intelligence 
of the situation on the ground. 
(Sandhurst, 2007) 
 
The soldiers in this case, had to rely heavily on their ability to communicate with 
the local population, and not accidentally escalate the situation by ‘snapping 
back’ at members of the civilian population. The trainers at Sandhust (including 
those who have created the Broadsword exercise) explain that the exercise is a 
culmination of UK military experiences in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan. In the majority of these cases, UK intervention 
has not been welcomed by all parts of the society in which they are deployed. 
Again, this working environment for the cadets offers valuable lessons in 
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fostering positive relations with the host population, and also about the 
consequences of escalation. The cadets also gain an increased understanding 
of the impact of the military intervention, through playing the part of the civilian 
population. This gives the cadets the opportunity to see their role ‘from the other 
side’, and understand what impact a military intervention has on a host 
population. This also illustrates the benefits of using a scenario-based role-play 
as a form of preparing military peacekeepers.  
 
The UNTSI CIMIC liaison briefing outlines tasks for CIMIC Liaison teams, which 
incorporates awareness of the local population and how relations affect the 
ability of a the liaison team in carrying out its duties. In notes from this particular 
briefing, the CIMIC ‘profile’ involved the following characteristics:  
 
• Common Sense 
• Credibility 
• Negotiation/mediation 
• Impartiality 
• Authority 
• Outgoing 
• Looking for ‘win-win’ solutions 
• Imaginative 
• Following the commanders intent 
• Available 24/7 
(UNTSI, 2008) 
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Notable in this list is emphasis on negotiation/mediation, the need to look for 
‘win-win’ situations, and for soldiers to possess an ‘outgoing’ and ‘imaginative’ 
stance. This links to a conversation held with a senior officer at UNTSI, who 
spoke of ‘Irish Solutions to Irish Problems’, which relied heavily on the soldiers’ 
abilities to think imaginatively when looking for solutions to extraordinary 
problems (UNTSI, 2007a). The briefing also outlined how CIMIC teams should 
appear to the local population. Examples were given of groups of four or six 
mainly light armed or unarmed soldiers in uniform. Such examples showed the 
soldiers to look relaxed and approachable. The briefing offered one example 
that was given on how a CIMIC team should not look. The example was a 
CIMIC team from the US armed forces, who were armed and in their full battle 
uniform. Here the lesson was that impressions count, and if the military are to 
foster positive relations with the local population and civilian groups, then care 
must be taken.  
 
However, Figure 4.4 (also taken from the CIMIC liaison briefing) asks that such 
CIMIC liaison officers are fully trained military officers. Attached notes from the 
briefing state that weapons training, shooting, and rules of engagement are 
obligatory for Liaison Officers, suggesting that they are regular soldiers with 
added non-traditional skills, to be used, at the least, to ensure the ‘timly [sic] 
and accurate dissemination of information’. 
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Figure 4.4: CIMIC Liaison Officer from UNTSI Briefing 
(UNTSI, 2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 expands on this non-traditional toolbox, by further outlining the need 
for patience, diplomatic sensitivity, professionalism, and courtesy.  
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Figure 4.5: CIMIC Liaison Officer From UNTSI Briefing  
(UNTSI, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Attached to this particular slide, the notes state: 
 
We need a diplomatic and sensitive officer with a great patience. Some 
cultures and societies have different feelings about time or business. 
Therefore the LNO [Liaison Officer] needs to be open minded, trying to 
understand the situation. He must have a feeling of people and the 
environment in a given moment. 
(UNTSI, 2008) 
 
This is another significant indicator of the importance attached to the non-
traditional skills, in particular knowledge of the cultural nuances of the host 
population.  
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The UN CPTMs recognise the importance of the host population and its 
institutions in the development of a peace process. In defining factors for 
‘success’ in a peacekeeping operation, one such factor is the ‘promotion of 
national and local ownership’. Importantly, the CPTM outlining ‘Fundamental 
principles of UN Peacekeeping’ notes that this involves reaching out to all parts 
of the country, and ‘not just those in power or those with guns’. This offers a 
valuable space for alternative sources of transformation and new models of 
governance (UN, 2009d; 55). Following on from this, the module asks that 
peacekeepers consult all parts of the local community to decipher factors for 
success. While peacekeeping has often been subject to the robust critique that 
argues that operations only look towards the traditional sources of power, the 
CPTM recognises the importance of other groups.  
 
It is important that peacekeeping personnel talk to all parts of society 
about what their needs are and how the mission’s work can improve their 
lives. This means local officials, but also non-governmental 
organizations, different political parties, women’s associations, youth and 
student groups. All opinions need to be heard and understood. 
(UN, 2009d; 56) 
 
The CPTM argues that the promotion of national and local ownership will be 
critical in the development of consent for the mission. According to the CPTM, 
operations which have worked with local actors on the ground have ‘built a solid 
relationship’ with them, which in turn has facilitated the handover of the 
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peacebuilding tasks to the host population (UN, 2009d; 56). Here again the 
CPTM reflects UN policy on peacebuilding mandates, and the ‘bigger picture’ of 
pursuing positive aspects of peace in its operations. This is illustrated in the 
CPTM through a case study of the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti, which worked 
alongside residents in cleaning large rubbish piles in the Bel Air Neighbourhood 
(the rubbish piles were being used as barricades by armed gangs). The joint 
ownership of the project, in the view of the CPTM, led to a building trust and 
consent from the local population (UN, 2009d; 56). 
 
The CPTMs further make this point in the ‘Working with mission partners’ Unit, 
which further underlines the importance of working with all actors within the host 
population and not just the host government83. It states that regular dialogue 
must be maintained with religious leaders, women and student associations, 
academics, professional organisations and other parts of the civil society. As a 
result of this consultation, peacekeepers ‘can get to understand the society in 
which they are working, and support them to ensure the sustainability of the 
peace’ (UN, 2009g; 96-97). In terms of longer term peacebuilding, such 
partnerships are promoted as being essential for the success of the 
peacekeeping operation, as well as offering a significant example of how the 
United Nations is aiming to consult a much wider range of groups to facilitate a 
positive transformation from negative into positive peace. Again, this can relate 
to Fetherston’s assertion that peacekeeping operations can play a critical role in 
setting a conducive atmosphere for longer term peacebuilding to take place, by 
‘coordination of local level resolution processes’ (Fetherston, 1994b; 157). 
                                                
83 Although this is qualified by the module stating that the host government is ‘by far the most 
important non-UN actor with whom a peacekeeping mission collaborates’, as it ‘has the most to 
lose’. 
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Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
 
As the previous chapter demonstrates, UN policy attaches high value in training 
as one of the key ways in which to stop further outbreaks of sexual exploitation 
and abuse (SEA). The UN CPTMs therefore incorporate added emphasis on 
addressing SEA. Apart from outlining the definitions of misconduct (see Figure 
4.6 below), the SEA module asks peacekeepers to understand a number of 
issues surrounding cases of SEA. It asks soldiers to look at three key questions: 
 
 What makes members of the host community vulnerable? 
 What does differential power mean in the peacekeeping context? 
 Why is it important that trust is not abused? 
 
The CPTMs answer to the first question highlight the need for peacekeepers to 
be aware of the prevalence of a ‘collapsed community’ with a lack of awareness 
of rights and obligations amongst the population, a history of unequal power 
relations and a ‘prevalence of gender-based violence’ (UN, 2009h; 23). In 
relation to what differential power means, peacekeepers are pointed to an 
imbalance between economic, social or educational status, a dependence by 
one on the assistance of another to sustain living, and one being in a position of 
authority over the other. Such a scenario is common in a peacekeeping 
environment. Finally, the answers to why it is important not to abuse trust are 
examined. The three reasons given by the CPTM here are that it further 
victimises vulnerable people, it violates the human rights of victims, and it 
disrupts families and communities. This goes into much more depth than 
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previous UN training and through offering a context to the conflict zone into 
which peacekeepers are deployed it provides a much wider base of knowledge 
for the peacekeepers (UN, 2009h; 23-24).  
 
As well as the questions noted above, the CPTM also offers a degree of 
participant-led learning through encouraging group work and discussions. In 
this case, participants are invited to discuss (in small groups) examples of SEA 
that occur in their home county on in peacekeeping missions. Although a small 
part of the overall module – which is very much based on disseminating 
information – this again offers participants a chance to use their implicit 
knowledge and gained experience to inform the training session (UN, 2009h; 3). 
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Figure 4.6: Definitions of misconduct for UN peacekeepers and Military 
Observers 
(UN, 2009h) 
 
 
 
 
 
The training module then offers a number of case study examples to test 
peacekeepers on what they believe to be ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in scenarios where 
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SEA may be taking place. For each scenario, peacekeepers are asked four 
questions: 
 
a) Has the UN personnel actually or attempted to abuse a position of 
vulnerability for sexual purposes? 
b) Has the UN personnel actually or attempted to abuse differential 
power for sexual purposes? 
c) Has the UN personnel in this scenario actually or attempted to abuse 
trust, for sexual purposes? 
d) Does this scenario constitute prohibited act(s)? 
e) Which uniform standards on sexual exploitation and abuse have been 
violated? List as many as apply84  
(UN, 2009h; 46) 
 
Peacekeepers are given seven scenarios to examine. While some scenarios 
are more straightforward, others may fall into slightly more grey areas. The two 
highlighted examples in the box below illustrate this.  
 
                                                
84 All questions apart from ‘e)’ require yes/no answers. 
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Box 4.1: Example questions in Conduct and Discipline Unit of UN CPTM 
(UN, 2009h; 51-52) 
 
Example 3: Carlos, a military commander posted in the southern district, has helped 
set up a boys’ soccer club in the town where his national contingent is deployed. 
Carlos enjoys the soccer games, but he particularly enjoys the access the club gives 
him to local adolescents. He gives presents (magazines, candy, sodas, pens) to 
various boys in exchange for sexual acts. He thinks there’s nothing wrong with this, 
since the boys like the presents he gives them. 
 
Example 5: Josie is an adolescent refugee in one of the camps. Pieter, one of the food 
distribution staff, who works for WFP, has offered to giver her a little extra during the 
distribution if she will be his “special friend”. She agrees willingly. Both of them agree 
that they should start a sexual relationship and neither one of them think that anything 
is wrong. Josie hopes that the relationship will be a passport to a new life in another 
country, and Pieter does nothing to discourage these hopes  
 
 
In the first example, it is relatively clear that the commander is in contravention 
of the UN’s rules, however, the second example is slightly vague on the ‘rights’ 
and ‘wrongs’ of the case. It is imperative for all who are being trained to 
understand that there are many different contexts in which acts of SEA can take 
place. Furthermore, the answers for questions a-d in all seven examples given 
(including the two examples above) are ‘yes’. The intention of this being that 
there are a number of different scenarios which may not be ‘typical’, but still 
constitute acts of SEA. All case studies and the official CPTM answers are 
attached as Annex 1.  
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The CPTM also refers to the impact that SEA has on the relationship between 
the peacekeepers and the local population. One of the stated ‘dramatic’ 
consequences is 
 
The duty and care of the peacekeepers appears to be a vain statement. 
People talk about impunity and the failure of the UN to take responsibility 
for the suffering of victims of such acts. 
 (UN, 2009h; 33) 
 
Finally, the CPTM also states that such acts overshadow the efforts of 
peacekeeping missions to ‘address the very critical political issues faced by the 
mission’. Importantly this is a theme that runs throughout the training 
programme. The CPTM module on human rights in peacekeeping operations is 
considerably strongly worded on the importance of peacekeepers avoiding any 
activity which is linked to SEA. It states that ‘under no circumstances can 
peacekeeping personnel be involved in sexual violence or exploitation of 
women, children or the local population in any way’. It goes on to state that the 
power imbalance often seen in peacekeeping environments between the 
peacekeepers and host population must be used ‘to do good’, by ‘supporting 
dignity and equality between women and men, as the UN Charter states you 
should’. Linking this into the relationship with the local population, the CPTM 
states that the behaviour for peacekeepers can have ‘far reaching impacts’ on 
the success of operations, and the exploitation of women or children can ‘call 
into question the legitimacy of the whole peacekeeping operation’ (UN, 2009f; 
11). 
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Gender Based Violence 
 
Dealing with Gender Based Violence (GBV) area is relatively new in the training 
programmes that were studied, and there are thus few examples of the role it 
plays in training programmes. However, a failure of militaries to adequately be 
briefed or trained on the causes of GBV, and the consequences of failing to 
deal with it, constitute a serious breach of trust between the operation and host 
population.  
 
A briefing given at the UNTSI training course was dedicated to addressing GBV 
in areas of deployment. As stated, this particular training course was geared 
towards a possible deployment in Chad, thus DF officers were briefed in 
instances of GBV in the context of Darfur (from where a number of refugees 
were coming from). The seminar was based on information from the Joint 
Consortium on Gender Based Violence, a collection of Irish NGOs and 
Government agencies, of which the DF was a member. One of the consortiums 
stated goals is ‘promoting the adoption of a coherent and coordinated response 
to GBV’ (JCGBV, 2009), and this briefing offered a good example of how the 
DF fitted into that response.  
 
Although the lecturer delivering the briefing was clear in pointing out that there 
were only ‘allegations’ of GBV in Darfur, it was clear that he was setting a 
context in which the DF would be deployed into when they arrived in Chad. 
Furthermore, the briefing examined the case for allegations of genocide made 
against the Sudanese government. It explained fully what GBV was in the case 
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of Darfur, citing official reports which have come out of the conflict zone. This 
was closely linked to what international law states, particularly about genocide. 
The final two slides in the briefing offered a valuable case in point of what the 
briefing was about. The penultimate slide from the presentation is quoted 
below, and examines why the Sudanese Government of National Unity would 
allegedly use such a tactic 
 
Box 4.2: Slide from GBV Presentation from UNTSI CIMIC Briefing  
(UNTSI, 2007d) 
 
Assessment 
• A GNU [Government of National Unity] strategic level tactic 
o Terrorise communities 
o Family unit 
o Dignity and respect 
o Survival and access to livelihood 
o Women’s bodies 
 
• A valid argument in breach of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention –  
o “…life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part…’ (Steiner, Alston, 2000; Power, 2003:57) 
 
 
 
The final slide follows this by examining the role of the International Community 
in punishing the perpetrators of such acts: 
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Box 4.3: Slide from GBV Presentation from UNTSI CIMIC Briefing 
(UNTSI, 2007d) 
 
Assessment – contd 
• A strong argument that the IC [International Community] are, at least, 
quite reluctant to act in a timely fashion and appear unwilling to 
investigate the possibility of genocide in Darfur 
• Unless the crime of genocide is vigorously challenged, there is a 
possibility that the crime itself becomes defunct and then only the people 
of Darfur suffers 
• Using GBV to underscore genocide is a useful tool in assisting and 
assessing the possibility of the crime of genocide in Darfur 
• ‘Does Rome burn while the IC plays the fiddle’ 
 
 
 
This briefing is vital to establish the context for the military. In terms of 
establishing a ‘new’ level of civil-military relations, it offers the military a greater 
awareness of issues that traditionally would not be conceived of as security 
risks, or would be left to civilian actors or political organs of the UN. It is 
important that soldiers who are playing the part of the third party interveners are 
aware of such contexts, as they will be able to react in order to effectively foster 
positive relations.  
 
An attached presentation given out as part of the overall briefing shows this, by 
examining engagement with civil society as one of the possible steps forward to 
effectively dealing with GBV. The slide in Figure 4.7 advises participation 
alongside women’s groups and local networks. Such engagement is critical, as 
it shows women and women’s organisations to not be only ‘victims’, but also in 
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a position to build peace. Like the UN CPTM, this also illustrates a coordinated 
policy in engaging with parts of the host population that may have been 
marginalised.  
 
Figure 4.7: Gender Based Violence Briefing from UNTSI: Working with 
Civil Society 
(UNTSI, 2007d) 
 
 
 
Furthermore, as Figure 4.8 shows, a considerable amount of care is taken in 
ensuring that soldiers gain an understanding of where GBV has come from, and 
the impact it has on the conflict zone.  
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Figure 4.8: Gender Based Violence Slide from UNTSI Briefing 
(UNTSI, 2007d) 
 
 
 
 
As said, this is a relatively new aspect of training for civil-military cooperation 
(although it has been highlighted in post-operational reports and academic work 
for some time). The UNTSI example offers a good example of how soldiers can 
be briefed for deployment into an area which is characterised by such atrocities.  
 
Securitising the civil-military dimension 
 
The fieldwork experience also raises the question of to what extent has civil-
military cooperation become an issue of securing the deployment for civilian-led 
peacebuilding initiatives. Fieldwork meetings at the NATO School indicate this. 
A senior trainer explained that in his view, NATO is moving away from 
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humanitarian assistance, and towards ‘supporting humanitarian operations’, 
unless the situation arises that there is nobody else to carry out humanitarian 
assistance. The trainer was also asked whether militaries are moving towards 
more traditional security roles. In answering, he stated that there is a growing 
fear amongst militaries of ‘mission creep’, and that since the 1990s the 
pendulum has swung away from the roles more akin to humanitarian assistance 
towards more traditional military approaches. The trainer believed that this was 
for two reasons. Firstly, because the military has found that it is not equipped to 
provide a wide range of humanitarian assistance; and secondly, because 
militaries have realised that they are not suitable aid providers. The trainer 
further remarked that there was a realisation within NATO militaries that if a 
military carries out large-scale humanitarian work, a dependency culture could 
be created. The trainer gave the example of installing a functioning water 
supply, which is relatively easy for the military to do, but can have an effect on 
the local ownership if the host population is not involved in the creation and 
running of such a project. Thus, for these reasons, it was felt that the military 
focus more on the security aspects of deployment, such as filling a security 
vacuum, and not the ‘touchy feeley’ aspects of deployment (NATO, 2008).  
 
The Broadsword exercise provided the starkest illustration of the importance 
that is attached to the idea securitising the humanitarian space. Much of this 
exercise involved aspects of security in post-conflict environments, and the 
need to reduce levels of violence before any civilian peacebuilding process 
begins.  This is possibly akin to the ideas espoused in the UK’s PSO doctrine, 
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which states that the fundamental role of the military is to provide the security 
for peacebuilding work to be carried out. 
 
There are examples of the securitisation throughout the exercise. The fostering 
of positive relations with the local population has a security aspect to it, and 
certain events observed in the exercise exemplified this. Overarching the whole 
role-play was the involvement of a violent spoiler group, in this case, called the 
Banital (based on the Taliban in Afghanistan). The Banital are based close to 
the village and often enter the village and carry out illegal or violent acts. On the 
second day of the observation in 2008, the military had to deal with a mass 
shooting of random civilians in a populated area. The perpetrators (Banital) 
entered the village, shot at civilians and fled. It was up to the military to cordon 
the area off, look for the perpetrators, and re-securitize the zone (Sandhurst, 
2008b).  
 
One would argue, however, that this emphasis on securitisation is required for 
effective civil-military relations, as without the military provision of a negative 
peace there would be little chance for the positive peace aspects to flourish. 
However, it must be stressed that if all aspects of civil-military relations are 
behind a veil of security, then it will be more difficult to achieve the more radical 
aspects of transformation. This links strongly to how soldiers deployed into 
conflict zones understand their rules of engagement, and how such 
understandings must be balanced with the peacebuilding needs of the 
operation. While an outright reluctance to use force can lead to the operation 
suffering militarily (such as the difficulties outlined in with the Sierra Leone 
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operation in 2000), a high amount of force used in a peacekeeping environment 
has a high chance of creating difficulties for the peacebuilding aspects of an 
operation to flourish. This carries significant training implications. 
Conclusions: 
How training is carried out: prescriptive and elicitive approaches 
Prescriptive approaches 
 
Prescriptive approaches are mainly used where training modules offer ‘policy’ 
and guidelines of what is acceptable and not acceptable in terms of the 
expectations of the military. If a soldier (according to the UNTSI briefing) is 
diplomatic, looks for ‘win-win’ solutions and follows the commander’s intent, 
then in the view of the Irish Defence Forces, he or she is doing the correct job. 
Similar can be said for UN guidelines on what constitutes acts of SEA: the UN 
has very clear expectations of what military peacekeepers do when deployed. 
These expectations are not there to be discussed: they are to be learned by 
soldiers, so that transgressions do not happen. These are cases where possibly 
a narrow form of training is used, and the role of participant input into briefings 
is limited. 
 
The UN’s SGTM offers the most prescriptive approach to training for military 
peacekeepers. The SGTM outlined in this chapter, entitled ‘Civil-military 
Coordination’ offers a clear set of assumptions and guidelines to be ‘trained’ to 
soldiers before deployment. In this case, the UN’s approach of ‘train the 
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trainers’ is notably prescriptive insofar it offers very little room for participants to 
discuss issues of conflict and its resolution.  
 
This chapter demonstrates, however, that there is room to manoeuvre within 
the prescriptive approach. The SGTMs have been replaced by the Core Pre 
Deployment Training Modules  (CPTMs), which leave room for participant led 
discussion and learning. Each CPTM has an opportunity for participants to 
reflect on the issues that are identified, providing space for group work. The 
CPTM modules covering SEA as well as coordination of UN agencies are good 
examples here. Although this is not the fully elicitive approach espoused by 
Lederach, it offers a slightly more flexible model of a prescriptive approach. 
While the majority of knowledge comes from the module (and the trainer who is 
delivering it), there exists room for participants to reflect on it. Similarly, 
experience of observing the briefings in UNTSI (particularly in the briefings on 
CIMIC meetings and CIMIC Liaison) demonstrated that the briefings are based 
on a prescriptive model, with the trainers knowledge being paramount to the 
training process. However, it also encouraged officers to add their own 
experiences. A number of officers on the CIMIC course had experience of 
deployment in UN-led operations (particularly in Liberia and Lebanon), and 
were able to offer their viewpoints. 
Elicitive approaches 
 
Looking at the approaches to training which may be more based on the implicit 
knowledge of the participants as opposed to the explicit knowledge of the 
trainer, the observation of the Broadsword exercise offered a chance for 
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participants (in this case, officer cadets) to inform both each other and the 
training session itself. This was most clearly seen in the debrief observed after 
the CIMIC house was stormed by locals chasing two men from another ethnic 
group. As stated, the value of this exercise was in the debrief, where instead of 
the trainer telling the cadets what was right and what was wrong, he facilitated a 
group discussion. This approach does to a certain extent rely on the cadets 
themselves to discuss their experiences of resolving, or at least managing 
conflict. Furthermore, discussions which followed Exercise Quick Fix observed 
in UNTSI once again point to a more elicitive approach to training. The 
observed session was very much based on group work, both in smaller groups 
(which discussed the initial topics) and the larger group which discussed the 
scenario, best practices and difficulties encountered with working alongside 
non-military groups. Thus it appears that the scenario-based training sessions 
which were observed (Broadsword and Exercise Quick-Fix) offer the best 
examples of models of for the participant-led learning, where the trainer 
assumes the role more of a facilitator for group discussion, and the participants 
use their own experiences as the ‘material’ for the learning process (through 
debriefs and group discussions). However, the observations were not ‘free’ from 
the teacher-student relationship, and the trainer did still exert a degree of 
control over the process. For example, in the Broadsword debrief at the CIMIC 
House, the trainer summarised to the participants (cadets) that ‘CIMIC is not 
just painting schools, it is engaging the local population to ensure the security of 
the area which you are deployed in’. This does show to some extent that the 
trainer has some control over the process. 
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What soldiers are learning – the content of training for civil-military 
cooperation 
 
Examining the content of training, one can see how training for civil-military 
relations has evolved considerably, with training programmes now incorporating 
a much wider range of principles, ideas and issues at the heart of peacekeeping 
operations. One can see this most clearly in the changes seen at the UN, and 
the development from the SGTM to the CPTM. The SGTMs focus on civil-
military cooperation was purely based on a minimal role for the military, centred 
mainly around information sharing and providing security in the conflict zone. 
Whilst the CPTM sees these as important, they open up the role of civil-military 
cooperation to a much wider interpretation and expand on the roles for the 
military.  
 
In terms of who the ‘civilians’ are in this civil-military interface, training 
programmes have opened themselves up to wider interaction with all parts of 
the host population, and not just bilateral donors, UN agencies and the host 
government. The CPTMs espouse the values of local and national ownership in 
processes, as well as asking peacekeepers not to consult only with ‘those in 
power or those with guns’. The Broadsword exercise also offers a valuable 
contribution, as trainers advise the cadets to get out into the local community 
establish links, understand the conflict, and look for non-violent solutions to 
problems. It also gave cadets their first experience of actually being deployed 
amongst civilians, which is critical in their development as soldiers and 
peacekeepers. This role-play scenario offers the cadets a first-hand 
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understanding of the impacts of their work in the civilian environment. 
Moreover, the UNTSI briefing on tasks for liaison officers ask peacekeepers to 
be able to consult with a wide number of people on the ground. The skills 
espoused for such consultation is removed from ‘traditional’ military practice.  
 
It is significant that there is development in programmes aimed to raise 
awareness of GBV in post-conflict environments, as well as the impacts of SEA 
by peacekeeping personnel. These programmes are of critical importance to 
civil-military cooperation as they address areas which have a huge impact on 
the civilian acceptance of a peacekeeping operation. These areas have been 
overlooked in the past, and although it took a catastrophic series of scandals to 
force movement on this issue, the UN, through the CPTMs, is moving in the 
right direction.  
  
Although there is movement towards a wider view of civil-military cooperation, 
one could suggest that there is an equal swing in the other direction, towards 
the securitisation of space. This is an interesting debate, and may stem from 
the problems which were highlighted in the previous chapter of the military 
becoming too involved in humanitarian work. In theory the problem that this 
created has two possible solutions: one was for the military to understand their 
environment, and the implications of their actions, and the other was for the 
military to ‘roll back’ to their main role of providing security. To an extent, both 
are evident in this chapter. This can place the military in a difficult position, 
where in some interventions militaries can not or will not become involved, and 
in other interventions they will be asked to be more involved in humanitarian 
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affairs. What may be seen is the military actor in the peacekeeping environment 
being asked to provide security, but be aware of their surroundings and the 
implications of their actions. Again, elements of this approach have been 
demonstrated in this chapter, particularly with the CPTMs asking soldiers to 
differentiate between their Quick Impact Projects and the humanitarian work 
carried out by agencies. It could become apparent that a great deal more ad 
hoc initiatives will be incorporated. This is because it is extremely difficult for the 
military, or any actor in this case, to prepare effectively for every context. The 
best which one can hope for is that such ad hoc initiatives are fed back into 
training programmes, so that a wider range of training scenarios can be 
created. From the examination of the training programmes, this thesis suggests 
that this is happening.  
 
Securing space in a conflict zone is a priority of the military and is accepted by 
cosmopolitan scholars. For example, Kaldor argues that militaries can provide 
‘secure areas in which alternative forms of inclusive politics can emerge’ and a 
strong military presence is primarily in conflict zones to do this. This both links 
the securitisation of space to building civil-military relations and developing 
cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution (Kaldor, 2001; 125). 
 
In terms of incorporating conflict resolution skills into peacekeeping operations, 
a significant finding can be offered as a result of the observations. The previous 
chapter notes that it is the view of many in the military that civil-military 
coordination is the ‘front line’ in the interface between military and non-military 
skills. To a large extent, this is true. The skills that peacekeepers need to be 
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effective in the role of civil-military coordination/cooperation are far removed 
from the traditional military roles, and more akin to ideas from fields such as 
conflict resolution. The understanding of institutional cultures, local cultures, 
mapping conflicts, being able to negotiate, understand the importance of 
dialogue, be aware of gender dynamics all point to an increase in non-
traditional skills.  
 
On the larger picture of promoting a wider transformation of the structural 
causes of the conflict, the development of training programmes will have 
positive benefits. An increased focus on groups which do not find their voice 
through being a party to the conflict or being a major political party will have 
positive benefits for the longer term peacebuilding projects. It may not offer the 
radical transformation which has been put forward by critics of such 
interventions, as the ‘system’ remains under the eye of the UN, but it offers a 
much wider approach to the development of peacebuilding projects and the 
pursuit of positive aspects of peace. Thus, bringing this back to the thesis, the 
overall assumption of this work is that peacekeeping is a form of international 
conflict resolution. In avenues such as civil-military cooperation, the influence of 
conflict resolution skills and approaches has found a critical impact. Again, this 
is a notable contribution. 
 
However, it is also worth bearing in mind that the skills that are being taught will 
not reach the whole of the military community. With regard to cadets at the 
Broadsword exercise, a CIMIC trainer stated that roughly one-third of cadets 
‘get it’ straight away, one-third of cadets ‘learn it’ through the exercise, and one-
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third of cadets ‘don’t get it at all’ (Sandhurst, 2008a). In Chapter six, the thesis 
examines possible reasons behind the one-third of students not ‘getting it’, 
particularly with regard to the culture clashes apparent between traditional 
military conceptions and the skills needed for peacekeeping.  
 
Returning to the research questions85, this chapter shows a development in 
training programmes since Fetherston’s 1994 thesis. The evolution of civil-
military cooperation has meant that soldiers have to develop (at the very least) 
communication skills, increased understanding of civilian agencies, and an 
understanding of the civilian characteristics in the deployment area. The 
chapter illustrates this, as well as the numerous ways in which this baseline 
understanding has been built upon. Moreover, through offering practical 
examples of civil-military cooperation training, this chapter how military training 
for peacekeeping shows evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice. 
Examples highlighted show how training for civil-military cooperation is giving 
peacekeepers the necessary skills and awareness for them to fulfil effective 
conflict resolution strategies, and strengthen bonds between the provision of 
negative and positive peace. This can be linked to cosmopolitan conceptions of 
peacekeeping. As the previous chapter outlined, peacekeeping operations can 
play a vital role in protecting alternative forms of politics which, through 
                                                
85 1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution 
theory and practice? (In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 
1994?) 2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there 
evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the 
changing nature of deployment zones? 3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan 
conception of peacekeeping? (Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping 
literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan 
ideals?) 
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violence, have been silenced. To return to Elliot’s conception of cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping, a key function is to 
 
Restore civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from 
criminal activities or various destructive forms of particularist politics, and 
to engage in rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices 
(Elliot, 2004; 25) 
 
From a number of the training examples outlined above, one can observe that 
soldiers are being prepared for this role. This is a crucial finding, as it shows 
linkages between the fields of military peacekeeping and cosmopolitan theory. 
This will be further discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
Looking towards the following chapter, civil-military cooperation is not the only 
area where conflict resolution skills have found their place in training for 
operations. Training programmes and exercises on a wider level incorporate 
similar levels of conflict resolution knowledge. The following chapter examines 
further fieldwork observations and offers a wider picture of where conflict 
resolution skills influence military training for peacekeeping operations, offering 
a more holistic view of the role of conflict resolution training for the military.  
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Chapter 5. 
Negotiation training for the British Military and United 
Nations 
 
As previously stated, this thesis examines further manifestations of links 
between the fields of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping, through 
observing training programmes for military personnel. The previous chapter 
notes that there is much room for positive engagement from the conflict 
resolution field through training in more nuanced forms of civil-military 
cooperation. This is backed up through observations of training in the United 
Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI), and Royal Military Training Academy 
Sandhurst (RMAS), as well as analysis of United Nations Standard Generic 
Training Materials (SGTMs) and Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials 
(CPTMs) 
 
This chapter adds to this analysis by surveying the role of negotiation training in 
the context of the UK military and the UN CPTMs. In doing so it uncovers a 
need to understand negotiation at the ‘tactical level’. This is reinforced through 
a sampling of articles from the journal International Peacekeeping, which 
illustrates how the peacekeeping literature understands negotiation contexts. It 
charts (in the UK case) how the need for negotiation became apparent, by 
examining the difficulties faced by British soldiers serving in the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina in the early 1990’s, and 
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offers an account of how lessons from this experience have been transferred to 
a strong culture of training negotiation and communication to soldiers at the 
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.  
 
Using an observation of a negotiation simulation at the Operation Broadsword86 
exercise, this chapter provides an illustration of how cadets react to the stresses 
of negotiation, as well as making a link to the field of conflict resolution 
research. It then offers an analysis of the UN CPTMs, which cover issues such 
as negotiation, and working with diverse cultures. This chapter will thus present 
an informed analysis of the development of negotiation training and the role it 
plays in preparing soldiers for peacekeeping duties.  
 
The chapter further provides a unique conflict resolution viewpoint in its 
approach to negotiation skills. It surveys negotiation literature, as well as charts 
where the conflict resolution field has had influence on military training for 
negotiation, both at the tactical level (in preparing troops themselves), as well 
as at a more theoretical level (in understanding the impact of negotiation on 
larger conflict resolution efforts).  
 
Tactical-level military negotiation in the literature: a brief 
synopsis  
 
To begin, it is important to define what type of negotiation is surveyed.  This 
chapter offers a significant contribution by outlining the unique pressures of the 
                                                
86 Chapter 4 has a full description of the exercise. 
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‘tactical-level military negotiation’. Goodwin (whose work is intrinsic to 
understanding this area) offers a definition of tactical-level military negotiation, 
through reflecting on the changing nature of military peacekeeping in the 
1990’s. This provides a constructive working definition by which to chart the 
academic literature: 
 
Circumstances were dictating that the military, primarily in their role as 
peacekeepers, were required to interact with a multiplicity of 
organisations and individuals on operations in order to achieve safe 
resolutions to volatile situations. Whilst a military force is inextricably 
linked with armed response, and this remains an option in most 
deployments, the growth of civil-military liaison work and non-
confrontational encounters with warring factions to uphold a mandate of 
neutrality dictate an urgent requirement for any soldier to negotiate 
responsively and effectively. 
(Goodwin, 2005; xvi) 
 
This account highlights interactions with a multiplicity of organisations and 
individuals, civil-military relations and finally ‘non-confrontational encounters’ 
with warring factions. Such actions cover both intended formalities (much of 
which was discussed in Chapter 4), and ‘flashpoints’ – areas of crisis 
negotiation. This chapter provides a considered analysis of this critical area of 
‘flashpoint’ negotiations. 
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General texts which offer an outline of negotiation 
 
The wider negotiation literature offers more generic themes which can be used 
to inform negotiation at the micro-level. For example, Zartman and Rubin’s five 
attributes for a successful negotiator - flexibility, interpersonal sensitivity, 
inventiveness, patience, and tenacity - can be used as a benchmark to aim for 
when training soldiers to negotiate effectively. Some of these skills will be 
apparent throughout this chapter, both in the theories of negotiation and in 
practical examples (Zartman, 2002; 104).  
 
It is through interest-based negotiation where the links between the negotiation 
literature and the tactical-level military negotiation contexts become apparent. 
Movius argues that this approach reflected a desire in the field to utilise 
negotiations to move parties to discover interests, and examine options for joint 
gain. This ‘win-win’ approach was a radical move from traditional bargaining 
practice and, in Movius’ view, explored themes involving: 
 
the creation and distribution of value, the importance of moving beyond 
positions to addressing underlying interests, the suboptimality of most 
outcomes, the irrationality of many negotiator assumptions, and the 
importance of achieving results while maintaining long-term relationships. 
(Movius, 2008; 511) 
 
Fisher Ury and Patton’s Getting To Yes offers an approach at all levels of the 
conflict. The authors built on work carried out at the Harvard Negotiation Project 
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to develop ‘principled negotiation’87, described as ‘a straightforward method of 
negotiation that can be used under almost any circumstance’ (Fisher et al., 
1991; 11). It follows four key areas: 
 
People: Separate the people from the problem 
Interests: focus on interests, not positions; 
Options: generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do 
Criteria: insist that the result be based on some objective standard. 
 
Fisher et al argue that in order to separate people from the problem, it is 
important to understand that conflict lies is in ‘people’s heads’. They argue that: 
 
Truth is simply one more argument – perhaps a good one, perhaps not – 
for dealing with the difference. The difference itself exists because it 
exists in their thinking. Fears, even if ill-founded, are real fears and need 
to be dealt with. Hopes, even if unrealistic, may cause a war. Facts, even 
if established, may do nothing to solve the problem. 
(Fisher et al., 1991; 23) 
 
On this basis, principled negotiation seeks to separate the underlying interests 
of each negotiating party from the overt positions taken. A close examination of 
underlying interests ‘will reveal the existence of many more interests that are 
shared or compatible than ones that are opposed’ (Fisher et al., 1991; 43). 
Following from this, the authors explore where negotiators can examine options 
                                                
87 ‘Principled Negotiation’ will be referred to when specifically discussing Fisher et al’s work. 
Otherwise the term ‘interest-based negotiation’ will be used. 
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for mutual gain, suggesting that problems arise where ‘all available answers 
appear to lie along a straight line between their position and yours’. In fact, 
according to Fisher et al, there is almost certainly room for shared interests and 
mutual gain, ranging from developing a ‘mutually advantageous relationship’ 
(Fisher et al., 1991; 59), or through satisfying each sides’ interests through a 
‘creative solution’. To facilitate this process, objective criteria are to be used, 
and the more that standards of ‘fairness, efficiency or scientific merit’ are used, 
the more likely that any final agreement is to be ‘wise and fair’ (Fisher et al., 
1991; 86).  
 
It is in the final part of Fisher et al’s analysis of principled negotiation where 
closer links emerge with military-level tactical negotiation. Firstly, is the concept 
of the BATNA – Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, which is the 
standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured. The 
BATNA can be used as the yardstick for any proposals offered during the 
negotiation process. The authors briefly connect this principle to armed 
negotiation, stating that the BATNA can assist in negotiation on merits, as 
opposed to negotiation on physical power. Secondly is ‘negotiation jujitsu’: 
 
when they assert their positions, do not reject them. When they attack 
your ideas, do not defend them. When they attack you, don’t 
counterattack. Break the vicious cycle by refusing to react. Instead of 
pushing back, sidestep their attack and deflect it against the problem. As 
in the Oriental martial arts of judo and jujitsu, avoid putting your strength 
 335 
against theirs directly; instead, use your skill to step aside and turn their 
strength to your ends. 
(Fisher et al., 1991; 114-115) 
 
Fisher et al offer a number of skills and techniques to improve ‘negotiation 
jujitsu’, including advice of how to look for and understand the interests behind 
stated positions, recasting personal attacks as attacks on the problem, and 
inviting criticism and advice.  
 
Finally, Fisher et al outline the use of ‘dirty tricks’ by parties to a negotiation. 
Such dirty tricks involve deliberate deception, phony facts, ambiguous authority, 
dubious intentions, and less than full disclosure. These tactics lead the authors 
to argue that a negotiation procedure could exist about the very rules of the 
negotiation itself – a meta-negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991; 135-140). ‘Dirty 
tricks’ and ‘negotiation jujitsu’ approaches are usually utilised during tense 
negotiation practice and may be more prominent in the flashpoint negotiation 
scenario. As this chapter demonstrates, the interest-based negotiation 
approach is incorporated into training at the RMAS, with Goodwin’s analysis of 
military negotiation (outlined below) recognising dirty tricks, much more 
offensive approaches and the possibility of a use of physical force. 
 
Avruch’s contribution investigates the cultural element of negotiation. He argues 
that a focus purely on communication in negotiation makes it difficult to avoid 
seeing the ‘human element’, in particular, subjectivity, cognition, and context – 
all parts of the cultural makeup. Avruch argues that although culture is present 
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in all levels of negotiation, the closer one gets to negotiations and interlocutors, 
the more difficult it is to theorise. This is because the closer one gets, the less 
chance one has of understanding the negotiation process to be a rational 
decision making process based on neutral assumptions contained within a 
‘hermetically sealed, “black box” process’ (Avruch, 2005; 40) This, as Avruch 
argues elsewhere, makes culture the ‘lens’ through which causes are refracted 
in the context of the negotiation arena. This has an impact on how culture is 
taught to negotiators, as in Avruch’s view, it should not be taught as a bolt-on, 
variable, or ‘independent causal vector’ in models of negotiation (Avruch, 2000; 
344). This links to Rubenstein’s concerns over cultural simplification in training 
for military peacekeepers (outlined in the previous chapter), where he likens 
simplified cultural understandings to little more than ‘travellers advice’ 
(Rubinstein, 2005; 531). 
 
A more recent development in the literature has been an examination of the 
motivations for negotiation, particularly if negotiation is not pursued for noble 
purposes. A good example of this is Aggestam’s work, which investigates how 
‘spoilers’ are involved in peace processes (linking into Fisher et al’s work on 
dirty tricks of parties to a negotiation). Although this study examined negotiation 
contexts at a higher level than the micro-negotiation, it highlights some 
important issues. For example, Aggestam notes how many negotiation 
processes are hastily arranged with the larger powers (be it international states, 
funders, allies) exert pressure on belligerents. This has an impact on the 
negotiations themselves: 
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As a consequence, the most likely negotiation strategy the adversaries 
tend to adopt is a competitive one. The key component in competitive 
negotiation strategy is power… a competitive strategy emphasizes self-
interests, autonomy, and strategic choice in a negotiation process and 
the main focus is on the advancement of one side’s interests relative to 
those of the opponent. 
 (Aggestam, 2006; 29) 
 
Although this particular article aims more strategic levels of negotiation, (the 
Israel/Palestine example is used extensively) it can certainly be true of a hastily 
arranged ceasefire negotiation or humanitarian aid delivery, following a directive 
or agreement made at the mission headquarters. Aggestam also notes that 
‘devious objectives’ can characterise the approach of a number of parties to a 
negotiation, who may use the peace process as ‘a way to achieve goals other 
than a peace agreement’ (Aggestam, 2006; 36). Thus, in the peace operations 
context, parties may be able to enter into negotiations without explicitly desiring 
an end to hostilities. Finally, Aggestam outlines the violent context into which 
negotiations with spoilers are placed. The transfer of war to peace (in which the 
participation of military peacekeepers is noteworthy) ‘entails a transition of 
turning warriors into peace-makers and transforming a culture of violence into 
one of negotiation’ (Aggestam, 2006; 31). If such an environment is 
accompanied by violence, Aggestam argues, the transition becomes particularly 
troublesome, and may even be interpreted as a failure of the negotiation 
context.  
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Utilising Lederach’s Pyramid 
 
Linking this to the conflict resolution literature, the work of Lederach provides a 
solid framework in which to understand negotiation contexts. A version of 
Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid has been amended to help understand the 
negotiation context. Lederach created the pyramid as a way of providing an 
overview of ‘how an entire affected population in a setting of internal armed 
conflict is represented and other actors, as well as the roles they play in dealing 
with the situation’. A similar pyramid can be used to understand how negotiation 
is viewed, and possibly represented in the literature (Lederach, 1997; 37-38).  
 
 Box 5.1: The Amended Peacebuilding Pyramid 
 
     
          Tier one – Top Leadership 
  
 
      Tier two – Middle-level leadership 
  
 
   
 
          Tier Three – Grassroots leadership  
 
        
 
 
          Tier Four – Flashpoint negotiation 
  
 
 
The tiers on this pyramid represent the same constituents as those on 
Lederach’s pyramid. At tier one, is the top leadership, those who negotiate 
peace agreements, deployment of peacekeepers, and large-scale secession of 
hostility agreements. Such negotiation contexts would be found at UN 
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headquarters, or official negotiations (such as the Dayton Accords). Tier two 
would encompass a more localised version of negotiation, at the level of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General or Force Commander, and 
those who lead the belligerent groups. Much of these negotiations will be at, for 
example the headquarters of a peacekeeping operation (an example would be 
the many negotiations which General Sir Michael Rose cited in his account of 
the UNPROFOR operation). Tier three outlines a larger number of negotiation 
contexts, under the rubric of civil-military cooperation. Such negotiation contexts 
(as discussed in the previous chapter) are generally organised on a local level 
(such as civil-military cooperation meetings) with either NGO staff, local 
leadership or the host population.  
 
It is at tier four where a number of less organised negotiation situations develop 
and where ‘tactical level military negotiation’ is placed. The ‘flashpoint scenario 
(as outlined in accounts of the Bosnia operation) is at this ‘sub-level’ of the 
matrix. Although at the lowest level of the pyramid, the conflict resolution 
literature sees such unorganised forms of negotiation as having a critical effect 
at all levels. Returning to Fetherston, her research likened military negotiation to 
‘conciliation’, encouraging parties to make conciliatory gestures that would lead 
to further conflict management. The conciliation process involves ‘pacification 
process and gentle persuasion which aims to restore severed communication’. 
This can be placed at a pre-negotiation stage, which decides the framework 
and mood for which further negotiation may take place. Thus, one could argue 
that it appears at the lowest level of the negotiation matrix outlined above 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 110-111).  
 340 
 
The pre-negotiation stage has been referred to in earlier chapters, and is of 
critical importance when attempting to move from peacekeeping towards 
peacebuilding.  Fetherston examines this in the context of Fisher and Keashly’s 
contingency model: 
 
 
Peacekeeping when operating from the rationale of a contingency model 
can be visualised in a two-tiered approach, with peacekeepers working in 
the area of operation at the micro-level facilitating settlement or 
facilitating a more positive atmosphere, coupled with peacekeeping, 
cooperating and coordinated with peacemaking and peacebuilding 
efforts at the macro level. 
(Fetherston, 1994b; 150) 
 
In order therefore for peacekeeping to be effective within the contingency mode, 
then the ability to negotiate at the lowest level in ‘flashpoint’ situations is 
paramount.  
 
The chapter now provides a sample of key texts and journal articles from 
International Peacekeeping in the period 1997-2001, focussing on where 
negotiation is used in the language of peacekeeping. In order to fully 
understand how negotiation is conceptualised, it links to the levels of 
Lederach’s pyramid.  
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The top level of Lederach’s pyramid: top leadership 
 
At the top tier, Kelman analyses negotiation as interactive problem solving, 
arguing that when parties seek to negotiate they both acknowledge that ‘there is 
a problem and that they can at least conceive of some outcomes that would be 
better than the status quo’(Kelman, 1996). It is in this rubric that the option of 
negotiation is presented. Kelman argues that the problem addressed in 
negotiation is: 
 
…a problem in the relationship between the two parties – a relationship 
that has become wholly competitive and mutually destructive. Both the 
process of negotiation itself and the substantive focus of the negotiation 
are designed to restore the cooperative element in the relationship 
between the conflicting parties. 
(Kelman, 1996; 100) 
 
Thus, in order for negotiation to be fully successful, it ought to be directed 
towards ‘solving the problem shared between the parties’, which, in Kelman’s 
view is to transform the relationship between them. Linking this to the work of 
John Burton, Kelman suggests that to transform the relationship between 
parties it is advisable to address fundamental human needs – in particular: 
security, identity, justice, autonomy and recognition. This approach provides a 
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solid base for conflict resolution efforts of larger scale conflict-resolution 
approaches88 (Kelman, 1996; 102). 
 
Through a survey of International Peacekeeping articles (from the period 1997-
2001), the focus on the top tier can be split into four main areas. Firstly, studies 
cite factors that influence international negotiations. Such factors include the 
return of refugees (Albert, 1997; 6), the development of civilian police 
mechanisms and establishment of law and order (Call and Barnett, 1999, 
Cordone, 1999), the influence of resources and ‘conflict goods’ on negotiations 
(Cooper, 2001; 33), the role of women in peace negotiations (Woodhouse, 
2000b; 22), or the vested interests inherent in international negotiations 
(Carstairs, 1997; 110). The second main area in this tier is the creation of 
specific peace agreements and mission specific negotiations. This area is 
concerned with particular missions (Krška, 1997, Mbadinga, 2001, Gardner, 
2000), bilateral negotiations over particular conflict zones (such as the 
Indian/Pakistani negotiations over the Kashmir) (St. John, 1997), and 
negotiations behind the intervention into Bosnia Herzegovina (Williams, 1999, 
Bellamy, 2000). The third area of this tier encompasses processes within the 
United Nations (Gordenker, 1998; 5, Keen, 2000; 24), in particular how UN 
mechanisms are used to facilitate peace agreements (Adebajo and Landsberg, 
2000; 181), the processes of peacekeeping (for example, the use of military 
force to create space for negotiation) (Otis, 1999; 31-32, Adebajo, 2000; 13-14), 
the development of peacebuilding mechanisms (including the need to develop 
democratic institutions) (Andersson, 2000; 16), and finally, the pressing need 
                                                
88 Kelman’s analysis looks at ‘opportunities for ‘politically influential representatives of conflicting 
parties’, such as Israelis and Palestinians, or Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
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for effective mandates (Bratt, 1997; 51). The fourth area of this tier is state-to-
state negotiations. This deals with state-specific policies, such as Russia’s 
stance against secessionist movements (Baev, 1999; 92), or South Africa’s 
policy towards peacekeeping (Williams, 2000), or a description of state-to-state 
negotiation (Sidhu, 2000; 203). It also covers regional engagement in conflict 
resolution efforts (Malone and Wermester, 2000; 48). 
The second level of Lederach’s pyramid: middle-level leadership 
 
The second level of the pyramid deals with country-level negotiations and the 
impact of UN peacekeeping within host countries. This tier can be split into 
three main areas. Firstly negotiation surrounding mission impact on the host 
country. Certain studies examine the overall impact of the UN (Stanley and 
Holiday, 1997; 35), and partner bodies, such as the WHO (Beigbeder, 1998; 
38), while others focus on the positive impacts of the mission on national-level 
negotiations. Louise’s study highlights positive impacts of MINUGA’s presence 
in Guatemala (Louise, 1997), as does Nachimas’ 1999 study of the UNIFIL 
operation, which argued that UNIFIL’s ‘most interesting and important function’ 
was its role in negotiation, mediation and confidence building at the national 
level (Nachmias, 1999; 110). However, studies also deal with the negative 
impacts of deployments, such as reasons behind the poor image of 
UNPROFOR in Croatia (Malešič, 1998; 99), as well as the catastrophic effects 
of using Western negotiating approaches amongst Somali elders in the 
UNOSOM operation (Duffey, 2000a). The second area of analysis at this level 
is the implementation of peace agreements and processes; in particular, where 
negotiation fits into implementation of justice and the rule of law (Mani, 1998; 6, 
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Mani, 1999; 13, Hartz, 1999; 29, Stanley, 1999; 131). The third main focus of 
study at this level explores issues surrounding negotiation once the 
peacekeeping operation is deployed in country. Strategic planning of civil-
military cooperation, including a coordinated approach to ‘negotiations with host 
authorities’ fits into this area (Weiss, 1998; 50). In terms of ‘mandate 
implementation’, scholars have examined the role of negotiating parameters 
surrounding the use of force in operations (May and Massey, 1998, 55) (Steele, 
1998; 69).  Studies also analyse the relationship between country negotiations 
and reality on the ground. Mackinlay and Kent chart the difficulties faced by 
negotiators in incorporating the range of interests of parties to a negotiation, 
and the effects this has. They outline the ‘seeds of destruction’ which are sown 
when ‘difficult’ issues which were circumvented in negotiations became reality 
on the ground (Mackinlay and Kent, 1997, 34-35). Chandler’s analysis agrees 
with this, and notes that many of the ‘complex needs’ of peacekeeping are not 
addressed by negotiators who focus on the ‘traditional tasks’ of ensuring a 
ceasefire (Chandler, 2001).  Linked to this is Zahar’s analysis which questions 
the motivations of militias who use a number of tactics in order to ‘seek the right 
to represent a given community at peace negotiations’ (Zahar, 2000, 124).  
The third level of Lederach’s pyramid: grassroots leadership 
 
It is in tiers three and four where recognition emerges for officers and soldiers at 
a tactical level to develop skills for negotiation. Tier three refers to the organised 
civil-military dimensions of an operation and organised meetings between the 
military and NGOs, or local leaders. 
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This tier can be further split into three categories: negotiation (or non-
negotiation) with belligerent groups; negotiation to enhance civil-military 
relations (both with the NGO community and the host population); and the 
impact of negotiation on mission tasks once the mission is deployed. In terms of 
negotiating with belligerent groups, Mackinlay and Kent note that the traditional 
period of peacekeeping89 was characterised by ‘well-established’ procedures of 
disengagement of opposing forces which involved ‘only a few negotiators who 
were… completely in control of their respective forces’ (Mackinlay and Kent, 
1997; 36). Furthermore, Sanzdoz’s example of the relative success of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross’s negotiation with belligerent groups 
to evacuate refugee camps in the 1976 Lebanon conflict (Sandoz, 1997; 91) is 
also of note here. However, studies also look at the failure of belligerent groups 
to enter negotiations with an operation. MacKinlay finds the difficulty of 
individuals having to reconcile their humanitarian agenda with warlords who 
‘disregard almost all the pressures and negotiation ploys’ of the international 
community (MacKinlay, 2000; 58-59). Bratt links this to the issue of gaining 
consent for a peacekeeping operation. The loss of consent, he argues, 
indicates that at least one party ‘believes that its objectives can still be achieved 
on the battlefield’. This leads Bratt to warn about the dangers of losing consent 
(Bratt, 1997; 3). The impact of negotiations in the civil-military dimension falls 
into this tier, though negotiation is mentioned more in the context of relating with 
key members of the host population. Hills discusses the role of NGO/Military 
relations in the SFOR context and the negotiation skills of Civil Affairs officers 
as a ‘vital link’ between military and civilian efforts (Hills, 1998; 38). Studies 
                                                
89 An account of the development peacekeeping doctrine can be found on page 43. 
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relating to aspects of civil-military relations with the host population and local 
civilian leaders highlight initiatives to remove landmines (Šimunović, 1999; 137), 
and training programmes undertaken by political missions (in this case 
UNMIBH) to enhance mediation and negotiation techniques amongst the host 
population (Day, 2000; 165). This also incorporates study of how negotiation (or 
a lack of it) has an impact on military tasks. Doherty (Doherty, 2000; 68) warns 
that the lack of a negotiated settlement means how there is a move towards 
peace enforcement  and the possibility of ‘mission creep’. Wilkinson finds that 
negotiation and mediation efforts are military tasks within themselves which aid 
other diplomatic efforts to ‘persuade the parties to fulfil agreements on peaceful 
settlements of a conflict’ (Wilkinson, 2000c; 74). Although not in the bottom tier, 
this relates to Fetherston’s assertions made above, and also illustrates the links 
between all levels of the pyramid.  
The fourth level of Lederach’s pyramid: flashpoint negotiation 
 
The fourth tier relates the most to the aims of this chapter, and is where the 
work of Goodwin makes a critical impact on the field. Again, it can be broken up 
into three predominant themes: specific examples of ‘flashpoint negotiation’, the 
skill set demanded to participate in peacekeeping operations; the skills that 
peacekeepers already possess and the need to improve that skill set (including 
the introduction of contact skills).   
 
Firstly, in relation to the examples cited of flashpoint negotiation, the literature in 
this case study cites two main operations which offer solid examples: 
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UNPROFOR 90 and UNIFIL91. In terms of the Bosnia operations, Newland and 
Waller record the skills used by UNPROFOR soldiers to gain access through 
roadblocks. They found that UNPROFOR and the UNHCR92 ‘responded to the 
obstruction of humanitarian relief with a combination of persistence, negotiation, 
threat (rarely carried out), and the non-aggressive use of UNPROFOR military 
assets’ (Newland and Meyers, 1998; 20-21). This is linked to examples of 
negotiation cited by Woodhouse, who uses Colonel Bob Stewart’s attempts to 
negotiate effectively with the host population (Woodhouse, 1999b; 35). As well 
as the Bosnian example, the UNIFIL operation in Lebanon offers examples of 
the ‘flashpoint’ negotiation. Murphy’s contribution here is relevant. He examines 
official policy of the UN, which was to pursue negotiations where possible, and 
how this translated into action on the ground. He argues: 
 
In attempting to diffuse potentially violent situations by using maximum 
restraint and negotiation, UNIFIL risked being accused of backing down 
and not enforcing the mandate effectively. Such solutions were 
preferable to becoming embroiled in the civil strife taking place in 
Lebanon and then being forced to withdraw. 
 (Murphy, 1999; 53) 
 
In addition, Murphy notes how negotiations diffused confrontations between the 
UNIFIL force and local armed elements. At a tactical level, negotiation had to be 
pursued because without being able to resort to negotiating with ‘de facto’ 
forces, elements of the UNIFIL forces would have been extremely ‘vulnerable’ 
                                                
90 United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia) 
91 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
92 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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(Murphy, 1999; 51). Zahar’s analysis of militias is not geographically tied down, 
but offers a solid example of contrasting types of militias. Such an investigation 
has useful insights into checkpoint negotiations: 
 
The militias that seek the improvement of general societal conditions and 
which possess clear lines of command and control are expected to be 
the least challenging interlocutor because they have both an interest in, 
and the capacity to, engage the issue of civilian protection. In contrast, 
militias with very narrow objectives and with a loose structure are 
expected to be the toughest interlocutor because they lack the motivation 
and the capacity to improve civilians' conditions. 
(Zahar, 2000; 121) 
 
The second area of research in this tier is the defined ‘needs’ for peacekeeping 
in terms of the skills already possessed by soldiers that are suitable for 
peacekeeping operations. Leeds’ research investigates aspects of cross-
cultural mediation and finds the disparities in military cultures when compared 
with the tasks that they are asked to outline: 
 
Professional soldiers used to share a military organizational culture 
associated with destroying an enemy and achieving victory. Increasingly, 
soldiers are involved in missions in which a win–lose scenario is 
inappropriate, focusing on non-coercive and facilitative activities rather 
than on stopping aggression. Their duties resemble police work where 
negotiating replaces fighting. However, PSOs may also escalate to more 
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‘muscular’ activities, as shown at various periods of successive conflicts 
in the Balkans since 1996. 
(Leeds, 2001; 95) 
 
From this, Leeds seeks to examine the viability of placing professional 
mediators (termed by Leeds as the D Mediator) into peacekeeping 
environments to facilitate contexts where the military needs to negotiate with 
civilian partners, as well as to deal with culture clashes within operations, 
particularly those which contain  ‘contingents from largely individualist societies’ 
and ‘counterparts from collectivist societies.’ Leeds finds that ‘D Mediators’ will 
act as ‘cultural coordinators’, trained to identify and deal with ‘disharmonies 
likely to arise when a mission contains contingents from diverse cultural 
backgrounds’ (Leeds, 2001; 96). Linked to Leeds’ investigation into national 
characteristics, a number of studies espouse the features of soldiers from 
different states. MacDonald and Murphy both advocate the capability of Irish 
soldiers deployed on operations. MacDonald finds that Irish peacekeepers 
‘enjoy a high level of acceptability’ among parties in a peacekeeping 
environment. This is due to such characteristics which include: acknowledged 
neutrality; a proven record of fairness and impartiality; high standards of 
professionalism; and, natural friendliness. Such characteristics, in MacDonald’s 
view, ‘help to diffuse tensions and… enhance the prospects of negotiation on 
the ground’ (MacDonald, 1997; 96). Murphy finds that the lack of heavy 
weaponry possessed by the Irish military, combined with more engagement in 
small skirmishes (as opposed to ‘full scale battles’), both go some way to 
complementing the needs for peacekeeping operations. On this basis, a military 
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(such as the Irish Defence Forces) unaccustomed to offensive military 
operations ‘can be very adept at resolving confrontations by negotiation and 
mediation’ (Murphy, 1998; 35-36). It is not only nationalities that influence 
soldiers’ characteristics, as job type also plays a role. Grist examines the role of 
the military observer in UN operations and argues that the importance of 
personal relationships between the observers and members of the warring 
sides ‘should not be overlooked’, as factors built from the personalities of the 
observers (or ‘good chemistry’ in the author’s view) provide a foundation for 
trust and confidence. Grist argues that: 
 
The work of the observer or monitor in this informal pre-negotiation 
process is often critical to later success or failure, and is an important, 
though often unstated function of such missions. 
(Grist, 2001; 72) 
 
On top of this, Grist outlines the tactical level negotiation contexts into which 
military peacekeepers are deployed. This is the level of negotiation most suited 
for level four of the Pyramid. He finds that when civilians are caught in the 
crossfire between belligerent groups, observers’ actions are extremely 
important. Such an example highlights the inherent skills required for 
peacekeeping and observation work: 
 
direct action by observers and monitors, speaking directly to local 
commanders, even during ongoing shooting, has saved civilian lives. 
Unarmed observers and monitors need to rely upon the skills of 
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investigation, negotiation, conciliation and others in order to de-escalate 
situations, reducing the frequency and severity of violent incidents. 
(Grist, 2001; 69) 
 
As well as studies of the natural characteristics of existing soldiers, 
assessments at this level seek to understand what is needed for effective 
tactical-level military negotiation. Importantly, much of this is linked to the 
conflict resolution field. Hills offers a comparison of military peacekeepers with 
gendarmerie approaches and makes the case that military peacekeepers will 
need to ‘move between enforcing order, humanitarian relief and combat 
operations’93. In this light, the French gendarmerie’s approach to dealing with 
civil disturbance through pursuing means of negotiation is used as an example 
of what militaries should train for (Hills, 2001; 92-93). Studies also investigate 
structural changes required in order for peacekeeping operations to have a 
higher chance of success. Wentges argues that in order for peacekeeping 
operations to take a further step towards determining ‘contextual, strategic, 
operational and tactical conditionality for successful operations’, a myriad of 
improvements need to be made at all levels of the peacekeeping chain. One set 
of improvements, in Wentges’ view is at the tactical level, where work must be 
done to improve skills such as negotiation (Wentges, 1998).  
 
Investigations to determine the needs for soldiers to become peacekeepers 
also examine the soldiers themselves. Johansson and Larsson’s study of 
Swedish forces argues that in addition to good military knowledge, it is 
                                                
93 Much like the ‘three block operation’ concept further outlined in the following chapter. 
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necessary for soldiers serving under the UN flag to have ‘extended skills’ such 
as ‘diplomacy, negotiating and mediating’ (Johansson and Larsson, 1998; 137). 
In a later study carried out by the same authors (a quantitative analysis of 
Swedish peacekeepers in Bosnia Herzegovina), they argue that a main 
‘stressor’ for soldiers serving on a peacekeeping operation is the ‘conflict 
between strong aggressive impulses seeking an outlet and the inability to 
express them’. In this light, the authors state that as well as being trained in 
traditional combat skills: 
 
So-called 'civilian skills', such as conflict resolution and negotiations, 
cross-cultural relations, and restraint in application of force, should also 
be emphasized. 
(Johansson and Larsson, 2001; 73) 
 
Accordingly, Johansson and Larsson make the case for peacekeeping forces to 
be predominantly comprised of volunteer military forces, as opposed to 
professional forces. This is due to the higher likelihood of such soldiers 
‘possessing necessary civilian skills’. From the conflict resolution field, 
Woodhouse’s work notes the increasing number of calls for more conflict 
resolution capacity for peacekeepers. In particular, Woodhouse sees the 
changing nature of doctrine configured to win ‘hearts and minds’. Such an end 
requires a management of consent (through impartiality, legitimacy, mutual 
respect, minimum force, credibility and impartiality) as well as the promotion of 
‘good communication, of negotiation and mediation, and of positive approaches 
to community relations’ through civil affairs programmes (Woodhouse, 2000b; 
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15). This approach to fostering support from the host population is taken up by 
Jakobsen, who argues that negotiation (alongside a ‘wide array of consent-
promoting techniques’) must be employed in order to ‘generate trust and 
cooperation’ (Jakobsen, 2000). Returning to Woodhouse, his analysis of current 
UK PSO doctrine leads him to suggest that negotiation and mediation are 
relevant at every level of the operation, ‘from senior commanders meeting with 
faction leaders to soldiers at isolated observation posts who may become 
involved in trying to control an incident or even arbitrate a dispute’ (Woodhouse, 
1999b; 33). From this, Woodhouse argues that further research from the conflict 
research field is required. In particular, Woodhouse advocates that experiences 
are compiled to help foster understanding of such ‘flashpoint scenarios’ such as 
riot control, and answer the question of ‘how in practice can problem-solving, 
negotiation and mediation skills be used’? (Woodhouse, 1999b; 33)  
 
Looking at the role of ‘Civil affairs operations’, Caddick-Adams emphasises the 
importance of non-traditional skills for negotiation at the tactical level. He 
argues that in order to foster ‘regional and local factional support’ a great deal 
of emphasis is placed on the shoulders of ‘the most junior commanders’. He 
argues that while a potential failure can cause problems at higher levels, ‘the 
actions of a bright junior commander or liaison officer can avert a serious crisis 
with careful negotiation or the massaging of a local faction commander’s ego’ 
(Caddick-Adams, 1998; 151). This leads Caddick-Adams to conclude that the 
where there has been success in both the UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR 
missions in Bosnia, it ‘has been achieved by junior commanders’ (Caddick-
Adams, 1998; 151). 
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This ‘needs analysis’ leads some to develop a type of soldier suited for tactical 
level negotiation. Kernic sees two faces of peacekeeping, which corresponds to 
two different ‘faces’ of soldier. The first face – that of traditional peacekeeping – 
asks the soldiers to assume the role of a ‘diplomat in uniform’ who ‘negotiates 
between conflicting parties without using force’. This must be considered 
against the second face – that of peace enforcement – where the more 
‘traditional military image’ of a soldier is assumed. Here peacekeeping is 
primarily an ‘enforcement task’ (Kernic, 1999; 124). The notion of the ‘diplomat 
in uniform’ is revisited in the following chapter.  
 
Taking this analysis as a whole, there is an even spread across the articles 
surveyed, with negotiation contexts observed at all levels in the pyramid from a 
number of viewpoints. Looking at the bottom tier (where the body of this work is 
aimed) studies offer ad hoc examples of soldiers, context and doctrine. A 
significant finding can be deduced here. Although there are cited examples of 
negotiation there is little that examines how negotiation is taught to soldiers in 
the pre-deployment phase. Thus, a gap in the literature is identified. 
 
It is within this gap that Goodwin’s work makes a valuable contribution. Much of 
the rationale for Goodwin’s analysis of the military and negotiation comes from 
her conclusions that established analysis of small scale negotiations (taken 
from a number of different fields, including business, labour management, 
conflict resolution, or game-theory modelling) ‘did not reflect or complement the 
situations within which serving personnel found themselves’ (Goodwin, 2005; 
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xvi-xvii). Following on from this, Goodwin’s main contention is that situations in 
which the military soldier has to negotiate differs from other forms of 
negotiation. For example, she argues that there will be situations where soldiers 
have to negotiate effectively under ‘duress, physical threat, and armed 
intervention’ (Goodwin, 2005; 3). Goodwin’s analysis also provides a useful 
table outlining her understanding of the differences of military-based negotiation 
and other types of negotiation. It is presented below in table 5.2. 
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Box 5.2: Goodwin’s comparison of negotiation 
(Goodwin, 2005; 7) 
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Notable in this table is a considerably higher chance of ‘threat moves’, use of 
force, interplay of cooperation and competition, and a considerably lower 
chance of preparation time for negotiations. When compared to models of 
negotiation espoused by Kelman and Zartman, it becomes apparent that this 
type of negotiation context is substantially different. However, as outlined 
above, there are skills and techniques that transcend all levels of the 
negotiation matrix. We have seen that cultural awareness is key in the 
circumstances outlined in Box 5.2, as is the work done by Aggestam on the role 
of spoilers. Furthermore, the importance of the interest-based negotiation 
approach has had a significant impact.  Goodwin finds that interest-based 
negotiation a useful base for her work on negotiation. She argues that: 
 
Being aware of interests, be they tangible or intangible aspirations, lies at 
the heart of conducting a successful negotiation, and this is no different 
in the case of military negotiation. In fact, perception of the interests 
which both parties hold could lead to a more satisfactory evaluation of 
what is going on, particularly in a volatile or aggressive context, and 
allow for a more productive exchange.  
(Goodwin, 2005; 46)  
 
Goodwin’s analysis of military training also notes the importance of the BATNA. 
When discussing the importance of the BATNA upon decision-making and 
behaviour in negotiation, Goodwin argues that BATNAs may prove to be 
‘particularly pertinent in the eventual propositions concerning military tactical 
level negotiation’. She adds that the BATNA may allow a greater insight into 
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‘the effect of situational behaviour such as aggression, or an escalation of 
armed response, and the extent to which it might affect the negotiation itself’ 
(Goodwin, 2005; 57). 
 
To add to this literature survey, this chapter now surveys the recognised need 
from within the community of practitioners (both military and conflict resolution) 
for peacekeepers to understand the nuances of tactical level negotiation. The 
most obvious example of this is through the ‘roadblock scenario’. This is 
explored, along with a brief history of how the humble roadblock became a 
driving force for those who wish to see more negotiation skills taught to military 
peacekeepers. 
The need to negotiate: the roadblock scenario 
 
A trainer at the United Nations Training School, Ireland provided the following 
anecdote. It provides an important basis for understanding how valuable the 
need is for military personnel to understand the importance of such skills as 
negotiation within the peacekeeping environment. 
 
The trainer explained that whilst he was attending a multinational training 
exercise, a task was given to soldiers from three different nationalities. The 
soldiers were tasked to escort an aid delivery from Village A to Village B. 
However, between villages A and B, residents of Village C had set up a road 
block on the main road, as they felt that they deserved some of the aid that was 
destined for Village B. A small, armed militia manned the roadblock. The task 
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for the military contingents was to make their way through this checkpoint to 
Village B. 
 
The trainer remarked that upon seeing the checkpoint, the first contingent 
decided to turn around and return to base; it was not in their mandate to 
negotiate with Village C, and they did not want the extra stresses of negotiating 
a further aid delivery. The approach of the second contingent was to negotiate 
their way through the checkpoint so that they could continue to Village B. They 
did this by offering a small amount of aid to the residents of Village C, in return 
for access along the road. They also promised another drop off of aid on their 
return journey. This was accepted, so they passed. The approach of the third 
contingent showed far less reliance on negotiation. When tasked with the 
roadblock scenario, the contingent was ordered to drive through it, showing no 
signs of stopping, as well as brandishing their weapons in order to retaliate to 
any signs of gunfire (UNTSI, 2007b).  
 
This the checkpoint scenario is helpful to understand how negotiation is used in 
a peacekeeping context (even if one takes into account the differing national 
approaches of each of the three contingents). In terms of this particular case, 
and the three methods applied by the different contingents, there is a huge 
divergence between the approaches that were employed. Taking the first and 
third approaches, we see two approaches which may have been useful in the 
short-term, but ultimately negative in the long-term. In the first case, there was 
absolute avoidance shown, which may have saved the contingent the trouble of 
having to negotiate a roadblock, (which was not in their mandate). However, 
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this can be weighed against the fact that Village B would not receive any aid, 
and that the attitude towards Village C could be interpreted as showing the 
international presence to be weak. On the other hand, the third approach 
showed the international force to be highly robust, through smashing their way 
through the barrier. Although this has had positive results in the past (cited 
below in the example of UNPROFOR), it runs a high risk of alienating local 
opinion to the operation as well as heightening the possibilities of those 
operating the roadblock to escalate their levels of force to stop any future 
patrols.  
 
Thus, the ideal approach in this scenario is to explore options for negotiation. In 
the immediate term, the result of negotiating a way through the checkpoint 
would be less than if no negotiations took place: for the military, less of the aid 
is delivered, and the inhabitants of Village C may not get as much aid as Village 
B. However, this outcome increases the chance of positive relations between 
the peacekeepers and the inhabitants of Village C. It may also prevent feelings 
of antagonism from Village C towards those other Villages in the area who are 
receiving aid.  
 
On a wider scale, the ‘roadblock scenario’ has played an important role in 
making peacekeepers understand the importance of having to negotiate, and 
the serious ramifications of ineffective negotiation in the maelstrom of a 
peacekeeping deployment. This view is reinforced by interviews at the RMAS, 
which provided a brief history of the development of negotiation in the UK 
Military. It was explained that although the need to negotiate was clearly 
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identified some time ago, the formalised teaching of such a topic is a relatively 
new evolution in training. In the case of the UK, it was stressed that the 
development of teaching negotiation skills to the soldiers was a development 
built on the negative experiences of the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. As a senior trainer at RMAS explained, post deployment reports 
from UNPROFOR described how soldiers were attempting to enter into 
negotiation processes, without any considerable knowledge of how negotiations 
worked. Because of this, it emerged that negotiation training for military 
peacekeepers would be critical in preparing them for complex deployments 
such as UNPROFOR (Sandhurst, 2008c). This provides a suitable juncture to 
examine what difficulties were being faced by British troops in Bosnia. 
British Participation in UNPROFOR and the role that 
negotiation played 
 
For the UK, participation in UNPROFOR was a considerable indicator of the 
requirement to increase negotiation skills for military peacekeepers, and that a 
sizeable shift in doctrine and training was required (Curran, 2004). The 
UNPROFOR operation represents a watershed moment in the development of 
UN peacekeeping operations and the role of conflict resolution in informing the 
role and activities of peacekeepers.  
 
The doctrinal significance of the UNPROFOR deployment cannot be 
understated. The operation provided the backdrop for UK peacekeeping 
doctrine Wider Peacekeeping, which provided guidance for soldiers and training 
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institutions. Wider Peacekeeping is a critical document when understanding the 
evolution of conflict resolution skills into military peacekeeping activities, (mainly 
due to the conditions that UK troops were operating under in the UNPROFOR 
mission) as it fully explored the issue of consent in peacekeeping environments 
and how this was influenced by acting non-violently to potentially violent 
situations. It argued: 
 
For Wider Peacekeeping therefore, consent is confirmed as foundational 
to any prospect of long-term success. Lessons learned reports have 
highlighted the point that seeking to promote and sustain consent is the 
most important activity in which the tactical commander can engage. The 
history of peacekeeping has consistently shown that consent is the only 
effective vehicle for carrying peacekeeping operations forward. 
(MOD, 1995; 2-6) 
 
Negotiation skills were integrated into the doctrine to a high degree, and were 
outlined as one of the key techniques to achieving consent in a conflict zone94.  
 
Wider Peacekeeping linked this to ‘pillars’ of consent - a number of principles 
which a mission needed to adhere to in order to foster and maintain consent. 
Amongst these was ‘minimum use of force’, which consequently pushed 
peacekeepers towards using non-violent forms of conflict management. Wider 
Peacekeeping states with regard to the use of force that it could become ‘liable 
to become sources of future resentment and hostility which may inhibit control 
                                                
94 The full list is: Negotiation and mediation, Liaison, Civil Affairs, Public information, Community 
Information, Community Relations. 
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and manifest in outbreaks of further violence and prolongation of the conflict’ 
(MOD, 1995; 2-7).   
 
The emergence of negotiation and non-use of force in Wider Peacekeeping was 
influenced primarily by the use of roadblocks as a principal impediment to the 
effective delivery of humanitarian aid to enclaves within Bosnia throughout the 
operation. Usually such roadblocks would consist of a small number of armed 
men blocking a road with obstacles and landmines (either anti-personnel, or 
anti-tank). Although it looked like a militarily small task to use force to destroy 
the roadblock, the UN’s mandate relied on the consent of all parties to ensure 
the convoys would get through, thus any increase in force could mean that 
consent would be withdrawn to the operation (meaning the UN could effectively 
have become a party to the conflict: something which was opposed to by the 
troop contributors). Thus, soldiers were required not to use force, but negotiate 
their way through the roadblocks. Such scenarios were a concern to soldiers at 
all levels. General Sir Michael Rose (who commanded the UNPROFOR 
operation from 1994-1995) found that the Serbs in particular wished to retain 
control of humanitarian goods, because delivery of aid to any of the Muslim 
enclaves would work against their strategic interests. However, Rose found (to 
the cost of the UNPROFOR operation), that Serbian forces ‘never blocked 
convoys in such a systematic manner that a military response from 
UNPROFOR became inevitable’. Instead, he argued, they played a ‘cat-and-
mouse’ game which involved giving in to the UN when the ‘pressure on them 
grew too much’, and then becoming obstructive when the UN moved on and 
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concerned itself with other issues (Rose, 1999b; 361-362). Goodwin’s analysis 
found that:  
 
 
On many occasions, the main aim in stopping peacekeepers at 
checkpoints appeared to be to delay and hamper the military from 
achieving its mission. Disruption was something that the other 
protagonists could achieve easily, especially so when the frustration felt 
by the UNPROFOR personnel was noted and observed. 
 (Goodwin, 2005; 173) 
 
Newland and Meyers found that convoys were continually obstructed and 
harassed by uncoordinated groups along the convoy route. They cite one 
example in particular, where in May 1992 a convoy had to negotiate its way 
through 90 roadblocks between Zagreb and Sarajevo, with ‘many of them 
manned by undisciplined and drunken soldiers of indeterminate political 
affiliation’ (Newland and Meyers, 1998; 19). The authors note that: 
 
The parties, though unwilling to explicitly oppose humanitarian 
assistance, did in fact oppose it when it helped to sustain the very 
populations they were trying to eliminate. The tactics of obstruction were 
endless delays, fruitless negotiations, outright blockades and, 
sometimes, attacks. 
(Newland and Meyers, 1998; 20-21) 
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Colonel Bob Stewart (who commanded the first British battalion to arrive in the 
country in 1992) approached such roadblocks with an attitude that negotiation 
as paramount. He argued: 
 
Without a mandate to force our passage through, we would have to 
negotiate all the way to our destinations. It would be no good simply 
launching a convoy and hoping that it would be able to get through the 
many checkpoints to its destination. We had to create the right conditions 
in which to operate, which might entail a ceasefire or at least a 
containment of the fighting between local forces… Faced with a choice 
between either forcing our way through using military power or 
negotiating, I would obviously use the latter option unless there was no 
other way. 
(Stewart, 1993; 61-62) 
 
Thus, Stewart’s approach was to seek out avenues to negotiate. Within this 
framework an extensive system of liaison officers was established to ensure 
that the force could maintain regular contact with local commanders. In 
Stewart’s view, building relationships with local commanders was of high 
importance, and liaison teams were essential to facilitating this success. 
Stewart found that personal relationships were ‘vital’ in situations with no 
established order, as ‘often a problem which seems impossible one moment 
can be solved almost instantly in a conversation’ (Stewart, 1993; 319).  
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As the conflict went on, the idea of having to negotiate through roadblocks was 
tested, with commanders and contingents assuming a tougher line on 
roadblocks. General Sir Michael Rose argued for a ‘robust’ response from 
contingents when stopped at a checkpoint. To show what can be achieved 
through the threat of force, Rose used the example of a Swedish Battalion’s 
action at a checkpoint: 
 
Hendrikson [the Swedish Commander] had led their [the Swedish 
contingent] first convoy across the conflict line. At a Bosnian Serb 
roadblock, he was confronted by an aggressive soldier who told him he 
had orders not to allow him to pass. Hendrikson immediately put a 
loaded pistol to the soldier’s head and informed him that he had just 
received a new set of orders. The convoy was allowed through without 
any further interruption. 
(Rose, 1999b; 50) 
 
Although Rose agreed with this policy, arguing that the Battalion were well 
respected throughout the mission, it did bring wider problems associated in 
refusing to negotiate at a checkpoint. Woodhouse, Fetherston and 
Ramsbotham note this, in their assessment of the role of conflict resolution 
theory and practice in the UNPROFOR operation. They found that although 
there was admiration for the Swedish approach, it ultimately led to three 
Swedish peacekeepers being taken hostage by Bosnian gunmen (although 
ironically they were released unharmed after negotiations) (Fetherston et al., 
1994; 24). Nevertheless, Rose maintained his view that a robust posture was 
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needed to improve chances of success. In his view, the Serbs (who seemed to 
be providing the majority of roadblocks in Rose’s experience) could have been 
obliged to offer the UNPROFOR convoys greater freedom of movement ‘if 
national contingents had adopted a universally robust approach on the ground’. 
It was the lack of a unified, robust posture which Rose viewed as a stumbling 
point in gaining any ground with aid deliveries (Rose, 1999b; 361-362). 
 
This debate highlighted the need for a coherent approach to training for 
peacekeepers, which was reinforced by post-operational assessments of the 
UNPROFOR deployment . Colonel Bob Stewart asserted that UN operations 
are ‘officers’ wars’, in which the balance of success or failure depends on the 
attitude of the officers who have to establish networks in the field, and 
implement UN policy into practice. This is to some extent reinforced by 
Fetherston et al who argue that: 
 
peacekeepers (military and civilian) operate at the critical interface 
between ‘structural-political’ attempts to broker mediated settlements at 
one set of levels (in this case reaching from Pale and Sarajevo through 
Belgrade and Zagreb to Moscow and Washington), and the task of 
monitoring or implementing them at another, including ‘cultural-
communal’ tasks such as relief work, refugee repatriation, communal 
policing, reconstruction, overcoming breakdown in communication and 
local reconciliation. (Fetherston et al., 1994; 13) 
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Goodwin contends that that because of the high number of instances where 
negotiation was ‘thrust’ upon soldiers (in most cases through negotiating at 
roadblocks), many found that they were ‘inadequately trained in negotiation 
skills’. Her investigation finds that the experiences gained through the 
UNPROFOR deployment ‘indicated that individuals were either good 
negotiators or were not, and had little time to alter the fact for the better’. With 
inadequate training, soldiers had to handle negotiations which had a high 
chance of failing, when coupled with a pervading hostility and cultural 
misunderstandings. As Goodwin says, ‘a great deal of damage could be done 
with very few words’ (Goodwin, 2005; 175). With this lesson in mind, belief 
developed in the peacekeeping community that amongst the skills needed for 
conducting peacekeeping operations, ‘negotiation was one of the most 
important duties, but one of the least practised in the pre-deployment phase’ 
(Goodwin, 2005; 191). 
 
It was also noted amongst the conflict resolution community that the ‘roadblock 
scenario’ was a unique case-in-point to highlight the wider issues of negotiation 
within peacekeeping operations. Woodhouse, Ramsbotham and Fetherston’s 
paper that examined UNPROFOR from a conflict resolution perspective, noted 
the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power approaches needed for peacekeepers negotiating at 
a micro-level. Throughout 1992 and 1993, UNPROFOR soldiers required a 
great deal of ‘skill, professionalism, judgement and restraint’ in order to deal 
with the myriad of issues they were confronted with on a daily basis. In the 
authors’ view, the development of ‘contact skills’ was essential in order for 
soldiers to develop their ‘soft’ power skills. The authors argued that: 
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contact skills are defined as those skills which support activities involving 
direct contact with armies and militias, civilian populations, humanitarian 
agencies, and other contingents of the peacekeeping force. They are in 
essence the communication skills required by the third party interveners 
enabling them to utilise their soft power capabilities 
(Fetherston et al., 1994; 14-16) 
 
Thus, on both sides of the military/conflict resolution divide, a growing 
recognition emerged that understood the need of a role for conflict resolution in 
micro-level military negotiation. Much of this recognition came about as a result 
of the difficulties which soldiers faced at checkpoint negotiation in Bosnia. This 
represents a significant development in links between the two fields. 
 
Training in negotiation soon took the form of checkpoint negotiations. One such 
attempt to formalise training into this context was spearheaded by the Centre 
for Conflict Resolution, at the Department of Peace Studies, (University of 
Bradford). This particular exercise was based on a composite of convoy events 
in the Bratunac/Srebrenica area of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Spring of 
1993. A more detailed description of the scenario is presented in Box 5.3 below. 
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Box 5.3: Humanitarian Aid Delivery in War-Zones – Case Study: 
Srebrenica, Bosnia Hercegovina95 1993  
(Lewer and Reynolds, 2002) 
 
It is spring 1993. A UNHCR food convoy, which set off from Belgrade escorted by 
UNPROFOR soldiers, has arrived at the outskirts of Bratunac (a Bosnian Serb town) in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. The convoy consists of 15 UNHCR trucks carrying 150 tons of 
food, medical supplies, blankets and soap. The convoy is on its way to Srebrenica 
(about 10 miles from Bratunac), an enclave established as a UN ‘safe area’ for Bosnian 
Muslims, which is surrounded by Serb forces 
 
The convoy has received all necessary permissions from Bosnian Serb HQ at Pale to 
travel through Serb territory to Srebrenica. In order to secure these permissions, the 
Bosnian Muslims agreed to allow Serbs to be evacuated (by the UN) from 
neighbouring Tuzla. The overall situation in the country is extremely volatile, with the 
Serbs rapidly gaining territory with devastating effects on civilians 
 
The convoy has had a long and difficult journey from Belgrade, with many stops. For 
example it was held up for a long time at Zvornik on the Serbian-Bosnian border. As it 
approaches Bratunac it is forced to stop yet again because of a crowd of angry 
Bosnian Serb civilians who are blocking the road. Positioned on the side of the road is 
a detachment of Serbian militia. International news reporters are present at the scene 
 
 
The creators of the training exercise argued that Serbian forces hindered aid 
delivery in Eastern Bosnia for four main reasons: 
 
• Passage of aid is stopped according to the orders of the highest Bosnian 
Serb authorities due to political or military reasons 
• Passage is stopped according to orders of the highest authorities but it is 
presented as a will of local militias on check points 
                                                
95 The authors’ use of this spelling format has not been changed. 
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• Passage is denied by local militia commanders 
• Aid passage is stopped by the local civilian population, as a sign of 
protest  
(Lewer and Reynolds, 2002; 49) 
 
Thus, the exercise sought to involve all four approaches in the role-play, by 
incorporating a multitude of different actors at a number of different levels. Over 
25 different roles were defined96 each with different ends, and means which to 
achieve them. Within the role-play were two main themes. The first level 
negotiated at a higher level by ‘those at the broader political and military levels’, 
and the second level at the micro-negotiation context of the roadblock. Within 
the micro-level negotiation of convoy delivery, the creators of the exercise make 
the point that: 
 
UN officials in charge of these convoys must, therefore, have plenty of 
courage, negotiation skills, and patience in order to fulfil their task. 
(Lewer and Reynolds, 2002; 49) 
 
Therefore, in essence the roadblock ‘scenario’ was symptomatic of the UN’s 
involvement in the wider conflict in Bosnia. Soldiers found themselves stuck 
between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power approaches towards those providing the 
roadblock, with no clear answer of which would be more successful. They found 
                                                
96 Actors came from the following list: Local officials from  Bratunac, Bosnian Serb Militia, 
UNHCR Convoy, UNPROFOR Escort, International Committee of the Red Cross, Medicins 
Sans Frontiers, Oxfam, United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General, UNHCR headquarters, UNPROFOR Headquarters, Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe Headquarters, Oxfam Headquarters, Government of Bosnia 
Hercegovina. 
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themselves at the crux of the divide between the policies made in the UN 
Headquarters, and dealing with the practical implementation challenges of such 
policies. In addition, was the need for negotiation through cultural contexts, both 
with the humanitarian community, the militias, as well as the local population. 
Finally, UN peacekeepers found themselves having to deal with, and make 
compromises with warring factions. This, Goodwin argues, involved having to 
make ‘some unsavoury deals’ in order to maintain consent. It is because of this 
spectrum of issues involved and the positive impact that conflict resolution 
theory and practice can provide, that we see the importance in using the hugely 
localised scenario at the level of a roadblock on a route from Village A to Village 
B to effectively teach soldiers the importance of negotiation in peacekeeping 
environments.  
 
Bringing this to the present day, research conducted at RMAS (through 
discussions with trainers and analysis of the training programme) shows that in 
the UK context the military roadblock is used to some extent in preparing 
soldiers for negotiation contexts. However, it is now seen as one of many 
contexts in which soldiers find themselves having to negotiate with civilians, 
NGOs, or belligerent groups of non-governmental organisations. Although the 
importance of the UNPROFOR experience is highlighted, militaries have 
developed training, adapting military peacekeepers to different contexts. It is, 
however, still kept as an example of negotiation, with a video of a roadblock 
negotiation being used to introduce officer cadets into the nuances of 
negotiation at RMAS (Sandhurst, 2008b). 
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RMAS and Negotiation Training 
 
Negotiation training for officer cadets at RMAS is undertaken by the 
Communication and Applied Behavioural Sciences Department (where 
Goodwin teaches), which focuses on teaching cadets a broad range of skills 
and techniques centred on four thematic areas: problem solving and creative 
thinking; motivating and team building; communicating and influencing; and 
leading and managing change. It is from this range of themes that the 
department aims to provide future officers with the necessary base skills to 
become ‘tactical level micro negotiators’ (RMAS, 2009)  
 
Goodwin categorises tactical level military micro-negotiators as Type D 
learners. These are defined as ‘learners who are to be frequent micro 
negotiators in given contexts with greater personal or scenario implications for 
their failure/success’ (Goodwin, 2005; 138). However, she finds that such 
learners are stifled with a very low starting knowledge of negotiation and its 
finer nuances (bordering on ignorance about the subject). This becomes 
problematic when the negotiator finds him/herself in a personal life-or-death 
scenario in the real world (Goodwin, 2005; 138-140). Developing negotiation 
training for this type of learner therefore requires a number of different 
approaches, in particular a mixture of classroom-based teaching, scenario 
based learning, and life-like simulations.  
 
Classroom-based teaching is based around ‘brainstorming sessions’, where 
cadets are encouraged to think creatively about a particular context or situation, 
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and share their thoughts with other members of the class. In such sessions, 
elicitive approaches are followed, with Goodwin noting that suggestions are 
invited as well as pooling together of different ideas and responses from the 
learners. This leads to a ‘diversity of issues and solutions’ from the group, with 
different groups providing different outcomes. Goodwin goes on to argue that: 
 
a learning method that is frequently overlooked is the sharing of ideas 
with mentors and colleagues, through general conversation or more 
formal interviews. This experience tends to promote higher-level skills, 
and the refinement of technique and approach, since improvement has 
no limits. 
(Goodwin, 2005; 143) 
 
Scenario-based training provides a significant part of the overall curricula, and 
complements the work done in the classroom. Goodwin argues that ensuring 
variety in the delivery of training exercises will involve the inclusion of simulation 
exercises, which provide a ‘realistic representation of likely negotiation 
processes, plus the inherent external factors, which will all be pertinent to the 
learner’ (Goodwin, 2005; 138-140). For students to effectively learn about 
negotiation in this framework, Goodwin argues that the context is ‘vital’ in order 
for the learner to transfer their theory into practice in a meaningful way. 
Furthermore in the terms of the military, attention must be paid to the rules of 
engagement, as well as current scenarios into which the military is likely to find 
itself deployed. Finally, and heeding more elicitive approaches, guided role-play 
ideally offers structured and constructive feedback through immediate debriefs 
 375 
which utilise ‘both trainer and learner response to enable a more proactive 
learning cycle to develop’ (Goodwin, 2005; 140). Linking this to Movius’s work 
on negotiation training, he cites systematic reviews of university and 
professional school curricula, which suggest that the most common single 
technique used to train negotiation was the use of simulations and role-play 
exercises. He argues that such exercises help trainees through experience, 
help reveal training participants’ ‘naïve theories of negotiation’, offer 
opportunities to try new skills, and to ‘illustrate the relevance and application of 
underlying principles and themes’ (Movius, 2008; 515). 
 
To supplement the theoretical approaches outlined above, this chapter now 
provides a fieldwork observation of a negotiation exercise at RMAS, and an 
examination of UN approaches to training in communication and negotiation. 
These will further illustrate the importance of conflict resolution skills in training 
programmes for military peacekeepers, particularly with regards to the 
significant area of tactical-level negotiation. 
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Fieldwork observations: Negotiation in the Broadsword 
exercise 
The fieldwork observation at Operation Broadsword97 provided the opportunity 
to witness a cadet taking part in a role-played hostage negotiation. It took place 
at the local mosque, where the local belligerent group (BANITAL) took three 
female civilians hostage. Outside of the mosque, a large crowd had gathered, 
angered by the fact that three civilians were taken hostage. The role of the 
soldiers was twofold: firstly, to stop the crowd from ‘storming’ the mosque 
(bringing a heightened danger of a large-scale loss of life); and secondly, to 
negotiate directly with the hostage takers to ensure the safe release of the 
hostages.  
 
Fieldwork notes explain how the negotiation process inside the mosque worked. 
The observation started after the first set of negotiations failed dramatically, with 
one of the hostages being ‘killed’. After this happened, a new negotiator was 
drafted in. This change of negotiator had a positive effect. The fieldwork notes 
explain what happened next 
 
He [the soldier] agreed to withdraw the forces (who moved back and ‘hid’ 
out of view to the hostage takers), and for this, one hostage was 
released. The negotiations then moved on to safe passage for the 
hostages. At first they [the hostage takers] demanded a bus, but were 
told that it was not a realistic demand. They then demanded that they 
had access to the edge of the village. The remaining hostage was taken 
                                                
97 A more detailed description of Operation Broadsword can be found in Chapter 3. 
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as a ‘human shield’. It was not until the hostage takers got to the edge of 
the village that she was let go. From this it was obvious that a degree of 
trust had emerged between hostage takers and the negotiators 
(Sandhurst, 2007) 
 
Interpreting this through an amended principled negotiation model, Box 5.4 
below shows the context of the negotiation: 
 
Box 5.4: An interpretation of the hostage scenario influenced by 
Goodwin’s use of the principled negotiation model 
 
Officer Cadet      BANITAL Member 
 
BATNA       BATNA 
Overwhelming Force     Use of force 
Kill Hostage-Taker     Kill Hostage 
 
 
 
Position      Position 
Secure safety of hostage    Secure safe Passage 
Ensure Security of     Not be targeted by military 
Deployment Zone 
 
 
 
Suggested Interests     Suggested Interests 
Save Face      Save Face 
Uphold international mandate    Survival 
Quick Resolution (pressure    Maintain threat 
from locals outside mosque)      
Safety of troops 
 
 
Examining this process, the BATNAs for both groups are overwhelmingly 
violent. In fact when this scenario was discussed with Sandhurst trainers, it was 
remarked that such a BATNA would be employed in the operational context, as 
one hostage had been executed and that is usually the ‘trip wire’ for 
overwhelming force to be implemented. However, it was through understanding 
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each side's BATNA that brought the negotiation scenario to its ultimately non-
violent conclusion. The soldiers knew the BANITAL gunman was providing a 
clear threat to the hostage and the BANITAL gunman knew the threat posed to 
himself by the military. This reciprocal understanding of the BATNA possibly led 
to each side exploring options for negotiation. By looking at the possible 
positions of the parties, there becomes scope for negotiation. The BANITAL 
gunman, by adopting the position of not being targeted by the military offered 
the safe release of one hostage in return for the military to withdraw to a safer 
distance. In terms of interests, there was certainly room for pursuing goals with 
mutual benefit. In the military’s case, there was a need to save face, ensure the 
mandate was not harmed, resolve the dilemma in a speedy manner (particularly 
under the observation of a number of angered local civilians), and ensure the 
safety of troops. The BANITAL gunman, through needing to save face himself, 
and ultimately survive, offered the negotiation context a type of solution. If both 
were to save face, with the security of the area safeguarded in a quick manner 
(thus upholding part of the mandate), with the gunman surviving and still 
showing that the BANITAL showed a threat, then the outcome would be a 
rational solution: the gunman taking a hostage to the edge of the village, before 
giving her up and fleeing.  
 
It is worth noting at this juncture that the observation was undertaken at a point 
where the negotiator had been replaced after the hostage taker had killed one 
of the hostages. In effect the first negotiator had failed his test, resulting in 
catastrophic failure. It was due to the flexibility of the role-play that another 
cadet could be brought in to ‘start again’ on the negotiation. Although the 
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observation sees the process as a success, it did begin after a failure in 
negotiation. In a real world scenario, this ability to start again would not be an 
option, and with the killing of a hostage, a chain reaction may be invoked where 
the military use overwhelming violence against the hostage takers – 
employment of the BATNA. Goodwin discusses this extensively in the case of a 
hostage negotiation in Sierra Leone, where an armed militia called the ‘West 
Side Boys’ had taken a number of UK soldiers hostage. In this particular 
scenario the influence of time pressures, and the growing threat of harm to the 
hostages led the UK military to employ violent force against the hostage takers. 
This, in Goodwin’s view, emphasised ‘the pervading threat of force, aggression 
and armed response’ in the military environment, and how such a threat is 
essentially an option for either negotiator (Goodwin, 2005; 203). Furthermore, 
Goodwin finds that 
 
If negotiation is undertaken in such circumstances, it is necessarily a 
process framed by mutual awareness of the presence of this type of 
coercion and tension. For the parties involved the negotiation becomes a 
stressful and, on occasions, physically threatening, encounter, with every 
decision creating the potential for destructive reaction. 
(Goodwin, 2005; 203) 
 
In order to understand such a negotiation scenario in the wider context, one can 
look at conflict resolution approaches to the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The fieldwork 
notes suggest that his micro-negotiation context can be interpreted as a form of 
prisoners’ dilemma. They find that: 
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From a [conflict resolution] perspective, this shows the prisoners 
dilemma clearly, as both sides could have gone back on agreement to 
achieve gain for themselves at the cost of the other. However, both sides 
clearly trusted each other and the resolution was win-win. 
(Sandhurst, 2007) 
 
As outlined by Hopmann, the prisoners dilemma is based on a story of two bank 
robbers who rob a bank and bury the stolen money, with the intent to dig up the 
money and split the bounty (Hopmann, 1996). Before they get the chance, a 
local sheriff arrests them and tries to extract confessions from both prisoners 
(as he has no evidence to convict them). The sheriff tells the prisoners that the 
length of the sentence will depend not only on whether they confess, but 
whether the other prisoner chooses to confess or not. There options outlined 
are: 
 
1) If neither confesses, they will be sentenced for a lesser crime; 
2) If both confess, they will each be sentenced to five years in prison; or 
3) If one confesses and the other does not, then the one who confesses will 
be given a light sentence, whereas the other will be sentenced to the 
maximum penalty of eight years in prison. 
 
Box 5.5 provides a grid for the prisoners’ dilemma with the potential jail 
sentence of Prisoner 1 is given first followed by the jail sentence of Prisoner 2 
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Box 5.5: The prisoner dilemma  
(Hopmann, 1996: 73) 
 
       Prisoner 2 
           No Confession  Confession  
 
  No Confession - 2, -2      -8, -1 
Prisoner 1  
   Confession             -1, -8      -5, -5  
 
 
 
The main crux of this dilemma, Hopmann finds, is in the relations between the 
top left corner (-2, -2) and bottom right (-5, -5), as the rational approach by the 
prisoners would both be to not confess. However, this is only a rational 
approach if both parties can trust each other not to confess (as doing so would 
mean a drastically longer sentence). This is where the tension lies, as 
confession can be a ‘safe option’. 
 
Linking this to the observed hostage negotiation, the situation demanded 
agreement between the cadet and hostage taker, possibly at the cost of 
something to both parties: through reaching an agreed settlement the hostage-
taker was sacrificing his goals and the cadet sacrificed obtaining ‘justice’ (by 
catching the hostage-takers) in order to ensure the safety of the hostage. What 
led both parties to sacrifice part of their goals in order to reach an agreement 
was a degree of trust that the other party would not go back on their part of the 
agreement. Furthermore, the costs of going back on the agreement would be 
more costly than following it. In this case the costs would lead to an escalation 
of force and a high probability of injury or death. In many aspects this was an 
active representation of the prisoners dilemma.  
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Hopmann suggests that traditional bargaining theory does not suggest a ‘good 
answer’ to the prisoners dilemma, and the related tensions between 
‘simultaneously cooperating to seek integrative solutions and competing to win 
a larger share of the distributive outcome’ (Hopmann, 1996; 75). Thus, he finds 
that more recent work on interpreting the prisoners’ dilemma as a ‘joint problem-
solving exercise’ rather than an exercise where each party aims to gain at the 
others expense is more fruitful. Hopmann also argues that this has longer-term 
benefits: 
 
When the two parties seek to cooperate to achieve mutually beneficial 
solutions, this usually tends to reinforce the long-term self-interests of 
each of the parties as well. It does so in part because this approach 
prevents optimal solutions from being undermined by mistrust and 
conflict, as in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. It also serves long-term interests 
because agreements that may undermine the fundamental interests of at 
least one of the parties are likely to be violated and eventually to dissolve 
(Hopmann, 1996; 75) 
 
In their analysis of the prisoners’ dilemma, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 
agree. Looking at the tit-for-tat strategy, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham explain 
that in a scenario where this prisoners' dilemma is repeated over and over 
again, the greatest strategy is to mimic what the other person does. However, 
the process begins with cooperation. Thus, if both sides begin with cooperating, 
then rationally they would copy each other’s behaviour: cooperating multiple 
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times. However, if one side does defect, then the other will change their 
approach from cooperation to defection for the next round. They argue: 
 
Tit-for-tat is not a pushover. It hits back when the other defects. But, 
crucially, it initially cooperates (it is ‘generous’) and it bears no grudges (it 
is ‘forgiving). Its responses are also predictable and reliable (it has ‘clarity 
of behaviour’). 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 17) 
 
In an extensive simulation of the prisoners’ dilemma, the tit-for-tat strategy was 
the most successful; with both parties gaining more by cooperating than if they 
defected. This leads the authors to agree with the argument that ‘nice guys do 
come first’. In terms of this particular negotiation, both sides maintained 
cooperation (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 17).  
 
In the case of the Broadsword observation, two conclusions can be reached 
about tit-for-tat. Firstly, tit-for-tat brought success in this observation. The 
negotiator began by offering to cooperate (moving the other soldiers away). The 
BANITAL member accepted this, and in turn cooperated with the negotiator 
(releasing one hostage). The spirit of cooperation through a tit-for-tat strategy 
was apparent throughout the rest of the negotiation, and the final hostage was 
released. The second conclusion suggests that in the larger picture, tit-for-tat 
was not followed. As stated, the negotiator was replaced after the BANITAL 
members had resorted to force. If tit-for-tat were to be followed, then it would be 
logical for the military to resort to force themselves. Thus, although tit-for-tat 
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works in cooperative strategies, it may not be as applicable when there is the 
risk of loss of life.  
 
Thus, the Sandhurst negotiation offers an excellent example of how militaries 
can be trained to deal with difficult negotiation scenarios in the deployment 
zone, with little preparation. It also illustrates where exactly one can see 
interests-based negotiation being used in a ‘flashpoint’ scenario: a common 
feature of the tactical-level military negotiation. By examining the BATNA, 
positions and interests, it becomes clear how agreement was reached. Also, 
through the prisoners’ dilemma, one can see how in the longer term this 
negotiation process may move the parties onto a more peaceful footing for 
future relations. Although it was a training exercise, it demonstrates the viability 
of conflict resolution theory and skills as tools to both inform and understand 
military negotiation. It further offers another example of the links between 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution. 
Approaches in the United Nations: SGTMs and CPTMs 
 
Negotiation training is to varying extents prevalent in current UN training. The 
Standard Generic Training Modules98 (SGTMs) contained a section on how to 
negotiate, entitled Communication and Negotiation. This is the most obvious 
point of departure to examine the UN’s approach to training soldiers in 
negotiation skills. Surrounding the negotiation context, the SGTM suggests is a 
wider ‘communication environment’: 
 
                                                
98 The SGTMs were replaced in 2009. 
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The communication environment in a peacekeeping mission is much 
more complex than one is used to under normal circumstances. The 
peacekeeper will typically be communicating with somebody from 
another culture, without a common language, often under threatening or 
tense situations in a context where people are stressed and easily 
irritable. 
 (UN, 2006g; 1) 
 
This description reflects many of the factors present in Goodwin’s analysis of 
tactical level military negotiation. In particular, the high threat level, influence of 
personality, and the importance of culture. The Communication and Negotiation 
SGTM is therefore intended to ensure peacekeepers understand where and 
when they will need to use negotiation skills, and how this differs from the 
traditional duties in military operations. The SGTM begins by explaining that in 
peacekeeping operations, soldiers will be placed under situations where they 
will be ‘interacting with another person or persons with the objective of reaching 
an agreement between them’ (UN, 2006g; 7). It then outlines common 
scenarios where one would see negotiation skills being put to use. These are 
as outlined in Box 5.6 below: 
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Box 5.6:  Common scenarios where negotiation is put to use (taken from 
SGTM 11: Communication and Negotiation)  
(UN, 2006g; 7) 
 
1. Negotiate freedom of movement of peacekeepers, NGO or population through area 
controlled by one of the parties, e.g. at a roadblock; 
2. Discuss relationship/roles between peacekeepers and the parties or local 
authorities, e.g. patrol moving through a village; 
3. Peacekeepers seek to prevent escalation or reoccurrence of conflict by parties 
agreeing to certain behaviour, e.g. patrol come across fighting between two 
villages; 
4. Peacekeepers resolve disputes with or between parties or between local people, 
villages, communities (depending on the mandate); and 
5. Peacekeepers meet among themselves, or with parties, the local authorities and/or 
community leaders to coordinate a specific event, e.g. a marriage or other 
traditional ceremony in a sensitive area, making arrangements for a vaccination 
campaign, coordinating the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or 
refugees or coordinating humanitarian relief distribution. 
 
 
 
These scenarios outlined in Box 5.6 cover a wide range of purposes. One can 
see more procedural objectives, outlined in points 1 and 2. Point 1 links quite 
closely to movement through roadblocks, as well as negotiating humanitarian 
corridors and refugee returns (which was a recurring difficulty encountered in 
the UNPROFOR operation). Point 2 reflects to the civil-military aspects of a 
deployment, where the peacekeeping operation attempts to foster 
understanding of the roles, responsibilities and working relationship between 
the third party and host population. This is also true of point 5, which looks 
towards Quick Impact Projects, social events, as well as the more critical 
coordination tasks, such as the return of refugees. Points 3 and 4 offer a more 
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interesting insight into the perceived non-violent conflict resolution potential of 
military peacekeepers. Point 3 refers to obtaining agreement from local parties 
to avoid adopting the use force, effectively setting ground-rules for the 
intervention. Here, one could see local ceasefire arrangements, 
decommissioning of arms, and non-weapons zones being the main source of 
discussion. In terms of point 4, peacekeepers are invited to use negotiation 
skills to resolve disputes between parties, local people, villages and 
communities: effectively asking peacekeepers to use contact skills to assist 
negotiations between belligerent groups.  
 
In order to achieve success in the range of negotiation scenarios, the SGTM 
follows a standard framework for negotiations (outlined in Box 5.7). 
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Box 5.7:  The structure of a negotiation (taken from SGTM 11: 
Communication and Negotiation) 
(UN, 2006g; 7) 
 
The structure of Part II follows the three stages of negotiations, namely: 
 
1: Introduction (start) 
2: Substance (discussion) 
3: Conclusion (end) 
 
Any actual negotiation event/session will always have three stages, the introduction 
(start), the substantive negotiations (discussion) and the closing session (end).  
 
Regardless whether it is an impromptu negotiation session, e.g. a dispute between two 
villages that you come across on a patrol (and thus have no prior warning for and no 
time for planning) or if this is a meeting that has been scheduled well in advance, 
approach the negotiation from the perspective that there is this three stages: (1) start, 
(2) discussion and (3) end. 
 
 
In order to ensure effective negotiation, the SGTM asks peacekeepers to keep 
in mind three main areas.  Firstly, peacekeepers understand their mandate and 
the role of the UN in the conflict: their own interests. In the peacekeeping 
context, the SGTM states ‘your interests will derive from the missions mandate, 
the policies of your unit and the instructions you have received’. Secondly, 
peacekeepers understand the interests of other party/parties, and what they 
aim to achieve out of the negotiations. This requires a degree of preparation, as 
the SGTM suggests that peacekeepers study previous statements and actions, 
including recent changes to policy. Thirdly, peacekeepers ‘understand the 
cultural/historical context’ within which they work, and aim to avoid ‘critical’ 
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cultural mistakes. This is achieved by peacekeepers understanding what 
influences their interests (the mandate, policies and instructions), as well as to 
understand interests of the other parties to the negotiation, (the SGTM advises 
peacekeepers pay attention to ‘identifying underlying interests, not their stated 
positions’). 
 
The SGTM also asks peacekeepers to understand different cultures that 
characterise the negotiation environment, and teaches one important aspect for 
all personnel to follow: 
 
Show respect and do nothing to offend: The foundation of cross-cultural 
communication is respect. The golden rule is to do nothing that will 
offend the other culture. If you are professional, humble, friendly and 
respectful your chances of not offending anybody are very good… every 
culture has developed customs and tradition to regulate formal 
communications like negotiations and mediations.  
(UN, 2006g; 8) 
 
In some ways this can be linked to the interest-based negotiation approach of 
separating the people from the problem: taking time to understand the context 
of the communication and what is driving the interests of the other partiers 
(discussed in the review of negotiation literature outlined above). It also, 
however, links closely to Avruch’s analysis of culture in the negotiation context. 
As stated above, Avruch argued that culture is the ‘lens’ through which one 
sees negotiations, and needs to be treated as a critical component of any 
 390 
negotiation (Avruch, 2000; 344). Seeing culture as a ‘bolt-on’ to a negotiation 
context is counterproductive; the UN’s approach in the SGTM is to ensure that 
this does not occur.  
 
As the previous chapter outlines, the SGTMs have been replaced by the new 
Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials. This new training regime has not 
incorporated a specific module on negotiation, although the new CPTMs offer 
an in-depth approach to training peacekeepers to work with diverse cultures in 
the operation.  
 
The updated UN training materials  subsumed the negotiation component of 
training a more broad range of principles. Thus, the CPTMs are more 
concerned with understanding who is being negotiated with, as opposed to the 
negotiation itself. As a result, the CPTMs offer a concerted effort to foster 
understandings of cultural differences between groups. This attempts to go 
further than traditional understandings of the obvious differences between 
military and civilian groups, by outlining thematic areas where differences may 
occur.  
 
 
The closest that the CPTMs get to a specific module on negotiation is the unit 
entitled ‘Working with Diversity’. The unit begins by stating that the 
peacekeeper’s ability to ‘maintain respectful relationships and communicate 
effectively’ constitute key determinants as to how successful the operation will 
be. It adds that many of the peacekeepers’ choices are influenced by ‘being 
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aware of the diverse backgrounds and being sensitive to different ways of doing 
things’ (UN, 2009i; 81-82). Following this, the CPTM asks that peacekeepers 
show a degree of reflexivity in order to increase chances of improving decision-
making. Awareness of peacekeepers’ own perspectives ‘allows us to consider 
the possibility that there may be other ways of seeing a situation’ (UN, 2009i; 
89). Thus, from the outset, there is a concerted effort to both understand the 
‘other’ culture(s), as well as being reflective about one’s own culture. 
 
In order to understand the impact of culture on communication, the CPTM offers 
a number of visual aids to explain the dynamics of culture. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
show these attempts to define the issue of culture to peacekeepers. Figure 5.1 
provides various dimensions of diversity, uncovering the different layers of 
culture. Figure 5.2 shows an exercise given to trainees, where they are asked 
to write about the obvious and less obvious aspects of culture (the obvious is 
above the waterline and the less obvious is below the waterline). 
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Figure 5.1: Dimensions of diversity  
(UN, 2009i; 83) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Iceberg exercise  
(UN, 2009i; 89) 
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Although relatively straightforward, these exercises introduce concepts for 
military peacekeepers to help them understand the complex cultural 
environment into which they are deploying, and also how their own cultures 
may affect it.  
 
The CPTM also examines ‘common differences’ which may hamper effective 
communication during negotiations. This is a far more culturally aware method 
of approaching contact with the host population than the SGTMs, which offer a 
‘blueprint’ of negotiations. The main areas of ‘common difference’ according to 
the CPTM are: 
 
• Attitudes regarding authority and management 
• Body language and gestures 
• Religion 
• Family and roles 
• Dress Code  
• Concepts of time  
(UN, 2009i; 93-97) 
 
Under each of these headings, the unit provides examples of where cultural 
differences lie. Like the exercises outlined above, the importance lies not in the 
depth of the topics. Instead the significance is in the intention to encourage 
military peacekeepers aware of the role of culture, and the considerable 
difference in cultural interpretations of regular activities. As Goodwin outlines  in 
her assessment of the negotiation environment in Bosnia, ‘a great deal of 
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damage could be done with very few words’ (Goodwin, 2005; 175). The CPTM 
here illustrates the value attached to avoiding this.  
 
 As stated, the CPTMs do not contain an outright section on negotiation and 
mediation (unlike the SGTMs). However, discussions with DPKO officials 
indicate that negotiation will be within a set of Specialised Training Materials 
(STMs) for the military and police (Curran, 2009). Although, at the time of 
writing, the STMs are not publicly available, it is a positive step to understand 
that negotiation and mediation is still an integral part of military preparedness 
for peacekeeping operations. In addition, it could be argued that by focussing 
more on the ‘human aspect’ of interactions, as opposed to the ‘processes’ of 
the negotiation, that the CPTMs link to some of the key guidelines in Fisher et 
al’s negotiation guide, Getting to Yes. One of the fundamental aspects of their 
principled negotiation process is an ability to understand the negotiating parties 
with: putting the people first. In Fisher et al’s view, a working relationship based 
on ‘trust, understanding, respect, and friendship’ can make negotiations 
‘smoother and more efficient’, and that relationships need to be based on 
accurate perceptions, clear communication, appropriate emotions, and a 
forward-looking, purposive outlook (Fisher et al., 1991; 19). 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter understands approaches to training negotiation for military 
peacekeepers who find themselves in the ‘flashpoint’ negotiation scenario. It 
offers an analysis of where the ‘flashpoint negotiation’ appears in the academic 
literature and practitioner experience, and uncovers four layers of negotiation 
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linked to Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid. Crucially, a sub-tier of ‘tactical-level 
military negotiation’ is uncovered. This provides a further analysis of factors 
influencing military peacekeepers at the lowest level, who make decisions 
which can affect the whole of the peacekeeping operation. Much of the 
research and study at this level examined ad hoc approaches, national 
characteristics, and, most importantly what skills peacekeepers need. 
 
The review of existing literature establishes a context, as well as an identified 
set of needs for peacekeepers. The work of Goodwin and the RMAS 
Broadsword Exercise provides a solid observed example of how (to varying 
degrees of success) those needs are addressed. Much of Goodwin’s work 
examines the needs of learners who end up becoming tactical level negotiators, 
and designing a curriculum to meet such needs. Moreover, the cadets at RMAS 
are given a safe environment in which to negotiate in contexts that are 
unfamiliar to them. This provides them with a greater ability to negotiate in 
difficult situations.  
 
The UN’s training modules offer a considered approach towards negotiation at 
the tactical level. Although it is not specifically outlined yet, it is an encouraging 
sign to understand that the UN is continuing to focus on negotiation and 
mediation for the military and police audiences, through the CPTMs. Coupled 
with an increasing amount of literature on working with diversity in a 
peacekeeping operation, there is much to look forward to in terms of UN training 
for tactical level military negotiation. 
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Linking this to the thesis questions99, the chapter further outlines a evidence of 
conflict resolution theory and practice in military training, and outlines a 
development of links since Fetherston’s 1994 study on training. The literature 
survey of negotiation shows that, although it is relatively ad hoc, there is a 
considered attempt to understand negotiation contexts. The chapter again 
demonstrates that training military peacekeepers provides further evidence of 
conflict resolution theory and practice. This is illustrated in the shared 
awareness of the ‘roadblock exercise’ from both the military and conflict 
resolution community, as well as the interpretation the RMAS hostage 
negotiation through both the lens of Fisher et al’s approach to principled 
negotiation, and solutions to the prisoners’ dilemma. There is however a 
pertinent question remaining over tit-for-tat strategies when the use of violent 
force is used. If a military peacekeeper is under a restricted set of rules of 
engagement, or knows that through using tit-for-tat would mean more violence, 
then the strategy becomes considerably more difficult. 
 
What does this particular chapter mean for the wider field of peacekeeping and 
conflict resolution? Peacekeepers continually find themselves in the dangerous 
situation of either pursuing the path of negotiation or resorting to the use of 
robust force. At the tactical level, there is no clear answer. Peacekeepers have 
resorted to either option in a number of examples. However, there is a need for 
                                                
99 1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution 
theory and practice? (In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 
1994?) 2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there 
evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the 
changing nature of deployment zones? 3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan 
conception of peacekeeping? (Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping 
literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan 
ideals?) 
 
 397 
peacekeepers to add negotiation skills to their traditional toolbox of skills 
(inclusive of the traditional military tasks). The literature review of peacekeeping 
contexts offered numerous examples of where negotiation was a success, and 
it must still be seen as a useful alternative to deadly force. Like in civil-military 
cooperation, there is a developing requirement for military peacekeepers to 
expand their decision-making capacities, to deal with the dilemmas of when to 
use force, when to negotiate, when to end negotiations, and whether there is an 
appropriate time to employ the BATNA. The next chapter will discuss this in 
more detail, and outline where military practitioners and conflict resolution 
theorists show similar aspirations for future peacekeepers. 
 
However the chapter raises an important note for concern. Related to the 
possible development in securitization of civil-military tasks, the development of 
more robust forms of peacekeeping may have a negative impact on the use of 
negotiation in peacekeeping contexts. Murphy’s assessment of the qualities of 
Irish peacekeepers was that they have developed skills in peacekeeping 
because of the lack of heavy weaponry possessed by the Irish Defence forces. 
Therefore, one can speculate that if peacekeeping is to become more robust, 
there could be a real danger that ‘force protection’ will be the winner, instead of 
examining approaches for negotiation100. The finding in the previous chapter 
that militaries may return to  ‘securitisation’ policies is pertinent here. This is a 
serious concern, particularly as much of the positive work designed to foster 
less violent approaches to potentially violent situations may be subservient to 
Rules of Engagement which place emphasis on robust use of force.  It is 
                                                
100 Force Protection will be examined in the following chapter. 
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therefore of critical importance that the ‘non-traditional’ aspects of PSO doctrine 
are highlighted, and given equal weight of importance in training programmes.  
Woodhouse’s study of PSO doctrine, and the ‘soft’ aspects it incorporates offers 
a degree of insight here, as he highlights the critical role that conflict resolution 
techniques play in the doctrine as a whole.  
 
As an aside, it is often asked whether such training is effective for 
peacekeeping operations. Although studies are yet to be conclusive in the 
military field, studies do exist in industry of the effects of increased negotiation 
training for personnel. Movius’ analysis of negotiation training cites one of the 
few research studies undertaken on its impact. The study was undertaken with 
sixty-four graduate students at Columbia Teachers College taking a twenty-hour 
conflict resolution course over three weekends. Forty-two similar students who 
did not take the course served as a control group. Half of the participants in the 
group received ‘multisource’ feedback (from the participant, a friend, a 
supervisor, and a subordinate or colleague) before the course, and half after the 
course. Feedback was designed to ‘tap’ conflict-related feelings and behaviors. 
Movius describes the findings of the study as ‘significant’. He adds  
 
Four weeks after the first measurement, training participants reported 
feeling significantly fewer negative emotions in conflict situations, had a 
more positive view of conflict and reported a more constructive work 
climate after the training. Perhaps more significant, their raters 
(observers who knew the subjects well) reported that participants used 
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more “uniting” and “informing” behaviors in conflict situations than they 
had before the training. 
(Movius, 2008; 523) 
 
Moreover, the study showed that supervisors of the participants noted that more 
constructive outcomes to conflicts appeared when participants were involved. 
Although there is still much work to be done, it is again encouraging to see that 
such training bears fruit. It is with this in mind that this thesis strongly supports 
Goodwin’s claim that  
 
When the ultimate goal is the desire to provide military practitioners with 
knowledge and skills in negotiation that might save lives, the impetus for 
pertinent training is evident. 
(Goodwin, 2005; 141) 
 
This thesis now focuses on wider discussions that arise from this chapter as 
well as work undertaken on civil-military relations training. Together, these two 
chapters on fieldwork observations both offer a solid understanding of how ‘soft’ 
aspects of peacekeeping operations are being trained for. In particular, the 
need to foster positive relations with civilian actors in a peacekeeping operation, 
and the need to quickly adapt to unpredictable negotiation contexts in the 
deployment zone. From this, the following chapter returns to the research 
questions, asking how exactly one sees the role of conflict resolution in military 
training. It further asks whether through such training we are seeing a 
development of the expectations of the ‘type’ of soldier which is being deployed 
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into post-conflict societies, and links this to cosmopolitan conceptions of military 
peacekeeping. An examination of future cosmopolitan compositions of military 
response to peacekeeping is then provided, taking into account current UN 
attempts and future proposals.  
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Chapter 6. 
Conclusion: Reflections on cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping 
 
As stated in previous chapters, this thesis examines where there exists further 
evolution of links between the fields of military peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution. This chapter brings together the project as a whole, by linking 
previous chapters to contemporary debates about peacekeeping operations. To 
serve as a reminder, the thesis is guided by the following research questions 
(supplementary questions are italicised):  
 
1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of 
conflict resolution theory and practice? 
1a) In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed 
since 1994101? 
2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military 
peacekeepers, is there evidence that training in non-traditional military 
skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the changing nature of 
deployment zones? 
3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan conception of 
peacekeeping? 
                                                
101 This refers to Fetherston’s 1994 project (entitled Towards a theory of United Nations 
Peacekeeping), examined the role of conflict resolution in training for peacekeeping. 
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3a) Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping 
literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more 
aligned with cosmopolitan ideals? 
 
After providing a summary of the thesis, this chapter investigates a number of 
broad conclusions that tie in the training of peacekeepers in conflict resolution 
skills to wider debates about the future role of peacekeeping, also paying 
attention to the emerging literature on cosmopolitan frameworks. 
The Chapters 
 
Chapter one sets the context for the thesis by offering a review of literature 
related to the links between peacekeeping and conflict resolution. After 
examining early attempts to conceptualise peacekeeping training (Gordenker 
and Weiss, 1991) (Moskos Jnr, 1976), the chapter examines Galtung’s work on 
the role of peacekeepers, which offers an early interpretation of the role of 
military peacekeepers as conflict resolvers. This study highlights the difficult 
position which soldiers find themselves in when deployed, insofar that they 
require skills to facilitate closer relations with the local population, but soldiers 
also felt that they also needed heavier arms to deal with belligerent groups. This 
led Galtung to suggest that military peacekeepers are akin to ‘armed police 
forces’. Moreover, Galtung notes that in order for peacekeeping operations to 
effectively make the link between negative and positive peace, the 
peacekeeping force is required to incorporate military skills (for peacekeeping), 
mediation techniques (for peacemaking) and civilian capacities to encourage a 
peacebuilding process (Galtung, 1976a). On a wider scale, Galtung looks at the 
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role of international peacekeeping in the framework of global conflict resolution. 
He critiques peacekeeping as an activity undertaken in the periphery areas, and 
not in the traditional centres of power. From this critique, Galtung argues that 
‘artificial walls’ of state sovereignty need to be dismantled, and peacekeeping 
be used to remove both direct and structural forms of violence, with 
peacekeeping operations be like a ‘one-way wall’ permitting freedom fighters to 
expand liberated territory, ‘but preventing the oppressors from getting in’ 
(Galtung, 1976a). Importantly, this represents the first real attempt by conflict 
resolution theorists in charting the impact of peacekeeping operations on the 
field of conflict resolution. 
 
Chapter 2 offers its main contribution through the development of the ‘Bradford 
Model’ of conflict resolution research. This has developed through the Centre 
for Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies, University of 
Bradford. Work from within this centre links peacekeeping practice and policy to 
wider theoretical understandings of conflict resolution and offers a solid 
manifestation of links between the two fields. Key to this body of work is 
Fetherston’s 1994 thesis on conflict resolution training for peacekeeping 
operations, where she advocated the incorporation of contact skills102 into 
training for peacekeeping operations (Fetherston, 1994b). Linked to 
Fetherston’s research on contact skills, early studies linked difficulties that 
peacekeepers were facing in operations to conflict resolution theory and 
practice, such as Fetherston, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse’s paper examining 
                                                
102 Fetherston’s definition of contact skills: ‘It is through the use of communication skills, 
methods of negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate 
potentially violent or manifestly violent situations and facilitate movement toward conflict 
resolution (Fetherston, 1994b; 219). 
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the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from a conflict resolution 
perspective (Fetherston et al., 1994). Ramsbotham and Woodhouse offer a 
wide range of research which links conflict resolution research to peacekeeping 
operations and practice. Their book Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution 
compiles a range of articles written by practitioners and academics, which 
examine the existing links between the fields of peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000). 
 
The Bradford model is strengthened by PhD research carried out in the Centre 
for Conflict Resolution. Duffey’s work on the impact of culture in peacekeeping 
operations advocates a wider role for culture specific training for military 
contingents participating in peacekeeping operations, which promotes 
‘indigenous conceptions of conflict and traditional methods of responding to 
conflict’ (Duffey, 1998; 270). Hasegawa examines the role of the UN operation 
in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as a vehicle of empowerment and promotion of 
Human Security and makes the case for peacekeeping as a form of conflict 
resolution, arguing that peacekeeping is ‘understood as a contributing factor in 
transforming conflict and a manifestation of the will to transform violent conflict 
into a peaceful situation’ (Hasegawa, 2005; 27-28). Sola i Martin also looks at a 
particular operation (UN Mission in the Western Sahara) as an example of the 
wider implications for conflict resolution and uses a Foucauldian analysis of 
power/knowledge to assess peacekeeping operations in relation to power 
relations at a local and international level (Sola i Martin, 2004). Levy’s thesis 
offers a valuable link between the practitioner and academic by examining the 
use of the Internet as a peacebuilding tool, offering practical examples of how 
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the internet has been used as a vehicle of change in the working practices of 
peacebuilding organisations (Levy, 2004).  
 
The Bradford Model also develops a more critical approach, with Pugh 
suggesting that peacekeeping operations serve ‘as forms of riot control directed 
against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace’ (Pugh, 2004; 
41). Pugh’s suggestions of an alternative framework include a route into more 
cosmopolitan assertions. He argues that future peacekeeping deployments will 
need to be separate from the ‘state-centric control system’, answerable to ‘a 
more transparent, democratic and accountable institutional arrangement’, and 
be based on a permanent military volunteer force ‘recruited directly among 
individuals predisposed to cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values’ (Pugh, 
2004). The chapter takes this as a starting point for an analysis of cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping. In assessing policy changes, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
understand that cosmopolitan peacekeeping is linked to deeper reforms in the 
UN, the development of a rapid reaction force, and ‘gender and culture aware 
policy and training’. From this, an assessment is made of current capacities for 
UN rapid reaction (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005). This chapter therefore 
adds a great deal to the existing literature on peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution, and also sets the stage for the thesis to examine civil-military 
cooperation, UN approaches, and the role of negotiation and other conflict 
resolution skills in making military peacekeepers more effective at their work.   
 
Chapter two outlines developments in the UN since the publication of the 2000 
Brahimi Report on peacekeeping operations. In doing this, the thesis offered an 
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up-to-date account of structural changes in the UN system, and how this has 
influenced the role of non-traditional training in peacekeeping operations. The 
UN still maintains its place as the leader in peacekeeping operations, with 101, 
882 peacekeepers in the field, (86, 357 being military personnel) (DPKO, 2010), 
and also maintains a sense of legitimacy in the peacekeeping field, with a 
charter - according to Cheeseman and Elliot - which ‘resounds in cosmopolitan 
values’ (Cheeseman and Elliot, 2004; 278). 
 
The chapter begins by noting where the Brahimi Report has had an impact on 
training practices for military peacekeepers. Most notably, recommendations on 
peacekeeping doctrine, and the use of robust force in an impartial manner, 
which pushed peacekeeping in a more robust direction. The Brahimi Report 
was also critical of the level of well equipped, well trained soldiers which the UN 
had at its disposal, and recommended that troop contributors, at the very least 
should ‘have been trained and equipped according to a common standard’. 
Assisting these reforms would be a further drive in the UN to develop common 
training standards for troop contributors (UN, 2000c; 19). Much of this was 
informed by the disastrous performance of UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone in 
the summer of 2000. On top of the need to change the structures of training in 
the UN system, the Brahimi Panel strongly advocated an increase in training for 
human rights, gender, and cultural awareness (UN, 2000c; 45-46). 
 
Linked to this is an increased institutionalisation of peacebuilding in UN. This 
has been due to two main processes. Firstly, in the creation of the 
Peacebuilding Commission at the UN headquarters (alongside peacebuilding 
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missions in Burundi and Sierra Leone), which has led to peacekeepers being 
mandated to facilitate the change from a more militarised peacekeeping 
operation into a more civilian led peacebuilding operation. Secondly, through 
the ‘integrated mission concept’, which aims to develop a ‘system-wide 
response’ to crisis management and peacekeeping operations, based on 
shared priorities and common strategic plans. This integration process has 
encouraged the process of civil-military cooperation, which has in turn had an 
impact on the training and preparedness of military peacekeepers (UN, 2006a). 
 
Alongside the changes in the UN, the thesis outlines the development of the 
UN’s three cross-cutting resolutions - children and armed conflict, women and 
peace and security, and protection of civilians in armed conflict - with particular 
focus on references to training for peacekeepers. Importantly, training and 
preparedness is mentioned in all three thematic areas (UN, 1999e, UN, 1999f, 
UN, 2000f). In addition to these three cross-cutting themes, the UN has added 
to nearly all of its peacekeeping mandates an increased focus on training as a 
method to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers in the 
field.  
 
These thematic changes have gone hand in hand with structural changes within 
the UN headquarters. The ‘aggressive reform’ agenda set out in the DPKO 
since the publication of the Brahimi Report led to the splitting of the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations into two separate departments: the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (UN, 2007b; 
24). Within this new structure (and placed directly between the two new 
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departments) is the ‘Policy, Evaluation and Training Division’, of which the 
Integrated Training Service is a part.  
 
The thesis finds that, significantly, the Integrated Training Service’s training 
needs assessment uncovers a considerable need amongst military 
peacekeepers for further training of non-traditional skills (UN, 2008a). For 
example, when asked to respond to the statement ‘Training on this topic is a top 
priority for my job’, a wide range of conflict resolution techniques and 
approaches appear in the list103. This shows a considerable desire amongst 
military peacekeepers for an increase in what Fetherston outlined as ‘contact 
skills’. Yet at the same time, the survey found that the existing training structure 
in the UN does not appear to meet those needs. 
 
Leading from the training analysis, the chapter follows the introduction of two 
key documents, whose importance will grow in the coming years. Firstly, the 
Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) which were introduced in 
2009 to replace the Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTMs) (UN, 2009b). 
The second key document is the United Nations Principles and Guidelines, 
which is the nearest the UN has to doctrinal guidance to its peacekeeping 
operations. Importantly, the chapter outlines problematic areas in the Principles 
and Guidelines, such as the ‘blurred areas’ between peacekeeping, robust 
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement (where different rules of engagement 
apply), and also the need for operations to seriously consider the peacebuilding 
needs of the operation. As well as this, the chapter outlines where the 
                                                
103 Responses include: ‘conflict resolution skills’, ‘team building’, ‘cross-cultural communication 
skills’, ‘different cultural norms of mission staff and host country customs’, and ‘negotiation 
skills’.  
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Principles and Guidelines prescribe for an increase in communication skills for 
peacekeeping forces (UN, 2008c; 32). 
 
Finally, the chapter examines how the UN is responding to current challenges 
and preparing itself (at a strategic level) to respond to future challenges. This 
comes in the form of the New Horizons paper, which draws together the 
Security Council, UN Secretariat, and Member States. Although this paper is 
aimed at the strategic level, it has an impact on the training of military 
peacekeepers in the fields of peacebuilding, the protection of civilians, and 
robust peacekeeping (UN, 2009a).  
 
This chapter adds to the literature through offering an up-to-date survey of UN 
practices. These include an institutional co-option of peacebuilding strategies 
developing alongside robust approaches to military peacekeeping, backed up 
by mandates focused on civilian protection. With these developments in mind, it 
becomes apparent where the policy community recognises a need for soldiers 
to expand on their knowledge of conflict resolution skills, and also their 
understanding of ‘blurred areas’ when deployed. It also highlights the most 
recent survey of UN peacekeepers in the field - in which there was a need 
identified for further training in conflict resolution-related skills. On a more 
theoretical level, the chapter raises the question of whether the UN continues to 
align itself with what Rubenstein identified as ‘root metaphors’ - symbols that 
the organisation possesses to maintain its legitimacy. Rubenstein’s contention 
is that the UN, through its actions in peacekeeping operations since the 1990s, 
has lost a degree of legitimacy (Rubinstein, 2005). This chapter debates this, 
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and argues that whilst it may not be so fully aligned with the original root 
metaphors that Rubenstein outlines, it possesses - through cross-cutting 
resolutions and commitment to peacebuilding, linked to a largely cosmopolitan 
charter - a degree of legitimacy not found with other organisations.  
 
Chapter three examines civil-military cooperation, and engages with 
assumptions that peacekeeping operations are akin to the ‘riot police’ of the 
liberal global order (Richmond, 2005, Pugh, 2004). Whilst not being overtly 
optimistic about the current state of affairs, it asserts that through increased 
interaction with civilian agencies, the militaries studied are opening themselves 
up to the civilian roles in conflict resolution efforts (Sandhurst, 2008a). From the 
conflict resolution literature, the civil-military aspects of a deployment can play 
an important role and can be linked to Lederach’s comprehensive approach, in 
which third party interveners must ‘actively envision, include, respect, and 
promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting’ 
(Lederach, 1995; 213). From the cosmopolitan peacekeeping literature, Kaldor 
argues that effective responses to what she terms as ‘new wars’ have to be 
based on ‘alliance between international organisations and local advocates of 
cosmopolitanism’ (Kaldor, 2001; 122). Elliot makes a similar point by suggesting 
that that local groups need to be supported, and that their advice, proposals 
and recommendations need to be taken seriously (Elliot, 2004; 25). The chapter 
highlighted a UNIDIR study that found that in operations which were deemed as 
a ‘success’ in the eyes of the UN, the majority of respondents felt that the 
relationship between the military and civilian components was ‘very good’. 
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However, in operations which struggled to find success, the vast majority of 
respondents felt the relationship to be inadequate (Gamba, 1998; 7). 
 
In terms of defining civil-military cooperation, the chapter outlines the number of 
different policy documents and doctrines (Rollins, 2001, EU, 2002, JDDC, 2003, 
DPKO, 2002, IASC, 2004). The chapter is thus able to outline important 
difficulties in understanding what civil-military cooperation is and who has 
control of the process. The chapter then analyses where the civil-military 
relationship occurs and why coordination is sometimes necessary, if also 
problematic. This takes into account the desire of operations to link military, 
political, humanitarian, security, socio-economic and legal issues (Spence, 
2002). The chapter surveys where conflicts in this relationship are noted in the 
academic and practitioner texts (TCP, 2002, Gamba, 1998, Byman, 2001, Slim, 
1996, Pugh, 2000). 
 
The chapter then examines the main differences which lie between military and 
civilian organisations. The first main area is the clash of organisational cultures, 
where operations have been hamstrung by ‘ill informed’ stereotypes of each 
organisation by the other (Duffey, 2000a; 149), often informed by deep rooted 
suspicions about the others occupation and motives (Gamba, 1998). This 
situation is not improved by the number of nationalities, contingents and 
organisations in an operation (Pouligny, 2006, Rubinstein et al., 2008). The 
second main area is the constant danger of the mission losing consent, 
heightened in the post-Brahimi context, where even the UN recognises that 
consent is not a constant feature of deployments. The integrated missions 
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concept is further considered here (Eide et al., 2005, Gordon, 2007, Jennings 
and Kaspersen, 2008b, Doss, 2008) 
 
This chapter offers a significant contribution to the literature by illustrating how 
observers understand the impact of peacekeeping operations on the civilian 
population. This is of crucial importance for effective civil-military cooperation 
strategies. Much of the progress made in this important area has been learned 
by the mistakes of the past. The most notable example of this is the changes in 
training for peacekeeping through the very serious allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers. Although allegations have 
been documented in the past, (Whitworth, 2004), the 2001 allegations 
challenged were of a serious enough nature to see that the UN change its 
training strategies, amend peacekeeping mandates, and pursue a zero level of 
tolerance (UN, 2003c, UN, 2004c, UN, 2005a; 9). The chapter goes on to 
examine local perceptions of the mission, another key determinant in the 
effectiveness of civil-military cooperation. Both Pouligny and Ammitzobel note 
the effectiveness of an operation in relation to the expectations of the civilian 
population in the deployment zone and notes how there exists a critical gap 
between expectation and reality. This is linked to the conflict resolution 
literature, in particular Galtung’s comparison of ‘good deeds’ undertaken by the 
UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) 
in the Middle East (Galtung, 1976b).  
 
The chapter further focuses on the varying degrees to which military 
peacekeepers understand the cultural dynamics of the local population. In its 
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worst manifestation, this leads to violence against civilians from peacekeepers 
poorly trained and prepared for the environment into which they are deployed 
(LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997). A great deal of research has thus been carried 
out examining what needs to be learned by military peacekeepers when 
deployed into civilian environments, and the need to develop cultural specific 
training for military peacekeepers (Rubinstein, 2005; 527). Duffey is of critical 
importance here. Her work examined the role of culture, and the substantial 
effect this has had on operations (Duffey, 2000b). A number of practitioners 
have also offered studies that have examined the benefits of cultural-specific 
training and cultural awareness in operations (Bosman et al., 2008, Soeters et 
al., 2004). Finally, we see a developing trend in the UN through the 
commissioning of a number of public opinion surveys of its operations 
(UNDPKO, 2005b, UNDPKO, 2006b, UNDPKO, 2006a). 
 
With these two forms of civil-military cooperation in mind (military-NGO / military 
– civilian), the chapter examines where academic and policy communities cite 
training of non-traditional skills as a positive way of addressing difficulties. In 
terms of military-NGO relations, joint training has been advocated as a positive 
step to increase understanding of roles and responsibilities (Project, 2005; 121, 
OIOS, 2007; 6, Eide et al., 2005, JDDC, 2004; 3-10). With regard to training 
military peacekeepers to understand the complexities of establishing positive 
relations with the local population, the chapter summarises UN resolutions to 
deal with allegations of SEA which seeks to prevent further abuses, as well as 
train peacekeepers on how to ‘prevent, recognise and respond’ to sexual 
violence against civilians (UN, 2008f, Williams, 1998). A number of authors also 
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commented that in order to better address cultural awareness in conflict zones, 
training of non-traditional skills is essential (Williams, 1998, Duffey, 2000b, 
LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997, TCP, 2002). 
  
This chapter is central to the thesis as it seeks to establish links between the 
practice of civil-military coordination and conflict resolution theory and skills. 
Theoretically, it links to both the cosmopolitan literature but also to the conflict 
resolution theory of pursuit of sustainable pathways to positive peace. Although 
there is by no means perfection in the pursuit of civil-military relations, there is 
room to speculate where links can be built. On a more tactical level, there is 
definitely critique from the conflict resolution field, as well as recommendations 
for the development of contact skills to deal effectively with both the NGO 
community as well as local civilians in the deployment zone.  
 
Chapter four takes this literature on civil-military cooperation as a springboard 
for the first of two fieldwork chapters. This chapter used observations to 
examine how training for civil-military cooperation involves skills drawn from the 
non-traditional toolbox. To begin, it addressed Lederach’s approach to 
prescriptive and elicitive forms of training, and highlighted the importance of 
elicitive approaches towards training for conflict resolution roles with emphasis 
placed on the participants’ knowledge of conflict and its resolution (Lederach, 
1996).  
 
The chapter firstly examines training to enhance processes of coordination 
between military and civilian actors in the conflict zone. It first highlighted 
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observations at the visit to a civil-military cooperation course at UN Training 
School Ireland (UNTSI), where sessions were held to teach officers in the 
nuances of CIMIC meetings (UNTSI, 2007c). The UNTSI observation also 
highlighted Exercise Quick Fix, a small training exercise where soldiers were 
asked to make a village assessment based on a descriptive account of a 
fictitious village. This both gave the soldiers an opportunity to discuss issues of 
coordination, and opened the soldiers up to a form of training more akin to an 
elicitive approach (UNTSI, 2007e). The chapter then analyses the SGTM (which 
had considerably more restrictive view of civil military coordination), and CPTM, 
(which offer a broader range of activities related to wider peacebuilding 
functions) (UN, 2009d; 55, UN, 2009g; 96-97).  
 
In terms of fostering better working relations between civilian and military 
organisations, interviews conducted at the UN DPKO and NATO highlighted the 
need for contact skills to be incorporated into training to help stem the 
organisational culture clashes that are apparent in operations (NATO, 2008). In 
this light, the UN’s CPTM attempt to foster understanding about the impact the 
military actions have on humanitarian principles, and asks for sensitivity in any 
interactions (UN, 2009g).   
 
Significant observations were made at the RMAS Broadsword Exercise in 
relation to training the military to foster positive relations with the local 
population. A number of examples were offered in the Broadsword observation, 
including the running of a ‘CIMIC house’, debrief sessions where cadets are 
taught the value of fostering positive relations with civilians, and the overall 
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context being shaped by a local civilian population who very much view the 
military with suspicion and, in some cases, hostility (Sandhurst, 2007).  
 
The chapter further examines UN training designed to encourage peacekeepers 
to understand the complex dynamics of a post conflict environment (UN, 
2009h). This incorporates combating SEA from peacekeepers, and addressing 
aspects of gender based violence (GBV) in conflict zones. In particular, it notes 
attempts made at UNTSI, which contains a briefing on how GBV has 
implications on international law, and the dynamics of the deployment zone, 
before examining approaches to prevent it.  
 
Thus, the chapter notes a number of ways in which non-traditional training is 
being used to enhance civil military cooperation. In many ways, the skills from 
the conflict resolution field have been incorporated at the tactical level to 
enhance chances for building successful relations with the local population. 
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that the ‘larger picture’ is being 
understood, where effective civil military cooperation may be more than ‘fire 
fighting’ and more akin to being a starting point towards progressive 
peacebuilding strategies. The chapter also outlines the importance of elicitive 
methods of training in terms of helping soldiers understand and reflect on their 
roles, and the impact that they have on the deployment zone. However, it warns 
about the possible emergence of a level of ‘securitisation’ within civil-military 
cooperation, as opposed to using civil-military cooperation. This may lead 
militaries to develop civil-military cooperation policies related to stabilisation 
over peacebuilding. This is an important finding as it may suggest a divergence 
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between militaries in their civil-military cooperation policies, whereas on one 
hand there is the UN policy of promoting sustainable peacebuilding, and the 
other is the NATO influenced idea of using civil-military cooperation techniques 
to promote stabilisation over a sustainable peace.   
 
Chapter five further adds to the literature by providing an up-to-date account of 
negotiation training. The chapter examines how the need to negotiate in 
peacekeeping environments was recognised both by the military and the 
conflict resolution community at a similar time – the UN’s deployment in Bosnia 
(in the UN Protection Force/UNPROFOR). UK soldiers began to see the value 
in negotiating ceasefire arrangements and access for humanitarian delivery, but 
also recognised the costs of not pursuing negotiations and using force. Much of 
the negotiation came at checkpoints, where small militias would often block 
humanitarian aid convoys for a number of hours, whilst they negotiated with 
UNPROFOR soldiers accompanying the delivery (Goodwin, 2005; 173). 
Commanders who wrote of their experience of this noted different tactics used, 
whether it was establishing a network of liaison officers (Stewart, 1993), or 
through the threat of force (Rose, 1999b). Doctrinally, there was the 
development of the UK’s Wider Peacekeeping doctrine which for the first time 
spoke extensively of the need to negotiate and use consent promoting 
strategies (MOD, 1995). The chapter further notes that the growing importance 
of negotiation in such contexts was also recognised by the conflict resolution 
community, where scholars began to note the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power 
approaches required for peacekeepers negotiating at the tactical level, and the 
growing requirement for contact skills to effectively deal with the scenarios 
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(Fetherston et al., 1994). Conflict resolution training also began to take note of 
the roadblock scenario, with the Bradford Centre for Conflict Resolution running 
a ‘roadblock exercise’ based on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lewer and 
Reynolds, 2002). Thus, a manifestation of the links between the military and 
conflict resolution fields is identified. 
 
In order to further define the location of such negotiation contexts, Chapter five 
uses Lederach’s Peacebuilding Pyramid, (Lederach, 1997; 37-38). In the 
amended pyramid (outlined in Box 6.1 below), a new fourth layer is added: 
‘flashpoint negotiation’. Such negotiation contexts are unorganised, have little 
formality and are often undertaken at the lowest level. A typical scenario of such 
a ‘flashpoint negotiation’ would be at a roadblock. This - as the chapter explains 
- further reinforces Fisher and Keashly’s approaches to a contingency model, 
with peacekeeping interventions requiring a need to control violence, and also 
facilitate a move towards peacebuilding (Fisher, 1993, Fisher and Keashly, 
1991). Fetherston builds on this, by outlining the importance of peacekeepers in 
‘preparing the groundwork for later, more concerted and direct efforts’ for 
peacebuilding efforts (Fetherston, 1994a). Being able to effectively negotiate 
within a ‘flashpoint scenario’ facilitates this.  
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 Box 6.1: The Amended Peacebulding Pyramid 
 
     
Tier one – Top Leadership 
  
 
 Tier two – Middle-level Leadership 
 
   
 
 Tier Three – Grassroots Leadership  
 
        
 
 
Tier Four – Flashpoint Negotiation 
  
 
 
 
With this in mind, the chapter offers a literature review of the journal 
International Peacekeeping (between 1997 and 2001 inclusive) and charts 
where negotiation has been examined, and how it links to the amended 
pyramid. Negotiation contexts are picked up at all levels in the pyramid (as 
would be expected). However, at the tactical level, one can see that there are a 
great deal of ad hoc initiatives and accounts, yet a gap in the literature can be 
identified, because very little is written about how negotiation is taught to 
military peacekeepers. The wider negotiation literature was also appraised, 
including Fisher et al’s approach to interests-based negotiation found in their 
work Getting to Yes (Fisher et al., 1991). 
 
Negotiation at the ‘tactical level’ takes much from Goodwin’s thesis on military 
negotiation and the development of the ‘soldier diplomat’. In this account, 
Goodwin argues that soldiers have to negotiate effectively under ‘duress, 
physical threat, and armed intervention’ (Goodwin, 2005). Thus Goodwin seeks 
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to outline the particular negotiating circumstances that military peacekeepers 
find themselves in, and the effects that circumstances can have on soldiers. Her 
work then explains the type of learners which the RMAS encounters, and how 
negotiation training has been adapted for this particular audience.  
 
With this background, chapter five offers an observation of a tactical level 
negotiation context at the RMAS Broadsword Exercise. In this exercise, a 
soldier negotiates with an armed hostage-taker and successfully manages to 
free the hostage without any further bloodshed (Sandhurst, 2007). Linking this 
to the conflict resolution literature, the chapter examines the negotiation through 
Goodwin’s amended principled negotiation model, and the uses the prisoner’s 
dilemma as a larger-scale framework to place the negotiation within. 
 
Developments in UN training were further scrutinised, in particular the SGTM 
entitled Communication and Negotiation, which is designed to ensure that 
military peacekeepers understand where and when they will need to use their 
negotiation skills, and how this differs from the traditional duties that they carry 
out in military operations. However, more recent developments in the UN has 
led to the CPTM to focus on negotiation in conjunction with other issues. 
However, there is a great deal of focus on the role that culture plays in the day-
to-day interactions of a peacekeeping operation (UN, 2009i).  
 
Thus, this chapter provides a significant contribution through examining 
negotiation at the lowest level in peacekeeping deployments, how it has been 
conceptualised, how conflict resolution skills have been used to enhance 
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tactical level negotiations and how the conflict resolution field helps to 
understand the role they play in a possible wider resolution process. It also 
provides further evidence of the links between military peacekeeping and 
conflict resolution, and how conflict resolution theory and practice can possibly 
influence military soldiers to approach potentially violent situations with a wider 
range of options than the traditional use of force.  
 
Towards cosmopolitan peacekeeping? 
From this study, a number of important conclusions can be made. By relating 
the conclusions back to the guiding questions of the research, we can see three 
distinct themes: 
 
1) There is evidence to suggest that conflict resolution theory and practice 
is incorporated into training programmes for military peacekeepers. This 
has developed significantly since 1994.   
2) There exists sufficient evidence to suggest that training in non-traditional 
military skills assists military peacekeepers in adapting to new roles and 
responsibilities encountered in deployment zones 
3) There exists a strong suggestion - in both the literature and through 
fieldwork examples - that there is evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan 
conception of peacekeeping. 
 
The rest of the chapter will be devoted to explaining these considerations.  
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The development of conflict resolution within training programmes for military 
peacekeepers can be observed at a number of levels. At the level of tactical 
negotiation, Chapter five illustrates the most overt use of contact skills by 
soldiers who are training for peacekeeping operations. By doing so, it highlights 
the significant development of negotiation training in the military. Doctrine has 
developed to meet the needs of negotiation training, with Wider Peacekeeping 
incorporating conflict resolution techniques into military peacekeeping and 
taking heed of the importance of obtaining consent from the host population. 
Training programmes have followed this practice, and encourage soldiers to be 
aware of the negotiation process, as well as the wider impacts of employing or 
not employing negotiation techniques when faced with potentially violent 
situations. It is also noteworthy that RMAS programmes incorporate a specialist 
academic (Deborah Goodwin, whose work is cited throughout this thesis) in 
negotiation practice, which highlights the degree to which negotiation training is 
intrinsic to RMAS teaching. Operation Broadsword also provides a solid 
example of other developments in training. For example, it asks soldiers to use 
minimum force when necessary, to understand the impacts of their posture on 
the host community, and to establish positive community relations as part of 
wider civil-military strategies. Furthermore, training at both RMAS and UNTSI 
are greatly informed by contemporary deployments.  
 
From a wider perspective, Chapter two outlined how, since 2000, there has 
been an attempt in the UN to integrate peacebuilding into peacekeeping 
operations. Although the guiding principles of these processes are not without 
criticism, this represents a noteworthy development in UN practices. The 
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recently developed integrated mission concept provides the link between 
strategies outlined in the Security Council and operations on the ground. This is 
aligned to a host of civil-military cooperation strategies, which (to varying 
degrees) ask military peacekeepers to establish strong relations with the civilian 
components of the operation and with the wider civilian population in the 
deployment zone (outlined in Chapter three). The UNTSI observation in 
Chapter four significantly demonstrates the nuances of civil-military cooperation, 
including CIMIC meetings, assessments, and liaison with NGOs and civilian 
bodies. Although the need for cooperation was apparent when Fetherston’s 
thesis was published, there was, at the time, an absence of any coherent 
response. The situation now, as outlined in the observations, shows that there 
has been a significant development in incorporating conflict resolution skills into 
training through civil-military cooperation.  
 
Furthermore, structural changes within the UN point to a considerable re-
organisation in their training mechanisms. With the replacement of the SGTMs 
by the CPTMs and the newly formed Integrated Training Unit, there is now a 
serious effort to support training capacities for peacekeeping deployments. This 
support capacity is required as UN mandates now refer to cross-cutting themes 
which ask deployed peacekeepers to be aware of a broad range of issues.  
 
There are two further developments which are also of note: the development of 
training institutions, and the use of Internet technology to train military 
peacekeepers. These developments will now be explored. The development 
and spread of international peacekeeping training centres also marks out the 
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deepening of the culture and practice of training for military peacekeeping, and 
the international norms that guide it. Training centres, such as UNTSI, provide a 
valuable space for military practitioners and civilian staff to train peacekeeping 
personnel in non-traditional skills. The burgeoning number of centres around 
the globe comes under the umbrella organisation, the International Association 
of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). Since its foundation in 1995, the 
IAPTC has held fifteen annual conferences and has a membership of 102 
member institutions (these can be found in Annex 2). The organisation 
describes itself as being a forum for training personnel for discussions relating 
to training ‘without their having to deal with national interests (and sometimes 
restrictions)’(IAPTC, 2009). 
 
As part of this research, the IAPTC Annual Conference 2007 was attended at 
the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Stockholm. This provided the opportunity to 
gain an understanding of how the organisation works, and to observe how the 
conference acts as a facilitator for military training institutions to share ideas, 
best practices, and challenges. The 2007 conference was notable for a larger 
civilian and police attendance, reflecting the widening of IAPTC membership 
and the multifunctional nature of current operations (Alberoth, 2007; 5). 
Moreover the conference split participants into three broad groups (functional 
committees): military; police; and civilians. The military group recommendation 
was an increase in joint training mechanisms – something that has been seen 
in the creation of the UN CPTMs (as discussed in Chapter 3). Since the 2007 
conference, the IAPTC has held two more conferences (in Sydney and Abuja), 
reflecting the growing trend for information sharing across national boundaries, 
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as well as opening up opportunities for joint training amongst nationalities and 
professions. Such joint training ventures have been outlined as being 
cosmopolitan in nature. Bergman outlines cooperation between Nordic 
countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) through the NORDCAPS model 
as being a framework ‘in which the Nordic states’ joint commitment to 
international peace can be furthered’ (Bergman, 2004; 175). From this example, 
it is evident that there exists potential for the IAPTC to be aligned with 
cosmopolitan values. Training centres are encouraged to cooperate with each 
other and non-military peacekeepers (police and civilian staff), and to work to 
UN standards and policies, without recourse to national politics and interests. 
 
The Internet is also playing an increasingly important role in communicating 
new forms of training to a wider range of military peacekeepers. As 
Ramsbotham et al state, the field of conflict resolution is being affected by the 
impact of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in such a way ‘that 
traditional distinctions between national, international and local levels of activity 
are being eroded and the basis for a global partnership for peacebuilding is 
being constructed’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 330). This builds on work 
(referred to in Chapter one) carried out by the Centre for Conflict Resolution on 
the role of the Internet as a peacebuilding tool (Reynolds and Wessels, 2001, 
Levy, 2004). Alongside this research project, the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
has developed an e-learning course in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. 
Much of this is based on an existing course authored by Professor Tom 
Woodhouse, run through the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI).  
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Here, it is important to look at the work of POTI, which started in 1995 under the 
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The organisation 
was created to provide self-paced training courses on different aspects of UN 
peacekeeping. More recently, POTI has separated from UNITAR, and updated 
its courses from correspondence to the e-learning platform. The organisation 
still maintains the UN’s seal of approval for online training. This was most 
recently outlined in the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
2010 report, which welcomed ‘the free and multilingual delivery of 
peacekeeping distance learning through the E-learning’. The mission statement 
of the organisation links to the assertion from Ramsbotham et al about ICT 
eroding national and international boundaries: 
 
The Peace Operations Training Institute is dedicated to providing 
globally accessible and affordable distance-learning courses on peace 
support, humanitarian relief, and security operations to men and women 
working to promote peace worldwide. 
(POTI, 2010b) 
 
The Institute has grown at an exceptional rate since beginning. In 1998, there 
were 1,500 students enrolled from fifty-six nations (Kidwell and Langholtz, 
1998; 97). Now, POTI trains a considerably higher number, with all military, 
police and gendarmerie personnel from African, Latin American and Caribbean 
nations able to enrol free, under the ELAP (E-Learning for African 
Peacekeepers) and ELPLAC (E-learning for Peacekeepers from Latin America 
and the Caribbean) programmes. According to the Institute, since the ELAP 
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programme was launched in 2006, over 200,000 African peacekeepers have 
been enrolled (POTI, 2010a). The list of courses available for the ELAP is listed 
below. 
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Box 6.2: Peace Operations Training Institute Available Courses (in 
English) 
(POTI, 2010a) 
 
o An Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission 
o Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) 
o Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
o The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations: Principles of Intervention and 
Management 
o Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): Principles of Intervention 
and Management in Peacekeeping Operations 
o Ethics in Peacekeeping 
o Gender Perspectives in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
o Global Terrorism 
o The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1945 
to 1987 
o The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Following the Cold War: 
1988 to 1996 
o The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from Retrenchment to 
Resurgence: 1997 to 2006 
o International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict 
o Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction 
o Operational Logistical Support of UN Peacekeeping Missions: Intermediate 
Logistics Course 
o Advanced Topics in United Nations Logistics: The Provision of Troops and 
Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) and the Method for Reimbursement 
o Mine Action: Humanitarian Impact, Technical Aspects, and Global Initiatives 
o Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution 
o Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia: Dayton-Kosovo 
o Preventing Violence Against Women and Gender Inequality in Peacekeeping 
o Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
o Security Measures for United Nations Peacekeepers 
o United Nations Military Observers: Methods and Techniques for Serving on UN 
Observer Mission 
o United Nations Police: Restoring Civil Order Following Hostilities 
 
The growth of the Peace Operations Training Institute and IAPTC are two 
further examples of training in non-traditional tasks for military peacekeepers 
being extended since the mid-1990s.   
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Thus there is evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice integrated into 
training programmes for military peacekeepers. The literature review in Chapter 
one forms this view from the conflict resolution standpoint, and the survey of UN 
policy and civil-military cooperation illustrate this from policy and practitioner 
perspectives. The fieldwork observations provide a unique account of where 
training programmes link the two fields in the training environment. This thesis 
therefore notes how skills drawn from the conflict resolution field assist military 
peacekeepers to comprehend the complex nature of peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding tasks. Leading from this increased understanding, training 
programmes provide military peacekeepers with adequate tools to respond to 
particular problems. Possessing both the skills to be aware of the environment 
and the tools to work in a non-violent manner gives military peacekeepers a 
higher chance of success. 
 
In examining how skills are imparted to military peacekeepers, the thesis 
observes that there are aspects of non-traditional training which lend 
themselves to what Lederach termed as elicitive approaches, which focus on 
discovering ‘what people already have in place and already know about the 
strengths and weaknesses of their own models of conflict resolution’ (Lederach, 
1996). Elicitive approaches are noted in training at UNTSI (in discussion groups 
asking soldiers for their understanding of the particular challenges in a fictitious 
village), debriefing sessions at Broadsword (after the CIMIC house had been 
attacked by an unruly mob), as well as being advocated by the UN’s CPTMs. 
The impact of an elicitive approach may be hamstrung in military structures, due 
to the top-down nature of training and decision-making in military organisations. 
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However, where the ‘grey areas’ of peacekeeping operations are concerned, 
trainers see a greater value in asking soldiers and cadets to discuss issues, 
come to a considered opinion, and to avoid acting purely on military instinct. 
This is an important observation, as it suggests recognition from within the 
military that standard military thinking is inadequate for the problematic 
dimension of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. When discussing the 
development of the ‘strategic corporal’, it should be noted that much of the 
basis of the change in mindset for soldiers is toward a more elicitive approach 
to training, and self-aware understanding of conflict situations.  
 
Training in the military also offers some long-term prospects for an increased 
indoctrination of conflict resolution skills for the military. The hierarchical 
structure of the military organisation allows those with operational experience to 
‘rise to the top’ as it were. This is clearly seen in the UK military after the 
UNPROFOR experience, where soldiers who served in the UNPROFOR 
operation moved up through the ranks and were able to espouse more 
peacekeeping skills, such as negotiation. This was one reason outlined during 
the Broadsword observation for there being an increased acceptance of 
negotiation training for officer cadets (Sandhurst, 2008c). The hierarchical 
structures will allow this to continue, and it is through an increased knowledge 
of conflict resolution skills that peacekeepers will be able to benefit in the short 
term, but this also opens up a real possibility for change in the long term.   
 
With regard to training and civil-military cooperation, an interesting and 
important debate is developing amongst those who see the activity as one of 
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preparing the ground for peacebuilding, and those who see CIMIC as a purely 
‘hearts and minds’ approach, designed to secure the local environment and 
meet the ‘commanders intent’. To take the first approach, there are examples of 
training programmes aligned with Stephen Ryan’s assertion that military 
peacekeeping is essential in the early stages of the peacebuilding enterprise, 
and that there is a recognised need for the military to work closely with non-
military components (Ryan, 2000; 40). Current UN doctrine for civil-military 
cooperation, which is about coordinating effective responses based on the 
needs of the local community and civilian representation, reflects this. 
Observations at UNTSI (such as Exercise Quick Fix) also outline where of civil-
military cooperation training emphasises the role of civil-military cooperation as 
a role of engagement with the civilian community.  
 
Referring to the second approach, examples exist which suggests that civil-
military cooperation may be more overtly used for securitisation or even 
stabilisation. Aspects of the Broadsword exercise placed emphasis on the 
securitization of the village. The rationale behind establishing relations with the 
local community reinforced this view. Moreover, doctrine from NATO and UK 
suggests that there is a degree to which civil-military coordination is linked 
strongly into the military objectives of the operation, and not the people that the 
mission serves. Although not as evident in the UNTSI example and UN CPTMs, 
this thesis suggests that civil-military cooperation skills can be used to more 
political ends: more-so if that operation is not mandated by the UN, lacks 
impartiality in its actions, and lacks consent from the host population. 
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At this point, it is important to reflect on the contribution played by the more 
critical end of the conflict resolution spectrum. This provides a number of 
important critiques including highlighting unintended consequences of 
deployments, the inherent economic impacts of the operation, and the 
normative foundations of interventions and their peacebuilding legacy 
(Pouligny, 2006). Chapter three engaged with critiques of peacekeeping, which 
suggest that operations are closely linked with neo-liberal values and 
stabilisation projects. In order for peacekeeping operations to effectively 
respond to such critiques and not become the ‘riot police’ of an international 
order, developments in civil-military cooperation need to take into account the 
real needs of the population in the areas into which they are deployed. There 
are signs of this being recognised through training, where the UN CPTMs ask 
for continued consultation with a much wider sector of society as opposed to 
those who have gained power through the show of force. Though those from 
the critical theory background may be far more robust in their criticism of UN 
peacekeeping, what it represents, and the normative foundations which it is 
built on, does not mean that those in the policy field deem it as a critique 
without recommendation. 
 
Furthermore, as a response to more critical conceptions of peacekeepers 
merely being the ‘riot police’ of a global order, an emerging body of theory 
suggests that military peacekeepers could assist in the emergence of pluralist 
offshoots of alternative power. Through linking contemporary thinking on the 
development of cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping, there may emerge a form 
of peacekeeping synonymous with Galtung’s concept of protection of freedom 
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fighters, as outlined in Chapter one. In his critique of peacekeeping operations, 
Michael Pugh concludes by offering a future policy consideration that there 
could exist a need for ‘a permanent military volunteer force recruited directly 
among individuals predisposed to cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values’. 
This force, in Pugh’s words, would be likely to be: 
 
increasingly subtle and flexible in responding to crisis, with expert teams, 
similar to disaster relief specialists, providing preventive action, economic 
aid and civilian protection.  
(Pugh, 2004; 54) 
 
This would be achieved through releasing such forces from ‘state-centric 
control’ and making them answerable to a ‘more transparent, democratic and 
accountable institutional arrangement’ (Pugh, 2004; 54). Rubenstein, whose 
‘root metaphors’ of the UN were discussed in Chapter two, has referred to such 
an institutional arrangement. He argues that peacekeeping was once seen as a 
‘military without weapons in the service of peace’, to reinforce an image of an 
international community ‘acting in a neutral, consensual manner to sustain a 
stable world economy’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 356-357). Although Rubenstein now 
questions whether this root metaphor is still present in UN operations, it is the 
view of the thesis that due to cross-cutting Security Council mandates 
pertaining to the protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, and women 
and peace and security, as well as an increase in the focus on the 
peacebuilding functions of an operation, that the UN maintains its legitimacy, 
even though its ‘root metaphors’ are somewhat amended. This is reinforced by 
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Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, in their suggestion that peacekeeping, based on 
an emerging Responsibility to Protect norm, can be strengthened and 
reconfigured to meet such responsibilities.  
 
This leads the chapter to the second broad conclusion: There exists sufficient 
evidence to suggest that training in non-traditional military skills assists military 
peacekeepers in adapting to new roles and responsibilities encountered in 
deployment zones. Even in the traditional era, the paradoxes of what soldiers 
had to deal with in peacekeeping operations were becoming apparent. Moskos 
noted that soldiers on peacekeeping duties, trained ‘in the skills of fighting and 
lethal weaponry’ had proved to be ‘readily available to the practices of the 
constabulary ethic’. However, Moskos viewed the different roles of ‘soldierly 
honour’ and peacekeeper to be a ‘fact of life’ for peacekeeping operations, and 
actually a benefit, arguing that it is because of, rather than in spite of such 
differences that ‘the institution building of viable peacekeeping forces has been 
facilitated by the standards of modern military professionalism’ (Moskos Jnr, 
1976; 138). Now, it is more common for military analysts to disagree with that 
view. Kiszely makes a valid point when examining the differences between the 
traditional and modern conceptions of the military. 
 
It was often claimed that it was relatively simple for armed forces trained 
in combat to adjust to what were perceived to be the lesser demands of 
operations other than combat, such as stability operations and counter-
insurgency, but much harder, if not impossible (in a short space of time), 
for troops trained only for operations other than combat to become 
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combat-capable. True though this is, it was interpreted by some to imply 
that counter-insurgency required little extra training for well-trained 
combat troops. This was an error. 
(Kiszely, 2007; 12) 
 
Peacekeeping operations through the last decade of the twentieth century shed 
light on the need to create a ‘new’ type of soldier. An example of early changes 
was in the International Peace Academy Publication, the Peacekeeper’s 
Handbook, which outlines the necessary skills required for effective 
peacekeepers. They are outlined in Box 6.3 below. What is important to know is 
that this list contains a lack of skills related to traditional military tasks. Although 
a number of these skills are currently practiced by the conflict resolution, the 
only skills directly equitable to skills from the traditional military tasks would be 
that of ‘vigilance and alertness’. 
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Box 6.3: List of soldier’s qualities as outlined in the Peacekeepers 
Handbook  
(IPA, 1984; 272-278) 
 
The handbook offers a list of the ‘main credentials a peacekeeper requires’. 
a) Patience. ‘A peacekeeper or a peacemaker needs to have infinite patience. Never 
should he expect quick results or solutions but rather he should evaluate repeatedly 
his achievement in the context of his aim’ 
b) Restraint. ‘Because of the special relationship between the third party and the 
parties to the dispute, any display of emotion on the part of the former can 
disadvantageously affect his credibility as a negotiator or pacifier’ 
c) Advocacy. ‘Since the third party’s weapon is not a self-loading rifle but his ability 
without force or threats to persuade both sides to avoid violence and settle their 
differences by peaceful means, it is basic to his role that he cultivates an attitude 
and approach founded on his own personality and understanding. The advocacy 
that he is called upon to undertake is (1) Negotiation, (2) mediation, (3) conciliation, 
and sometimes (4) arbitration’ 
d) Personality. ‘He has to combine an approachable, understanding and tactful 
manner with fairness and firmness. The unapproachable and tactless are resented 
and often ignored, while the weak are put upon and exploited.’ 
e) Persuasion and influence. ‘The degree of persuasion called for is more a matter of 
quiet reasoning than direct pressurising, while influence should take the form of 
indirect suggestion rather than action manipulation.’ 
f) Perspective. ‘If a third party peacekeeper is to be effective and avoid making 
misjudgements he has to keep the conflict, his part in it, and the reactions of all 
concerned, in proper proportion. A clear understanding of the motivations and 
ethnic and cultural structures of the respective disputants is all important to the 
peacekeeper in the exercise of his third party role’ 
g) Attitude and Approach. ‘It is reasonable to demand a high level of objectivity from 
the members of a peacekeeping Force in their assessment, evaluation and in their 
reporting of actions taken by the respective sides in a dispute. Given this 
fundamental principle, the peacekeeper, maker and builder must strive not to pre-
judge any issue or controversy but, as has already been pointed out, to consider 
each and every case on its merits alone, bearing in mind the antecedents and the 
factors affecting the reactions and motivations of those responsible for the 
particular case problem’ 
h) Flexibility and Speed.  
i) Humour. ‘Good humour makes for good working relations, because a man of good 
humour is accessible and approachable – a quality of considerable importance in a 
peacekeeper when negotiating with the respective parties to a dispute.’ 
j) Vigilance and Alertness. ‘The two human factors most important in a soldier’s 
mentality make up’ 
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Studies from conflict resolution scholars examine the positive impact that the 
field has on military peacekeepers in deployment zones (Fetherston et al., 
1994). Woodhouse’s 1998 examination of how the psychology of conflict 
resolution has impacted on peacekeepers argues that new types of ‘routine 
duties’ (such as mediation and arbitration) do not come naturally to 
conventional military personnel, and that personnel will require considerable 
‘shifts in traditional or conventional military culture toward a culture or 
psychology suitable for peacekeeping’. Woodhouse further makes the point that 
standard military thinking is going to be tested considerably: where instead of 
destroying an enemy, a soldier may have to negotiate with them, and instead of 
blowing a door off its hinges in a search and cordon operation, the military may 
have to learn to knock on it (Woodhouse, 1998; 163). 
 
Kernic offers an important contribution to debates over the impact of 
peacekeeping to military postures by noting the experiences of Austrian soldiers 
when presented with the ‘complex cultural environment’ on deployment in 
Bosnia with the NATO IFOR operation. Through he notes that the nature of the 
IFOR deployment challenged soldiers’ ‘self-esteem as warriors’, Kernic argues 
that a need was identified for an ‘intelligent soldier’. This soldier is outlined as 
somebody who is not only trained to use force, but also ‘use communication 
skills’. Kernic relates this to the deployment in Bosnia: 
 
There was no demand for Rambo-type soldiers in Bosnia, so that some 
Austrian soldiers were, of course, rather disappointed. IFOR turned out 
to be an operation with some similar peacekeeping requirements as 
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previous UN missions. As such, it provided a challenge to the prevailing 
military warrior culture. 
(Kernic, 1999; 123) 
 
Bellamy concurs with this different mindset, noting that like those serving in 
national air forces or navies, who are required to undergo training to use highly 
technical equipment, the infantry officer needs to be equipped with similar levels 
of technical expertise. However, this level of technical expertise involves issues 
such as the ‘commanders’ intent’, which will have to be understood to a high 
degree by ordinary soldiers. Bellamy suggests that soldiers will have to be 
adept at dealing with local parties, who, in ‘may be frightened, bitter – and very 
cunning’ (Bellamy, 1996; 196). Tillett also notes that there are fundamental 
differences between traditional military and peacekeeping skill sets. In his 
project on conflict resolution training for military peacekeepers, Tillett offers the 
following breakdown of the differences: 
 
It [peacekeeping] involves the psychological change from an adversary 
to a pacific role; from confrontation to third party imposition. In 
peacekeeping there is no enemy: the object is to avoid hostilities, to 
improve communication between the parties, and to advance the 
process of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the 
causes of the conflict—political, military and economic—as well as the 
social and cultural environment. It demands a fair-minded and impartial 
approach while operating in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion 
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among the protagonists, often under difficult and provocative 
circumstances. 
(Tillett, 1996; 3) 
 
Taking this into account, it appears reasonable to agree with Goodwin’s 
suggestion that ‘the modern world is witnessing a revival of the role of the 
soldier-diplomat in the military operational context’. This type of soldier, 
according to Goodwin: 
 
Needs to possess and display a multiplicity of responses within a conflict 
zone, ranging from ‘traditional’ outright warfare (where there is a 
complete negation of negotiation) to a seemingly antithetical skill in the 
form of negotiation (where armed conflict is avoided). Such a range of 
response creates a complex decision-making context for the modern 
soldier. 
(Goodwin, 2005; xvii) 
 
This type of soldier is a product of the operational context into which militaries 
are being deployed. Goodwin outlines a number of characteristics (mainly found 
in UN mandates), which have influenced the need to develop junior soldiers into 
more ‘rounded’ soldiers. These include the ‘inclusion of non-combative 
imperatives’, new and varied Rules of Engagement, and stress on the ‘the 
relevance and importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as 
preferred ways to resolve disputes’ (Goodwin, 2005; xvii). The result of this 
complex mix of characteristics is to create a ‘complex decision making 
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environment’ for the soldier. This is reflected in Kiszely’s research, carried out at 
the UK Defence Academy. Although primarily based on counter-terrorism 
operations, his paper refers to the changing nature of what is termed 
‘stabilisation’ operations, and offers an insight into what is expected from 
soldiers. Noting that operations are requiring junior commanders to make ‘very 
senior decisions’, the paper calls for soldiers who can 
 
Not only cope with, but excel in, these circumstances – thus, minds that 
are agile, flexible, enquiring, imaginative, capable of rigorous analysis 
and objective critical thinking, minds that can conceptualise and 
innovate, minds at home with sophistication and nuance (‘interpreting 
shades of grey’), and minds that have developed understanding, 
intuition, wisdom and good judgment. 
(Kiszely, 2007; 15) 
 
This is an interesting insight into the roles and responsibilities of future soldiers, 
who will possess a considerably high degree of decision-making capabilities 
and critical judgement. This complex-decision making environment informs 
much of Byrne’s article on the development of the ‘strategic corporal’ in the Irish 
Defence Forces Review. Such a soldier is expected to have a great deal more 
than the traditional proficiency in fighting wars, but also be capable of providing 
humanitarian aid and performing a ‘wide range of other activities relating to 
order and stability’. The study goes on to describe the attributes of the ‘strategic 
corporal’: 
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The strategic corporal is considered a competent, professional, 
technologically proficient decision-maker who is acutely aware of his 
actions. The constabulary role of our troops on peacekeeping missions 
demands a high degree of responsibility. This role requires the ability to 
adapt to an ever-changing environment and this environment is 
becoming multi-dimensional and more easily subjected to global review 
through media relations. 
(Byrne, 2007; 101) 
 
Byrne goes on to argue that the ‘strategic corporal’ will have to deal with a 
number of different pressures, including rapidly changing technology, an 
awareness of ‘ethnic issues’, increasing globalisation and ever changing 
security implications (Byrne, 2007; 96). His article examines at two different 
decision-making frameworks. Firstly, the ‘analytical’ mode (commonly used by 
the Defence Forces), which is based on a ‘scientific, quantitative approach’, 
dependant on a ‘high level of situational certainty and accuracy’. Secondly, a 
participative form of decision-making, which is more reflective of the situation 
and allows lower-ranked officers greater involvement in decision making (Byrne, 
2007; 97). This second type of decision-making is more akin to elicitive 
approaches espoused by Lederach. Ultimately, Byrne understands the benefit 
in soldiers using both approaches. Critically, he also attaches importance in 
understanding the benefits of autonomy that the reflective process provides. 
 
The ‘strategic corporal’ further appears in the Australian Army Journal, in an 
article by Liddy, who defines it as: 
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A soldier that possesses technical mastery in the skill of arms while 
being aware that his judgement, decision-making, and action can all 
have strategic and political consequences that can affect the outcome of 
a given mission and the reputation of his country. 
(Liddy, 2005; 140)  
 
Although Liddy notes that officially there is no ‘exact belief’ as to the skills 
needed for the ‘strategic corporal’, a general view held by senior officers in the 
Australian Army is that he/she is highly trained in skills related to conventional 
warfare but supplemented with a number of specific skills which will assist them 
in duties in ‘multidimensional operations’. These skills, as outlined by Liddy, are 
‘foreign language, cultural awareness, media training, negotiation techniques 
and conflict resolution skills’ (Liddy, 2005; 145). To train the strategic corporal, 
Liddy finds that new training requirements will be in such areas as ‘the Law of 
Armed Conflict, cultural awareness, and the discriminate use of force, as well as 
improved liaison and mediation skills’. The training impacts of the ‘strategic 
corporal’ in the Australian case has led their practitioners to recommend moving 
from a ‘training culture’ to an ‘educational culture’. Liddy goes on to suggest the 
contrasting training requirements for the ‘strategic corporal’: 
 
It has also been argued in some military circles that the constabulary role 
of troops on peace operations demands a range of skills that are 
qualatively different from those of conventional military training. For 
example, on peace operations, soldiers are often confronted with 
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incidents that require restraint in the use of force, impartiality in action 
and the resolution of crisis by mediation. Developing such skills may 
require a new balance between training and education that transcends 
competency standards in favour of more educational and cognitive 
problem-solving skills. 
(Liddy, 2005; 144) 
 
Taking the above examples into account, there exists within militaries a 
significant move towards the ‘soldier-diplomat’, or ‘strategic corporal’. In some 
cases, this is seen as being more than just a new type of decision making for 
soldiers. In Batistelli’s view, ‘the movement way from the professional ideal 
emphasising the warrior hero toward an ideal emphasizing the soldier scholar 
and soldier-statesman’ is a positive step in the creation toward what he terms 
as a ‘postmodern military’104 (Batistelli, 1997; 468). 
 
In terms of developing training for the strategic-corporal or soldier-diplomat, 
Bellamy argues that armed forces will need to be even better trained over a 
longer period of time and that soldiers will ‘probably be very well educated by 
past standards’. Interestingly (and similar to Galtung’s findings in his 1976 
study), he likens future military peacekeeping structures to the police, ‘where 
individuals at the bottom of the rank structure are invested with a great deal of 
authority in their own right, and the sense of hierarchy is less dominant’. All of 
                                                
104 The other steps being an increasing reliance on civilian employees, integration of women, 
increasing public acceptance of homosexuals as serving soldiers, greater independence of 
soldiers’ spouses, and an increasing alternatives to conscientious objection and ‘civilian 
alternatives to military service’. 
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this is directly impacted by training, which Bellamy argues may move militaries 
closer to an ‘all-officer’ structure (Bellamy, 1996). 
 
Training to develop such a soldier strikes similarities with what has been 
observed in training programmes viewed as part of fieldwork studies. For 
example, Liddy’s conception of training the ‘strategic corporal’ is reflected in the 
fieldwork observations: 
  
areas such as media awareness, improved foreign-language proficiency, 
comparative cultural differences and educational measures to develop a 
soldier’s basic understanding of Australia’s strategic circumstances 
demand greater formalisation in training and education programs. 
(Liddy, 2005; 145) 
 
Notwithstanding the need to understand Australian policy concerns, the above 
statement reflects many of the facets of the Broadsword exercise, UNTSI 
training and UN CPTMs. Linking this to the Broadsword observation, Liddy 
suggests a ‘carefully designed, scenario-based’ training regime for both 
individuals and groups would be appropriate to offer greater room for 
experimentation. This is reflected in Goodwin’s approaches to training the 
‘soldier diplomat’, and her approaches to training at RMAS (outlined in Chapter 
five).  
 
From this examination of the practitioner and academic literature, it can 
therefore be deduced that because of the demands of peacekeeping 
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operations, new skills are being imparted on to soldiers, which is changing their 
fundamental roles, responsibilities and identities. Such new identities have been 
christened with names ‘soldier-diplomat’ and ‘soldier-scholar’. To follow on from 
this, and add further to the conflict resolution literature, the question of to what 
extent this is linked to conflict resolution approaches requires some discussion. 
 
One may ask how the strategic soldier is linked to conflict resolution theory. 
This is a pertinent question, as much of the strategic soldier literature is based 
on army doctrine, publication and thought. It is also linked to such ‘tactical’ 
approaches to warfare, such as the ‘three block war’105, the goals of effective 
decision making in complex environments, and to some extent even been 
linked to the counter-terrorism and stabilisation approaches seen in Afghanistan 
and Iraq (Kiszely, 2007). 
 
However, the concept of the strategic soldier/soldier diplomat/strategic corporal 
is vital for conflict resolution purposes. If the goal of international peacekeeping 
operations is to search for less violent resolutions to violent conflicts, then it is 
imperative for soldiers to not contribute to cultures of violence, or at least be 
aware of the recriminations of their actions. The thesis outlines a development 
of more robust forms of peacekeeping, and recognition within UN 
documentation that it is a ‘blurred area’, which relies on the impartial nature of 
operations (which in itself is contested) (UN, 2008c). Therefore, a critical 
amount of pressure is placed on individual soldiers to understand the force that 
they have at their disposal, and the impacts, both short and long-term, it has. 
                                                
105 Described as ‘the entire spectrum of military challenges in the span of a few hours and within 
the space of three contiguous city blocks’ (Byrne, 2007). 
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Woodhouse finds in his 1999 assessment of peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution that: 
 
Working in conflict zones thus becomes a complex process of balancing 
coercive inducements with positive inducements; of supplementing 
military containment and humanitarian relief roles; and of promoting civic 
action to rebuild communities economically, politically and socially. 
(Woodhouse, 1999a; 10) 
 
This balance places a pressure on the shoulders of a military peacekeeper. 
Fetherston and Nordstrum’s paper explored the impact of habitus on the 
abilities of third parties to effectively resolve conflicts. Habitus refers to ways of 
understanding and acting that individuals develop and learn. These forms of 
understanding and acting are consistent with an individuals’ ‘social and 
historical setting’. Fetherston and Nordstrum warn of the dangers of putting 
soldiers, trained predominantly for war, into a conflict environment, arguing that: 
 
There is no switch inside a blue helmet that automatically turns a soldier 
trained for war-fighting into an individual prepared to work non-violently 
and with cultural sensitivity in a highly militarised environment. 
(Fetherston, 1995; 21) 
 
Because of this, military peacekeepers will arrive in a conflict zone with their 
own habitus (based on military values), which will come into conflict with the 
habitus of the host population (fostered, by and large, from living within a 
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conflict environment). An awareness of the limitations of one’s own 
understanding and how it impacts on the host culture is therefore critical. 
Fetherston and Nordstrum suggest that failing to understand this and pursuing 
a warrior identity can have critical repercussions on opportunities for 
peacebuilding to occur.  
 
Focussing on the complex nature of peacebuilding, Daniker finds that soldiers 
will have to continually be aware that the ‘the final goal cannot be a tactical 
victory, but strategic peace’ (Daniker, 1995). This resonates with the conflict 
resolution literature, with a number of the cited authors examining the 
complexities of moving from military peacekeeping toward civilian 
peacebuilding. Daniker’s description of the ‘Guardian Soldier’ is slightly more 
optimistic than the military definitions, which we have seen above. He argues 
that the traditional conceptions of the ‘combatant’ soldier have ceased with the 
evolution of new conceptions of the soldier as a ‘protector’ who ‘helps and 
rescues’. Daniker outlines this type of soldier: 
 
He embodies a new type of soldier who, in analogy to the “Christian 
soldier” (miles christianus) of the late Middle Ages, might be dubbed the 
“Guardian Soldier” (miles protector). A soldier who is capable of wielding 
his arms valiantly and countering any use of force from any quarters, 
who will punish peacebreakers and restore peace, but who can intervene 
with the same efficiency in order to help and rescue when it is needed. A 
soldier who will be increasingly involved in preventative peacekeeping 
measures and in missions of conflict settlement. This new soldier will 
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gradually take the place of the old concept of a heroic warrior and sole 
protector of the home country, but also of the noncommittal “homo faber” 
of conflict. 
(Daniker, 1995; 80) 
 
Written with much optimism after the UN’s collective action against the Saddam 
Hussein Government in 1990 – something he describes as being a ‘watershed 
moment’ - Daniker argues that the ‘guardian soldier’ would be driven by two 
main motivations that are highly cosmopolitan in character. Firstly, a ‘conviction 
to act’ on behalf of new regional and global security structures, which ‘enhance 
stability’ and ‘promote peaceful development and prosperity’. Secondly, the 
soldier’s willingness to ‘participate in the defence of basic values’ (Daniker, 
1995; 77). Taken together, these two aspects bring this thesis to the discussion 
of a possible development of a cosmopolitan soldier, and the operationalisation 
of cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution. This refers to the third observation 
made by this chapter106. 
The Cosmopolitan Soldier 
 
Through finding links between conflict resolution skills and theory, and the field 
of military peacekeeping, manifested in the form of training for peacekeeping 
operations, this thesis has thus found a growing acceptance of the ‘soldier-
diplomat’, ‘strategic corporal’ or ‘guardian soldier’. In the more traditional sense, 
this type of soldier shows skills in the manner of decision-making, ensuring that 
                                                
106 There exists a strong suggestion - in both the literature and through fieldwork examples - 
that there is evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping. 
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the ‘mission’ does not suffer as a consequence of poor decisions at the lowest 
level. However, as we see in Daniker’s account, there is scope for the ‘guardian 
soldier’ to be a moral ‘force for good’. This bears similarities to: the intuitive 
decision making espoused by Byrne, Liddy and Kiszely; the increased 
understanding of negotiation contexts, as outlined by Goodwin; and, the moral 
agent, as advocated by Daniker. 
 
In order for cosmopolitan peacekeeping to be effective, operations require the 
integration of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power roles, with the peacekeeping force 
being ‘robust enough to use force to protect populations under the emergent 
‘responsibility to protect’ norm’, yet having ‘enough conflict resolution capacity 
to facilitate operations across the conflict–development–peacebuilding 
continuum’ (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). Taking the first part of the 
equation, a degree of force must be used to ensure the creation of ‘negative 
peace’ – freedom from violence – and the creation of political and humanitarian 
space. This can be linked to the development of human security doctrine and 
emergent ‘responsibility to protect’ norm.  Kaldor’s analysis of ‘new wars’ leads 
her to the suggestion that the enforcement of cosmopolitan norms is required 
(Kaldor, 2001; 124-125). This is evident in the development of peacekeeping 
doctrine (embedded in PSO doctrine), backed up by guidelines over the 
impartial use of force set out in a number of UN publications, most notably the 
Brahimi Report. Consequently, this places demands on the intellectual capacity 
of the ‘soldier diplomat’. In particular, through understanding the level of force to 
be used, how it relates to achieving the mandated tasks of the operation, and 
the impacts of the use (or non use) of force on the immediate environment.  
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The second part – the creation of positive peace – is of equal importance. Elliott 
argues that in addition to defending societies from violence, cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping missions may be expected to, where necessary: 
 
Restore civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from 
criminal activities or various destructive forms of particularist politics, and 
to engage in rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic 
practices. 
(Elliot, 2004; 25) 
 
Kaldor asserts that the role of peacekeeping is to assist ‘islands of 
cosmopolitanism’ within civil wars. ‘Just as warring factions depend on outside 
support’ she argues, ‘so there needs to be a conscious strategy of building on 
local cosmopolitan initiatives’, as opposed to the top-down imposed peace 
initiatives that were seen through the 1990s (here she uses Bosnia as a case in 
point, where political negotiations at the highest level took precedence over 
local initiatives) (Kaldor, 2001; 122). Linking this to conflict resolution, which is 
very much based on principles of ‘addressing underlying structural or cultural 
asymmetries’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 317), one can argue that future forms 
of peacekeeping can be ‘understood as a component of a broader and 
emancipatory theoretical framework centred on the idea of human security’ 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 147). While at a more strategic level, such 
processes are in their infancy (for example, the UN’s peacebuilding 
commission); at the tactical level it is the responsibility of the ‘soldier-diplomat’ 
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to address these issues. The thesis highlights the importance of incorporating a 
complex range of relationships, postures and initiatives into peacekeeping 
operations (from civil-military cooperation, to negotiation skills). As a result, a 
high level of decision-making is needed at the lowest level to answer (or at least 
begin to answer) important questions. Such questions include who to consult, 
what messages are sent out through consulting one group over another, and 
what are the cross-cultural issues and gender implications. This is not to 
mention the organisational clashes and coordination that is required with other 
civilian agencies in the field. Outlining all of this is the conflict zone itself, an 
area which the UN has warned its own peacekeepers not to look into as being 
‘normal’ (UN, 2005a).  
 
Thus, we can see the two broad outlines of cosmopolitan peacekeeping – to put 
the hawks back in their box, and also to let the doves out of their boxes. 
Cosmopolitan scholars have linked these broad roles to the ‘type’ of soldier 
envisaged for future operations, thus offering early conceptions of the 
‘cosmopolitan soldier’. Kaldor explains such tasks are being ‘between soldiering 
and policing’. She states that: 
 
Some of the tasks that international troops may be asked to perform fall 
within traditional ambits, for example, separating belligerents and 
maintaining ceasefires, controlling airspace. Others are essentially new 
tasks, e.g. the protection of safety zones and relief corridors. And yet 
others are close to traditional policing tasks – ensuring freedom of 
 452 
movement, guaranteeing the safety of individuals, especially returned 
refugees or displaced persons, and the capture of war criminals. 
(Kaldor, 2001; 125) 
 
Elliot’s definition follows a wider span than the more traditional issues of 
protection: 
 
The use of coercive power to defend cosmopolitan law and cosmopolitan 
right must be embedded in a suite of policy responses which account for 
conflict prevention as well as conflict resolution… Thus a cosmopolitan 
mission might be expected to help defend and, where necessary, restore 
civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from criminal 
activities or various destructive forms of particularist politics, and to 
engage in rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices. 
(Elliot, 2004; 25) 
 
Thus, an emerging set of principles can be observed. As a result of existing 
studies on cosmopolitan peacekeeping, and cosmopolitan militaries, a list can 
be compiled of what would be expected from the cosmopolitan soldier:  
 
1) Somewhere between soldiering and policing 
2) Mixture of ‘soft and hard’ roles 
3) Involving traditional security roles: separating belligerents, maintaining 
ceasefires  
4) With doctrine aligned across the continuum of negative-positive peace 
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5) Ensuring freedom of movement 
6) Guaranteeing return of refugees 
7) Defend and possibly assist in the restoration of civil society 
8) Assisting civil reconstruction 
9) Providing an environment in which peacebuilding practices can flourish 
 
To look at this list on a point-by point basis, Points 1 and 2 highlight the mixture 
of postures that are expected, with some calling it a mixture of ‘soft and hard’ 
roles, and other calling it somewhere between soldiering and policing. Numbers 
3,4 and 5 are linked to the traditional ‘negative peace’ tasks of operations, such 
as a comprehensive doctrine, ensuring freedom of movement and ensuring 
return of refugees. Numbers 7, 8 and 9 refer to the civil military cooperation end 
of the spectrum with peacekeepers being asked to defend and possibly restore 
civil society, assist in civil reconstruction projects (through quick impact 
programmes), and in providing an environment for peacebuilding practices can 
flourish. What can also be seen through many of these is the need for conflict 
resolution skills and frameworks for understanding. Even the traditional security 
roles, such as ensuring freedom of movement, separating belligerents, and 
maintaining ceasefires requires some reliance on techniques from the conflict 
resolution field. Understanding reconstruction, civil-military cooperation, and 
how to provide an environment for peacebuilding to flourish all require some 
kind of knowledge of conflict resolution skills.  
 
When examining the list it also becomes apparent that fieldwork experiences 
provide distinct similarities between what is currently being trained and what the 
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list offers. The policing aspect of training is not necessarily a radical diversion. 
Operation Broadsword gave soldiers training in riot control (as was seen in the 
large crowd outside the mosque in the negotiation scenario). Military doctrine is 
aimed towards using the military to provide security for peacebuilding projects 
to take place. The UN has noted in public opinion surveys the benefits of quick 
impact projects, and has linked schemes such as assisting in projects to clear 
rubbish piles in inner city suburbs in Haiti to wider security benefits for both the 
operation and host population. If the combined observations and analysis in this 
thesis were to be matched to the list outlined above, the results would show a 
convergence of cosmopolitan ethics and current training practices for military 
peacekeepers. This is outlined in table 6.1 (below): 
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Table 6.1: Cosmopolitan ethics in observed training programmes 
 
Characteristic Fieldwork Observation 
1) Somewhere between 
soldiering and policing Soldiers’ posture during Broadsword  
2) Mixture of ‘soft and hard’ 
roles Broadsword 
3) Involving traditional 
security roles: separating 
belligerents, maintaining 
ceasefires UN/UK doctrine 
4) With doctrine aligned 
across the continuum of 
negative-positive peace 
United Nations Principles and 
Guidelines/PSO 
5) Ensuring freedom of 
movement 
PSO Doctrine, Robust 
Peacekeeping as outlined in UN 
Policy 
6) Guaranteeing return of 
refugees Civil-military coordination 
7) Defend and possibly 
assist in the restoration of 
civil society Civil-military coordination 
8) Assisting civil 
reconstruction 
Civil-military coordination/Quick 
Impact Projects 
9) Providing an 
environment in which 
peacebuilding practices 
can flourish PSO Doctrine/UN CPTMs 
  
A cosmopolitan ethic therefore appears to be developing amongst the training 
programmes observed. This is of crucial importance to the thesis and to the 
wider conflict resolution literature, as it demonstrates that through training 
programmes there has been a further manifestation of the conflict resolution 
and military peacekeeping fields, and that cosmopolitan approaches (both 
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through ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ responses) have found relevance in the militarised 
environment of peacekeeping. 
Barriers to operationalising cosmopolitan norms 
 
Although these advances are encouraging, it does not mean that militaries are 
now, by definition, cosmopolitan. Hurdles exist which hinder the development of 
this cosmopolitan soldier. This comes from a number of levels – the 
socialisation and psychologies of the soldiers themselves, the reluctance to 
institutional change, and finally, the role of the military in protecting the nation 
state. In order to offer a considered account of where one fully understands 
cosmopolitan ethics in the present day, it is important to examine the barriers 
which are still in place.  
 
First, to examine the level of change required in military personnel to become 
peacekeepers. As outlined above, Fetherston and Nordstrum suggest that there 
no ‘switch’ exists inside a UN helmet which turns a soldier into a peacekeeper 
(Fetherston, 1995; 21). Much of this can be due to the ‘warrior ethic’ instilled 
into soldiers. As described by Kiszely, the warrior ethic is thus: 
 
To be effective in combat, an army needs its members to have a self-
perception of warriors as fighters; and the army as a whole needs to be 
imbued with the characteristic spirit, or ethos, of the fighting warrior: the 
desire to close with the enemy and kill him. 
(Kiszely, 2007; 10) 
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It is this warrior ethos that is the overriding identity in the military, and any 
attempted change in the posture of a military from war-fighting to peacekeeping 
must examine this. This ethos can be explained through pledges of allegiance 
in national militaries. In highlighting two pledges (in this case the USA and UK), 
there exists a strong reference to defence of the state, or head of state. 
 
Box 6.4: Pledges of Allegiance 
 
The US pledge of allegiance (Army, 2010) 
I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of 
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith 
and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the 
United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to 
regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God 
 
United Kingdom (MOD, 2010) 
I... swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth II, her heirs and successors, and that I will as in duty bound, honestly 
and faithfully defend Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, in person, crown and 
dignity against all enemies, and will observe and obey all orders of her Majesty, her 
heirs and successors, and of the generals and officers set over me. 
 
 
The warrior ethos forms a considerable part of the military identity. However, 
new challenges in deployments mean new challenges to identity. Britt notes 
that soldiers, (who work under this ‘warrior ethic’) have recently become subject 
to a ‘new’ set of identity images, including ‘peacekeeper, peacemaker, 
humanitarian, mediator, observer, and multinational “interactant”’. Such 
identities are ‘forced’ upon the soldier, who, by and large, will have joined the 
armed forces with the primary role of ‘defending national interests through the 
use of force’ at the forefront of their minds. Thus, there are psychological 
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ambiguities for the soldier when he or she is asked to assume such ‘new’ 
identities, although they may not be the primary role first assumed by the 
soldiers. Britt highlights an earlier research project that found that 36 per cent of 
US soldiers participating in Operation Joint Endeavour to Bosnia disagreed with 
the statement that the role of peacekeeper was relevant to their military training. 
Britt sees that this ‘loose bond’ is exacerbated with a lack of training practice 
(Britt, 1998; 119). This also concurs with Thompson and Pasto’s view that 
‘[s]oldiers can feel ambivalent about the upcoming peace support operation if 
warrior training clashes with the more neutral peacekeeping role’ (Thompson, 
2003; 224).  
 
Such factors could offer a reason for the results of a study cited by Wisher into 
the skills deterioration in military peacekeepers. Wisher highlights a study 
undertaken by the US Army Research Institute for Behavioural and Social 
Sciences, which examined 27 tasks selected for training prior to US soldiers 
deploying in Bosnia or Hungary as part of the IFOR Operation Joint Endeavour 
deployment in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1995. A sample of soldiers was asked a 
number of questions about the tasks after a two-month period of not using 
them. The table, in full, is below.  
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Table 6.2: Task Retention for US soldiers 
(Wisher, 2003; 97) 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen ‘negotiation’ maintains a relatively low skills retention rate with 
36% of soldiers retaining the skills after two months. Thus, after two months of 
non-use, almost two-thirds of soldiers will forget negotiation techniques (at least 
in this case study). Furthermore, tasks with similar retention rates include ‘rules 
of engagement’, and ‘react to the media’: both characteristics of current 
deployments. Although the table is not too ‘surprising’ with regards to the tasks 
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that soldiers are more likely to retain (the more traditional of tasks), it is 
important to understand the comparative importance of negotiation skills in the 
military peacekeeper’s mindset (Wisher, 2003; 97). 
 
These mixed identities can further be seen in the issue of ‘force protection’. This 
is described as a responsibility to ‘safeguard’ military personnel from various 
threats (Kretchik, 2004; 20). Kretchik examined policies regarding force 
protection from six militaries (UK, Poland, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Poland, 
USA) serving in Bosnia Herzegovina from 1995 – 2001, under the NATO 
banner. He found that whilst peacekeepers from five out of the six nations found 
that positive relations with the local population was critical for a successful 
mission, not one US officer interviewed found such relations essential. Much of 
this was due to a considerable reliance of ‘force protection’ by the US forces. 
Kretchik explains: 
 
Observed civilian behaviour toward SFOR troop patrols was much more 
cooperative in certain sectors than others. Within the British, Canadian, 
German and Polish sectors, local people welcomed the patrols and were 
more than willing to engage them in conversation through interpreters. 
US troops were met with suspicion as late as June 2001, nearly five 
years after the initial arrival of American forces. Where the majority of 
multinational troops smiled, waved and frequented bistros for a tea or 
coffee in the majority of cases with a reduced protection posture, US 
troops secured a perimeter while one officer wearing body armour and 
helmet approached people with an interpreter and perhaps one or two 
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others. The difference in mood was striking: warm in the majority of 
situations where non-US troops operated and a chilly reception for the 
US contingent. From the testimonials of both soldier and civilian alike, 
force-protection posture affected civilian attitudes. 
(Kretchik, 2004; 34) 
 
This is not the only example where force protection has had an impact on the 
positive role that military peacekeepers can play. Gooren argues that in the 
Dutch military, although soldiers ‘appreciated’ gaining information through 
interaction with the civilian population, force protection ‘frequently took priority 
over maintaining friendly relations with the local population’ (Gooren, 2006; 59). 
This could be a symptom of the differing identities coming into conflict, where 
on the one hand the soldiers and structures recognise a need for effective 
engagement with the local population, and on the other, they are unable 
(through a genuine fear of attack, or a suspicion of alien environments) to let 
their guard down.  
 
Studies also find that the strength of the warrior ethic has an impact on the 
performance of deployed military personnel on a peacekeeping mission. Franke 
highlights the operation in Somalia where soldiers, unable to grasp the vague 
mandates given to them, followed two distinct identities. Some pursued a 
‘humanitarian strategy’, where conscious efforts were made to not negatively 
stereotype all Somali’s, and an effort made by soldiers to understand Somali 
culture and custom. The other distinct identity followed was the ‘warrior 
strategy’, where soldiers used the behaviour of a small number of rioters as a 
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general stereotype for all of Somali culture, treated the whole of the population 
as ‘potential enemies’, and attempted to hide any signs of vulnerability. Franke 
argues that this experience (as well as other post-cold war peacekeeping 
endeavours) has called into question ‘what it has traditionally meant to be a 
soldier’. As a consequence, adjustments need to be made not only in military 
doctrine, but also in the military’s ‘combat-orientated warrior identity’ (Franke, 
2003; 33-35). Further, LaRose Edwards et al find that the ‘stresses and strains’ 
of operations such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia revealed to outsiders 
the ‘partial inadequacy of general-purpose combat training for peacekeeping’. 
They found in their study that those who served in the multidimensional 
operations in ‘failed states’ were the first to identify any shortcomings (LaRose-
Edwards et al., 1997).  
 
Linked to this, Durch and England examined the trouble in assuming that all 
soldiers can ‘shed’ the baggage of their warrior ethos, and change their mindset 
to that of a peacekeeper, and warn that it may not be the case that all soldiers 
are equally as well suited to rapidly shifting roles: 
 
 
One could envisage such adaptation in a thirty-four-year-old Special 
Forces sergeant with fifteen years of experience and special education 
and training in winning local support for his campaign. One has more 
trouble seeing it in a nineteen-year-old line infantryman with a high 
school education and at most a year of field experience of any sort under 
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his belt. In all armies, the latter types of personnel far outnumber the 
former. 
(Durch et al., 2009; 44) 
 
The mixed identity is not only felt at the tactical level, national military structures 
often show reluctance in developing their working patterns. Highlighting the 
impacts of mixed identities on higher levels of the military hierarchy, Hills notes 
the reaction to the UK’s peacekeeping commitments in the immediate aftermath 
of the Kosovo intervention. Through her examination of the reaction in the press 
by senior army figures, she found that there was certainly a feeling that too 
much emphasis on PSO style deployments would result in UK forces becoming 
a ‘gendarmerie’, with a diminished reputation for fighting (Hills, 2001; 87). She 
refers to an MOD lessons learned report from the Kosovo intervention to further 
underline this point. It is worth outlining it in full to gain the essence of this 
dilemma: 
 
While our forces need to be trained in the special skills required for 
peacekeeping and other lower intensity operations, this must not be at 
the expense of their readiness for more demanding joint, all arms 
warfighting operations. A serviceman trained and equipped for war may 
do an effective job on a peacekeeping operation, and can acquire 
additional special skills for this purpose, but one just trained for 
peacekeeping is not ready for high intensity operations. 
(MOD, 2000; 6.38) 
 
 464 
Kernic also makes a telling argument as to how certain military thinkers react to 
the difference in skills needed for peacekeeping operations, and the apparent 
‘numbing effect’ this has on soldiers ability to fight and execute the ‘warrior 
ethos’. He contends that with an increasing degree of peacekeeping 
experience, the Austrian military soon found that in order to be more effective, it 
needed to develop ‘civilian skills’. However, the reaction in Austria from some 
officers and public commentators was that such operations - and the skills they 
demand - could ‘undermine’ combat capabilities. Hence, instead of requesting 
that the soldiers be better trained in the ‘civilian skills’, ‘they demanded tougher 
combat training for soldiers before and during peacekeeping operations’ 
(Kernic, 1999; 123). 
 
This highlights the tendency of militaries to be resistant to the pressures of 
institutional change. Gooren, studying the Dutch military, argues that militaries 
are ‘strongly attached to traditions; to familiar embedded practices; and to 
standard operational procedures that have withstood the test of time’ (Gooren, 
2006; 54). Similar problems are highlighted by Kiszely, who notes that there is 
opposition in the UK to ‘moderating the warrior ethos’, which is largely due to 
the fear that stability operations are a ‘sideshow’ to what the military train for 
(Kiszely, 2007; 21). Langille’s thesis on the creation of the Pearson 
Peacekeeping Centre in Canada highlights the conservatism that existed in 
Canadian military hierarchies. In the debates leading up to the development of 
a training centre, Langille found that there was a considerable amount of 
opposition to the notion of turning a redundant military facility into a 
peacekeeping training centre. This was due to a military conservatism that 
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existed in Canada at the time, which was highly skeptical of a dedicated 
peacekeeping training centre, or the idea of developing particular training for 
peacekeeping. For example Major General Lewis Mackenzie dismissed the 
idea of setting up the centre, stating‘I think we’re unanimous in the military that 
there is no special training (required) for the peacekeeping soldier’ (Langille, 
1999; 101).  
 
Militaries are also tools of the nation state, and are used in whatever manner 
the national state structures wish to see. This brings the chapter to the third 
hurdle to pursuing cosmopolitan militaries. It is worth at this point to examine 
the UK. This also highlights how the military structures were unwilling to change 
their structures, even if foreign policy develops along cosmopolitan principles. 
Dorman has linked the UK approach to peacekeeping and stability operations to 
notions of cosmopolitan military forces and relates policy statements made in 
the early years of the Labour administration under Prime Minister Tony Blair to 
the reality of military doctrine and force. In terms of the policy statement, this 
period is characterised by what many termed as the ‘Chicago Speech’ – a 
speech on foreign policy made by Prime Minister Blair in Chicago on 24th April 
1999 – in the early period of the Kosovo intervention. Declaring that ‘we are all 
internationalists now’, Prime Minister Blair argued that British Foreign Policy 
would be unable to ‘turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights 
within other countries’. He went on to state that: 
 
Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest 
and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values 
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and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, 
the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our 
national interests too: 
 (Blair, 1999) 
 
Prime Minister Blair’s speech led observers to note that the UK could pursue a 
more internationalist agenda. Furthermore, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook 
argued at the time that an approach to foreign policy required an ethical 
dimension, which ‘recognises that the national interest cannot be defined only 
by narrow realpolitik’ (Guardian, 1997) . Dorman’s analysis of this period finds 
that although there was a cosmopolitan-minded outlook at the beginning, the 
difficulty of justifying ‘out of area operations’ forced the government to link 
operations with the national interest. From this, he argues that any 
cosmopolitan-like operations, in the UK at least, would not only have to be both 
‘operationally feasible and have broad international support’, but must also 
show clear net benefits to the UK. Thus, ‘national realpolitik’ was able to assert 
its dominance (Dorman, 2004; 246). 
 
This is reflected in UK contributions to UN peacekeeping, in comparison to UK 
deployments in non-UN operations. The UK’s troop commitment to UN 
peacekeeping provides only a fraction of its total armed forces. The most recent 
(January 2010) UN figures (outlined in Box 6.5 below) total UK peacekeepers at 
250 personnel.  The total strength of the UK Regular forces (in April 2009) was 
188,370, with the Army comprising of 106,500 (DASA, 2009). 
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The UK justifies its role in other ways. The first justification is through funding of 
the peacekeeping project, where it is the fourth largest contributor to the UN 
peacekeeping, providing 7.8% of the overall peacekeeping budget. This 
contribution is argued to be an adequate commitment, replacing the need for 
‘boots on the ground’. Secondly is the commitment the UK has to ‘UN 
Mandated operations’. Such terminology refers to deployments in Iraq (up until 
the commitment ended in 2009), and Afghanistan. The current Afghani 
deployment has 9,500 personnel serving, covering all facets of the 
peacekeeping-peace enforcement-war spectrum. It can be suggested that the 
NATO led intervention differentiates itself from UN ‘blue helmet’ operations, and 
offers less to the cosmopolitan ethics espoused by the Labour administration, 
and more to the ‘hard security’ aspects more akin to realist politics. 
 
 
Box 6.5: UK Troop Contributions to peacekeeping operations 
(UNDPKO, 2010c) 
 
Mission   Number Role 
MONUC (DRC)  5  Experts on mission 
UNAMA (Afghanistan) 1  Expert on mission 
UNAMI (Iraq)  1  Expert on mission 
UNFICYP (Cyprus)  241  Contingent troop 
UNMIS (Sudan)  2  Contingent troop 
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Box 6.6: Top five contributors to the UN Peacekeeping budget 
(CIC, 2009; 163) 
 
1. USA  26.4% 
2. Japan  16.5% 
3. Germany 8.5% 
4. UK  7.8% 
5. France 7.4% 
 
 
Through his examination of the reluctance of the military to develop along 
cosmopolitan lines, Dorman argues that the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 
gave precedence to heavy armoured brigades, when it became more apparent 
that cosmopolitan-style operations – such as the UK intervention in Sierra 
Leone – required an ‘increased requirement for light infantry capable of rapid 
deployment’ (Dorman, 2004; 245). Dorman’s argument is that although the 
military were gaining ‘considerable experience’ in situations which required 
small infantry groups, trained for interventions such as Sierra Leone, the military 
was exceptionally keen to focus efforts on traditional war fighting.  
 
The UK example is significant as it outlines a number of barriers towards 
effective cosmopolitan peacekeeping. This has an impact on how to 
‘operationalise’ cosmopolitan conceptions of peacekeeping, human security, 
and the responsibility to protect.  
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Cosmopolitanism considered 
 
As illustrated with the UK as a cosmopolitan actor, much of the justification for 
cosmopolitan action (as outlined in the extract from Prime Minister Blair’s 
‘Chicago Speech’) was based on the UK’s desire to uphold and promote 
cosmopolitan democracies. This certainly links in with Held’s opinion of the 
cosmopolitan democratic project, where ‘we live in a world where we must 
come to enjoy multiple citizenships’. From this, Held asks for the creation of a 
network of politically accountable bodies through the local, national, regional 
and international levels. The task of a cosmopolitan force, in Held’s view, is to 
uphold these politically accountable models. However, Held makes an 
important qualification, arguing that such types of intervention would not be 
used to ‘impose’ a particular form of democracy (Held, 1997; 28). This is an 
uneasy qualification for cosmopolitans to deal with, as it does leave the theory 
somewhat open to accusations of it being a ‘Trojan horse’, used by the most 
powerful members of the international system to uphold favourable political 
regimes or instigate regime change.  
 
Where those who study cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping feel more 
comfortable is through espousing a ‘moral’ need and requirement for a level of 
outside intervention to protect civilians and uphold international law and 
institutions. Jones describes such moral cosmopolitanism as being the view that 
every person in the world is ‘entitled to equal moral consideration regardless of 
their various memberships in states, classes, nations, religious groups, and the 
like’ (Jones, 2005; 1). Brock furthers this viewpoint, by arguing that 
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Cosmopolitanism highlights the responsibilities we have to those whom 
we do not know, but whose lives should be of concern to us. The borders 
of states, and other boundaries considered to restrict the scope of 
justice, are irrelevant roadblocks in appreciating our responsibilities to all 
in the global community. 
(Brock, 2009; 9) 
 
This links to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse’s concept of cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping, which takes the protection of civilians, and provision of negative 
peace as a starting point for positive peacebuilding projects. 
 
The question that arises from the UK’s example is whether the nation can be a 
cosmopolitan actor. Balancing the role of the nation state as an actor in world 
politics, with more cosmopolitan ideals (which have implications for the 
boundaries of the nation state) is a debate for many cosmopolitans, with a wide 
spectrum of theories ranging from absolute power being handed to a 
supranational structure, to the strengthening of cosmopolitan ideals within 
states. Some, such as Tan, note the importance of cosmopolitan institutions 
being able to accommodate the needs of state structures and patriotic ties. He 
finds that in order for cosmopolitan values to serve the whole of humanity, 
instead of rejecting patriotic partiality outright,  
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Cosmopolitans must accept that the challenge is to show how the 
impartiality of cosmopolitanism can consistently accommodate and 
account for the special ties between compatriots. 
(Tan, 2005; 167) 
 
The importance of the cosmopolitan project, according to Tan, is to ensure that 
there are institutions, rules and set practices to guide states in their pursuit of 
their own interests. As people opt to pursue their own concerns and interests 
within rules of a just international setting, Tan argues, then individuals can 
pursue ‘particular ends and ties, including the commitment of patriotism, within 
the limits of a just global institutional arrangement’ (Tan, 2005; 184). 
 
Lawler takes this a stage further by advocating the state as a cosmopolitan 
agent in its own right. Lawler starts with the assertion that any attempt to arm 
and empower a cosmopolitan military would be met with a degree of resistance 
on the grounds of it going against traditional conceptions of the state boundary 
(or as Lawler calls it ‘of apparently trans-historical international political 
realities’) and the contested nature of the legitimising bodies who authorise the 
use of force by such a military. He also notes calls for the state to act as a force 
for good in itself, against manifestations of violent groupings and actions not 
along state lines, but along lines of ‘blood and ethnicity’ (Lawler, 2004; 59). 
Thus it is in Lawler’s view that the good state can be an effective vehicle for 
moving cosmopolitan values forward. The good state is described as thus: 
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the good state can be defined simply as a state committed to moral 
purposes beyond itself, to a robust internationalism in its foreign policy. 
By internationalism I mean a philosophy of foreign policy constructed 
around an ethical obligation on the part of state actively to pursue 
authentically other-regarding values and interests. 
(Lawler, 2004; 56) 
  
This conception of the cosmopolitan state is not seen as a universally accepted 
step forward in the cosmopolitan project. Lawler accepts this, noting the 
difficulties of staunchly defending state policies based on the pursuit of the 
national interest. Lawler also notes that by pursuing such an argument, it 
‘invites the charge of naivety from realists’ and being accused of being narrow-
minded by cosmopolitans (Lawler, 2004; 50). 
The cosmopolitan state? 
 
As we have seen with the UK example, there is enough evidence to suggest 
that cosmopolitan ideals have not been fully met with regard to military action, 
regardless of the specialised training that soldiers receive. Does this mean that 
all nation states do not pursue a cosmopolitan agenda? It is in the view of this 
thesis that room does exist for nations to espouse and act upon cosmopolitan 
objectives. Here, an example can be extracted from another case study: 
Ireland. The Irish approach to international institutions is more cosmopolitan 
than the UK. Service to international institutions is embedded in the Irish 
Constitution itself (under Article 29), which states: 
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1. Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-
operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality.  
2. Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of 
international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.  
(Ireland, 1937; Article 29)  
 
The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs aligns itself with peacekeeping and 
conflict resolution tasks. In 2007, the Department set up the Conflict Resolution 
Unit, to ‘lead work on enhancing Ireland’s engagement in conflict resolution 
activities internationally’ (DOFA, 2010). Guiding this work, the CRU has three 
cross cutting themes: the promotion of human rights, working to the guidelines 
set out in UNSCR 1325, and the impact of climate change on conflict. This 
informs the three main strands of the Conflict Resolution Unit’s work: 
peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace process lessons sharing.  
 
Within the peacemaking section, there is a Mediation Support Unit, which 
primarily collates peacemaking experiences and gathers lessons learned. The 
unit coordinates training for mediators, offers advice on UN standards and 
procedures, and has assisted in mediation projects in East Timor107 and 
Uganda108. Furthermore, support is provided to conflict prevention, 
reconciliation projects, and security sector reform, alongside research into 
where lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process can be used 
elsewhere. 
 
                                                
107 Where it supports the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and works with conflict prevention 
projects including assistance in the establishment of an early warning system for future conflict 
108 Where it supported the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
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The Defence Forces (DF) objectives can be matched to the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. Amongst the DF ‘high level goals’ is a commitment to: 
 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security through 
participation in approved UN-mandated peace support, crisis 
management and humanitarian relief operations. 
(DOD, 2008; 6) 
 
Noting that Ireland has been an ‘active contributor’ to UN mandated 
peacekeeping operations, the strategy states that Irish troops will participate 
‘where appropriate’ in humanitarian and crisis management operations, subject 
to the ‘triple-lock’ – the agreement of the Irish Government, the approval of the 
Dáil (Parliament), and, importantly when looking at cosmopolitan conceptions, a 
UN mandate (DOD, 2008; 9). The strategy statement outlines how this will have 
an impact on serving personnel, who are required to understand the ‘complex 
issues of cultural diversity affecting both the host nation and troops from other 
contributing nations’, as well as balance more robust rules of engagement and 
national and International Human Rights Law (DOD, 2008; 13). Finally, as the 
box below shows, the military oath sworn by DF personnel refers to the loyalty 
to the constitution, and not its defence – a major difference between this and 
the UK and US oaths. 
 
 
Box 6.7: Irish Defence forces Oath 
(DFHQ, 2006; 1) 
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I do solemnly swear (or declare) that I will be faithful to Ireland and loyal to the 
Constitution and that while I am a member of the Defence Forces I will obey all lawful 
orders issued to me by my superior officers and that while I am a member of the 
Permanent Defence Forces I will not join or be a member of or subscribe to any 
political organisation or society or any secret society whatsoever and that, if I become 
a member of the Reserve Defence Forces, I will not, while I am a member of the 
Reserve Defence Forces, join or be a member of or subscribe to any secret society 
whatsoever. 
 
Irish UN commitments also highlight a commitment to international operations. 
The DF roughly maintain ten per cent of their 10,500 personnel serving on 
international operations (both Blue-helmet and UN mandated Operations) 
(UNTSI, 2007f). The list of Irish contributions to UN operations is outlined 
below.   
 
Box 6.8: Irish Contributions to UN operations 
(UNDPKO, 2010c) 
 
Mission    Number Role   
  
MINURCAT (Chad)  428  Contingent troop 
MINURSO (Western Sahara) 3  Experts on mission 
MONUC (DRC)   3  Experts on Mission 
UNFICYP (Cyprus)   18  Individual police 
UNIFIL (Lebanon)    8  Contingent troop 
UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire)   2  Experts on Mission 
UNTSO (Middle East)  2  Experts on mission 
 
 
This thesis therefore strongly advocates that it is possible for a version of 
cosmopolitan ethics to exist within states. Through using Ireland as a case 
study, it evidence that states can align defence commitments with cosmopolitan 
priorities – in this case, prioritising UN mandated operations for DF personnel, a 
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considerable commitment in the Department of Foreign Affairs to peacebuilding 
activities, and a constitution aligned to international institutions.  
Operationalising cosmopolitan arrangements: the role of the UN 
 
Moving to a more radical end of the cosmopolitan spectrum, a need is 
advocated to develop standing forces free from state and national interests. 
Elliot sums this up, in her work on cosmopolitan-minded militaries: 
 
The deployment of cosmopolitan force (and forces) must be detached as 
much as is possible from statist and great power purposes and that it 
must be conducted under the authority of broadly-based international 
institutions such as the United Nations… Military forces that are used in 
support of cosmopolitan force must be qualitatively as well as materially 
different from traditional militaries in their identity and value structures. 
(Elliot, 2004; 24) 
 
Where can present peacekeeping arrangements fit into this? Practical 
considerations that have been put forward for sourcing a standing UN force. 
From the conflict resolution perspective, the UN is seen as the ‘essential’ global 
institutional framework for the realisation of conflict resolution goals, for its 
‘unique reservoir’ of legitimacy, or integrative power. Furthermore, it is hoped 
that the UN can continue to be: 
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The only genuinely global institution capable of delivering authoritative 
endorsement of fundamental international values, and of conferring 
legitimacy on the most difficult international undertakings. 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 327)  
 
The idea of a standing force has surfaced in a number of proposals from within 
the UN, from national governments (the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark), 
and through proposals from within parliamentary structures, such as the United 
Nations Rapid Deployment Act, proposed to the US House of Representatives 
in 2001(Congress, 2001). This is not a recent occurrence as proposals for a 
standing peacekeeping force are as old as the UN Charter itself. Article 43 
(under Chapter VII) of the Charter requests states to make available to the 
Security Council ‘armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of 
passage for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security’ (UN, 
1945). Furthermore, within the UN, there have been ambitious calls for the 
reform of the structures that assist peacekeeping operations. The revival of the 
UN’s Military Staff Committee (MSC) - a ‘dormant’ area of the UN charter – has 
been proposed as a way to improve the UN’s ability to launch effective 
peacekeeping operations. The MSC is mentioned in the UN Charter, under 
Chapter VII, Article 47, outlined in Box 6.9 below 
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Box 6.9: Chapter VII Article 47 of the UN Charter 
(UN, 1945) 
 
o There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the 
Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military 
requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of 
armaments, and possible disarmament. 
o The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent 
members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the 
United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by 
the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the 
Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work. 
o The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the 
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security 
Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out 
subsequently. 
o The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and 
after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-
committees. 
 
In the early years of the UN, the organisation could have facilitated the creation 
of a standing UN force. However, political deadlock ultimately led to the UN 
being ‘deprived’ of having military capabilities. Fabian suggests the obstacles in 
creating such a committee and standing forces:  
 
 
just as there were in 1946 no purely military perspectives on Article 43, 
there have been none since on preparedness for peacekeeping.  Before 
organizing such a force and giving it a real capacity to act, governments 
 479 
want assurance that it will neither be used against their own interests nor 
be controlled by countries threatening those interests 
(Fabian, 1971; 60-61) 
 
The lack of such assurances and certainly stopped the development of a UN 
standing force, with Soviet and US representatives mistrusting their adversaries 
and suspecting that their Cold War enemy would use any such force as a tool 
against their interests. Thus, no common conclusions could be reached about 
the overall size of such forces, size of national contributions, ratios of naval, air 
and land forces (Fabian, 1971; 61). This led the Security Council to entrust 
military forms of intervention to Member States, who would put forces under 
their own command and control (Childers, 1994; 173)3.  
 
More recently, Member States made incremental steps towards a serious 
standby peacekeeping force system through the development of the Standard 
High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). The Brigade was set up in response to a 
request made in the UN’s 1995 Working Group on a Multinational United 
Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade to establish a ‘multinational 
brigade-size force at high readiness’ (SHIRBRIG, 1995). The Memorandum of 
Understanding for SHIRBRIG outlines its main concept: 
 
The SHIRBRIG will only be employed on a case-by-case basis in a 
manner safe-guarding national sovereignty considerations in 
peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council under 
Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, including humanitarian 
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tasks. The SHIRBRIG, as an integral formation – i.e. consisting of 
elements from all types of arms, including manoeuvre units, medical, 
logistics and communications – will only be employed for deployments of 
up to 6 months duration, and it should not be considered for routine 
rotation of forces in connection with ongoing missions. 
(SHIRBRIG, 1996) 
 
The brigade became operationally available to the UN in 2000109 and was 
involved in five UN Missions110, which were under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, 
to mainly assist with the establishment of headquarters and planning for 
missions (SHIRBRIG, 2010). Deployments were generally met with success, 
and the SHIRBRIG model gained credit for its work. The official lessons learned 
report into the brigade (published in 2009) states that SHIRBRIG had a 
reputation for possessing ‘a cohesive force with the highest level of 
peacekeeping expertise and training standards’ (CISR, 2009; 22). It was also 
highly regarded within the DPKO, whose lessons learned department 
maintained that ‘what SHIRBRIG did it did well’ (CISR, 2009; 96). In addition to 
the operations which it assisted in setting up, the brigade assisted in activities 
related to enhancing African capabilities, as well as developing a ‘Civil-military 
cooperation start up kit’ and a ‘Rapid Deployment/Interim Headquarters 
concept’(CISR, 2009; 8). However, although the operation had noted success, 
the impact of SHIRBRIG was limited. Many of the aspirations of setting up a 
                                                
109 Sixteen nations have signed one or more SHIRBRIG Documents. They are - Argentina, 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Seven other nations (Chile, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Jordan, Latvia and Senegal) are participating as observers. 
110 UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea), UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia), 
UNAMIS (Sudan). 
 481 
standing brigade were realised in a somewhat smaller reality as SHIRBRIG staff 
often formed the ‘nucleus’ of mission headquarters. It was only in UNMEE, 
where the possibilities of a large rapid deployment were realized. Even when 
this was deployed, its strength was 1,200 – 1500 troops, and not at the brigade 
size of 2,000-5,000 envisaged.  
 
It was mainly due to such limitations that the initiative was disbanded in 2009. 
The lessons learned report identifies SHIRBRIG’s ‘cumbersome decision-
making process’ as well as a lack of resources and political will, as important 
factors in making the initiative untenable (CISR, 2009; 8). Furthermore, the 
report states that: ‘Bottom line is that the force generation did not work 
properly.’ The SHIRBRIG model offers both positive lessons insofar as what 
can be achieved by like-minded states to deal with rapid deployment, but also 
negative lessons on how such a force can be sidelined by other needs. The 
lessons learned report best sums this up by stating that such an ambitious 
agenda like that of SHIRBRIG ‘can only remain as strong as the support 
received from its own member-nations’ (CISR, 2009; 97). 
 
Importantly, a missed lesson from the SHIRBRIG model is that a more workable 
idea could be through the operationalisation of more radical conceptions of 
standing capacities. As opposed to building on state-based arrangements – 
such as SHIRBRIG – this thesis supports the concept of a capacity that is totally 
disassociated to the sovereign state. Goulding finds that a UN force based on 
cosmopolitan values would make it more difficult for troop contributing countries 
to use participation in UN operations to ‘advance their national interests’. This 
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would be particularly relevant in smaller operations in which ‘a dominant UN 
contingent could be the champion of cosmopolitan values’ (Goulding, 2004; 
112). Held also argues for a long term shift of the nation state’s coercive 
capacity to regional and global institutions, with the ultimate aim of 
‘demilitarization and the transcendence of the war system’ (Held, 1995; 279).  
 
A more comprehensive concept of a UN force comes in the form of Langille’s 
proposal for a standing force in 2002. His proposal for the creation of a UN 
Emergency Service – what he termed a UN ‘911’ - which would be based on a 
force (including deployable elements, base support and administration) of 
approximately 13,200 personnel111. Langille recommends that this force can 
address human needs including ‘protection, security, health and hope’ (a whole 
spectrum from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding) (Langille, 2002; 113), 
would work under a robust mandate aligned with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
but also have the conflict resolution capabilities to build and maintain consent. 
Langille suggests that: 
 
All ranks should be trained in contact skills such as mediation and 
dispute resolution to help ensure that minor conflicts are quickly 
contained before they risk early escalation. 
(Langille, 2002; 109-111) 
 
A more comprehensive approach, undertaken by the civilian component of the 
force, would address issues related to human needs as well as working to 
                                                
111 The force would comprise of military (10,270 personnel), police (850 personnel) and civilian 
volunteers (550 personnel). 
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‘restore hope’. Langille argues that the success of progressing to such a force 
will depend on the willingness of officials to recognise the ‘potential contribution 
of conflict resolution and peace studies’ (Langille, 2000; 243). However, Langille 
argues that the vision of the UN being a guarantor of such a force is a 
requirement for such development.  
 
Codner elaborates on this idea, proposing a standing UN force ‘independent of 
particular national or regional cultural stereotypes’ (Codner, 2008; 62). The 
reasons for the more radical departure are more entrenched in policy 
considerations. Codner argues that a dilemma has emerged, where on the one 
hand, traditional operations are now replaced with a need for a considerably 
larger ‘comprehensive approach’, and on the other hand, is the existence of 
national interest: something which Codner understands: 
 
 
the governments and electorates that own the more competent and 
combat capable of military forces may be unwilling to commit to elective 
operations with uncertain outcomes. 
(Codner, 2008; 62) 
 
This leaves Codner to conclude that there is room for ‘serious consideration’ for 
a combat capable force distanced from national ownership – a UN Emergency 
Service - recruited from ex-servicemen and women to begin with, and ‘young 
civilians’ in the future.  
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Codner elaborates on the development of the UN Emergency Service, arguing 
that in the first stage it is to be used as a preventative measure, deploying in 
situations where preventative diplomacy is needed (e.g. the missed opportunity 
to avert the genocide in Rwanda) (Codner, 2008; 61). The main thrust of the 
proposal is the creation of a ‘Phase 1 UN Intervention Force’ (UNIF I). This 
would be a small military force combining civilian, police and judicial capability. 
The tasks for the UNIF I force would include to: 
 
• prevent violence from escalating;  
• assist, monitor, and otherwise facilitate a cease-fire;  
• provide the emergency framework for UN efforts to resolve the conflict 
and commence negotiations;  
• secure a base, communications and airfield for a subsequent UN force;  
• provide safe areas for persons and groups whose lives are threatened by 
the conflict ; 
• secure humanitarian relief operations; and  
• assess the situation and provide first-hand information for the Security 
Council so that an informed decision can be made on the utility and 
feasibility of further UN involvement. 
 
This list of tasks focuses on ‘hard’ power aspects of securitising space for the 
protection of civilians and humanitarian agencies. Codner suggests that such a 
force would be based on the concept of the US Marine Expeditionary Unit, 
which numbers a total size of 2,200, though the UNIF1 force would be 
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considerably larger, comprising of up to 10,000 troops112. The capability of 
UNIF1 would be a highly trained ‘specialised’ infantry, whose main task would 
be to convey the ‘diplomatic message that they genuinely represent a potential 
more powerful follow-on capability that could be deployed by UN sanctioned 
national combat forces’ (Codner, 2008; 61-62). This certainly fits in with the 
robust end of peacekeeping operations outlined in PSO Doctrine. Codner’s 
ideas relate to those espoused by Langille which include to provide a 
framework for a UN force, without the emphasis on national interest, with 
conflict resolution capabilities allied to the ability to defend the UN mandates 
and provide security to the civilian population. 
 
A series of proposals that link the soft power aspects of Langille’s with the 
robust framework espoused by Codner is the body of research emerging 
around the creation of a ‘United Nations Emergency Peace Service’ (UNEPS). 
Based at UN designated sites (including a mobile field headquarters), the force 
is outlined as being a ‘first-in, first-out’ service, designed to supplement existing 
UN operations as well as offering early warning and preventative capacities. 
With regard to personnel, Herro et al outline the composition of such a force: 
 
UNEPS personnel would be individually recruited from among those who 
volunteer from many countries so it would not suffer the delays of ad hoc 
forces, the reluctance of UN members to deploy their own national units 
or gender, national or religious imbalance. Its personnel would be 
expertly trained and coherently organized to avoid the challenges of a 
                                                
112 Comprising of an infantry battalion reinforced with an artillery battery, combat engineering 
platoon, light armored reconnaissance company, tank platoon, reconnaissance platoon, as well 
as other various units which would fit into particular missions. 
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lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness and experience in resolving 
conflicts. 
 (Herro et al., 2009; 52) 
 
Importantly, the UNEPS force is designed to have a considerable civilian 
dimension. Suthanthiraraj et al’s study on regional perspectives of a UNEPS 
force argue that although it would contain military and police contingents to 
‘undertake protective functions’, the force will place equal emphasis on civilian 
non-military capacities, enabling it to ‘perform certain peacebuilding as well as 
peacemaking functions’. Furthermore, in the UNEPS concept, civilian/military 
units would be created, consisting of individuals trained with ‘wider professional 
competencies’ such as social workers, health professionals, human rights 
lawyers and gender specialists (Suthanthiraraj et al., 2009; 15). Linking this to 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse’s research on cosmopolitan objectives, the 
desire for a civilian dimension is apparent (see Table 6.3). There is existing 
literature on this area of research, which deals with the wide range of roles that 
civilians play in conflict environments and the possible role that civilian 
peacekeepers can play in the future.  
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Table 6.3: Woodhouse and Ramsbotham’s table 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Theory Quasi-
realist 
Pluralist Solidarist Cosmopolitan Critical/ 
Transformative 
Practice Stabilization 
Forces 
Traditional 
Peacekeeping 
Enhanced 
Peace 
Support 
Operations 
UN emergency 
Peace 
Services 
? 
CR 
Capability 
Zero or low 
CR capacity 
Limited 
passive CR 
capacity 
High 
Military/low 
civilian CR 
capacity 
High 
Military/High 
civilian CR 
capacity 
? 
 
Civilian forms of peacekeeping  
 
Civilian peacekeeping, as Schrich outlines, is similar to some of the more 
benign tasks of military peacekeeping, such as interpositioning, 
accompaniment, and monitoring. However, while the tools of power used by the 
military are the threat or use of limited force, the power in civilian peacekeeping 
initiatives lies with the very nature that they are unarmed civilians from the 
international community. Schrich explains: 
 
 
Civilian peacekeeping works with different sources of power. Instead of 
weapons, civilian peacekeepers rely on nonviolent forms of power 
including moral authority, the power in numbers of people, the power that 
comes through economic and political leverage, and the power 
 488 
embodied in different forms of identity, like those held by religious 
leaders or people with Western passports 
(Schrich, 2005; 44) 
 
Schrich outlines the potential of civilian peacekeeping to deal with a number of 
scenarios. These include:  
 
• providing a human shield or moral deterrent against international or civil 
warfare;  
• strengthening ceasefires by providing a deterrent presence and 
monitoring of violations;  
• monitoring and reducing the likelihood of violence during elections;  
• accompanying human rights activists or people who may be targeted by 
armed forces because of their work for peaceful social change;  
• accompanying internally displaced people, refugees, communities who 
are threatened because of their ethnic or religious identity or their refusal 
to cooperate with armed groups;  
• preventing terrorism by non-state actors;  
• deterring violence during transitions in leadership; and/or  
• preventing looting in crises or after natural disasters. 
 
This list may look ambitious, but has roots in working examples of non-violent 
civilian peacekeeping taken from a wide range of organisations113. There is 
                                                
113 These organisations include: Nonviolent peaceforce, Peace Brigades International, 
Witnesses for Peace, Christian Peacemaker teams, Servicio Internacional Para La Paz, 
Swedish Fellowship for Reconciliation, as well as the more traditional aid NGOs such as Oxfam, 
Care, the ICRC and Médicins Sans Frontiérs. 
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crossover in this list between civilian peacekeeping and military peacekeeping, 
through the monitoring of ceasefires, election monitoring, and protection of 
returning IDPs and refugees. To take one example, the organisation Non-
Violent Peaceforce has been intrinsically involved with the peace process in 
Mindanao, a southern province in the Philippines. The organisation was invited 
to peace talks between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro-Islamic 
liberation Front (MILF), and has been able to deploy civilian peacekeepers into 
the conflict area, with a wide-reaching mandate (outlined in Box 6.10 below) 
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Box 6.10: Non-Violent Peaceforce Strategy in Mindanao 
(NPF, 2010) 
 
 To enhance the scope and quality of locally based people’s organizations 
and peace/human rights advocates. 
 To reduce the incidence of violence in the vicinity of NP field sites through 
means of unarmed international civilian peacekeeping, thereby aiding in the 
maintenance of the ceasefire(s). 
 To support human rights reporting mechanisms in remote conflict areas and 
assist/connect local and international advocacy groups that work for peace 
with justice by responding to people’s grievances.  
 To localize grassroots conflicts so that they are resolved through dialogue at 
the lowest level and do not snowball into larger crises.  
 To provide conscious international presence by deploying international 
civilian peacekeepers in vulnerable areas to associate with partners from 
local civil society. 
 To offer protective accompaniment to individuals, groups or communities 
wedded to non-violent solutions but exposed to threats. 
 To provide neutral spaces and facilitation services to local peacemakers 
who attempt to resolve traditional (‘rido’) and non-traditional disputes 
carrying the potential of violence. 
 To facilitate mutual sharing, learning and training on nonviolent strategies 
with peacemakers and authorities dealing with the peace process. 
 To monitor violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, 
reporting them to relevant national and international agencies upon the 
consent of survivors.  
 To interposition international civilian peacekeepers along with local peace 
volunteers and ceasefire monitors to boost the sanctity of buffer zones and 
zones of peace.  
 
Nonviolent Peaceforce’s involvement in the peace process has gained a great 
deal of momentum since the initial entry of the organisation in May 2007. It is 
now part of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), a multinational force 
comprised of military personnel from Malaysia, Brunei, Japan and Libya, and 
other civilian representation from the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
and a local peacebuilding organisation - Mindanao People’s Caucus. The 
strong civilian component of the IMT allows Nonviolent Peaceforce to play a key 
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role in carrying out work under the Civilian Protection Component, which is 
tasked to ‘monitor, verify and report noncompliance by the Parties to their basic 
undertaking to protect civilians and civilian communities’ (NP, 2010; 5). 
 
This example illustrates coordination and complimentarity between military and 
civilian components of a peacekeeping operation, as well as a noteworthy 
attempt to incorporate a less militarised form of international presence to 
safeguard human rights and monitor issues of civilian protection. Although the 
results of the Mindanao case-study are yet to be seen, it can at least be argued 
that the IMT and its incorporation of a civilian component offers an indication of 
cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping.  
 
In addition to the practical examples in Mindanao and the development of the 
project from academics and practitioners, a further understanding of a possible 
future role of civilian peacekeeping has emerged in the policy community. In 
their submission to the UN’s New Horizons Project (referred to in Chapter 
three), the Center on International Cooperation (at New York University) 
examined alternatives to military peacekeeping. In this study, the authors found 
two possible avenues for further civilian involvement in peacekeeping, arguing 
that the Security Council should consider deploying civilian missions in the 
future. The first example is through civilian observers and inspectors - standing 
missions or routine inspections to be deployed in areas where ‘tensions take 
non-military forms’ such as systemic human rights abuses. Examples of this are 
mainly in OSCE114 missions and the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for 
                                                
114 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
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Human Rights (OHCHR). The second area is through ‘civilian observers with 
protection’. The authors found that the example of the OSCE’s Kosovo 
Verification mission, which was backed by a US-managed ‘over-the-horizon’ 
force, was a useful case where civilian observer were able to ‘provide the 
international community with real-time information on the situation on the 
ground’. Such deployments would be in conflict environments where conditions 
are more insecure. These two examples are important in recognising the impact 
of civilian peacekeeping on the ‘policy community’ in and around the UN 
Secretariat (Jones et al., 2009; 18).  
The UN in 2010: practical considerations 
 
Although there are positive offshoots, the impact of policy considerations in this 
venture must not be downplayed, particularly current issues that are preventing 
the UN from being more effective in its attempts to continue with effective 
peacekeeping operations. It is little secret that the UN’s peacekeeping 
architecture is overstretched. Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping 
Operations Alain Le Roy warned about the impact of overstretch on operations, 
stating in January 2009 that forces are ‘spread more widely than ever before 
with mandates that are more complex and robust than ever’ (UN, 2009n). This 
follows on from warnings given by his predecessor in the DPKO, Jean-Marie 
Guehenno, in July 2008. In numerous interviews given toward the end of his 
tenure, he stated that UN peacekeeping was at the ‘outer limits of 
peacekeeping’, and the UN was finding it difficult in finding troops and 
capacities for operations (BBC, 2008). 
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Gowan offers a substantial critique of current UN mechanisms to address 
conflict, and asserts that the UN is facing crisis in three distinct areas: a short-
term crisis in deploying missions effectively; a strategic crisis in its framework 
for deploying new missions; and a paradigmatic crisis which underpins much of 
the UN’s core assumptions. The short-term crisis links to fears over the UN 
overstretch, where the Security Council launched new operations in Timor-
Leste and Darfur, heavily reinforced the UNFIL operation in Lebanon, suffered 
setbacks in the MONUC operation in the DRC, and failed to find an exit strategy 
for the Kosovo operation (UNMIK). Such commitments and setbacks have 
stalled the development of a ‘strategic culture’ within the UN, and led the 
organisation to a state where it is ‘stumbling from short-term crisis to short-term 
crisis’ (Gowan, 2008; 459). Gowan cites the Darfur case-study as an important 
example to highlight the crisis the UN faces to effectively deploy operations. 
The size and make up of this mission was highly ambitious, leading the UN 
Secretary General to consider switching personnel from other missions to the 
new Darfur operation, running the risk of ‘cannibalizing’ existing deployments. 
Gowan notes that somewhat ironically, the major problems did not come from 
the impact force generation, as the major problem was in fact deploying any 
soldiers at all. Much of this is due to the Sudanese government following a 
policy of ‘obstructionism’ against the force, abusing the need for consent from 
the host government, and demanding that the force be staffed only by African 
troops, even for positions where Africans were not available (Gowan, 2008; 
461). Gowan argues: 
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Cumulatively, these problems indicate that the decisive impact of the 
Darfur crisis has not been to destroy the UN’s peacekeeping framework 
as a whole, but to show how a determined government could use 
political demands to block its operations… Darfur has been particularly 
damaging for the UN because it has not fulfilled its mandate in spite of a 
high level of international support for its activities. 
(Gowan, 2008; 461) 
 
Finally, Gowan outlines a deeper difficulty for the UN system - a paradigmatic 
crisis, where some of the fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping are 
brought into question. The Darfur operation was not the only one which 
questioned the idea of consent, with other operations (Burundi, Ethiopia-Eritrea, 
Afghanistan) either being asked to withdraw from the country or finding 
themselves in opposition to the host government. Gowan notes that in more 
cases, leaders in Africa and Afghanistan appeared to be ‘prioritizing their 
political autonomy over the benefits of an integrated UN plan’ (Gowan, 2008; 
463). From this, Gowan asserts that key assertions of UN peacebuilding 
strategies – based on liberal underpinnings – were being questioned by national 
governments, which in the UN’s eyes, the organisation was helping. Most 
disturbingly, in Gowan’s opinion, was the operation in the DRC, which has 
continually been beset by difficulty. One such difficulty is a government which: 
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…seemed less interested in finishing the transition from war to peace in 
2007 than in using force against its opponents in the east of the country, 
dragging a wary UN along with it  
(Gowan, 2008; 463) 
 
Gowan finally notes the alarm that was raised when the government announced 
a US$9.25 billion project with the Chinese government to swap mineral 
resources for infrastructure projects, and links this to the UN’s declared 
principles on peacebuilding: 
 
If these were meant to align security and economic assistance, but the 
model and ability to implement it was now in question, how could it carry 
any political credibility? 
(Gowan, 2008; 464) 
 
In addition to this crisis is the search for agreement from a potentially divisive 
Security Council. This is a concern for the UN, as much of its most recent 
literature notes the reliance on unanimity within the Security Council, in its 
strategic direction and production of clear and achievable mandates. Such 
policy considerations need to be clearly kept in mind when negotiating the 
complexities of strengthening UN capacities. The UN is one of the few bodies, if 
not the only body that carries a degree of international legitimacy. However, it is 
an organisation that is beset by difficulties.  
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Such a warning about the UN’s capacity does not negate its importance to 
pursue a cosmopolitan agenda. There is also no end of literature which deals 
with forms of reform to the UN, and its mechanisms to deal with conflict. 
Cosmopolitan scholars link any development in the UN peacekeeping 
structures to the development of the UN’s larger democratic structures, such as 
the Security Council (Held, 1995; 279, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 
153). Others see a very clear pathway to the UN assuming control of a standing 
force. Childers argues that the parameters of a UN force are already clear. His 
case for the formation of such a force follows these arguments: 
 
If it were to be made accountable to the General Assembly, the 
repository of democratic legitimacy of the United Nations, it would 
perhaps be an admirable goal. If access to this standing army, or even to 
its supplies and cargo planes and medical-evacuation units, was made 
available to the regional organizations functioning in Africa, in Asia, in the 
Middle East, in Latin America; or if representatives of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, the Group of 77, were somehow institutionalized within its 
leadership; or if the links and accountability to the humanitarian and 
economic development providers within the UN system and the NGOs 
outside it could somehow be assured – then and only then, would such a 
plan bode well for dealing with the root causes, economic and social, of 
the world’s unrest. 
(Childers, 1994; 173) 
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Linking this to a more democratised UN, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 
contend that widening the representation on the Security Council is a major 
consideration in order to pursue a cosmopolitan peacekeeping force.  
 
Thus, it is of critical importance that cosmopolitan peacekeeping is linked to 
major reforms in the UN. If reform is achieved, a cosmopolitan peacekeeping 
force could be a ‘force for good’, and not a new manifestation of the powerful 
creating control mechanisms to ensure that a status quo exists in the 
international order  
Conclusions 
 
Through investigating the role of conflict resolution in military training for 
peacekeeping, this chapter outlines three important conclusions: 
 
1) There is evidence to suggest that conflict resolution theory and practice 
is incorporated into training programmes for military peacekeepers. This 
has developed significantly since 1994.   
2) Training in non-traditional military skills contributes to the roles and 
responsibilities of military peacekeepers 
3) There exists a strong suggestion - in both the literature and through 
fieldwork examples - that there is evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan 
conception of peacekeeping. 
 
The chapter analyses these conclusions, and in doing so, offers a valuable 
contribution to the conflict resolution literature.  
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Importantly, this chapter has shown that there is a convergence between 
military practitioners, conflict resolution scholars, and cosmopolitan scholars 
over the future requirements for military peacekeepers. Through an analysis of 
the literature and training observations, this thesis suggests that if current 
trends continue the ‘soldier diplomat’ of the future will: be trained in conflict 
resolution techniques akin to Fetherston’s contact skills; possess the 
capabilities to make considered judgements on ‘blurred lines’ such as rules of 
engagement and the complex nature of peacebuilding activity; and, be 
deployed in operations where protection of civilians will play a critical role. 
However, the missing part of the equation is exactly who that soldier will 
represent. In a fully cosmopolitan outlook, he or she will represent a standing 
UN force. In a more pragmatic outlook, the soldier diplomat will be representing 
a state with cosmopolitan values. This thesis suggests that although current 
capacities are still state-centric, there is cause for cosmopolitans to be 
optimistic. The operationalisation of cosmopolitan principles is not an idea 
which has little grounding in reality: quite the opposite. The development of 
peacebuilding practice in the UN, the importance attached to protection of 
civilians, the integration of civil-military cooperation into military practice, and 
the incorporation of ‘soft’ power roles in military training all suggest an evolution 
towards cosmopolitan conceptions of peacekeeping operations.  
 
Turning to the conflict resolution literature, this chapter highlights where there 
have been developments in training since Fetherston’s 1994 thesis, which 
espoused the requirement for contact skills in training programmes. This has 
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been predominantly through the observed training programmes at RMAS, 
UNTSI and through the UN CPTMs, as well as through the increased attention 
that conflict resolution scholars have paid to military peacekeeping (particularly 
at University of Bradford’s Department of Peace Studies). Both these areas 
have been thoroughly surveyed throughout this thesis. The chapter also 
highlights two new areas of development: the spread of peacekeeping training 
institutions (such as UNTSI), and the increasing value of Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) in spreading training programmes. It is the 
view of this thesis that these areas will grow and will be mutually reinforcing. 
The expanding potential of ICT will allow further collaboration between training 
institutions, and this in turn will strengthen bonds between them, allowing for 
further dissemination of good practice. Both areas also share a common theme 
insofar as they provide excellent locations to develop new forms of training 
practice, and experiment in learning practice. It is in these spaces where ideas 
drawn from the conflict resolution field can have a dramatic impact. Again, this 
offers a cause to be optimistic, as the conflict resolution field will continue to 
offer new and innovative ways to understand and meet the challenges posed by 
contemporary peacekeeping deployments. 
 
The following section concludes the thesis by drawing on the predominant 
themes of the project, as well as offering future avenues for research.  
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Future research agendas 
 
This thesis provides a significant contribution to the field of conflict resolution 
research. It determines where there are further manifestations between the 
fields of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping, by using examples of 
training theory and practice to understand how conflict resolution skills are 
being imparted to soldiers preparing for deployment. At the same time, the 
thesis demonstrates the emergence of cosmopolitan peacekeeping, with 
training programmes highlighting the need to understand issues pertaining to 
the protection of civilians and the importance of understanding the 
peacebuilding functions of an operation.  
 
The research project has further achieved the aims set out in the introduction. 
These are explored in greater depth in the discussion chapter, but it is worth 
comparing the research aims to the findings presented. This is done in table 
7.1: 
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Table 7.1: Comparison between research aims and findings 
 
Research Question Finding 
 
In what ways does military 
peacekeeping training show 
evidence of conflict resolution 
theory and practice? 
(In what direction has training for 
military peacekeeping 
developed since 1994?) 
 
There is evidence to suggest that 
conflict resolution theory and 
practice is incorporated into 
training programmes for military 
peacekeepers. This has 
developed significantly since 1994 
 
 
In light of the new roles and 
responsibilities placed on 
military peacekeepers, is there 
evidence that training in non-
traditional military skills assists 
military peacekeepers adapt to 
the changing nature of 
deployment zones? 
 
There exists sufficient evidence to 
suggest that training in non-
traditional military skills assists 
military peacekeepers in adapting 
to new roles and responsibilities 
encountered in deployment zones 
 
 
 
Does this indicate evidence of a 
cosmopolitan conception of 
peacekeeping? 
(Can we find evidence - both 
practically and in the 
peacekeeping literature - of the 
emergence of a different type of 
soldier more aligned with 
cosmopolitan ideals?) 
 
There exists a strong suggestion - 
in both the literature and through 
fieldwork examples - that there is 
evidence of an emerging 
cosmopolitan conception of 
peacekeeping 
 
 
 
 
The research project further adds to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, the 
thesis contributes to the conflict resolution literature by surveying where conflict 
resolution scholars have dealt with the issue of military peacekeeping. Starting 
with Galtung’s seminal study of Norwegian peacekeepers stationed in the 
Middle East in 1976, the thesis charted not only how military peacekeeping has 
been conceptualised, but also where academic scholarship has sought to 
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influence this once highly militarised activity. The thesis further adds to the 
literature by offering an account of the ‘Bradford model’ of conflict resolution 
research, cultivated at the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of 
Bradford. This allows the thesis to chart how the two fields have developed, and 
place this particular thesis within that research tradition. Through this survey, 
the thesis records the first steps made in the ‘Bradford model’ towards 
promoting cosmopolitan conceptions of peacekeeping and international conflict 
resolution (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005, Curran and Woodhouse, 
2007). Although this is a new area of research, it offers a logical area in which 
to place this thesis.  
 
As well as this survey, individual chapters link thematic areas to wider 
conceptions of conflict resolution. Civil-military cooperation has been linked to 
Lederach’s comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, which targets all levels 
of the society, from the political leaders at the top, through the local leaders in 
the middle, down to the local grassroots and combatants at the bottom. At the 
‘bottom’, civil-military cooperation strategies are understood as having the 
potential to facilitate for Conflict transformation, which aims to ‘actively envision, 
include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a 
given setting’ (Lederach, 1995; 213). Lederach’s approaches to elicitive forms 
of training are also examined in the context of military training for peacekeeping 
operations, as the thesis charts a development in how peacekeepers are 
trained (Lederach, 1996; 56-58). Moreover, an amended version of Fisher, Ury 
and Patton’s approach to understanding negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991) is 
employed as a lens to examine a negotiation scenario observed at the 
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Broadsword exercise (Goodwin, 2005), and  a consideration of the prisoners 
dilemma is used to explain the importance of negotiation in longer-term 
peacebuilding (Hopmann, 1996, Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 17).  
 
This thesis further contributes to the conflict resolution field through charting the 
development of negotiation training in the UK military, as well as the importance 
of understanding negotiation at the tactical level - below the more formal areas 
of civil-military cooperation. Accordingly, this allows the thesis to further 
examine the peacekeeping literature - in this case, the journal International 
Peacekeeping - to determine where negotiation experiences set at the tactical 
level have been discussed. From this, it was concluded that the vast number of 
negotiation experiences at the tactical level covered in the literature are 
generally of an ad hoc nature. Thus, the thesis adds to the literature dealing 
with negotiation by examining training programmes and exercises which deal 
specifically with this important aspect of contemporary peacekeeping 
deployments.  
 
Further to the contribution to the conflict resolution field, this thesis has 
contributed to the emergent field of cosmopolitan conflict resolution. In the first 
chapter, the thesis used Woodhouse and Ramsbotham’s framework. This shall 
be looked at again in Box 7.1: 
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Box 7.1:  Conflict Levels and Focal Points in the Development of 
Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping 
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 143) 
 
Conflict Levels and Focal Points in the Development of Peacekeeping 
 
(1) Global: (Rapid Reaction Emergency Forces/Services) 
 
 
 
International 
SHIRBRIG (limited to Chapter 6 operations) 
UN Standby Arrangements System 
Sixteen extant missions (Jan 2004) 
 
 
 
(2) Regional: Regional Peacekeeping Coalitions (EU, AU, NATO) 
 
(3) Sub-regional: ECOMOG and other African sub-regions 
 
(4)National: Lead Nations (UK in Sierra Leone; Australia in East Timor; France in Ivory Coast) 
 
 
 
(5)Conflict party/Conflict locale 
 
CIMIC and Community Liaison and Mediation Programmes:   
Cross community peacebuilding and post conflict reconstruction programmes 
 
Key: Arrows show desired direction of capacity building and empowerment needed for 
the development of cosmopolitan peacekeeping 
 
 
 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of, and further enhances, 
cosmopolitan capacities at level five of this matrix. Throughout the thesis, there 
is a considered analysis of the military aspects of this area, In particular, how 
training has been configured to facilitate the expansion of civil-military 
cooperation strategies, the development of training with regard to increasing 
soldiers’ ability to liaise with the host community, and the increased 
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understanding of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction programmes 
(and the role of the military within this wider picture).  
 
As well as contributing to research at the lower levels, this thesis contributes to 
the requirement for further research toward the top levels of this matrix. 
Through examining the new demands on peacekeepers, and how militaries are 
learning to cope with such new demands, this thesis (in its discussion chapter) 
outlines an emerging cosmopolitan ethic amongst the training regimes in the 
observed militaries, informing wider debates about cosmopolitan forms of 
peacekeeping. Firstly, at the national level, the thesis offered a brief 
examination of a state which has highly developed training programmes, but is 
presently lacking a cosmopolitan approach (the United Kingdom), and a state 
which, although relatively small in size and deployment, has a cosmopolitan 
ethic running through its military institutions (Ireland). 
 
At the very top level, the thesis contributes to the cosmopolitan literature by 
offering a strong account of current UN developments, and how they link to 
cosmopolitan conceptions of conflict resolution. As referred to throughout this 
thesis, the UN is widely seen as the vehicle to move global cosmopolitan 
objectives forward in a legitimate manner. The thesis assessed this aspect of 
the UN, through an examination of Rubenstein’s root metaphors of the UN, as a 
symbol of world order ‘not dominated by national interests’, where the ‘the weak 
are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and conflicts settled 
peacefully’. According to Rubenstein, peacekeeping operations once 
represented a ‘military without weapons in the service of peace’ to reinforce an 
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image of an international community ‘acting in a neutral, consensual manner to 
sustain a stable world economy’ (Rubinstein, 2005; 356-357). Noting that 
Rubenstein now questions these root metaphors in the light of UN activities 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the thesis argues that there is enough 
evidence to suggest that such root metaphors still exist, and in turn, the UN 
continues to be a legitimate vehicle for the development of cosmopolitan 
principles. Policies which ask military peacekeepers to be prepared use force to 
protect the most vulnerable civilians within a conflict zone, as well as cross 
cutting mandates which not only see the civilian population as vulnerable, but 
also as valuable peacebuilders in their own right.  
 
It is at this juncture where this concluding chapter will examine possible areas 
for future research.  
Future research agendas: 
 
The most obvious area for future research is to understand the impact of 
training on military peacekeepers. Understanding the impact of conflict 
resolution training of military peacekeepers will continue to be of critical 
importance. A number of studies from academic and policy fields have sought 
to add to the considerable anecdotal evidence about the effectiveness (or 
ineffectiveness) of peacekeepers in contributing to positive peace in a conflict 
zone, yet very few have been able to chart the impact of negotiation training in 
peacekeeping environments. A considerable study of a peacekeeping operation 
is thus required. Again, examples exist: Galtung’s study of UNIFIL contingents 
in 1976 (Galtung, 1976b) offers a prime example, as does Wall and Druckman’s 
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2003 research on mediation in operations  (Wall and Druckman, 2003). Such an 
examination may require an extended period of time with a peacekeeping 
contingent. 
 
At the time of writing, the UN is without any official standing capacity. Although 
the failure of the SHIRBRIG model to provide a long-standing solution to rapid 
deployment is disheartening, it does not mean that the debate about 
strengthening UN capacities is over. In fact, it leaves opportunities to discuss 
where the UN can feasibly develop new rapid reaction capacity. In the previous 
chapter, this thesis examined calls and proposals for a standing UN capacity. In 
assessing these options, the chapter concluded that a contributing factor to the 
demise of the SHIRBRIG initiative was that it was an initiative of a number of 
member states. In the end, according to the official lessons learned reports, it 
was not in the interests of enough of those states to keep the initiative alive. As 
a result of this, this thesis proposes that space exists for more radical solutions 
based on developing cosmopolitan capacities for international peacekeeping 
operations. Questions will remain over the long-term viability of relying on 
nation states to ‘pull together’ to create standing capacities: governments and 
priorities can change very quickly. Therefore, in looking toward more radical 
conceptions of peace, we return to Pugh’s argument in the first chapter that 
peace support operations will be likely to be increasingly subtle and flexible in 
responding to crises, providing expert teams similar to disaster relief specialists, 
providing preventative action, economic aid and civilian protection. Importantly 
for cosmopolitans, Pugh contends that this may only happen if such forces are 
released from the ‘state-centric control system’, making them ‘answerable to a 
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more transparent, democratic and accountable institutional arrangement’. 
Moreover, Pugh finds that such a scheme would be based on a permanent 
military volunteer force ‘recruited directly among individuals predisposed to 
cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values’ (Pugh, 2004; 53). This assertion is 
where Woodhouse and Ramsbotham take their starting point, and further 
reinforces existing understandings of cosmopolitan forms of conflict 
management (Elliot, 2004, Held, 1995, Kaldor, 2001). 
 
How would a continuation of this research fit into this more radical conception of 
future peacekeeping? In outlining the training needs currently placed on 
soldiers in peacekeeping operations, this thesis has outlined the fundamental 
importance of training related to civil-military cooperation and wider 
peacekeeping, training of how to more effectively relate with the host civilian 
population, and the importance of negotiation skills for peacekeepers. Further 
research into how to operationalise cosmopolitan values, aligned with conflict 
resolution theory would be of value here.  
 
One route to examining this is through collating the wide and varied number of 
training regimes which exist for military peacekeepers. Training exists at sub-
national, national, sub-regional, regional, and international levels. It involves a 
multitude of actors from training centres, academic institutions, militaries, 
private contractors, and non-governmental organisations. This is also not to 
mention training for soldiers once they are deployed. Although this thesis has 
succeeded in offering a substantial examination of training for peacekeeping 
operations, it analyses a relatively limited number of training initiatives. There is 
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thus certainly scope for further research into the different forms of training 
offered. Importantly this should not just be a ‘check list’ of training institutions 
and courses on offer: there is much more scope than that, particularly with 
regard to the links with conflict resolution. This thesis found that in order for 
peacekeepers to comprehend the ‘grey areas’ of deployment, greater autonomy 
is needed in decision making. In turn, this impacts training programmes, with a 
number of them employing what Lederach termed as elicitive forms of training. 
This is an area that can be further examined in future study. It is also worth 
studying the cultural aspects of such training programmes. Each training 
institution has a different approach to how they perceive peacekeeping 
operations. In UNTSI, for example, trainers remarked about ‘Irish solutions to 
Irish problems’. Using a more ethnographic approach to understanding training, 
in order to grasp the prevailing military cultures from the troop contributors 
would be of use. This leads to investigating whether certain programmes instil a 
‘cosmopolitan ethic’ into training programmes, at the levels outlined above. 
Such a study may be able to uncover whether there are any discernable 
patterns in the development of cosmopolitan ethics in training.   
 
Such research can further align itself with the cosmopolitan desire for a 
standing UN force. Through charting where cosmopolitan ethics lie in training 
on a much wider level, a training programme can be developed for military 
peacekeepers who would enter into such a standing force. This thesis has 
already deciphered a number of areas where there are cosmopolitan values 
embodied in training practice (whether this is intended or not). Furthermore, 
within the Centre for Conflict Resolution, a considerable amount of knowledge 
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and practical experience exists. This valuable resource (already made 
operational through the e-learning course outlined in the previous chapter) can 
be engaged with further to create a solid training programme for a standing UN 
capacity based on cosmopolitan values. 
 
As cosmopolitan authors have stated, any attempt of a standing UN capacity 
should have at its heart, a commitment to aligning the peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding aspects of an operation, offering alternative forms of pluralistic 
democracy, and not offering a purely securitised peace as there is a danger of 
replicating existing power structures. Returning to Rubenstein’s root metaphors, 
an ability to provide space to those groups who have been most marginalised 
through a period of prolonged violence is essential if the UN is to remain a 
legitimate enterprise for international conflict resolution. Ensuring military 
peacekeepers understand their role within such a framework is of crucial 
importance, as these peacekeepers are at the critical interface where negative 
peace meets positive peacebuilding projects. If peacekeepers are to act ‘less 
like a conflict manager and more like a midwife at the birth of a new society’ 
(Ryan, 2000; 40), then they must be trained to encounter the complex 
challenges that this role inevitably brings. It is therefore encouraging to chart 
the continued relevance of conflict resolution approaches on the field of military 
peacekeeping.  
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Annex 1: UN CPTM On Sexual Abuse and Exploitation 
 
 
 
 513 
 514 
 515 
 516 
 
 
 517 
Annex 2 - list of IAPTC member states 
 
Country  Centre's Name 
Argentina 
Training Centre for Foreign Missions (CENCAMEX) 
Austria 
The Austrian International Operations Command/Centre for 
Operations  
Preparation or International Peace Support Command(AIPSC) 
Austria 
Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution 
(ASPR) 
Bolivia Peacekeeping Centre and Consulting (PKC&C) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) 
Brazil CEPAEB 
Bulgaria 
Gueorgui S. Rakovski National Defence And Staff College 
Peacekeeping Training Centre 
Canada 
The Canadian Forces Centre for Excellence for Peace Support 
Operations 
Chile UNITAR-POCI 
China Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence 
China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Centre 
Cote d'Ivoire Peacekeeping School of Zambakro 
Croatia International Military Operations Traning Centre (IMOC) 
Czech Republic Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre 
Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea PKO Dept, National Defence College 
Denmark Danish Army Logistics School 
Denmark Danish International Logistics Centre 
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Ecuador Peacekeeping Operations Departments (Joint Operations) 
El Salvador Agregado de Defensa en Chile 
Estonia Estonian Peace Operations Centre 
European Union Military Staff 
Fiji Police Academy 
Fiji Peacekeeping Force Training Group 
Finland  Crisis Management Centre 
Finland Finnish Defence Forces International Centre  
France Gendarmerie National International Training Centre 
Germany UN Training Centre 
Germany 
Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Ge Armed Forces 
Command & Staff College) 
Germany Centre for Intersectional Peace Operations 
Germany Police Academy, Wertheirrmain 
Greece Hellenic Multinational PSOs Training Centre 
Hungary Defence HQ Peace Support Training Centre 
Hungary 
Ministry of Defence, Joint Staff, Operational Directorate, 
Peacekeeping and Crisis 
Hungary Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy 
Indonesia Department of Defence and Security Peacekeeping Operations 
Indonesia  Indonesia Peacekeeping Centre 
Ireland UN Training School (UNTSI) 
Israel IDF Liaison and Foreign Relations Division 
Italy United Nations Staff College 
Italy 
Sant' Anna School of University Studies & Doctoral Research 
Via Carducci 
Ivory Coast Peacekeeping Training Centre 
Jamaica Jamaica Defence Force HQ 
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy 
Jordan Jordan Armed Forces Peacekeeping Academy 
Kenya Kenya Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) 
Lebanon Lebanese Army HQ - Directorate of Training 
Lithuania 
Peacekeeping Training Branch/ General A. Ramanauskas 
Combat Training Centre 
Malawi Peacekeeping Training Centre 
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Malaysia Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre  
Malta Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies 
Mongolia Peacekeeping Operation Office 
Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
NATO NATO HQ, SHAPE, CIMIC Group North 
Nepal Royal Nepal Army Peacekeeping Training Centre 
New Zealand New Zealand Defence Force 
Nigeria National War College  
Nigeria Legion Centre for International Affairs (LECIA) 
Northern Ireland UN Training Advisory Team 
Norway Norwegian Armed Forces Peacekepeing Training Centre 
Norway Norwegian Institute for International Affairs 
Pakistan Peacekeeping Training Programme and School 
Paraguay 
Centro de Institutos Militares de Operaciones Especiales 
(CIMOE) 
Peru Joint Command of the Army Forces 
Phillipines AFP Peacekeeping Operations Centre 
Poland National Defence University 
Poland Military Training Centre for PSOs 
Portugal National Republican Guard Practical School 
Republic of Korea The Special Warfare Training Group 
Republic of Moldova Training Centre for Peacekeeping Missions 
Romania PfP Regional Training Centre 
Russia Police Peacekeeping Training Centre 
Russia Peacekeeping Military Training Centre 
Senegal Senegal Peacekeeping Training Headquarters 
Singapore SAF Peacekeeping Office 
Slovakia UN Training Centre 
South Africa Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) 
South Africa Institute for Defence Policy 
Spain Coordination and International Cooperation Unit 
Swaziland Umbufto Swaziland Defence Force 
Sweden Swedish Police Peace Support Operations 
Sweden International Peacekeeping Training Centre 
Switzerland Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) 
Switzerland 
Swiss Armed Forces International Command Training Centre 
(SWISSINT) 
Thailand Peace Operations Centre 
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The Netherlands Netherlands School for Peace Operations 
The Netherlands Chief Training Education, CIMIC Group North, NATO 
The Netherlands Royal Netherlands Army 
Turkey PfP Training Centre 
Ukraine Peacekeeping Veterans Association 
Ukraine Yavoriv PSO and Security Training Centre 
Ukraine PfP Coordination Centre 
United Kingdom Operation Training Advisory Group (OPTAG) 
United Nations UNHCR 
United Nations OCHA 
United States Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) 
United States Inter American Defence College 
United States Potomacs Strategies International 
United States JFDC- Joint Forces Staff College 
United States 
Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Assistance  
United States Global Peace Operations Initiative  
Uruguay Peacekeeping National Sysytem (SINOMAP), Uruguayan Army 
Uruguay Uruguay Peacekeeping Operations School 
Zambia Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies  
Zimbabwe SADC Regional Peacekepeing Training Centre 
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